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COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED AND RULED UPON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING AFTER A DEFENDANT DIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the death of a defendant in this foreclosure action precluded the court from hearing and determining plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, even with respect to the other defendants:

As a general matter, “the death of a party divests a court of jurisdiction to act, and automatically stays proceedings in the action pending the substitution of a legal representative for that decedent pursuant to CPLR 1015(a)” … . “[A]ny determination rendered without such a substitution will generally be deemed a nullity”… .

Here, the defendant Michael Costello died before the plaintiff’s motion was made and before the orders appealed from were issued. Since a substitution had not been made, the Supreme Court should not have determined the merits of the plaintiff’s motion, even to the extent that the plaintiff sought relief against the other defendants … . Furthermore, although this Court has recognized, under certain limited circumstances, that “where a party’s demise does not affect the merits of a case, there is no need for strict adherence to the requirement that the proceedings be stayed pending substitution” … , those circumstances are not present here … . American Airlines Fed. Credit Union v Costello, 2018 NY Slip Op 03335, Second Dept 5-9-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (DEATH OF A PARTY, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED AND RULED UPON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING AFTER A DEFENDANT DIED (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (CIVIL PROCEDURE, DEATH OF A PARTY, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED AND RULED UPON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING AFTER A DEFENDANT DIED (SECOND DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (DEATH OF A PARTY, CIVIL PROCEDURE, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED AND RULED UPON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING AFTER A DEFENDANT DIED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 1015  (DEATH OF A PARTY, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED AND RULED UPON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING AFTER A DEFENDANT DIED (SECOND DEPT))/DEATH OF A PARTY  (CIVIL PROCEDURE, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED AND RULED UPON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING AFTER A DEFENDANT DIED (SECOND DEPT))/SUBSTITUTION (DEATH OF A PARTY, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED AND RULED UPON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING AFTER A DEFENDANT DIED (SECOND DEPT))

WILL THAT CANNOT BE FOUND IS PRESUMED REVOKED, HERE PETITIONER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined Surrogate’s Court properly determined the presumption the will had been revoked had not been rebutted. Petitioner had attempted to probate a photocopy of the will which could not be found upon the death of the testator:

“A lost or destroyed will may be admitted to probate only if . . . [i]t is established that the will has not been revoked” (SCPA 1407 [1]).

” When a will previously executed cannot be found after the death of the testator, there is a strong presumption that it was revoked by destruction by the testator’ ” … . That “strong presumption of revocation by the testator . . . stands in the place of positive proof when a will previously executed cannot be found after a testator’s death”… . Respondent was thus entitled to rely on the presumption to meet his burden on the motion … . In addition, petitioner’s own submissions established that decedent asked to retain the original will in her possession, and the attorney who drafted the will had the original delivered to decedent shortly after its execution … .

In opposition to the motion, petitioner failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a question of fact whether the presumption of revocation may be overcome … . The presumption is unaffected by evidence that decedent’s attorney retained a copy of the will at his office and that decedent never advised him that she intended to revoke the will … . Nor may the presumption be overcome with hearsay accounts of decedent’s statements concerning her testamentary intentions … . Finally, while the presumption of revocation may be overcome with circumstantial evidence … , “[p]etitioner[] cannot succeed on mere speculation and suspicion” … . Rather, petitioner must present “facts and circumstances which show that the will was fraudulently destroyed during the testator’s lifetime” … . Matter of Scollan, 2018 NY Slip Op 03287, Fourth Dept 5-4-18

​TRUSTS AND ESTATES (WILL THAT CANNOT BE FOUND IS PRESUMED REVOKED, HERE PETITIONER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT))/WILLS (REVOKED, WILL THAT CANNOT BE FOUND IS PRESUMED REVOKED, HERE PETITIONER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT))/REVOCATION, PRESUMPTION OF (WILLS, WILL THAT CANNOT BE FOUND IS PRESUMED REVOKED, HERE PETITIONER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT))/LOST WILLS (WILL THAT CANNOT BE FOUND IS PRESUMED REVOKED, HERE PETITIONER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT))

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MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ALLOW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WILL, WRITTEN BY DECEDENT’S CARETAKER THREE DAYS BEFORE DEATH, WAS DULY EXECUTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the jury verdict finding the will offered by petitioner had been duly executed was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. The will was handwritten by petitioner, not decedent, three days before his death. The decedent, who was terminally ill, had moved to petitioner’s family-type adult home only three weeks before his death. One attesting witness had worked at the home for 28 years. The other attesting witness had lived at the home for seven years and was petitioner’s friend:

A verdict may be set aside as unsupported by legally sufficient evidence where “there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” … .. A jury verdict may be found to be against the weight of the evidence “where the proof so preponderated in favor of the unsuccessful party that the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” … . * * *

Upon this record, we cannot find legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding that the will had been duly executed … . Further, the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence, as it could not have been reached on a fair interpretation of the evidence … . Matter of Fraccaro, 2018 NY Slip Op 03198, Third Dept 5-3-18

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ALLOW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WILL, WRITTEN BY DECEDENT’S CARETAKER THREE DAYS BEFORE DEATH, WAS DULY EXECUTED (THIRD DEPT))/WILLS (MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ALLOW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WILL, WRITTEN BY DECEDENT’S CARETAKER THREE DAYS BEFORE DEATH, WAS DULY EXECUTED (THIRD DEPT))/VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE (MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ALLOW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WILL, WRITTEN BY DECEDENT’S CARETAKER THREE DAYS BEFORE DEATH, WAS DULY EXECUTED (THIRD DEPT))

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PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE TOWN AMBULANCE IN THIS WRONGFUL DEATH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY AND NO TIMELY KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF THE MUNICIPALITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim should not have been granted. Petitioner’s decedent was transported from a nursing home to a hospital by a town ambulance. He was pronounced dead at the hospital. Petitioner sought to file a notice of claim against the town one month after the deadline for the wrongful death cause of action (the deadline is 90 days following the appointment of a representative of the estate) and 11 months after the deadline for the medical malpractice and Public Health Law causes of action:

The petitioner failed to provide a reasonable excuse for her failure to serve a timely notice of claim. The failure of the petitioner and her attorneys to review the medical records and ascertain a claim against the appellants in a timely manner is not an acceptable excuse … .

Furthermore, the petitioner failed to submit evidence establishing that the appellants acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claims within 90 days or a reasonable time thereafter. The petitioner provided no records or documentation in support of the petition demonstrating such actual knowledge on the part of the appellants … . The notice of claim was served on the appellants together with the petition more than 1 month after the 90-day statutory period applicable to the wrongful death claim had elapsed and 11 months after the 90-day statutory period applicable to the remaining claims had elapsed. This service occurred too late to provide the appellants with actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claims within a reasonable time after the expiration of the applicable statutory period … .

Inasmuch as the petitioner failed to present any evidence or plausible argument that the appellants have not been substantially prejudiced by the delay, the appellants never became required to make “a particularized evidentiary showing” that they were substantially prejudiced … . Matter of Mangino v Town of Mamaroneck, 2018 NY Slip Op 02625, Second Dept 4-18-18

​NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE TOWN AMBULANCE IN THIS WRONGFUL DEATH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY AND NO TIMELY KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF THE MUNICIPALITY (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, NOTICE OF CLAIM, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE TOWN AMBULANCE IN THIS WRONGFUL DEATH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY AND NO TIMELY KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF THE MUNICIPALITY (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE TOWN AMBULANCE IN THIS WRONGFUL DEATH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY AND NO TIMELY KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF THE MUNICIPALITY (SECOND DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE TOWN AMBULANCE IN THIS WRONGFUL DEATH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY AND NO TIMELY KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF THE MUNICIPALITY (SECOND DEPT))/WRONGFUL DEATH (MUNICIPAL LAW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE TOWN AMBULANCE IN THIS WRONGFUL DEATH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY AND NO TIMELY KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF THE MUNICIPALITY (SECOND DEPT))

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BANK’S MOTION TO CHANGE THE CAPTION IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE NOTE TO A NEW PLAINTIFF, AND NO PROCEDURAL STEPS TO REMOVE A DECEASED DEFENDANT FROM THE ACTION WERE TAKEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s motion to change the caption in this foreclosure action to substitute and new bank plaintiff (FNMA) and eliminate one of the defendants who had died should not have been granted. The motion papers did not demonstrate with admissible evidence that the note had been assigned to the new plaintiff and did not take any of the required steps to remove the deceased defendant (George Bredehorn) from the action:

Although the plaintiff submitted evidence that the mortgage was assigned to FNMA, there was no evidence in admissible form of an assignment of the note or a transfer of possession of the note to FNMA. The only evidence offered by the plaintiff that the note had in fact been transferred to FNMA was the statement in the plaintiff’s attorney’s affirmation that “based on telephonic conversations,” the attorney had been advised that FNMA was the holder of the note as of February 1, 2014. This statement is inadmissible hearsay … .

Further, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to omit George Bredehorn from the caption. The plaintiff did not establish that George Bredehorn died intestate, move to substitute a representative for George Bredehorn’s estate as a defendant, move to discontinue the action insofar as asserted against him, or represent that it would not seek a deficiency judgment against his estate. In light of the plaintiff’s failure to take any one of those actions, the action against George Bredehorn was not extinguished … . Citimortgage, Inc. v Bredehorn, 2018 NY Slip Op 02595, Second Dept 4-18-18

​FORECLOSURE (BANK’S MOTION TO CHANGE THE CAPTION IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE NOTE TO A NEW PLAINTIFF, AND NO PROCEDURAL STEPS TO REMOVE A DECEASED DEFENDANT FROM THE ACTION WERE TAKEN (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (FORECLOSURE, BANK’S MOTION TO CHANGE THE CAPTION IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE NOTE TO A NEW PLAINTIFF, AND NO PROCEDURAL STEPS TO REMOVE A DECEASED DEFENDANT FROM THE ACTION WERE TAKEN (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, CHANGE CAPTION, BANK’S MOTION TO CHANGE THE CAPTION IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE NOTE TO A NEW PLAINTIFF, AND NO PROCEDURAL STEPS TO REMOVE A DECEASED DEFENDANT FROM THE ACTION WERE TAKEN (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FORECLOSURE, CHANGE CAPTION, BANK’S MOTION TO CHANGE THE CAPTION IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE NOTE TO A NEW PLAINTIFF, AND NO PROCEDURAL STEPS TO REMOVE A DECEASED DEFENDANT FROM THE ACTION WERE TAKEN (SECOND DEPT))/HEARSAY (FORECLOSURE, CHANGE CAPTION, BANK’S MOTION TO CHANGE THE CAPTION IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE NOTE TO A NEW PLAINTIFF, AND NO PROCEDURAL STEPS TO REMOVE A DECEASED DEFENDANT FROM THE ACTION WERE TAKEN (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 1015  (FORECLOSURE, CHANGE CAPTION, BANK’S MOTION TO CHANGE THE CAPTION IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE NOTE TO A NEW PLAINTIFF, AND NO PROCEDURAL STEPS TO REMOVE A DECEASED DEFENDANT FROM THE ACTION WERE TAKEN (SECOND DEPT))

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FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s foreclosure action was time-barred. Although the action would have been timely against the estate of defendant’s (Kess’s) wife because of the 18-month post-death statute of limitations toll in CPLR 210 (b), plaintiff did not demonstrate Kess was representing his wife’s estate:

…Kess demonstrated that the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213[4]) began to run on May 6, 2008, when the plaintiff accelerated the mortgage debt and commenced the 2008 foreclosure action … . Since the plaintiff did not commence the instant foreclosure action until more than six years later, Kess sustained his initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that this action was untimely … . …

CPLR 210(b) provides that “[t]he period of eighteen months after the death . . . of a person against whom a cause of action exists is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced against his [or her] executor or administrator.” The statute plainly is limited in scope to the executor or administrator of the decedent’s estate and does not extend to other defendants in the same action … . Consequently, CPLR 210(b) could not extend the statute of limitations period as to Kess individually. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish that Kess was the administrator or executor of his deceased wife’s estate, a point which Kess denied in reply to the plaintiff’s opposition. U.S. Bank, N.A. v Kess, 2018 NY Slip Op 01498, Second Dept 3-7-18

FORECLOSURE (FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (FORECLOSURE, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, ORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 210 (b)  (FORECLOSURE, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))

DESPITE PROBATE OF WILL IN FLORIDA, DECEDENT WAS A DOMICILIARY OF NEW YORK, ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK INAPPROPRIATE, NONANCILLARY LETTERS GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined decedent was a domiciliary of New York, despite the probate of the will in Florida:

Even if the Florida court had decided that decedent was a domiciliary of that state, “the decree of the State of original probate is not conclusive on the question of domicile or residence” … . Accordingly, this Court may make an independent inquiry into domicile … .

[Petitioner] failed to meet her burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that decedent had changed her domicile from New York to Florida … . The documentation submitted by petitioner in support of her motion to renew, showed that decedent voted in New York, her driver’s license was from New York, and her passport application used her New York address… . She filed New York State tax returns … , and her will and death certificate said she was from New York … . Moreover, when decedent left New York for Florida in July 2009, she said she intended to return, but never did because of medical complications … .

Since decedent was a New York domiciliary, ancillary probate in this state is inappropriate, even though her will has already been probated in Florida … . Therefore, the grant of ancillary letters to [petitioner] is revoked, and nonancillary letters are granted to the Public Administrator. Matter of Assimakopoulos, 2018 NY Slip Op 01440, First Dept 3-6-18

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (DESPITE PROBATE OF WILL IN FLORIDA, DECEDENT WAS A DOMICILIARY OF NEW YORK, ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK INAPPROPRIATE, NONANCILLARY LETTERS GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/DOMICILE (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS, DESPITE PROBATE OF WILL IN FLORIDA, DECEDENT WAS A DOMICILIARY OF NEW YORK, ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK INAPPROPRIATE, NONANCILLARY LETTERS GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, DESPITE PROBATE OF WILL IN FLORIDA, DECEDENT WAS A DOMICILIARY OF NEW YORK, ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK INAPPROPRIATE, NONANCILLARY LETTERS GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

BECAUSE THERE WAS ONLY ONE ORIGINAL WILL, NOT MULTIPLE ORIGINALS, THE INABILITY TO FIND A WILL UPON DECEDENT’S DEATH DID NOT GIVE RISE TO THE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION BY THE DECEDENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department affirmed Surrogate’s Court’s finding that there was only one original will, a finding made upon remittal from the Court of Appeals. Because no will was found upon decedent’s death, and because, in the initial Surrogate’s Court proceeding, there was conflicting evidence about whether there was one will, with three copies, or four original wills, the presumption of revocation by the decedent had not been rebutted (the decedent could have possessed an original will). In the post-remittal proceeding, Surrogate’s Court determined petitioner, the sole beneficiary of the will, had proven there was only one will, not multiple original wills. Because, upon remittal, Surrogate’s Court found there was only one original will, the presumption of revocation by the decedent did not arise (because the decedent could not have possessed an original). The wills were drawn for decedent and her ex-husband. Petitioner, the ex-husband’s father, was made alternate beneficiary. When decedent and her ex-husband were divorced, the will as it related to the ex-husband was revoked by operation of law, triggering the petitioner’s alternate beneficiary status. The objectants are decedent’s parents and brothers:

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Contrary to objectants’ contention, it cannot be said that the Surrogate erred in crediting the ex-husband’s testimony that he and decedent each signed one original will, one original power of attorney, and one original health care proxy, and that the attorney’s office made three photocopies of each of those estate planning documents. Despite the uncertainty with respect to the ex-husband’s testimony at the initial hearing, his testimony at the hearing upon remittal unequivocally clarified that there was only one original of each of six estate planning documents, i.e., his will, power of attorney, and health care proxy, and decedent’s will, power of attorney, and health care proxy. We conclude that the other instances of inconsistent testimony alleged by objectants have no bearing on the issue whether decedent executed only one original will and were otherwise adequately clarified by the ex-husband. Matter of Lewis, 2018 NY Slip Op 00941, Fourth Dept 2-9-18

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (BECAUSE THERE WAS ONLY ONE ORIGINAL WILL, NOT MULTIPLE ORIGINALS, THE INABILITY TO FIND A WILL UPON DECEDENT’S DEATH DID NOT GIVE RISE TO THE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION BY THE DECEDENT (FOURTH DEPT))/WILLS (PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION, BECAUSE THERE WAS ONLY ONE ORIGINAL WILL, NOT MULTIPLE ORIGINALS, THE INABILITY TO FIND A WILL UPON DECEDENT’S DEATH DID NOT GIVE RISE TO THE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION BY THE DECEDENT (FOURTH DEPT))/REVOCATION, PRESUMPTION OF (WILLS, BECAUSE THERE WAS ONLY ONE ORIGINAL WILL, NOT MULTIPLE ORIGINALS, THE INABILITY TO FIND A WILL UPON DECEDENT’S DEATH DID NOT GIVE RISE TO THE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION BY THE DECEDENT (FOURTH DEPT))

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FLAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Austin, determined Surrogate’s Court properly denied the wife’s (Irene’s) motion to dismiss the husband’s estate’s petition to invalidate Irene’s notice of spousal election. Irene and her husband who had both been married before, signed a prenuptial agreement that they would not make a claim to each other’s estates. There was no question both parties signed the agreement, but essential language was missing from the acknowledgments, taken by their respective attorneys as notaries. Both attorneys submitted affidavits stating that the signers were known to them at the time of signing, the information missing from the acknowledgments.  The question came down to whether, by submitting the prenuptial agreement with the invalid acknowledgments, Irene demonstrated conclusively that the petition could not succeed. The Second Department determined the flaw in the acknowledgments can be cured, and the motion to dismiss was therefore properly denied:

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In Galetta v Galetta (21 NY3d 186), the Court of Appeals left unanswered the question of whether a defective acknowledgment of a prenuptial agreement could be remedied by extrinsic proof provided by the notary public who took a party’s signature. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that such proof can remedy a defective acknowledgment. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Surrogate’s Court, which denied the appellant’s motion to dismiss a petition to invalidate her notice of spousal election. Matter of Koegel, 2018 NY Slip Op 00833, Second Dept 2-7-18

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (FLAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT))/PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, FLAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT))/NOTARIES (FLAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT))/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS (NOTARIES, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, LAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT))/FAMILY LAW (PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS, FLAWED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WERE KNOWN TO THE NOTARIES, CAN BE CURED BY AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE NOTARIES (SECOND DEPT))

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NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW PETITION TO DISINTER THE REMAINS OF ARCHBISHOP FULTON SHEEN AND MOVE THEM FROM ST PATRICK’S CATHEDRAL TO PEORIA ILLINOIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, over a two-justice dissent, determined a hearing must be held to decide whether the remains of Archbishop Fulton Sheen should be removed from St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York City to Peoria, Illinois, in anticipation of Archbishop Sheen’s Sainthood. The affidavits submitted by Archbishop Sheen’s relatives, stating that the Archbishop would have wanted his remains moved to Illinois, and the Archbishop’s long-time close friend, stating that the Archbishop expressed a wish that his remains be in New York, required a hearing. The petition court had granted the petition for removal of the remains to Illinois:

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In June 2016, petitioner brought a proceeding pursuant to Not-For-Profit Corporation Law § 1510(e) seeking to disinter the remains of Archbishop Sheen for removal and transfer to a crypt located in St. Mary’s Cathedral in Peoria. Petitioner submitted the affidavits of her three siblings, all of whom fully support and consent to the transfer … . …

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A body may be disinterred upon the consent of the cemetery owner, the owners of the lot, and certain specified relatives of the deceased (Not-For-Profit Corporation Law § 1510[e]). If such consent cannot be obtained, a court may grant permission to disinter … . There must be a showing of “[g]ood and substantial reasons” before disinterment is allowed  … . Although “each case is dependent upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances” … , “[t]he paramount factor a court must consider in granting permission to disinter is the known desires of the decedent” … . “Among other factors, a court must also consider the desires of the decedent’s next of kin” … . Where issues of fact have been raised concerning the decedent’s wishes, the court should order a hearing … . Matter of Cunningham v Trustees of St. Patrick’s Cathedral, 2018 NY Slip Op 00815, First Dept 2-6-18

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW PETITION TO DISINTER THE REMAINS OF ARCHBISHOP FULTON SHEEN AND MOVE THEM FROM ST PATRICK’S CATHEDRAL TO PEORIA ILLINOIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING (FIRST DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW (DISINTERMENT, NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW PETITION TO DISINTER THE REMAINS OF ARCHBISHOP FULTON SHEEN AND MOVE THEM FROM ST PATRICK’S CATHEDRAL TO PEORIA ILLINOIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING (FIRST DEPT))/NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION LAW (DISINTERMENT, NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW PETITION TO DISINTER THE REMAINS OF ARCHBISHOP FULTON SHEEN AND MOVE THEM FROM ST PATRICK’S CATHEDRAL TO PEORIA ILLINOIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING (FIRST DEPT))/DISINTERMENT  (NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW PETITION TO DISINTER THE REMAINS OF ARCHBISHOP FULTON SHEEN AND MOVE THEM FROM ST PATRICK’S CATHEDRAL TO PEORIA ILLINOIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING (FIRST DEPT))/CEMETERIES (DISINTERMENT, NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW PETITION TO DISINTER THE REMAINS OF ARCHBISHOP FULTON SHEEN AND MOVE THEM FROM ST PATRICK’S CATHEDRAL TO PEORIA ILLINOIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING (FIRST DEPT))

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