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Plaintiff-Passenger’s Injury In an Illegal Drag-Race Not Actionable—Under the Facts, Public Policy Precluded Plaintiff from Bringing Suit

The First Department, over a dissent, determined that a complaint brought by a passenger, who was a willing participate in illegal drag-racing, against the drivers and other passengers involved, was properly dismissed.  Plaintiff was injured when the car he was in crashed during the race:

“[A]s a matter of public policy, . . . where a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiff’s conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation” … . Plaintiff urges that this rule of law is inapplicable because he was merely a passenger and also because some of the defendants indicated during disclosure that they did not consider themselves to be racing. As for the latter argument, plaintiff controls the theory of his case and he has not wavered from his contention that a high-speed drag race was in progress — an allegation made in his complaint, bills of particulars, proposed amended complaint, affidavits submitted in the underlying motions and about which he testified in detail at his deposition. Supreme Court did not err in accepting plaintiff’s admitted conduct in such regard … .

The fact that a plaintiff’s injuries occurred in the course of unlawful conduct does not mandate dismissal …, but instead the violation of law must be “sufficiently serious” to support such an extreme result, and this determination necessarily implicates “due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances” … . Here, plaintiff testified that he knew Eastman had been drinking beer all day, plaintiff participated in banter regarding racing and he vouched for Eastman’s truck as the fastest. Plaintiff stated that he entered the truck knowing a race was about to start, the truck and the vehicle driven by Losaw revved engines at a starting point on the road with yelling back and forth, and plaintiff never suggested that Eastman not proceed to race. In fact, once the race started, he even made comments urging Eastman to go faster so as not to be defeated in the race. Shortly thereafter, Eastman lost control of the truck. Estimated speeds during the race exceeded 100 miles per hour. Plaintiff was very familiar with the road, acknowledged racing on it previously and described it as “pretty curvy,” “surface isn’t even,” “potholes, bumps” and “not much shoulder.”

Racing side by side at over 100 miles per hour in the dark on a two-lane rural road under the circumstances of this case constitutes the type of grossly reckless conduct that created a grave risk to the public … . Hathaway v Eastman, 2014 NY Slip Op 07533, 3rd Dept 11-6-14

 

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Presumption Vehicle Was Operated with Owner’s Consent Not Overcome—Defendant Not Entitled to Summary Judgment

The Second Department determined the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the unknown driver of defendant’s vehicle did not have the defendant’s consent to operate the vehicle:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 creates a strong presumption that the driver of a vehicle is operating it with the owner’s consent, which can only be rebutted by substantial evidence demonstrating that the vehicle was not operated with the owner’s express or implied permission … . The defendant, on its motion for summary judgment, has the burden of demonstrating its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … . Thus, to obtain summary judgment on its defense that the vehicle was used without its permission, the defendant was required to present substantial evidence that the vehicle was used without its permission … . “The uncontradicted testimony of a vehicle owner that the vehicle was operated without his or her permission, does not, by itself, overcome the presumption of permissive use” … . The question of consent is ordinarily one for the jury … . Ultimately, “whether summary judgment is warranted depends on the strength and plausibility of the disavowals [of permission], and whether they leave room for doubts that are best left for the jury” …

Here, the defendant failed to sufficiently rebut the strong presumption that the driver was operating the subject vehicle with its permission. The deposition testimony of the defendant and some, but not all, of its employees that the driver only had permission to drive the vehicle for work-related purposes did not, by itself, overcome the presumption of permissive use … . In addition, the defendant failed to establish that the vehicle was stolen … . Han v BJ Laura & Son Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 07480, 2nd Dept 11-5-14

 

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Although Not the Case Here, the Court Explained How a Collision Between a Vehicle Entering the Roadway and a Vehicle Which Is In the Roadway (and Has the Right-of-Way) Can Possibly Have Two Proximate Causes

The Second Department determined the defendant, who apparently struck plaintiff’s car as plaintiff pulled into traffic from a parking lot, was entitled to summary judgment.  Plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law based on a violation of Vehicle and Traffic law 1143, which requires a driver entering a roadway to yield to drivers within the right-of-way.  And there was no showing defendant was negligent.  The decision has a good explanation of how there can be two proximate causes of an accident under such facts (not the case here):

There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident …, because each driver has a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid an accident … . As a result, even where there is evidence that another driver involved in the accident was negligent as a matter of law due to a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, “the proponent of a summary judgment motion has the burden of establishing freedom from comparative negligence as a matter of law” … . Thus, a driver traveling with the right-of-way may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening of the accident if he or she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident … . However, “[a] driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle that has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision” … . Desio v Cerebral Palsy Transp Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 07322, 2nd Dept 10-29-14

 

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Review Criteria Re: Nonjury Trials Explained/Violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law, Including the Provision Requiring the Exercise of Care to Avoid Colliding with Bicyclists, Constituted Negligence Per Se

The Third Department affirmed a verdict in a nonjury trial finding a state trooper 70% responsible for injuries caused when the trooper’s car collided with plaintiff bicyclist.  The court explained its review powers re: a nonjury trial and noted that the trooper’s violations of Vehicle and Traffic Law, including the provision requiring the exercise of care to avoid colliding with a bicyclist, constituted negligence per se:

When reviewing a determination after a nonjury trial, this Court independently considers the weight of the evidence and may grant whatever judgment is warranted by the record, all while deferring to the trial judge’s factual findings, especially where those findings are based on credibility determinations … . * * *

After weighing the eyewitness and expert testimony and considering it along with the physical evidence, the court determined that the collision occurred in claimant’s lane of travel, meaning that the trooper crossed at least somewhat into claimant’s lane in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1120 (a). “[A]n unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se” … . The court also reasonably determined that the trooper was negligent in cutting the corner while making his left turn, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1160 (b)… . Considering the trooper’s testimony that he never saw claimant until the moment of impact, along with evidence regarding the ample sight distance at the intersection and the legal concept that every driver has a duty to see what is there to be seen through the proper use of his or her senses …., the court properly found that the trooper was additionally negligent for violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (a), which requires drivers to “exercise due care to avoid colliding with any bicyclist” … . Smith v State of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 07229, 3rd Dept 10-23-14

 

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Rear-End Collision Liability Explained

The Second Department determined the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in a rear-end collision case should have been granted.  The court explained the relevant analysis:

The driver of an automobile is required to maintain a safe distance between his or her own vehicle and the vehicle in front of him or her (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]…). A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision … . Once the movant has established his or her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the opposing party to provide sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to the moving party’s comparative fault … . A bare allegation that the lead vehicle stopped short is insufficient to rebut the inference of negligence on the part of the driver of the following vehicle … . Cheow v Cheng Lin Jin, 2014 NY Slip Op 07337, 2nd Dept 10-214

 

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Although Title Had Not Yet Formally Passed to the Driver/Owner, the Vehicle Was Covered as a “Newly Acquired” Vehicle Under the Terms of the Policy

The Third Department reversed Supreme Court and held that the insurer could not disclaim coverage of a 1987 Dodge driven by Porter under the terms of the policy.  Porter was driving the vehicle before receiving the title documents from the seller, Elmore:

We consider first whether coverage extended to the 1987 Dodge under the provision for “[a] private passenger auto newly acquired by you.” [The insurer] contended, and Supreme Court held, that this provision did not apply because Porter had not yet received title or registered the Dodge under the Uniform Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see Vehicle and Traffic Law art 46). The term “newly acquired” is not defined in the policy and, importantly, it is not limited by the policy to completed transactions that were done in full compliance with the Certificate of Title Act. Ownership of a motor vehicle generally passes “when the parties intend that it pass” … .

Here, it is undisputed that, during the month before the accident, Porter had disposed of his 1994 Chevrolet truck and, shortly thereafter, replaced it by trading his ATV (which he had recently purchased for $1,000) to Elmore for the 1987 Dodge. Although Elmore apparently indicated to Porter after the accident that the Dodge was actually owned by his girlfriend’s father, there was no indication that Elmore did not have authority from the owner to make the transaction. At the time of the transaction, Elmore took possession of the ATV and likewise Porter took absolute possession and control of the Dodge, including all of the keys. According to Porter, the trade was final and permanent. Porter testified that Elmore was about to produce documents so he could register the Dodge, but the accident occurred the day before Elmore was going to give him the documents. Nonetheless, upon taking physical possession of the Dodge, Porter had placed the plates from his junked truck on the Dodge and began using it to drive to work. Under the circumstances and considering the pertinent policy language in light of “the reasonable expectations of the average insured” …, the 1987 Dodge fell within the meaning of replacement auto newly acquired by Porter at the time of the accident and, accordingly, was covered under plaintiff’s policy. Nationwide Ins Co of Am v Porter, 2014 NY Slip Op 07029, 3rd Dept 10-16-14

 

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Ordinary Negligence Standard Applied Where Ambulance (Responding to an Emergency) Struck Plaintiff Who Was Lawfully in the Crosswalk/Questions of Fact Whether There Was a “Special Relationship” Between the City’s Crossing Guard and the Plaintiff, and Whether the Crossing Guard Was Performing Ministerial, Rather than Discretionary, Functions (Such that the City Could Be Held Liable)

In a case involving a pedestrian who was lawfully crossing a street when struck by an ambulance responding to an emergency, in the presence of a city employee acting as a crossing guard, the Second Department determined that ordinary negligence standards applied to the ambulance (not the “emergence” “reckless disregard” standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1104) and that there were questions of fact whether the city was liable based upon a “special relationship” with the plaintiff and whether the city was liable because the crossing guard was performing ministerial, rather than discretionary, functions:

Failure to abide by the provisions set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1111 (duty to yield to pedestrians in crosswalk) and 1112 (pedestrian has right of way), which was the injury-causing conduct at issue here, is not privileged conduct pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b). As the injury-producing conduct was not specifically exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b), the principles of ordinary negligence apply … . * * *

“To impose liability [upon a municipality], there must be a duty that runs from the municipality to the plaintiff. We have recognized a narrow class of cases in which a duty is born of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the governmental entity” … . One of the ways that a special relationship arises is when the municipality “assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty” … . * * *

Further, “[g]overnment action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff apart from any duty to the public in general” … . Here, the City defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the basis that the crossing guard’s actions were discretionary. Based on their submissions in support of their cross motion, and under the circumstances here, the City defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the crossing guard’s actions constituted ministerial governmental functions … . Benn v New York Presbyt Hosp, 2014 NY Slip Op 05615, 2nd Dept 8-6-14

 

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Failure to Strictly Comply with the Statutory Requirements for the Contents of a Parking Ticket Invalidates the Ticket

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, determined that the failure to strictly comply with the statutory requirements for a parking ticket rendered the tickets invalid and unenforceable.  Specifically, the type of license plate on the trucks in question was described on the ticket as “IRP” when the plates should have been described as “Apportioned” or “APP” (“IRP” and “APP” are related terms used interchangeably by the NYC Parking Violations Board).  The decision is noteworthy because of the strictness with which the statutory requirements for the contents of a parking ticket are applied:

…[T]his Court is bound by the plain language of VTL 238(2). We must conclude that the New York City Parking Violations Bureau’s policy of deeming “IRP” an accurate description of out-of-state “APPORTIONED” license plates for purposes of adjudicating parking violations violates the statute. As indicated, VTL § 238(2) requires that a notice of parking violation shall include the “plate type as shown by the registration plates of said “vehicle” (emphasis added). It is undisputed that each ticket here described the “vehicle type” as “IRP,” while the corresponding license plate described the vehicle type as “APPORTIONED.” The choice of the words in the statute “as shown” by the vehicle plate is evidence that the legislature intended strict compliance with the statute, and “new language cannot be imported into a statute to give it a meaning not otherwise found therein” … . Matter of Nestle Waters N Am Inc v City of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 05609, 1st Dept 7-31-14

 

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Defendant’s Actions In Driving Under the Influence and Causing a Collision Did Not Support Convictions for Offenses Requiring Proof of a Depraved Indifference to Human Life

The Second Department determined that there was insufficient proof of “depraved indifference” to support defendant’s convictions for first degree assault and reckless endangerment stemming from a collision with a vehicle driven by Petrone:

Depraved indifference is ” best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life—a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn’t care whether grievous harm results or not'” … . It is embodied in conduct that is ” so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes [serious physical injury to] another'” … .

The issue of whether a defendant possessed a state of mind evincing depraved indifference to human life is highly fact-sensitive, requiring a case-by-case analysis … . Here, the prosecution’s witnesses established that the defendant’s vehicle, without braking, collided into the back of Petrone’s vehicle while both were traveling eastbound in the left lane on Northern Boulevard. The collision was of such force that both vehicles left the roadway and flipped over. Moreover, the testimony of the forensic toxicologist demonstrated that, at the time of the accident, the defendant was significantly impaired due to his ingestion of six different drugs, including methadone. Nevertheless, the evidence of the defendant’s conduct did not support a finding of depraved indifference. The defendant was not driving well in excess of the speed limit, he was not driving the wrong way into oncoming traffic, he had not failed to obey traffic signals, and there was no evidence that he was driving erratically prior to the collision … . Under these factual circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish that the defendant possessed an “utter disregard for the value of human life” or that he “simply [did not] care whether grievous harm result[ed] or not” from his actions … . Consequently, there is simply no “valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences [that] could lead a rational person to the conclusion” … that the defendant acted with depraved indifference to human life when he caused the injuries to Petrone… . People v Jakobson, 2014 NY Slip Op 05354. 2nd Dept 7-16-14

 

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Proof Vehicle Was Stolen at the Time of the Accident Defeated Action Based Upon Vehicle-Owner’s Vicarious Liability

The Second Department determined defendant’s evidence that her vehicle had been stolen at the time of the accident entitled her to summary judgment in an action based upon the vehicle-owner’s vicarious liability:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1) provides that, with the exception of bona fide commercial lessors of motor vehicles, which are exempt from vicarious liability by virtue of federal law …, the owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for the negligence of one who operates the vehicle with the owner’s express or implied consent … . This statute creates a presumption that the driver was using the vehicle with the owner’s express or implied permission …, which only may be rebutted by substantial evidence sufficient to show that the vehicle was not operated with the owner’s consent … . Evidence that a vehicle was stolen at the time of the accident will rebut the presumption of permissive use … . Fuentes v Virgil, 2014 NY Slip Op 04899, 2nd Dept 7-2-14

 

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