You are here: / Vehicle and Traffic Law
,

DEFENDANT MADE A LEFT TURN IN THE PATH OF PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY AND DISMISSING THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability and dismissing the comparative negligence affirmative defense in this intersection traffic accident case should have been granted:

… [T]he plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting his deposition testimony and the deposition testimony of the defendant driver, which demonstrated that the defendant driver made a left turn directly into the path of the plaintiff’s vehicle without yielding the right-of-way to the plaintiff, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141, and when it was not reasonably safe to make a left turn, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(a) … . The plaintiff also established, prima facie, that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence by demonstrating that he was not at fault in the happening of the accident and that the defendant driver’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . The plaintiff, who had the right-of-way, was entitled to anticipate that a vehicle turning left would obey the traffic laws requiring that vehicle to yield, and the evidence established that the plaintiff did not have a sufficient opportunity to avoid the accident when the defendant driver turned left directly into the path of the plaintiff’s vehicle … . Seizeme v Levy, 2022 NY Slip Op 05049, Second Dept 8-24-22

Practice Point: Defendant made a left turn in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic causing a collision with plaintiff in the oncoming lane. Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on liability and dismissing the comparative negligence affirmative defense.

,

DEFENDANT MADE A LEFT TURN IN FRONT OF PLAINTIFF IN VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case. Defendant attempted to make a left turn in front of plaintiff’s vehicle from the middle lane, cutting off plaintiff. The court noted that a plaintiff’s comparative negligence is not a bar to summary judgment:

The accident allegedly occurred when the defendants’ vehicle attempted to make a left turn from the middle lane of Rockaway Boulevard in front of the plaintiff’s vehicle, and cut off the plaintiff’s vehicle. …

“A plaintiff in a negligence action moving for summary judgment on the issue of liability must establish, prima facie, that the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff and that the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the alleged injuries” … . “To be entitled to . . . summary judgment [on the issue of liability] a plaintiff does not bear the . . . burden of establishing . . . the absence of his or her own comparative fault” … . A violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence as a matter of law … .

Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting, inter alia, his own affidavit, which demonstrated that the driver of the defendants’ vehicle was negligent in striking the plaintiff’s vehicle while attempting to make a left turn from the middle lane of traffic (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1128[a]; 1160[b …). Jaipaulsingh v Umana, 2022 NY Slip Op 05028, Second Dept 8-24-22

Practice Point: Here defendant violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by making a left turn from the middle lane, cutting plaintiff off. Comparative negligence is not a bar to summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted.

 

,

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S DOUBLE-PARKED TRUCK MERELY FURNISHED THE OCCASION FOR THE MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT OR WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT; PLAINTIFF FLIPPED OVER THE MOTORCYCLE BRAKING TO AVOID COLLIDING WITH THE TRUCK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff motorcyclist raised a question of fact whether defendant’s double-parked truck was a proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff alleged the motorcycle struck a defect in the road which cause the motorcycle to veer toward defendant’s truck. Plaintiff flipped over the motorcycle when he braked to avoid colliding with truck. The issue was whether the double-parked trucked merely furnished the occasion for the accident or whether the double-parked truck was a proximate cause of the accident (a difficult distinction which comes up occasionally in the appellate decisions):

In support of its motion, [defendant] Peapod submitted the transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which the plaintiff testified that his motorcycle struck a road defect, but that the defect did not cause him to immediately fall or apply the brakes. Instead, when the motorcycle encountered the defect, the motorcycle veered toward Peapod’s double-parked truck 40 yards ahead of him in the same lane of traffic. In order to avoid colliding with the truck, the plaintiff applied the front brakes of the motorcycle, which resulted in him flipping over the motorcycle. Given this evidence, it cannot be said that Peapod established as a matter of law that the truck merely furnished the occasion for the accident … . Rather, this testimony demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the presence of Peapod’s double-parked truck was a proximate cause of the accident … . Further, the evidence relied upon by Peapod in support of its motion failed to establish, prima facie, that its truck was not negligently parked or violating applicable traffic regulations … . Colletti v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 05019, Second Dept 8-24-22

Practice Point: Accident cases sometimes require making a difficult distinction between merely furnishing an occasion for an accident, which is not actionable, and a proximate cause of an accident. Supreme Court held the presence of defendant’s double-parked truck merely furnished the occasion for plaintiff’s motorcycle accident. The Second Department reversed finding a question of fact whether the presence of the truck was a proximate cause of the accident.

 

, ,

INFANT PLAINTFF WAS STRUCK BY DEFENDANT DRIVER WHILE IN A CROSS-WALK WITH THE WALK SIGNAL ON; SUN-GLARE IS NOT AN “EMERGENCY” WHICH WILL RAISE A QUESTON OF FACT; PLAINTIFFS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in this pedestrian-cross-walk traffic accident case should have been granted. Defendant driver alleged sun-glare prevented her from seeing the infant plaintiff in the cross-walk. Sun-glare is not an “emergency” and did not raise a question of fact:

… [A] “violation of a standard of care imposed by the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se” … . “A driver who faces a green light has a duty to yield the right-of-way to pedestrians who are lawfully within a crosswalk in accordance with the standard of care imposed by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(a)(1)” … . “A driver also has ‘a statutory duty to use due care to avoid colliding with pedestrians on the roadway [pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146], as well as a common-law duty to see that which he [or she] should have seen through the proper use of his [or her] senses” … .

Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting the police accident report, and an affidavit from a witness who averred that the defendants’ vehicle struck the infant plaintiff with its front bumper while the infant plaintiff was crossing Stillwell Avenue in a marked crosswalk with an active “white pedestrian signal” … . In opposition to the plaintiffs’ prima facie showing, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver had a non-negligent explanation for the accident … . By the defendant driver’s own admissions in the police accident report and her affidavit, she did not see the infant plaintiff prior to the accident, which she only realized had occurred upon “hear[ing] the impact,” and she continued to drive into the crosswalk after being “blinded” by sun glare, which “caus[ed] her to collide into [the infant plaintiff].” Further, as the plaintiffs contend, the foreseeable occurrence of sun glare while the defendant driver was driving west at sundown did not constitute a ‘qualifying emergency’ under the emergency doctrine … . E.B. v Gonzalez, 2022 NY Slip Op 04942, Second Dept 8-17-22

Practice Point: Here the infant plaintiff was lawfully crossing the street in a cross-walk when struck by defendant driver. The driver’s allegation she was blinded by sun-glare was not an emergency and did not raise a question of fact. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment should have been granted.

 

,

THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S MOTORCYCLE WAS SO CLOSE AS TO CONSTITUTE AN IMMEDIATE HAZARD WHEN DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A LEFT TURN ACROSS PLAINTIFF’S LANE OF TRAFFIC; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this intersection traffic accident case should not have been granted summary judgment. Plaintiff motorcyclist collided with defendants’ vehicle as defendant driver was attempting to make a left turn crossing plaintiff’s lane of traffic. The Second Department determined there was a question of fact about whether plaintiff’s motorcycle was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard at the time defendant initiated the turn:

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141, “[t]he driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection . . . shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close as to constitute an immediate hazard” … . A violation of this statute constitutes negligence per se … .

The plaintiff failed to meet his prima facie burden of demonstrating entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted, inter alia, the transcripts of his deposition testimony and that of the defendants. This evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendants, as the nonmoving parties, raised triable issues of fact as to whether, at the time the defendant driver initiated her turn, the plaintiff’s motorcycle was “so close as to constitute an immediate hazard” … . DePass v Beneduci, 2022 NY Slip Op 04622, Second Dept 7-20-22

Practice Point: Vehicle and Traffic Law 1141 prohibits making a left turn when oncoming traffic is “so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.” Plaintiff motorcyclist collided with defendant’s car as defendant attempted a left turn across plaintiff’s lane of traffic. Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment but the Second Department held there was a question of fact whether plaintiff was ‘”so close as to constitute an immediate hazard” when defendant initiated her turn.

 

,

IN A REAR-END COLLISION CASE, THE ALLEGATION THAT PLAINTIFF STOPPED SUDDENLY IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in this rear-end collision case did not raise a question of fact by alleging plaintiff stopped suddenly:

… [P]laintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by averring that he had activated his right turn signal, had slowed to a speed of approximately five miles per hour, and was attempting to make a right turn when his vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendants’ vehicle … .

In opposition, the defendants submitted an affidavit of the defendant driver in which he averred that the plaintiff’s vehicle stopped short suddenly, causing the defendants’ vehicle to collide with the plaintiff’s vehicle. The defendants’ assertion that it was the sudden stop of the plaintiff’s vehicle which caused the accident was insufficient, in and of itself, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the happening of the rear-end collision … . Gil v Manhattan Beer Distribs., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 04537, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: The defendant in a rear-end collision case does not raise a question of fact about a non-negligent explanation for the accident by alleging plaintiff stopped suddenly.

 

, ,

A PLAINTIFF BRINGING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION MUST ADDRESS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER; HERE IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE OWNER OF A LEASED CAR IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRIVER, WAS RAISED AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE; BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT ADDRESS THAT ISSUE IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this traffic accidence case did not demonstrate the owner of defendants’ vehicle, PV Holding, was vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver of the vehicle. Therefore plaintiff’s summary judgment motion with respect to PV Holding should not have been granted. Defendants apparently raised the affirmative defense that the vehicle was leased from PV Holding and therefore was not liable under the Graves Amendment. Because that defense was not addressed in plaintiff’s summary judgment papers, the motion should have been denied:

… [I]n 2005, Congress enacted the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users. That act included the Graves Amendment (49 USC § 30106), which provides that the owner of a leased or rented motor vehicle cannot be held liable for personal injuries resulting from the use of such vehicle if the owner (1) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, and (2) engaged in no negligence or criminal wrongdoing contributing to the accident … .* * *

“CPLR 3212(b) requires the proponent of a motion for summary judgment to demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact on every relevant issue raised by the pleadings, including any affirmative defenses” … . Pierrelouis v Kuten, 2022 NY Slip Op 04314, Second Dept 7-6-22

Practice Point: A plaintiff bringing a motion for summary judgment must address affirmative defenses raised in the answer. Failure to do so requires denial of the motion. Here the Graves Amendment was raised as an affirmative defense in this traffic accident case. The Graver Amendment provides that companies in the business of leasing cars are not vicariously liable for the negligence of the drivers. Plaintiff did not address that defense in the motion for summary judgment.

 

, ,

PLAINTIFFS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT (1) WHETHER THE POLICE ACTED IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY OF OTHERS DURING A HIGH-SPEED CHASE AND IN FAILING TO NOTIFY THE DISPATCHER OF THE CHASE, AND (2) WHETHER THE CHASE WAS A PROXIMATE OR CONCURRENT CAUSE OF PLAINTFFS’ ACCIDENT (THERE WAS NO CONTACT WITH EITHER VEHICLE INVOLVED IN THE CHASE) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, determined plaintiffs raised questions of fact about whether the police acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others during a high-speed chase, and whether the chase of the BMW driven by Llewellyn was a proximate or concurrent cause of the accident (neither vehicle involved in the chase struck plaintiffs’ vehicle):

… [T]he motion court properly held that the reckless disregard standard applied in evaluating the City defendants’ conduct in pursuing Llewellyn (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1104[b], 1104[e]). However, the motion court erred in determining that “there is no evidence that the NYPD officers acted recklessly as a matter of law, and that the pursuit was not the proximate cause or a concurrent cause of this incident” … . …

Plaintiffs … submitted evidence that the City defendants initiated a high-speed chase of Llewellyn’s BMW at close proximity after observing it run a single red light, and continued the high-speed chase, which included crossing over a double yellow line and running two red lights, in a known congested and heavily populated residential area which at the time of the pursuit had moderate to heavy traffic and numerous pedestrians…. . …

Plaintiffs also raised an issue of fact concerning whether the NYPD officers acted recklessly in failing to notify the radio dispatcher at the start of the pursuit and inform headquarters with relevant information, including the nature of the offense. Handelsman v Llewellyn, 2022 NY Slip Op 04093, First Dept 6-23-22

Practice Point: Here there were questions of fact whether the police acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others during a high-speed chase such that the city would be liable for plaintiffs’ accident, and whether the high-speed chase was a proximate or concurrent cause of plaintiffs’ accident (there was no contact with either vehicle involved in the chase). There were questions of fact whether the police drove “in reckless disregard of the safety of others” and whether their failure to notify the dispatcher of the chase was also reckless.

 

, , ,

THE INTOXICATED DEFENDANT’S DRIVING WHEN HE FLED FROM THE POLICE, WHILE RECKLESS, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE; DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; CONVICTION REDUCED TO MANSLAUGHTER (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reducing defendant’s conviction from depraved indifference murder to manslaughter, over a dissent, determined that the intoxicated defendant’s driving when fleeing from the police did not evince a complete disregard for the safety of others. Therefore the depraved indifference murder conviction was against the weight of the evidence:

… [T]he credible evidence at trial made clear that defendant was extremely intoxicated, but his driving prior to police pursuit demonstrated that he was aware of his surroundings, obeyed multiple traffic signals and responded to the alerts of other drivers. Although he was traveling at an exceptionally high rate of speed during the pursuit, he did so “on a roadway designed to accommodate greater rates of speed than residential roads, at an hour when lighter traffic conditions predominated” … , and there is no evidence that he failed to abide by any traffic signals while he fled or that any vehicles were forced to pull over or move out of his way … . According deference to the jury’s credibility determinations, defendant did partially enter the lane of oncoming traffic for brief periods of time, but such “episodic” conduct stands in stark contrast to cases where the defendant traveled in an oncoming lane “as part of a deadly game” … . Defendant in fact largely chose to evade police not by weaving in and out of the oncoming lane but instead by driving on a wide, paved shoulder, and, even if his “attempted escape [was] carried out in a reckless manner,” he may “simultaneously intend to flee police and avoid striking other cars” … . “No contact occurred between [defendant’s] vehicle and any other vehicle before the accident” … , and the limited evidence of his proximity to other vehicles prior to the collision falls short of establishing the sort of “narrow[] miss[es]” the disregard of which could be some evidence of depraved indifference … . People v Williams, 2022 NY Slip Op 03945, Third Dept 6-16-22

Practice Point: Here the intoxicated defendant acted recklessly in fleeing from the police, but his driving did not evince a depraved indifference to the safety of other drivers. For the most part defendant followed the rules of the road and avoided other vehicles. Therefore the depraved indifference murder conviction was not supported by the weight of the evidence. Conviction reduced to manslaughter.

 

,

THE AMENDMENT TO THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE WHICH EXTENDED THE STATUTE’S COVERAGE TO TRAFFIC INFRACTIONS JOINTLY CHARGED WITH CRIMES OR VIOLATIONS IS NOT TO BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined the amendment to the speedy trial statute (CPL 30.30 (1) (e)) which made the statutory time-limits applicable to traffic infractions jointly charged with crimes or violations should not be applied retroactively. The amendment went into effect while defendant’s appeal to the Appellate Term was pending. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument (which jointly charged misdemeanors and traffic infractions) on speedy-trial grounds should not have been granted by the Appellate Term:

Defendant was charged in 2014 in a single accusatory instrument with three misdemeanor counts and three traffic infractions under various sections of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Approximately 17 months later, defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds pursuant to CPL 30.30. The court denied the motion, concluding that the statute did not apply to jointly charged traffic infractions and that the People did not exceed the 90-day statutory time limit applicable to the misdemeanor counts. Thereafter, a jury convicted defendant of two misdemeanors and two infractions and acquitted him of the remaining counts. …

The Appellate Term granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument, including the traffic infractions, concluding that the People exceeded the statutory time limit to state their readiness for trial on the misdemeanor counts and that the amendment applied retroactively … . * * *

… [B]ecause the amended statute was not in effect when the criminal action against defendant was commenced, CPL 30.30 (1) (e) has no application to defendant’s direct appeal from that judgment of conviction. People v Galindo, 2022 NY Slip Op 03928, Ct App 6-16-22

Practice Point: The amendment to the speedy trial statute which extended the statute’s coverage to include traffic infractions jointly charged with crimes or violations is not to be applied retroactively. Here the amendment became effective while defendant’s appeal to the Appellate Term was pending. The Appellate Term should not have ruled the amendment applied to the defendant’s accusatory instrument, which jointly charged misdemeanors and traffic infractions.

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy