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You are here: Home1 / Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

NEW JERSEY CONVICTION FOR LEWDNESS, ALTHOUGH NOT A REGISTRABLE OFFENSE IN NEW JERSEY, IS THE EQUIVALENT OF ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD; IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER THE CONDUCT UNDERLYING THE FOREIGN OFFENSE IN ADDITION TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE; 30 POINT ASSESSMENT BASED ON THE NEW JERSEY CONVICTION WAS CORRECT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, over a concurrence and a two-judge dissent, determined defendant was properly assessed 30 points based upon his prior New Jersey conviction for lewdness. The New Jersey offense, based upon defendant’s repeatedly exposing himself to the 12-year-old victim,  was deemed the equivalent of New York’s endangering the welfare of a child:

At the SORA court hearing, defendant challenged the assessment of 30 points under risk factor 9, asserting that his New Jersey lewdness conviction was neither a registrable offense in New Jersey nor did the comparable offense under New York law—public lewdness (a misdemeanor)—subject defendant to SORA registration in New York … . * * *

At the outset, we must resolve whether reliance on the underlying conduct of a prior foreign conviction is appropriate as a matter of law for purposes of assessing points under risk factor 9 when conducting a SORA risk-level determination. Under these circumstances, we hold that it is. * * *

Our analysis of the New Jersey conviction starts with North v Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders of State of New York, wherein we considered whether the defendant was required to register as a sex offender as a result of his federal conviction for possession of child pornography (8 NY3d 745 [2007]). That question turned on the “essential elements” provision in SORA, which defines “sex offense,” in relevant part, as “a conviction of an offense in any other jurisdiction which includes all of the essential elements of any [registrable sex offense in New York listed in section 168-a (2) of the Correction Law]” … . We concluded that, with respect to registrable offenses, the “essential elements” provision “requires registration whenever an individual is convicted of criminal conduct in a foreign jurisdiction that, if committed in New York, would have amounted to a registrable New York offense” … . …

In the SORA registration context … we [have held] that the strict equivalency standard was “not the optimal vehicle to effectuate SORA’s remedial purposes” and it was thus appropriate to utilize a more flexible approach that allowed consideration of the underlying conduct of a foreign conviction in addition to comparing the essential elements of the foreign and New York offense … . People v Perez, 2020 NY Slip Op 02096, CtApp 3-26-20

 

March 26, 2020
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-03-26 20:22:072020-03-27 20:49:55NEW JERSEY CONVICTION FOR LEWDNESS, ALTHOUGH NOT A REGISTRABLE OFFENSE IN NEW JERSEY, IS THE EQUIVALENT OF ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD; IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER THE CONDUCT UNDERLYING THE FOREIGN OFFENSE IN ADDITION TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE; 30 POINT ASSESSMENT BASED ON THE NEW JERSEY CONVICTION WAS CORRECT (CT APP).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

AN ENTRY IN THE CASE SUMMARY ALONE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF POINTS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reducing defendant’s risk level, determined that an entry in the case summary alone is not sufficient to justify an assessment of points:

We agree with defendant that the People failed to prove by the requisite clear and convincing evidence that he had committed a continuing course of sexual misconduct, i.e., risk factor 4 on the risk assessment instrument (RAI) … . The sole evidence presented by the People in support of that risk factor was the case summary prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders. At the SORA hearing, however, defendant specifically denied the allegation within the case summary that he engaged in a continuing course of sexual misconduct, and instead testified that he engaged in one instance only. Indeed, it is undisputed that defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of rape in the third degree … stemming from a specific instance of intercourse that occurred on one specified day. We conclude that “the case summary alone is not sufficient to satisfy the People’s burden of proving the risk level assessment by clear and convincing evidence where, as here, defendant contested the factual allegations related to [the] risk factor” … . People v Maund, 2020 NY Slip Op 02011, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

 

March 20, 2020
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-03-20 18:43:002020-03-22 18:44:53AN ENTRY IN THE CASE SUMMARY ALONE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF POINTS (FOURTH DEPT).
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Judges, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, ASSESSED POINTS ON A THEORY NOT RAISED BY THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF SEX OFFENDERS OR THE PEOPLE; DEFENDANT WAS THEREBY DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, assessed points on a theory not raised by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders or the People:

… [D]efendant contends, and the People correctly concede, that County Court violated his right to due process by sua sponte assessing points on a theory not raised by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders or the People … . The due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions require that a defendant be afforded notice of the hearing to determine his or her risk level pursuant to SORA and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the risk level assessment … . Here, no allegations were made either in the risk assessment instrument (RAI) or by the People at the SORA hearing that defendant should be assessed 30 points under risk factor 3, and defendant learned of the assessment of the additional points under that risk factor for the first time when the court issued its decision … . …

The court stated that, if defendant were a presumptive level one risk, an upward departure to level two would be warranted based on certain aggravating factors stemming from the nature of the crimes. Because those factors were not presented as bases for departure in the RAI or by the People at the hearing, defendant was not afforded notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond to them … . People v Wilke, 2020 NY Slip Op 02002, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

 

March 20, 2020
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-03-20 09:31:132020-03-22 09:48:17JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, ASSESSED POINTS ON A THEORY NOT RAISED BY THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF SEX OFFENDERS OR THE PEOPLE; DEFENDANT WAS THEREBY DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT).
Appeals, Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

SCHOOL-GROUNDS-PROXIMITY-RESIDENCE PROHIBITION APPLIED TO PETITIONER, A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER, EVEN THOUGH THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH HE WAS BEING PAROLED WAS BURGLARY; SECOND DEPARTMENT DISAGREED WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE BY THE THIRD AND FOURTH DEPARTMENTS; APPEAL WAS HEARD AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and disagreeing with the Third and Fourth Departments, determined Executive Law 259-c (14), which prohibits sex offenders from entering school grounds, applied to petitioner in this habeas corpus proceeding. Petitioner had been designated a level three sex offender and was subsequently arrested and incarcerated for burglary. He was not released on parole for the burglary conviction when his sentence was complete because housing which complied with the school-grounds condition could not be found. Although the habeas corpus petition was moot because defendant had been released at the time of the appeal, the exception to the mootness doctrine allowed appellate review:

Executive Law § 259-c(14) provides, in relevant part, that “where a person serving a sentence for an offense defined in [Penal Law articles 130, 135, or 263, or Penal Law §§ 255.25, 255.26, or 255.27] and the victim of such offense was under the age of [18] at the time of such offense or such person has been designated a level three sex offender pursuant to [Correction Law § 168-l(6)], is released on parole or conditionally released pursuant to [Executive Law § 259-c(1) or (2)], the [Board of Parole] shall require, as a mandatory condition of such release, that such sentenced offender shall refrain from knowingly entering into or upon any school grounds, as that term is defined in [Penal Law § 220.00(14)], . . . while one or more of such persons under the age of [18] are present.”

As a result of its inartful wording and use of the term “such person,” Executive Law § 259-c(14) has been interpreted in opposing fashion by the Appellate Division, Third Department (see People ex rel. Negron v Superintendent Woodbourne Corr. Facility, 170 AD3d 12) and the Appellate Division, Fourth Department (see People ex rel. Garcia v Annucci, 167 AD3d 199). Inasmuch as the statute is amenable to competing interpretations, we agree with the appellants that the language of the statute is ambiguous and should be interpreted with reference to its legislative history and the purpose of the enactment of the 2005 amendment … . The legislative history clearly supports an interpretation that imposes the SARA [Sexual Assault Reform Act]-residency requirement based on either an offender’s conviction of a specifically enumerated offense against an underage victim or the offender’s status as a level three sex offender … . People ex rel. Rosario v Superintendent, Fishkill Corr. Facility, 2020 NY Slip Op 01178, Second Dept 2-19-20

 

February 19, 2020
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-02-19 09:18:132020-02-22 09:44:05SCHOOL-GROUNDS-PROXIMITY-RESIDENCE PROHIBITION APPLIED TO PETITIONER, A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER, EVEN THOUGH THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH HE WAS BEING PAROLED WAS BURGLARY; SECOND DEPARTMENT DISAGREED WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE BY THE THIRD AND FOURTH DEPARTMENTS; APPEAL WAS HEARD AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

‘RELIABLE HEARSAY’ IN A PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION (PSI) REPORT IS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR A FINDING DEFENDANT USED VIOLENCE IN THE COMMISSION OF A SEX OFFENSE; LEVEL TWO RISK ASSESSMENT UPHELD (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over an extensive two-judge dissent, determined documentary evidence of “reliable hearsay” was sufficient for a finding defendant used violence to coerce the child victim in this “course of sexual conduct against a child” case, Therefore defendant was properly adjudicated a level two risk of reoffense:

At a SORA hearing conducted as defendant was nearing completion of his prison sentence, he was adjudicated a level two risk of reoffense due, in part, to the assessment of ten points under risk factor one, use of violence. That finding was based on information in the Presentence Investigation (PSI) report prepared in connection with the offense stating that “[o]n one or more occasions, he used physical force to coerce the victim into cooperation,” information also included in the case summary prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders. Defendant argues that this evidence was insufficient to supply evidence of use of violence because it constituted hearsay and did not more specifically describe his conduct. …

SORA adjudications, by design, are typically based on documentary evidence under the statute’s “reliable hearsay” standard. Case summaries and PSI reports meet that standard … , meaning they can provide sufficient evidence to support the imposition of points. PSI reports are prepared by probation officers who investigate the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense, defendant’s record of delinquency or criminality, family situation and social, employment, economic, educational and personal history, analyzing that data to provide a sentencing recommendation (see CPL 390.30[1]). Their primary function is to assist a criminal court in determining the appropriate sentence for the particular defendant based on the specific offense. Defendants have a right to review the report prior to sentencing (see CPL 390.50[2][a]) and may challenge the accuracy of any facts contained therein at that time (see CPL 400.10). * * *

Because there is record support for the imposition of points under risk factor one, there is no basis to disturb the Appellate Division order. People v Diaz, 2020 NY Slip Op 01114, CtApp 2-18-20

 

February 18, 2020
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-02-18 10:10:582020-02-21 10:29:46‘RELIABLE HEARSAY’ IN A PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION (PSI) REPORT IS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR A FINDING DEFENDANT USED VIOLENCE IN THE COMMISSION OF A SEX OFFENSE; LEVEL TWO RISK ASSESSMENT UPHELD (CT APP).
Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

THERE SHOULD ONLY BE ONE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING BASED UPON THE SAME RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (RAI); HERE THERE WERE TWO ASSESSMENTS IN TWO COUNTIES, ONE AT LEVEL TWO AND ONE AT LEVEL THREE; THE LEVEL THREE RISK ASSESSMENT WAS VACATED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined there should not be more than one SORA risk assessment for convictions stemming from the same course of conduct and based upon the same Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI). The first risk assessment was in Allegany County and designated defendant a level two risk. The second risk assessment was in Cattaraugus County and designated defendant a level three risk based upon the evidence. The Cattaraugus County assessment was vacated:

… [D]efendant was convicted in Cattaraugus County Court upon his plea of guilty of attempted sodomy in the second degree and, that same year, he was convicted in Allegany County Court upon his plea of guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree. The convictions stemmed from a course of conduct against one victim that occurred in both jurisdictions. Defendant was sentenced in both cases and, prior to his release from prison, Allegany County Court held a proceeding to determine his risk level designation under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (Correction Law § 168 et seq.) and designated him a level two risk. Cattaraugus County Court subsequently held a SORA proceeding utilizing a risk assessment instrument (RAI) and case summary that were substantively identical to those used in the Allegany County SORA proceeding, but designated defendant a level three risk. On a prior appeal … , we affirmed the order of Cattaraugus County Court designating him a level three risk.

“Where, as here, a single RAI addressing all relevant conduct is prepared, the goal of assessing the risk posed by the offender is fulfilled by a single SORA adjudication. To hold otherwise—that is, to permit multiple risk level determinations based on conduct included in a single RAI—would result in redundant proceedings and constitute a waste of judicial resources” … . In order to prevent multiple courts from reaching conflicting conclusions based on the same RAI, “one—and only one—sentencing court should render a risk level determination based on all conduct contained in the RAI” … . Inasmuch as the Cattaraugus County SORA proceeding was duplicative, we reverse the order and vacate defendant’s risk level determination  by Cattaraugus County Court … . People v Miller, 2020 NY Slip Op 00766, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

 

January 31, 2020
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-01-31 16:17:562020-02-01 16:33:28THERE SHOULD ONLY BE ONE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING BASED UPON THE SAME RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (RAI); HERE THERE WERE TWO ASSESSMENTS IN TWO COUNTIES, ONE AT LEVEL TWO AND ONE AT LEVEL THREE; THE LEVEL THREE RISK ASSESSMENT WAS VACATED (FOURTH DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

PEOPLE’S APPLICATION FOR AN UPWARD DEPARTURE NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED BUT NEVER INDICTED OR CONVICTED DOES NOT MEET THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING STANDARD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the People’s application for an upward department was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Evidence defendant was charged but not indicted or convicted does not meet the clear and convincing standard:

A departure from the presumptive risk level is generally the exception, not the rule (see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]). Where the People seek an upward departure, they must identify an aggravating factor that tends to establish a higher likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines, and prove the facts in support of the aggravating factor by clear and convincing evidence … .

Here, contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the People failed to prove the existence of an aggravating factor by clear and convincing evidence. In granting an upward departure, the court relied upon the defendant’s criminal history. However, the Guidelines account for an offender’s criminal history by assessing points under risk factor 9, and the defendant’s history here was not so extraordinary, extensive, or serious as to demonstrate that the assessment of those points was inadequate to capture his actual risk of reoffense and danger to the community . Further, an upward departure could not properly be based upon certain prior conduct of which the defendant was charged but either never indicted or never convicted, as the People’s evidence regarding that alleged conduct did not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard … . People v Pittman, 2020 NY Slip Op 00443, Second Dept 1-22-20

 

January 22, 2020
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-01-22 11:05:522020-01-26 11:27:07PEOPLE’S APPLICATION FOR AN UPWARD DEPARTURE NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED BUT NEVER INDICTED OR CONVICTED DOES NOT MEET THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING STANDARD (SECOND DEPT).
Appeals, Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

COUNTY COURT DID NOT ISSUE A WRITTEN ORDER RE THE DEFENDANT’S RISK ASSESSMENT PURSUANT TO THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA); THEREFORE THE APPEAL WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND WAS DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined Count Court had not issued a written order with respect to the defendant’s risk assessment under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) and therefor the appeal was not properly before the court:

Following a hearing at which the People advocated for an upward departure, County Court granted the request and classified defendant as a risk level three sex offender with a sexually violent offender designation. Defendant appeals.

It is a statutory requirement that County Court “render an order setting forth its determinations and findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the determinations are based” (Correction Law § 168-n [3] … ). That written order then must be “entered and filed in the office of the clerk of the court where the action is triable” (CPLR 2220 [a] …).

Although the record before us contains a decision of County Court that sets forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court did not issue a written order and the risk assessment instrument does not contain the “so ordered” language so as to constitute an appealable order. Absent any order by the court, this appeal is not properly before us and must be dismissed … . People v Johnson, 2020 NY Slip Op 00006, Third Dept 1-2-20

 

January 2, 2020
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-01-02 18:56:082020-01-24 05:45:49COUNTY COURT DID NOT ISSUE A WRITTEN ORDER RE THE DEFENDANT’S RISK ASSESSMENT PURSUANT TO THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA); THEREFORE THE APPEAL WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND WAS DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

SPANISH-LANGUAGE CONVICTION RECORDS FROM PUERTO RICO, WHICH WERE NOT TRANSLATED, WERE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE DEFENDANT TO BE A SEX OFFENDER (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, vacating the risk level determination, determined the proof defendant was a sex offender was insufficient. The documents relating to a conviction in Puerto Rico were in Spanish and were not translated:

We agree with defendant that, in making its determination that defendant is a sex offender, the Board erred in relying on documents in Spanish that were not accompanied by an English translation (see generally CPLR 2101 [b]). Upon defendant’s objection during the SORA hearing to the Board’s determination, no additional documents were submitted to support the Board’s determination. Thus, there is no English-translated document stating the offense of which defendant was convicted in Puerto Rico, and therefore there is no competent evidence to support the Board’s determination that defendant was convicted of a felony offense in another jurisdiction … . In addition, the purported sex offender registration form showing that defendant was required to register in Puerto Rico is entirely in Spanish, and thus there is no competent evidence to support the Board’s determination that defendant was required to register as a sex offender in Puerto Rico … . People v Ramos, 2019 NY Slip Op 09153, Fourth Dept 12-20-19

 

December 20, 2019
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-12-20 10:27:342020-01-28 14:55:38SPANISH-LANGUAGE CONVICTION RECORDS FROM PUERTO RICO, WHICH WERE NOT TRANSLATED, WERE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE DEFENDANT TO BE A SEX OFFENDER (FOURTH DEPT). ​
Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF 30 POINTS UNDER RISK FACTOR 9; DEFENDANT WAS THEREFORE A PRESUMPTIVE LEVEL ONE; HAD THE PEOPLE KNOWN DEFENDANT WAS PRESUMPTIVE LEVEL ONE THEY WOULD HAVE SOUGHT AN UPWARD DEPARTURE; MATTER REMITTED FOR A NEW DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s conviction of attempted endangering the welfare of a child did not meet the criteria for assessing 30 points under risk factor 9, and therefore defendant should have been assessed at a presumptive level one. The People argued that had the defendant been assessed at a presumptive level one they would have sought an upward department based on aggravating factors. The matter was remitted for a new determination:

Risk factor 9 requires the assessment of 30 points where “[t]he offender has a prior criminal history that includes a conviction or adjudication for the class A felonies of Murder, Kidnaping or Arson, a violent felony, a misdemeanor sex crime, or endangering the welfare of a child, or any adjudication for a sex offense” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary [hereinafter Guidelines], risk factor 9 [2006]). Here, as the defendant contends, the Supreme Court should not have assessed 30 points under risk factor 9 based on his prior conviction for attempted endangering the welfare of a child inasmuch as that conviction was neither for a felony, nor for a “sex offense” (Correction Law § 168-a[2]), “nor a conviction for actually endangering the welfare of a child” … . Accordingly, only 5 points could be assigned under risk factor 9 for “[p]rior history/no sex crimes or felonies,” resulting in a total score of less than 70 points, a presumptive risk level one … . People v Lewis, 2019 NY Slip Op 09045, Second Dept 12-18-19

 

December 18, 2019
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-12-18 09:41:572020-01-24 05:52:10DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF 30 POINTS UNDER RISK FACTOR 9; DEFENDANT WAS THEREFORE A PRESUMPTIVE LEVEL ONE; HAD THE PEOPLE KNOWN DEFENDANT WAS PRESUMPTIVE LEVEL ONE THEY WOULD HAVE SOUGHT AN UPWARD DEPARTURE; MATTER REMITTED FOR A NEW DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).
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