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UNBEKNOWNST TO ALL DURING THE 1992 SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEEDING, THE DECEDENT’S BROTHER WAS STILL ALIVE; DECEDENT’S NEPHEW TOOK POSSESSION OF DECEDENT’S PROPERTY, A THREE-STORY BUILDING, IN 1993; THE NEPHEW FIRST BECAME AWARE OF DECEDENT’S BROTHER’S INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN 2019; THE COURT OF APPEALS DETERMINED THE NEPHEW ACQUIRED THE PROPERTY BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a dissenting opinion, determined respondent (Mr. Golobe), who “inherited” the building after his aunt (Dorothy) died, was entitled to the building through adverse possession after it became known that Dorothy’s brother, Yale, was still alive. During the Surrogate’s Court proceeding a family friend testified that Yale  predeceased Dorothy by six or seven years:

Mr. Golobe. Mr. Golobe took possession of the Premises in October 1992 and has maintained possession since then. He has negotiated leases, collected and retained rent, paid property taxes, executed a construction mortgage, and made substantial renovations to the Premises. Those renovations include a complete structural support overhaul, an interior gut renovation, the replacement of the front entrance and door, the replacement of the second and third floor windows, and the replacement of the roof.

Yale actually died the year after Dorothy, in 1993. His estate passed to his wife Helen, then to Helen’s sister Beatrice, then to Beatrice’s husband Emil Kraus. Upon Mr. Kraus’s death, his estate passed to the Trust, the defendant-appellant in this case. * * *

The question—whether a cotenant may adversely possess property when neither cotenant is aware of the existence of the co-tenancy—is an issue of first impression in New York. We hold that a cotenant may obtain full ownership of jointly owned property even when neither party is aware of the other cotenant’s interest. Mr. Golobe did so.

“To establish a claim of adverse possession, the occupation of the property must be (1) hostile and under a claim of right (i.e., a reasonable basis for the belief that the subject property belongs to a particular party), (2) actual, (3) open and notorious, (4) exclusive, and (5) continuous for the statutory period (at least 10 years)” … . The parties agree that Mr. Golobe actually, exclusively and continuously occupied the Premises for over 20 years, beginning in October 1992. We must determine whether Mr. Golobe’s possession was hostile, under a claim of right, and open and notorious. It was all three. Golobe v Mielnicki, 2025 NY Slip Op 01670, CtApp 3-20-25

Practice Point: In a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals determined a cotenant may adversely possess property even when neither cotenant is aware of the existence of the co-tenancy.

 

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TO SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FRAUD EXCEPTION TO THE FOUR-YEAR LOOKBACK FOR A “FRAUDULENT SCHEME TO INFLATE RENTS” ACTION, THE PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ALLEGE RELIANCE ON A FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATION; IT IS ENOUGH TO ALLEGE SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF FRAUD OR A COLORABLE CLAIM OF FRAUD (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing (modifying) the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined that to sufficiently allege the applicability of the fraud exception to the four-year statute of limitations (“lookback” period) in a “fraudulent scheme to inflate rents” action, a plaintiff need not allege satisfaction of each element of common-law fraud (including reliance), rather the plaintiff need only allege “sufficient indicia” of fraud:

… [T]he fraud exception serves a far different purpose than an allegation of common law fraud. The fraud exception, applicable only to an overcharge claim, simply allows for review of the rental history outside the four-year lookback period and then … “solely to ascertain whether fraud occurred—not to furnish evidence for calculation of the base date rent or permit recovery for years of overcharges barred by the statute of limitations” … . The exception operates to protect not only current tenants, who may or may not have relied on a fraudulent representation, but future tenants and the overall rent regulatory system. Requiring that a tenant show reliance on a landlord’s fraudulent representation would exempt an “unscrupulous landlord in collusion with a tenant” from the consequences of engaging in a scheme to evade the law’s protection … . Given the narrow purpose and scope of the fraud exception, there is no basis for imposing the pleading requirements of a common law fraud claim. Instead, we require plaintiffs to put forth “sufficient indicia of fraud” or a “colorable claim” of a fraudulent scheme but do not impose a burden to establish each element of a common law fraud claim.

… [T]o invoke the fraud exception, a plaintiff must allege sufficient indicia of fraud, or a colorable claim of a fraudulent scheme to evade the protections of the rent stabilization laws, to withstand a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. Such allegations must include more than an assertion that a tenant was overcharged—a mere allegation of a high rent increase is insufficient for the fraud exception to apply … We address only the reliance issue here. On remittal the Appellate Division should apply our established standard—assessing whether plaintiffs’ complaint alleges sufficient indicia of fraud or a colorable claim of a fraudulent scheme “to remove tenants’ apartment from the protections of rent stabilization” … . Burrows v 75-25 153rd St., LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 01669, CtApp 3-20-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into what the complaint must allege to invoke the fraud exception to the four-year lookback period for a “fraudulent scheme to inflate rents” action.

 

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NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW 11, WHICH ALLOWS NON-CITIZENS TO VOTE, VIOLATES THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined New York City Local Law 11, which allowed non-citizens to vote, violates the New York Constitution:

Local Law 11 allows “municipal voters” to vote in New York City elections for the offices of Mayor, Public Advocate, Comptroller, Borough President and City Council Member (New York City Charter §§ 1057-aa, 1057-bb). The law defines a municipal voter as “a person who is not a United States citizen on the date of the election on which he or she is voting,” and who: (1) “is either a lawful permanent resident or authorized to work in the United States”; (2) “is a resident of New York city and will have been such a resident for 30 consecutive days or longer by the date of such election”; and (3) “meets all qualifications for registering or preregistering to vote under the election law, except for possessing United States citizenship, and who has registered or preregistered to vote with the board of elections in the city of New York under this chapter” … . * * *

Whatever the future may bring, the New York Constitution as it stands today draws a firm line restricting voting to citizens. Fossella v Adams, 2025 NY Slip Op 01668, CtApp 3-20-25

Practice Point: The NYS Constitution restricts the right to vote to citizens.

 

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IN A FACT-SPECIFIC OPINION, THE COURT OF APPEALS, REVERSING THE APPELLATE DIVISION, DETERMINED THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE UNIVERSITY’S RULING THAT PETITIONER-STUDENT VIOLATED THE CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT BY ENGAGING IN UNWANTED SEXUAL ACTIVITY (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannatara, in a fact-specific analysis, determined the university’s ruling that petitioner, P.C., a university student, violated the Code of Student Responsibility by engaging in unwelcome sexual activity with another student, S.G., was supported by the evidence:

… [S]ubstantial evidence supports the determination that P.C. violated the Code of Student Responsibility by engaging in unwanted sexual activity with S.G. despite her physical resistance and loss of consciousness during separate encounters. Although some aspects of the sexual encounters may have been consensual, there is ample evidence that other aspects were not. S.G.’s unrebutted testimony was deemed credible and she provided consistent evidence, both in her written statement for the investigator and in her hearing testimony, that she tried unsuccessfully to physically remove P.C.’s hands from her neck during an encounter in the woods. Under the Code of Student Responsibility, her physical resistance is inconsistent with affirmative consent.

Similarly, with respect to the allegation that P.C. had sex with S.G. in the car without her affirmative consent, S.G. consistently maintained that she lost consciousness, woke up while P.C. was still having sex with her, and that P.C. then told her she had only been “out” for a moment. Under the Code, sexual activity must stop when a person is incapacitated by lack of consciousness or being asleep. Moreover, P.C.’s own text messages acknowledge the sexual contact and, to some degree, evince a consciousness of guilt.

The evidence adduced depicting unwelcome sexual conduct by P.C. constitutes substantial evidence supporting all three charges. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Appellate Division majority improperly reweighed the evidence by relying on S.G.’s statements concerning consensual conduct that transpired earlier in the evening, to the exclusion of her testimony regarding the contact to which she did not consent, and disregarded the conclusion that P.C.’s text messages reflected a consciousness of guilt. Matter of P.C. v Stony Brook Univ., 2025 NY Slip Op 01566, CtApp 3-18-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for some insight into the evidence which is sufficient to support a university’s ruling that a student should be suspended for violating the Code of Student Responsibility by engaging in unwanted sexual activity.

 

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WHERE THERE IS A FACTUAL DISPUTE ON A MATERIAL ISSUE WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE COURT CAN DECIDE A LEGAL ISSUE, THE FACTUAL DISPUTE MUST BE RESOLVED IN A HEARING BEFORE THE COURT CAN DECIDE THE LEGAL ISSUE; WHETHER THE RECORD GIVES RISE TO A FACTUAL DISPUTE ON A MATERIAL ISSUE IS A QUESTION OF LAW (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined a factual dispute about whether an attorney (Santamarina) validly waived personal jurisdiction on behalf of defendant Koukis required a hearing:

Supreme Court decided Mr. Koukis’s motion without a factual hearing, holding that Mr. Santamarina lacked authority to act on Mr. Koukis’s behalf and vacating his waiver of personal jurisdiction and service defenses. But Supreme Court concluded that personal jurisdiction existed over Mr. Koukis pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (2). It therefore set the matter down for a traverse hearing to determine if service on Mr. Koukis of the summons and complaint was proper.

Before the traverse hearing occurred, the Appellate Division modified the order of Supreme Court by vacating the default judgment and granting Mr. Koukis’s motion to dismiss based upon a lack of jurisdiction. The Appellate Division held that “there was no basis to conclude that Koukis authorized Santamarina to appear and waive all jurisdictional defenses on his behalf” … . Additionally, the majority departed from Supreme Court in its analysis of CPLR 302 (a) (2), concluding that the court did not have personal jurisdiction and dismissing the complaint in its entirety … . Two Justices partially dissented on the ground that Supreme Court should have held a hearing to determine whether Mr. Santamarina had the authority to represent Mr. Koukis … . We now reverse on the basis that there is a material factual dispute as to whether Mr. Koukis authorized or ratified the waiver of personal jurisdiction

[Plaintiff] was entitled to a factual hearing to determine whether Mr. Santamarina validly appeared on Mr. Koukis’s behalf and waived personal jurisdiction. Where the record shows a “factual dispute on a material point which must be resolved before the court can decide the legal issue,” the court may not grant the motion without first holding a hearing (… see … CPLR 2218). Whether the record gives rise to such a factual dispute is a question of law … .Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP v Koukis, 2025 NY Slip Op 01565, CtApp 3-18-25

Practice Point: Here there was a factual dispute on a material issue which had to be decided before the related legal question could be answered. Therefore a hearing was required to resolve the factual issue before the court addressed the legal issue. Whether a factual dispute on a material issue exists raises a question of law.

 

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THE INFORMATION IN THE CHILD-VICTIMS-ACT CLAIM WAS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO ALLOW THE STATE TO INVESTIGATE THE ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE BETWEEN 1986 AND 1990; CLAIM DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan,, determined the Child Victims Act claim did not provide sufficient information to allow the State to investigate the allegations of sexual abuse between 1986 and 1990:

… [W]e conclude that Wright’s [claimant’s] claim lacks the specificity section [Court of Claims Act] 11 (b) requires. Because the allegations are too spare to enable the State promptly to investigate and ascertain the existence and extent of its liability, the claim suffers a jurisdictional defect and therefore must be dismissed.

The claim lacks critical information about the abusers. It alleges that the perpetrators included teachers, coaches, counselors, and perhaps other employees of the State, but it does not explain whether those employees were Wright’s teachers, coaches, and counselors, or why, as a child, he was in their company multiple times between 1986 and 1990. The claim also alleges that members of the public were responsible for some of the abuse he suffered, but it does not explain why Wright came into contact with those persons as a child, the context in which adult supervision of any particular activity allegedly should have been provided, or the extent to which the State bore responsibility for Wright’s contact with the abusers. Nor does the claim adequately allege what repeatedly brought Wright to The Egg [a State performing arts center] over a four-year period in the late 1980s, or why, once on the premises, he frequently engaged with both members of the public and State employees.

In the absence of such information, the State cannot promptly investigate the claim and determine its liability under Wright’s theories of negligence. … The State is left to “guess” whether at any point during the four-year period alleged in the claim it owed some duty to Wright and, if so, whether it breached that obligation … . But it “is not the State’s burden . . . to assemble information” not included in a claim so that it may promptly investigate and assess its liability … . Section 11 (b) places that burden on the claimant. Wright v State of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 01564, CtApp 3-18-25

Practice Point: If the claim in a Child Victims Act suit against the State does not provide enough information to allow the State to investigate, it will be deemed to lack the specificity required by Court of Claims Act section 11 (b) and will be dismissed.​

 

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DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT VOLUNTARY BECAUSE HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE MANDATORY FINES FOR THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW OFFENSES; AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT APPLIED; AN APPEAL WAIVER DOES NOT PRECLUDE ARGUING THE PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined defendant’s guilty plea was not voluntary because he was not informed of the mandatory fines for the Vehicle and Traffic Law offenses. Although the error was not preserved, the “no actual or practical ability to object” preservation exception was invoked: An appeal waiver does not preclude the defendant from arguing the plea was involuntary:

An exception to the preservation requirement exists where, as here, a defendant had “no actual or practical ability to object” prior to the imposition of the fines by the sentencing court … . Further, a valid appeal waiver does not preclude a defendant from challenging a plea as involuntary, where the court fails to advise a defendant of a component of their sentence before it is imposed … .

Supreme Court erred in failing to inform defendant at the time of his plea that the sentences for two of the offenses to which he was pleading guilty included mandatory fines (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [3] [b]; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 [1] [a]) The failure to “ensure that . . . defendant, before pleading guilty, ha[d] a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences” … , requires vacatur of the plea. People v Padilla-Zuniga, 2025 NY Slip Op 01563, CtApp 3-18-25

Practice Point: The failure to inform the defendant of mandatory fines renders the guilty plea involuntary.

Practice Point: Here the “no actual or practical ability to object” exception to the preservation requirement applied.

Practice Point: An appeal waiver does not preclude the argument that the plea was involuntarily entered.

 

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THE DEFENDANT’S MAXIMUM SENTENCE WAS 20 YEARS BUT THE JUDGE REPEATEDLY TOLD DEFENDANT HE WAS FACING 45 YEARS; THE MAJORITY DETERMINED THE GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT VOLUNTARILY ENTERED; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a two-justice dissent, determined defendant’s guilty plea was not entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently because the judge repeatedly told the defendant he was facing 45 years in prison when his sentence was capped at 20. The dissent argued the error was not preserved:

The issue on appeal is whether defendant Marquese Scott’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Supreme Court made an egregious error during the plea proceedings, repeatedly asserting that defendant faced up to 45 years’ incarceration if found guilty after trial, when his maximum exposure was statutorily capped at 20 years. As we have long recognized, inaccurate information regarding a sentence is a significant factor in determining whether a plea was voluntary. Given defendant’s young age, his inexperience facing serious charges with the risk of consecutive sentencing, and the vast disparity between the plea offer of 6 to 8 years and the court’s erroneous assertion that he faced 25 years more than the law allowed, we hold that defendant’s guilty plea was not the result of a free and informed choice. Accordingly, defendant’s plea cannot stand. * * *

From the dissent:

With only narrow exceptions, we have unequivocally required a defendant to preserve a challenge to the voluntariness of their plea by making “a motion to withdraw the plea under CPL 220.60 (3) or a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction under CPL 440.10” … . People v Scott, 2025 NY Slip Op 01562, CtApp 3-18-25

Practice Point: A guilty plea entered after the defendant is erroneously told he is facing 45 years in prison when the sentence is statutorily capped at 20 is not voluntary.​

Practice Point: Here the dissent argued the majority should not have carved out a new exception to the preservation requirement to consider the merits of this case.

 

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THE TREBLE DAMAGES PROVISION IN RPAPL 861 FOR THE IMPROPER TRIMMING OR REMOVAL OF TREES FROM ANOTHER’S PROPERTY IS PUNITIVE IN NATURE; HERE THE TOWN TRIMMED AND REMOVED TREES FROM PLAINTIFF’S LAND; BECAUSE A MUNICIPALITY CANNOT BE ASSESSED PUNITIVE DAMAGES, THE TREBLE DAMAGES AWARD WAS REVERSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the treble damages provision in RPAPL 861 is punitive in nature and therefore cannot be imposed upon a municipality. Here the town removed and trimmed trees along a roadway. Plaintiff, the owner of the land abutting the road, sued and was awarded treble damages. The Appellate Division had concluded the treble damages provision was compensatory, not punitive:

RPAPL 861 provides that “[i]f any person, without the consent of the owner thereof, cuts, removes, injures or destroys . . . tree[s] or timber on the land of another . . . an action may be maintained against such person for treble the stumpage value of the tree or timber or two hundred fifty dollars per tree, or both and for any permanent and substantial damage caused to the land or the improvements thereon . . . .” … .

* * * Treble damages are the default measure for any recovery, but the statute also provides that “if the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence, that when the defendant committed the violation, he or she had cause to believe the land was his or her own, or that he or she had an easement or right of way across such land which permitted such action, or he or she had a legal right to harvest such land, then he or she shall be liable for the stumpage value or two hundred fifty dollars per tree, or both . . . .” …

In other words, the defendant’s good faith “does not insulate that person from the imposition of statutory damages, but merely saves him or her from having to pay the plaintiff treble damages” .. . * * *

The “good faith” provision in RPAPL 861 demonstrates the punitive nature of the treble damages available under the statute. Matter of Rosbaugh v Town of Lodi, 2025 NY Slip Op 01406, CtApp 3-13-25

Practice Point: Here the statute allowed treble damages for the removal of trees only if the removal was not in good faith. Therefore the treble damages provision was punitive in nature. Punitive damages cannot be assessed against a municipality, here the town which removed the trees.​

 

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IN THE CONTEXT OF DRIVING WITH A SUSPENDED LICENSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS EXPLAINED THE CRITERIA FOR A VALID MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT, VERSUS A MISDEMEANOR INFORMATION (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, affirming the convictions by guilty pleas to misdemeanor complaints, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, determined the factual allegations in the complaints were sufficient. The defendants were charged with driving with a suspended license and argued the complaints did not demonstrate reasonable cause to believe they knew they their licenses had been suspended:

The misdemeanor complaints here satisfy the reasonable cause standard. The complaints “state[d] the time, date and location of the[ ] events,” and otherwise “provide[d] [defendants] with enough information” of how defendants committed the crime “to put [them] on notice of the crime” and “to prevent defendant[s] from facing double jeopardy on the same charges” … . Defendants knew from the complaints what they were accused of doing and where, when, and how they allegedly did it. Based on the complaints’ allegations, defendants could assess what defenses were available to them, such as contending that they never knew their licenses were suspended, that they were never served with a summons, or that the summonses didn’t warn them that their licenses would be suspended if they failed to respond.

… [D]efendants contend that the complaints failed to provide reasonable cause because they did not specifically allege that defendants personally received the summonses. * * * … [T]he numerous summonses issued to each defendant are sufficient to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment, and experience that it is reasonably likely defendants received at least one of them. …

… [D]efendants’ consent to prosecution by misdemeanor complaint relieved the People of their obligation under a misdemeanor information to proffer “[n]on-hearsay allegations establishing every element of each charge” … . Although that obligation—known as “the prima facie case requirement”—applies to an information, “[a] misdemeanor complaint, in comparison, need only set forth facts that establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the charged offense” … .

Nor were the complaints deficient simply because they did not explain how the officers knew about suspension warnings appearing on traffic summonses or about those suspensions occurring automatically (by computer) within four weeks of a defendant’s failure to answer those summonses. We do not require complaints to contain such “formulaic recitation” … . Moreover, at this stage, the officers’ statements about summonses “appear[] reliable” … , inasmuch as the law tasks officers with delivering traffic summonses to alleged violators … . People v Willis, 2025 NY Slip Op 01405. CtApp 3-13-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the criteria for a valid misdemeanor complaint, versus a misdemeanor information.

 

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