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Municipal Law, Tax Law

SPRINT IS NOT A UTILITY AND THEREFORE IS NOT EXEMPT FROM THE UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS INCOME TAX.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Sweeney, determined plaintiff (Sprint) was not a “utility” within the meaning of the relevant statutes and therefore was required to pay both the Utility Tax and the Unincorporated Business Income Tax (UBT). If Sprint were deemed a utility, as opposed to a vendor of utility services, it would have been exempt from the UBT:

The question in Cable & Wireless [Cable & Wireless v City of N.Y. Dept. of Fin. (190 Misc 2d 410, 416 [Sup Ct, NY County 2001])], as it is here, was whether the plaintiff telecommunications firm was a utility or a vendor of utility services. The plaintiff there argued, as plaintiff does here, that, under the plain statutory language, it was “supervised” by the PSC [Public Service Commission] and thus must be classified as a utility. In rejecting plaintiff’s argument, the court conducted an extensive review of the legislative history of the statutes and their amendments, including the history of the circumstances surrounding the statutes’ initial passage in 1933 and their amendments through the 1940s to more recent times. After holding that plaintiff had the burden of proving that it was a supervised utility and thus exempt from the tax at issue, the court held that “in using the words subject to the supervision of the [PSC],’ the City Council did not envision imposing the Utility Tax on gross income on entities such as [the plaintiff] which exhibit none of the characteristics of the monopolies to which the tax was intended to apply” … . The plaintiff was therefore not a utility and was not entitled to an exemption from the UBT.

We find the reasoning in Astoria [Matter of Astoria Gas Turbine Power, LLC v Tax Commn. of City of N.Y. (7 NY3d 451 [2006])] and Cable & Wireless to be equally applicable to the present case. By its own admission, plaintiff is “a competitive entity” that does not enjoy monopoly status. As a result, the “light regulation” by the PSC to which it is subject does not rise to the level of “supervision” necessary to classify it as a utility and thus warrant an exemption from the UBT. Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v City of N.Y. Dept. of Fin., 2017 NY Slip Op 05194, 1st Dept 6-27-17

 

June 27, 2017/by Bruce Freeman
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Tax Law

IN THIS PROSECUTION ALLEGING DEFENDANT CELL PHONE COMPANY’S UNDERPAYMENT OF SALES TAX, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE SALES TAX RETURNS OF OTHER CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS.

The First Department determined defendant Sprint Communications was entitled to the state’s sales tax returns and records of other providers of mobile telecommunications voice services, but with the names of the providers redacted.  The action was brought by the state and alleged the underpayment of sales tax:

The People claim that they will use only material obtained from third-party discovery and that they have disclosed those materials to defendants. However, the fact that the People have chosen to restrict the materials they will use to prosecute defendants does not mean that defendants must restrict the materials they will use to defend themselves. Moreover, defendants cannot obtain … [the] documents from third parties.

If a document that shows another cell phone company’s or DTF’s position about debundling, etc., happens to mention the other cell phone company’s name, the People may not withhold the entire document. … Instead, the People should replace the taxpayers’ names with “Cell Phone Company No. 1” and “Cell Phone Company No. 2,” or the like. People v Sprint Communications Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01801, 1st Dept 3-15-17

 

TAX LAW (IN THIS PROSECUTION ALLEGING DEFENDANT CELL PHONE COMPANY’S UNDERPAYMENT OF SALES TAX, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE SALES TAX RETURNS OF OTHER CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS)/SALES TAX (CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS, IN THIS PROSECUTION ALLEGING DEFENDANT CELL PHONE COMPANY’S UNDERPAYMENT OF SALES TAX, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE SALES TAX RETURNS OF OTHER CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS)/CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS (SALES TAX, IN THIS PROSECUTION ALLEGING DEFENDANT CELL PHONE COMPANY’S UNDERPAYMENT OF SALES TAX, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE SALES TAX RETURNS OF OTHER CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS)

March 15, 2017/by CurlyHost
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Tax Law

AMUSEMENT TAX AND CABARET TAX PROVISIONS ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO AN ADULT ENTERTAINMENT CLUB; TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF DRAMATIC OR MUSICAL ART PERFORMANCES ARE PROPERLY NOT AVAILABLE TO THE CLUB.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, determined the provisions of the Tax Law which allow the imposition of an amusement tax and a cabaret tax were not unconstitutional either facially or as applied to the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs operate a men’s entertainment club featuring topless dancers (Hustler Club). The Tax Law includes exemptions for certain types of entertainment, i.e., dramatic or musical art performances. Plaintiffs argued the exemptions should apply to the adult entertainment at the club, as well. In rejecting the constitutional arguments, the court wrote:

Here, the Tax Laws are laws “of general application” … . The Amusement Tax applies to sales at “[a]ny place where any facilities for entertainment, amusement, or sports are provided” (Tax Law § 1101[d][10]), and the Cabaret Tax applies to sales at “[a]ny roof garden, cabaret or other similar place which furnishes a public performance for profit” (Tax Law § 1101[d][12]). The Tax Laws “ha[ve] not selected a narrow group to bear fully the burden of the tax” … , since the taxes imposed on plaintiffs are equally applicable to many other types of entertainment and recreational activities, including sporting events, car races, amusement parks, arcades, zoos, animal performances, and magic acts … . Nor are the performances of the sort presented at the Hustler Club “singled out for special treatment”… based on their erotic, sexual, or adult nature. The performances merely happen to fall under the very broad categories of “entertainment” or “amusement,” for purposes of the Amusement Tax, and “public performance for profit,” for purposes of the Cabaret Tax. CMSG Rest. Group, LLC v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 07280, 1st Dept 11-3-16

TAX LAW (AMUSEMENT TAX AND CABARET TAX PROVISIONS ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO AN ADULT ENTERTAINMENT CLUB; TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF DRAMATIC OR MUSICAL ART PERFORMANCES ARE PROPERLY NOT AVAILABLE TO THE CLUB)/AMUSEMENT TAX (AMUSEMENT TAX AND CABARET TAX PROVISIONS ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO AN ADULT ENTERTAINMENT CLUB; TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF DRAMATIC OR MUSICAL ART PERFORMANCES ARE PROPERLY NOT AVAILABLE TO THE CLUB)/CABARET TAX (AMUSEMENT TAX AND CABARET TAX PROVISIONS ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO AN ADULT ENTERTAINMENT CLUB; TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF DRAMATIC OR MUSICAL ART PERFORMANCES ARE PROPERLY NOT AVAILABLE TO THE CLUB)/ADULT ENTERTAINMENT (AMUSEMENT TAX AND CABARET TAX PROVISIONS ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO AN ADULT ENTERTAINMENT CLUB; TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF DRAMATIC OR MUSICAL ART PERFORMANCES ARE PROPERLY NOT AVAILABLE TO THE CLUB)

November 3, 2016/by CurlyHost
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Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Tax Law

DOCUMENTS WHICH REFLECT INFORMATION IN TAX RETURNS ARE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER THE TAX LAW.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL), TAX LAW.

The Third Department determined Supreme Court properly withheld from disclosure both tax returns and documents which reflect information included in tax returns:

“The policy behind the [tax] secrecy provisions is twofold: to protect personal privacy interests in the information on a return, which may reveal information concerning a person’s activities, associations and beliefs, and to encourage voluntary compliance with the tax laws by preventing use of return information to harm the reporting taxpayer” … . As relevant here, the statute prohibits the disclosure of “any particulars” by any person who “is permitted to inspect” a return, receives “any information contained in any [return]” or who “in any manner may acquire knowledge of the contents of a [return]” (Tax Law § 211 [8] [a]). By its terms, therefore, the confidentially required by the statute necessarily extends to any document that reflects information included in a return. If we were to construe the statute to only protect the secrecy of the return, the purpose of the statute would not be served … , and we find, in particular, that Tax Law § 211 (8) (a) prohibits the Department from releasing an agreement made with another taxpayer (see Tax Law §§ 171 [18]; 210-A [11]). … Contrary to petitioner’s arguments, where, as here, a document is exempt from disclosure pursuant to state statute, it may not be subjected to redaction … . Matter of Moody’s Corp. & Subsidiaries v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 2016 NY Slip Op 05612, 3rd Dept 7-21-16

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) (DOCUMENTS WHICH REFLECT INFORMATION IN TAX RETURNS ARE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER THE TAX LAW)/TAX LAW (DOCUMENTS WHICH REFLECT INFORMATION IN TAX RETURNS ARE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER THE TAX LAW)/TAX RETURNS  (DOCUMENTS WHICH REFLECT INFORMATION IN TAX RETURNS ARE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER THE TAX LAW)

July 20, 2016/by CurlyHost
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Indian Law, Tax Law

TAX ON CIGARETTE SALES TO NON-INDIANS UPHELD.

The Fourth Department upheld the state's ability to impose a tax on the sale of cigarettes to non-Indians and non-members of the Seneca Nation:

It is well established that “the States have a valid interest in ensuring compliance with lawful taxes that might easily be evaded through purchases of tax-exempt cigarettes on reservations . . . States may impose on reservation retailers minimal burdens reasonably tailored to the collection of valid taxes from non-Indians” … . Although plaintiffs are obligated to pay the amount due as tax from non-Indians who have the tax liability, and from whom the amount is collected at the time of the sale, “this burden is not, strictly speaking, a tax at all” … . White v Schneiderman, 2016 NY Slip Op 04533, 4th Dept 6-18-16

TAX LAW (TAX ON CIGARETTE SALES TO NON-INDIANS UPHELD)/INDIAN LAW (TAX ON CIGARETTE SALES TO NON-INDIANS UPHELD)/CIGARETTES (TAX ON CIGARETTE SALES TO NON-INDIANS UPHELD)

June 18, 2016/by CurlyHost
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Tax Law, Trusts and Estates

LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES.

The Second Department determined the value of properties transferred upon decedent's death was the fair market value at the time of death. The fact that decedent willed life estates in the properties did not diminish the value of the properties for estate tax purposes:

“Because the estate tax is a tax on the privilege of transferring property upon one's death, the property to be valued for estate tax purposes is that which the decedent actually transfers at his death rather than the interest held by the decedent before death or that held by the legatee after death” … . An estate tax taxes “not the interest to which the legatees and devisees succeeded on death, but the interest which ceased by reason of the death” … . “The value of every item of property includible in a decedent's gross estate … is its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death” … . An estate tax is a tax on the privilege of passing on property, not a tax on the privilege of receiving property; “[t]he tax is on the act of the testator not on the receipt of the property by the legatees” … .

Therefore, contrary to the petitioner's contention, the life estates in the condominium and cooperative apartment granted by the decedent to his longtime companion upon the decedent's death did not diminish the value of those properties for estate tax purposes and should not have been taken into account on the estate tax return. Matter of Cleary, 2016 NY Slip Op 04410, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES)/TAX LAW (ESTATE TAX, (LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES)/ESTATE TAX (LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES)

June 8, 2016/by CurlyHost
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Municipal Law, Tax Law

PETITIONER’S EMPIRE ZONE CERTIFICATION PROPERLY REVOKED.

The Third Department determined decertification of petitioner's Empire Zone status was supported by sufficient evidence, including, but not limited to, petitioner's affirmative response to whether it was subject to a Tax Law provision which required it to demonstrate the business was formed for a valid business purpose:

As a participant in the Empire Zones Program, petitioner was required to complete and submit business annual reports (hereinafter BARs) that provided information about its activities, employment and investments (see 5 NYCRR 11.7). The BAR that petitioner completed for 2006 included a section inquiring whether its business was subject to a recently-enacted Tax Law provision that excluded certain firms from receiving tax benefits unless they could establish that they had been formed for a valid business purpose (see Tax Law § 14 [j] [4] [B]). Petitioner responded affirmatively and, as required by the form, attached a statement explaining that it had been formed by combining two previously-existing accounting firms for various valid business purposes. We find that petitioner's affirmative response on the 2006 BAR, taken together with facts set forth in the attached explanatory statement, provided a rational basis for the Commissioner's decertification decision.

Petitioner's mere affirmative response to the question whether the Tax Law provision was applicable to its business, without more, would not have sufficed to provide a rational basis for the determination that it was a shirt-changer. * * * However, the statement that petitioner attached to the 2006 BAR to demonstrate that it was formed for a valid business purpose contained factual information that was relevant to the Commissioner's 2009 analysis. In the statement, petitioner averred that it was formed in 2002 by combining two previously existing accounting firms, one of which — then known as Dermody, Burke & Brown, P.C. — had been engaged in the practice of public accountancy for 50 years. According to the statement, the 14 shareholders of this firm joined with the seven partners of a second accounting firm, Pasquale and Bowers, LLP, to become members of a new entity, which subsequently carried on the combined practices of the two previous firms. These factual assertions were sufficient to give rise to the reasonable inference that petitioner had caused individuals to transfer from existing employment with the previous two accounting firms to similar employment with petitioner, and that — as petitioner's members were the same individuals who had been the members and shareholders of its predecessors — its ownership was similar to that of the prior firms. Accordingly, there was an evidentiary basis for the determination that petitioner was a shirt-changer within the meaning of the 2009 legislation … . Matter of Dermody, Burke & Brown, CPAs, LLC v Department of Economic Dev., 2016 NY Slip Op 04286, 3rd Dept 6-2-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (PETITIONER'S EMPIRE ZONE CERTIFICATION PROPERLY REVOKED)/TAX LAW (PETITIONER'S EMPIRE ZONE CERTIFICATION PROPERLY REVOKED)/EMPIRE ZONES PROGRAM (PETITIONER'S EMPIRE ZONE CERTIFICATION PROPERLY REVOKED)

June 2, 2016/by CurlyHost
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Municipal Law, Tax Law

PETITIONER’S EMPIRE ZONE CERTIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVOKED.

The Third Department, reversing the Empire Zone Designation Board, determined the decision to revoke petitioner's Empire Zones Program certification was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that petitioner's affirmative response to a question mandated by the Tax Law concerning whether petitioner had ever been required to demonstrate the business was formed for a valid business purpose was not, standing alone, a basis for decertification:

In deciding whether a business should be decertified for failing the shirt-changer test, the Commissioner was directed to determine whether the entity had “caused individuals to transfer from existing employment with another business enterprise with similar ownership . . . to similar employment with the certified business enterprise or if the enterprise acquired, purchased, leased, or had transferred to it real property previously owned by an entity with similar ownership, regardless of form of incorporation or organization” (General Municipal Law § 959 [a] [v] [5]; see General Municipal Law § 959 [w]). Petitioner contends that it never engaged in such transfers of real property or employment, that the administrative record lacks any evidence to the contrary, and, thus, that there is no factual basis for the determination that this provision was violated. We agree, and therefore find that the Board's denial of petitioner's appeal from the revocation of its certificate was “arbitrary and capricious and without a rational basis” … . Matter of PG Erie Props., LLC v Department of Economic Dev., 2016 NY Slip Op 04284, 3rd Dept 6-2-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (PETITIONER'S EMPIRE ZONE CERTIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVOKED)/TAX LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, PETITIONER'S EMPIRE ZONE CERTIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVOKED)/EMPIRE ZONES PROGRAM (PETITIONER'S EMPIRE ZONE CERTIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVOKED)

June 2, 2016/by CurlyHost
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Constitutional Law, Education-School Law, Tax Law

EDUCATION LAW STATUTE REQUIRING A 60% MAJORITY TO AUTHORIZE A PROPERTY TAX INCREASE OVER THE STATUTORY CAP (TO FUND SCHOOL DISTRICTS) IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Devine, over a partial dissent, determined the Education Law statute which requires a 60% majority vote to increase property taxes beyond the statutory cap (to fund local school districts) is constitutional.  The Election Article of the New York Constitution, the due process clause, the right to equal protection under the law, and the fundamental right to vote were deemed not to have been violated by the statute. With regard to the equal protection argument, the court wrote:

Defendants suggest, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that Education Law § 2023-a ,,, [was] designed with the legitimate goal in mind of restraining onerous property tax increases that were believed to be depressing economic activity in the State … . Plaintiffs suggest that it is irrational to achieve this legitimate aim in a manner that impairs local control of schools and deters poorer school districts that would otherwise seek a property tax increase over the tax cap to keep pace with educational needs. It suffices to say that, while Education Law § 2023-a … incentivize[s] districts and their residents to avoid property tax increases over the tax cap, neither prevents such increases if sufficient community support exists for them (see Education Law § 2023-a [6]). The differences in the services offered by various school districts accordingly result from a permissible consequence of local control over schools, namely, the variable “willingness of the taxpayers of [different] districts to pay for and to provide enriched educational services and facilities beyond what the basic per pupil expenditure figures will permit” … . Inasmuch as there is nothing irrational in this, plaintiffs' equal protection claims fail … . New York State United Teachers v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 03572, 3rd Dept 5-5-16

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (EDUCATION LAW STATUTE REQUIRING A 60% MAJORITY TO AUTHORIZE A PROPERTY TAX INCREASE OVER THE STATUTORY CAP (TO FUND SCHOOL DISTRICTS) IS CONSTITUTIONAL)/TAX LAW (EDUCATION LAW STATUTE REQUIRING A 60% MAJORITY TO AUTHORIZE A PROPERTY TAX INCREASE OVER THE STATUTORY CAP (TO FUND SCHOOL DISTRICTS) IS CONSTITUTIONAL)/CONSITUTIONAL LAW  (EDUCATION LAW STATUTE REQUIRING A 60% MAJORITY TO AUTHORIZE A PROPERTY TAX INCREASE OVER THE STATUTORY CAP (TO FUND SCHOOL DISTRICTS) IS CONSTITUTIONAL)

May 5, 2016/by CurlyHost
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False Claims Act, Tax Law

Attorney General’s Complaint Against Sprint Stated a Cause of Action Under the False Claims Act Re: Sales Tax On Wireless Phone Calls

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Lippman, over a partial dissent, determined the attorney general’s (AG’s) complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action against Sprint, based upon the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging the knowing submission of false sales tax statements re: interstate and international wireless phone calls. The court succinctly stated its holding as follows:

… (1) the New York Tax Law imposes sales tax on interstate voice service sold by a mobile provider along with other services for a fixed monthly charge; (2) the statute is unambiguous; (3) the statute is not preempted by federal law; (4) the Attorney General’s (AG) complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action under the New York False Claims Act (FCA)(State Finance Law § 187 et seq.); and (5) the damages recoverable under the FCA are not barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. People v Sprint Nextel Corp., 2015 NY Slip Op 07574, CtApp 10-20-15

 

October 20, 2015/by CurlyHost
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