You are here: / Negligence
, ,

DESPITE THE CITY CODE PROVISION CREATING A NONDELEGABLE DUTY ON THE OWNER’S PART TO MAINTAIN AN ABUTTING SIDEWALK, THE TERMS OF THE LEASE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE TENANT’S LIABILITY [LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES ARISING FROM CONTRACT].

The Second Department determined plaintiffs raised a question of fact when the terms of the lease created a duty on the part of the tenant (the City here) to maintain the abutting sidewalk:

Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210 imposes a nondelegable duty on a property owner to maintain and repair the sidewalk abutting its property, and specifically imposes liability upon certain property owners for injuries resulting from a violation of the code provision (see Administrative Code § 7-210…).

As a general rule, the provisions of a lease obligating a tenant to repair the sidewalk do not impose on the tenant a duty to a third party … . This is in accordance with the principle that “a contractual obligation, standing alone, will generally not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party” … . However, the Court of Appeals has recognized that there are exceptions to this general rule and that there are situations in which a party who enters into a contract may be said to have assumed a duty of care to third parties

The lease, inter alia, required the City, at its sole cost and expense, to take good care of the sidewalk, and “make all repairs thereto, ordinary and extraordinary, foreseen and unforeseen.” It also provided that the former owner “shall have no responsibility and shall not be required to furnish any services, make any repairs or to perform any other maintenance work.” The plaintiffs’ submission of this evidence raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the City’s lease was comprehensive and exclusive as to sidewalk maintenance so as to entirely displace the former landowner’s duty to maintain the sidewalk … . Hsu v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 08348, 2nd Dept 12-14-16

NEGLIGENCE (DESPITE THE CITY CODE PROVISION CREATING A NONDELEGABLE DUTY ON THE OWNER’S PART TO MAINTAIN AN ABUTTING SIDEWALK, THE TERMS OF THE LEASE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE TENANT’S LIABILITY [LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES ARISING FROM CONTRACT])/CONTRACT LAW (TORT LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES, DESPITE THE CITY CODE PROVISION CREATING A NONDELEGABLE DUTY ON THE OWNER’S PART TO MAINTAIN AN ABUTTING SIDEWALK, THE TERMS OF THE LEASE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE TENANT’S LIABILITY)/LANDLORD-TENANT (SLIP AND FALL, DESPITE THE CITY CODE PROVISION CREATING A NONDELEGABLE DUTY ON THE OWNER’S PART TO MAINTAIN AN ABUTTING SIDEWALK, THE TERMS OF THE LEASE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE TENANT’S LIABILITY [LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES ARISING FROM CONTRACT])/SLIP AND FALL (DESPITE THE CITY CODE PROVISION CREATING A NONDELEGABLE DUTY ON THE OWNER’S PART TO MAINTAIN AN ABUTTING SIDEWALK, THE TERMS OF THE LEASE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE TENANT’S LIABILITY [LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES ARISING FROM CONTRACT])/SIDEWALKS (DESPITE THE CITY CODE PROVISION CREATING A NONDELEGABLE DUTY ON THE OWNER’S PART TO MAINTAIN AN ABUTTING SIDEWALK, THE TERMS OF THE LEASE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE TENANT’S LIABILITY [LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES ARISING FROM CONTRACT])

DEFENDANT’S CAR MERELY FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment should have been granted to defendant Brady in this bicycle-car collision case. Brady was parked parallel to Dunbar waiting for Dunbar to pull out of a parking space. Plaintiff rode her bicycle between the two cars and struck the door of the Dunbar car when Dunbar opened it to speak to Brady. Brady’s car was deemed not to be a proximate cause of the accident, rather the position of Brady’s car merely furnished the condition for the accident. Dunbar’s motion for summary judgment, however was properly denied:

The Supreme Court should have granted Brady’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the second supplemental complaint insofar as asserted against him. Although the issue of proximate cause is generally one for the jury … , “liability may not be imposed upon a party who merely furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the event’ but was not one of its causes” … . Here, in support of his motion, Brady demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence that his conduct in stopping his car while waiting for a parking space merely furnished the condition or occasion for the accident, and was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries … .

… Dunbar failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Dunbar was negligent in opening the door when it was not reasonably safe to do so, and in allegedly failing to see what, by the reasonable use of his senses, he should have seen … . Price v Tasber, 2016 NY Slip Op 08385, 2nd Dept 12-14-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT’S CAR MERELY FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/PROXIMATE CAUSEEFENDANT’S CAR MERELY FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/ BICYCLES (DEFENDANT’S CAR MERELY FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/CONDITION FOR ACCIDENT (DEFENDANT’S CAR MERELY FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE)

WHEEL STOP OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS.

The Second Department after the grant of defendant’s summary judgment motion in this slip and fall case. The wheel stop over which plaintiff tripped was deemed open and obvious and not inherently dangerous:

Although a landowner has a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe manner … , there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition that is not inherently dangerous … . Generally, “[a] wheel stop or concrete parking lot divider which is clearly visible presents no unreasonable risk of harm” … .

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting, inter alia, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony and photographic evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff tripped when her foot came into contact with a wheel stop that was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous. Among other things, the plaintiff testified at her deposition that she noticed the yellow cement wheel stops in the parking lot shortly before her accident … . Bogaty v Bluestone Realty NY, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08343, 2nd Dept 12-14-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (WHEEL STOP OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS)/SLIP AND FALL (WHEEL STOP OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS)/WHEEL STOPS (WHEEL STOP OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS)/OPEN AND OBVIOUS (WHEEL STOP OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS)

,

INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court correctly set aside a verdict in a slip and fall case as inconsistent. The jury found plaintiff was negligent but her negligence was not a substantial factor in causing her injuries (she slipped and fell on a wet floor in defendant’s store). But the jury went on to attribute 15% of the fault for the accident to plaintiff:

… [W]hen a jury’s verdict is internally inconsistent, the trial court must order either reconsideration by the jury or a new trial … . Under the circumstances here, the jury’s verdict as to liability was internally inconsistent because the jury attributed 15% of the fault for the accident to the plaintiff, despite having found that the plaintiff’s negligence was not a substantial factor in causing her injuries … . The Supreme Court properly determined that the jury was confused about the meaning of the court’s charge regarding proximate cause when it returned its liability verdict … . Magee v Cumberland Farms, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08354,  2nd Dept 12-14-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE)/VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE (INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASSIDE)/NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE)/SLIP AND FALL (INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE)

,

JURY ONLY CONSIDERED THE TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF’S LEG AFTER IT HAD BEEN INJURED BY A DRIVER, THE DRIVER WAS PROPERLY NOT INCLUDED IN THE MALPRACTICE VERDICT SHEET.

The First Department, over a dissent, determined the driver who caused the injury to plaintiff’s leg was properly excluded from the verdict sheet in this medical malpractice action. Only the treatment of the leg injury (amputation) was before the jury, not the original injury:

[T]he court [did not] err in denying defendants’ request to place the driver of the vehicle that struck plaintiff, who settled prior to institution of the instant action, on the verdict sheet. Defendants are subsequent tortfeasors, and the jury was correctly charged that its award was to be limited to the exacerbation of the original injury caused by malpractice … . Defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s original injury and subsequent amputation were indivisible is without merit, in that the experts testified as to what the condition of the leg would have been if it had been saved … . Defendants’ arguments concerning General Obligations Law § 15-108 are academic, given that the court reduced the judgment based upon the settlement received by the settling driver. Marin v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 08294, 1st Dept 12-8-16

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, JURY ONLY CONSIDERED THE TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF’S LEG AFTER IT HAD BEEN INJURED BY A DRIVER, THE DRIVER WAS PROPERLY NOT INCLUDED IN THE MALPRACTICE VERDICT SHEET)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (JURY ONLY CONSIDERED THE TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF’S LEG AFTER IT HAD BEEN INJURED BY A DRIVER, THE DRIVER WAS PROPERLY NOT INCLUDED IN THE MALPRACTICE VERDICT SHEET)

,

CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this traffic accident case, determined the causes of action against abutting property owners (the Herlichs) and the county alleging obstruction of sight at an intersection should not have been dismissed:

“A homeowner has no duty under the common law to prevent vegetation from creating a visual obstruction to users of a public roadway, but a duty to such users may be created by statute or ordinance” … . “[W]here a specific regulatory provision . . . imposes upon property owners a duty to prevent vegetation from visually obstructing the roadway, proof of noncompliance with the regulatory provision may give rise to tort liability for any damages proximately caused thereby” … . Here, the Herlich defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as they failed to demonstrate that the hedge on their property did not constitute a visual obstruction in violation of Code of the Town of Oyster Bay chapter 246 § 246-4.4.4, and Code of the Village of Massapequa Park chapter 298, article I, § … . …

“It has long been established that a governmental body, be it the State, a county or a municipality, is under a nondelegable duty to maintain its roads and highways in a reasonably safe condition, and that liability will flow for injuries resulting from a breach of the duty” … . Here, the County, which concedes that the section of Park Boulevard where the accident occurred was within its jurisdiction, failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that Park Boulevard was maintained in a reasonably safe condition with unobstructed sight lines. Dutka v Odierno, 2016 NY Slip Op 08196, 2nd Dept 12-7-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/HIGHWAYS AND ROADS (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/INTERSECTIONS (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT.

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case was properly denied. Plaintiff did not demonstrate freedom from comparative fault. Plaintiff had the right-of-way at the time of the collision:

While an operator of a motor vehicle traveling with the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that other drivers will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield … , the driver with the right-of-way nonetheless also has an obligation to keep a proper lookout and see what can be seen through the reasonable use of his or her senses to avoid colliding with other vehicles … . There can be more than one proximate cause of a motor vehicle accident and, thus, “a plaintiff moving for summary judgment on the issue of liability in an action alleging negligence must establish, prima facie, not only that the defendant was negligent but that the plaintiff was free from comparative fault” … . The issue of comparative fault is generally a question for the trier of fact … .

Here, the plaintiff failed to establish her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as her submissions were insufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether she contributed to the happening of the accident … . Taylor v Brat Auto Sales, Ltd., 2016 NY Slip Op 08220, 2nd Dept. 12-7-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT)/INTERSECTIONS (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT)/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (COMPARATIVE FAULT, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT)/COMPARATIVE FAULT (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT)

ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE.

The Second Department determined the abutting property owner was entitled to summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case. No statute or ordinance imposed a duty to maintain the sidewalk on the property. And the property owner demonstrated it did not create the icy condition:

An abutting landowner will be liable to a pedestrian injured by a defect in a public sidewalk only when the owner either created the condition, or when a statute or ordinance places an obligation to maintain the sidewalk on the owner and expressly makes the owner liable for injuries caused by a breach of that duty … . Here, the defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … , by establishing that no statute or ordinance imposed upon it tort liability for failure to maintain the adjoining sidewalk, and that it did not create the alleged icy condition. Escobar v Lowe Props., LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 08197, 2nd Dept 12-7-16

NEGLIGENCE (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE)/SLIP AND FALL (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE)/SIDEWALKS (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE)

DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE UNDER THE STORM IN PROGRESS DOCTRINE.

The Second Department determined defendant, which owned property abutting a sidewalk, was entitled to summary judgment in this slip and fall case under the storm in progress doctrine. The court laid out all of the applicable law:

“Under the so-called storm in progress rule, a property owner will not be held responsible for accidents occurring as a result of the accumulation of snow and ice on its premises until an adequate period of time has passed following the cessation of the storm to allow the owner an opportunity to ameliorate the hazards caused by the storm” … . However, “if the storm has passed and precipitation has tailed off to such an extent that there is no longer any appreciable accumulation, then the rationale for continued delay abates, and commonsense would dictate that the rule not be applied” … .

If a property owner has elected to clear a sidewalk during a storm in progress, the owner is required to act with reasonable care and may be liable if its efforts create a hazardous condition or exacerbate a natural hazard created by the storm … . The mere failure of a defendant to remove all of the snow and ice, without more, does not establish that the defendant increased the risk of harm … . Aronov v St. Vincent’s Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08190, 2nd Dept 12-7-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE UNDER THE STORM IN PROGRESS DOCTRINE)/SLIP AND FALL  (DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE UNDER THE STORM IN PROGRESS DOCTRINE)/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL,  DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE UNDER THE STORM IN PROGRESS DOCTRINE)/STORM IN PROGRESS (DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE UNDER THE STORM IN PROGRESS DOCTRINE)

, , , ,

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had adequately pled that the defendant law firm was equitably estopped from arguing an assignment, which was drawn up by the law firm, did not assign to plaintiff the right to bring a malpractice action against the law firm. The law firm had missed a deadline. Although the assignment could not be interpreted to include the malpractice claim, the equitable estoppel doctrine could be applied to prohibit the law firm from arguing the issue:

The motion court correctly found that the subject assignment, which merely transferred the assignor’s “entire right, title and interest in and to the [call] option contained in Paragraph 8 of” another contract, did not explicitly assign tort claims … . The assignment is not ambiguous; even if it were (and if we therefore considered parol evidence), an unexpressed understanding does not suffice … .

However, accepting plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition to defendants’ motion as true, we find that plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that defendants should be equitably estopped from arguing that the assignment did not assign tort claims. Contrary to defendants’ contention, estoppel can be based on silence as well as conduct … . Under these circumstances, where defendants drafted the assignment at a time when it represented … plaintiff, and that interpreting the assignment to exclude tort claims would mean that neither the assignor nor plaintiff, the assignee, would be able to sue defendants for malpractice for failing to exercise the call option in a timely manner, we find that the “special circumstances” exception to the privity requirement applies … . Deep Woods Holdings LLC v Pryor Cashman LLP, 2016 NY Slip Op 08156, 1st Dept 12-6-16

NEGLIGENCE (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/LEGAL MALPRACTICE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/CONTRACT LAW (ASSIGNMENT, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/ASSIGNMENT (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/ATTORNEYS (MALPRACTICE, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy