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PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST STRUCK FROM BEHIND, NO EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff bicyclist was entitled to summary judgment in this traffic accident case. Plaintiff was in the bicycle lane when he was struck from behind by defendant’s (Reyes’) car. There was no evidence plaintiff was comparatively negligent:

“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, a plaintiff must establish, prima facie, not only that the opposing party was negligent, but also that the plaintiff was free from comparative fault” … . Thus, “a plaintiff has a twofold burden that trial courts must bear in mind when determining motions for summary judgment, because more than one actor may be a proximate cause of a single accident” … . The issue of comparative fault is generally a question for the jury to decide… . Where the movant has established his or her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party may defeat the motion for summary judgment by submitting sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to the moving party’s comparative fault … .

Here, the evidence submitted on the plaintiff’s motion, which included the deposition transcripts of the plaintiff and Reyes, demonstrated, prima facie, that Reyes was negligent as a matter of law because he violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(a)… . The deposition testimony showed that Reyes struck the rear of the plaintiff’s bicycle while making a right turn from Wythe Avenue onto North 6th Street. The plaintiff was in the bicycle lane and ahead of the defendants’ vehicle when the accident occurred. This evidence demonstrated that Reyes failed to yield the right-of-way to the plaintiff, that the turn could not be made with reasonable safety, and that Reyes failed to see that which he should have seen. The evidence submitted in support of the motion also demonstrated that Reyes’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the subject accident, without any comparative negligence on the plaintiff’s part. In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Harth v Reyes, 2017 NY Slip Op 05204, 2nd Dept 6-28-17

 

EXPOSED TREE ROOT OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS. ​

The Second Department determined an exposed tree root was an open and obvious condition. Plaintiffs’ slip and fall complaint was properly dismissed:

“A landowner has a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining [its] property in a safe condition under all of the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the potential injuries, the burden of avoiding the risk, and the foreseeability of a potential plaintiff’s presence on the property”… . However, a landowner has no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition that is inherent or incidental to the nature of the property, and that could be reasonably anticipated by those using it … .

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by demonstrating that the tree root was an open and obvious condition and inherent or incidental to the nature of the property, and was known to the injured plaintiff prior to the accident … . . In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Commender v Strathmore Ct. Home Owners Assn., 2017 NY Slip Op 0519, 2nd Dept 6-28-17

 

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MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN TWO WEEKS AFTER THE ACCIDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED, CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS FOR WORK ON THE AREA OF THE FALL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED, SUBPOENAS FOR WITNESSES WHO HAD NOT BEEN DEPOSED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUASHED.

The First Department determined the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. The First Department further held that photographs of the sinkhole where plaintiff fell (taken two weeks after the injury) and the contract specifications for repair of the sinkhole should not have been excluded from evidence. In addition plaintiff’s subpoenas for a city inspector and a principal of the contractor (Halcyon) which repaired the sinkhole should not have been quashed. The fact that those witnesses were not deposed did not preclude plaintiff’s calling them at trial:

… [T]he trial court erred in precluding pictures of the accident site … . Plaintiff authenticated the photographs at his deposition, and further testimony at trial could have explained how and why the scene depicted in the photos did or did not differed from the scene on the day of the accident … . Exclusion of the photographs meant that plaintiff was unable to show the jury the hole into which he allegedly fell.

Nor should the court have precluded the City’s specifications incorporated into its contract with Halcyon. The specifications were expressly incorporated into the contract between Halcyon and the City; thus, they applied not only to the City itself, but also to third parties. Therefore, they were admissible as potential evidence of defendants’ negligence… , and indeed, the City failed to show how the specifications transcended the duty of reasonable care. The trial court’s exclusion of this evidence regarding the specifications hobbled plaintiff’s ability to prove that the City had engaged in affirmative negligence — the very basis upon which the trial court granted the directed verdict.

Likewise, the court erred in quashing the subpoenas directed to the City’s onsite inspector and a principal of Halcyon … . Although plaintiff did not formally name the City’s onsite inspector and the principal of Halcyon as witnesses, nothing in the CPLR requires a party to generate a trial witness list, nor does the record indicate that the individual court rules required him to do so … . Indeed, there is no requirement that a party depose a witness in order to call him or her as a witness at trial. Gonzalez v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 05180, 1st Dept 6-27-17

 

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PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION.

The Third Department determined plaintiff’s expert did not raise a question of fact in this medical malpractice action.  Plaintiff injured her shoulder when she caught a patient (Lisa Clark) who started to fall as she was being transferred from a sideboard to a physical therapy bed. The action was deemed to sound in medical malpractice:

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The gravamen of plaintiff’s claim is that initiating a slide board transfer of Clark with minimal to moderate assistance deviated from the applicable standard of care, thereby causing Clark’s fall and plaintiff’s injuries. Defendants met their initial burden of establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting, among other things, an expert affidavit from a physical therapist opining that utilizing a slide board transfer with minimal assistance did not deviate from the accepted standard of care and noting, based on a review of Clark’s records, that Clark had successfully completed slide board transfers with minimal or moderate assistance on prior occasions … . Thus, “the burden shifted to plaintiff to present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care” … .

In opposition, plaintiff submitted, among other things, the affidavit of an orthopedic surgeon, Matthew J. Nofziger. Even assuming that Nofziger was qualified to provide an opinion with respect to the standard of care used in the physical therapy field for the purpose of assessing the appropriateness of transfer procedures … , we find his affidavit to be insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Although Nofziger criticized the assessment of Clark’s physical and cognitive abilities prior to the slide board transfer, he failed to identify or define the applicable standard of care appropriate in this case, merely asserting, in a conclusory manner, that Clark required a higher level of assistance than was provided to her … . Nor did Nofziger set forth any particular actions or procedures that could have prevented Clark from falling, thereby failing to establish the requisite nexus between the alleged malpractice and plaintiff’s injury … . Therefore, even if considered, Nofziger’s affidavit was patently insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the transfer procedure used in this case deviated from the applicable standard of care … . Webb v Albany Med. Ctr., 2017 NY Slip Op 05146, 3rd Dept 6-22-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (EVIDENCE, PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION)/EXPERT OPINION (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, LAINTIFF’S EXPERT DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION)

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CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON THE ALLEGATION THE HIGHWAY SHOULDER WAS TOO NARROW, RESULTING IN CLAIMANT’S STRIKING A DISABLED VEHICLE, PROPERLY NO-CAUSED, STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

The Third Department determined claimant’s negligent highway design action was properly no-caused after a non-jury trial. Claimant struck a disabled vehicle that was on the shoulder of the road. Claimant alleged the four-foot wide shoulder was too narrow. The state was entitled to qualified immunity for the highway design:

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Defendant has a “duty to keep its roadways in a reasonably safe condition,” but “is afforded ‘a qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway planning decision'” … . Qualified immunity does not attach where defendant’s “study of a traffic condition is plainly inadequate or there is no reasonable basis for its traffic plan,” however, and it falls on defendant to show that its actions resulted from a sufficiently deliberative process … .

Claimant cites various alleged deficiencies in the design of Route 7 relating to his assertion that the four-foot wide shoulder where the disabled vehicle was parked was too narrow. Route 7 is a four-lane freeway originally designed for traffic speeds of 70 miles per hour but, due to it being on a prolonged incline, a third “climbing lane” was added in the westbound direction to allow slow vehicles to make their way uphill without posing difficulties for other drivers. The credible proof at trial indicated that the shoulder width reflected the slower vehicles traveling in a climbing lane that was wide enough, in any case, to allow vehicles to pass a disabled vehicle on the shoulder. The record further reveals that the shoulder design was appropriate under the guidelines in place when the road was designed and built … . Inasmuch as the shoulder “that was installed met the relevant design standards in effect at the time of its construction,” the Court of Claims properly concluded that defendant cannot be held liable for that design … . Lake v State of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 05142, 3rd Dept 6-22-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (HIGHWAY DESIGN, IMMUNITY, CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON THE ALLEGATION THE HIGHWAY SHOULDER WAS TOO NARROW, RESULTING IN CLAIMANT’S STRIKING A DISABLED VEHICLE, PROPERLY NO CAUSED BASED UPON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY)/IMMUNITY (HIGHWAY DESIGN, CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON THE ALLEGATION THE HIGHWAY SHOULDER WAS TOO NARROW, RESULTING IN CLAIMANT’S STRIKING A DISABLED VEHICLE, PROPERLY NO CAUSED BASED UPON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (HIGHWAY DESIGN, IMMUNITY, CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON THE ALLEGATION THE HIGHWAY SHOULDER WAS TOO NARROW, RESULTING IN CLAIMANT’S STRIKING A DISABLED VEHICLE, PROPERLY NO CAUSED BASED UPON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY)/HIGHWAY DESIGN (IMMUNITY, CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON THE ALLEGATION THE HIGHWAY SHOULDER WAS TOO NARROW, RESULTING IN CLAIMANT’S STRIKING A DISABLED VEHICLE, PROPERLY NO CAUSED BASED UPON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY)

PLAINTIFF FELL THROUGH OPEN TRAPDOOR IN LEASED PREMISES, DOOR WAS NOT DEFECTIVE, NO BASIS FOR LIABILITY OF BUILDING OWNER.

The Second Department determined the building owner’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. The property was leased by a restaurant. Plaintiff fell through an open trapdoor. The trapdoor functioned properly and the fact that the trap door may have been installed without a permit did not raise a question of fact about the owner’s liability:

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The trapdoor itself was not defective or unsafe when closed, but allegedly became unsafe only upon being left open … . This is the case even assuming the truth of the plaintiffs’ allegation of a statutory violation based upon the installation of the trapdoor without a permit … . Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the owner demonstrated that there was no basis for imposing liability upon it … . Curran v 201 W. 87th St., L.P., 2017 NY Slip Op 05064, 2nd Dept 6-21-17

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, PLAINTIFF FELL THROUGH OPEN TRAPDOOR IN LEASED PREMISES, DOOR WAS NOT DEFECTIVE, NO BASIS FOR LIABILITY OF BUILDING OWNER)/SLIP AND FALL (OPEN TRAPDOOR,  PLAINTIFF FELL THROUGH OPEN TRAPDOOR IN LEASED PREMISES, DOOR WAS NOT DEFECTIVE, NO BASIS FOR LIABILITY OF BUILDING OWNER)/TRAPDOOR (PLAINTIFF FELL THROUGH OPEN TRAPDOOR IN LEASED PREMISES, DOOR WAS NOT DEFECTIVE, NO BASIS FOR LIABILITY OF BUILDING OWNER)

A GENERAL AWARENESS THAT WATER COULD COLLECT ON THE FLOOR OF THE LAUNDRY ROOM WAS INSUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE OF A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. Plaintiff testified he used the dryer in the laundry room and noticed no water on the floor. He returned to the laundry room a half hour or more later. The room was empty at that time, as it had been when he put his clothes in the dryer. After taking his clothes from dryer he slipped on water near the dryer. He did not notice the water until after he fell. The defendant submitted plaintiff’s testimony in support of the summary judgment motion. The fact that water on the floor could be a recurring condition in the laundry room was not enough to defeat the evidence of a lack of constructive notice of the condition:

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A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that it neither created the alleged hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence… . To provide constructive notice, “a defect must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it” … .

Here, the evidence submitted by the defendant in support of its motion, including the decedent’s deposition testimony, was sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the defendant did not create the alleged hazardous condition or have actual or constructive notice of it… . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. A general awareness that the laundry room floor could become wet was legally insufficient to constitute constructive notice of the particular condition that allegedly caused the decedent to slip and fall … . Adamson v Radford Mgt. Assoc., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 05057, 2nd Dept 6-21-17

NEGLIGENCE (A GENERAL AWARENESS THAT WATER COULD COLLECT ON THE FLOOR OF THE LAUNDRY ROOM WAS INSUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE OF A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/SLIP AND FALL (A GENERAL AWARENESS THAT WATER COULD COLLECT ON THE FLOOR OF THE LAUNDRY ROOM WAS INSUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE OF A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE (SLIP AND FALL, WATER ON FLOOR OF LAUNDRY ROOM, A GENERAL AWARENESS THAT WATER COULD COLLECT ON THE FLOOR OF THE LAUNDRY ROOM WAS INSUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE OF A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)

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WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the action against the city as owner of the sidewalk where plaintiff slipped and fell on ice should have been dismissed because the city did not have written notice of the condition:

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Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201(c) “limits the City’s duty of care over municipal streets and sidewalks by imposing liability only for those defects or hazardous conditions which its officials have been actually notified exist at a specified location” … . Accordingly, “prior written notice of a defect is a condition precedent which plaintiff is required to plead and prove to maintain an action against the City” … . The only recognized exceptions to the prior written notice requirement involve situations in which either the municipality created the defect through an affirmative act of negligence, or a special use confers a special benefit upon the municipality … . Neither exception is applicable here. “Transitory conditions present on a roadway or walkway such as debris, oil, ice, or sand have been found to constitute potentially dangerous conditions for which prior written notice must be given before liability may be imposed upon a municipality” … . Puzhayeva v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 05107, 2nd Dept 6-21-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, SLIP AND FALL, SIDEWALKS, WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, WRITTEN NOTICE, SIDEWALKS, ICE, WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW, WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/SIDEWALKS (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, SLIP AND FALL, WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/WRITTEN NOTICE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, SIDEWALKS, WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

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COUNTY PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY, COMPLAINT ALLEGED MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT TRAFFIC CONTROL.

The Second Department determined governmental function immunity protected the county from suit in this motorcycle accident case. Plaintiff was riding in a charity event and alleged the traffic control by the county caused his injury:

The complaint alleged, among other things, that the County defendants were negligent in failing to properly control traffic along the route of the motorcycle run, and specifically, at the location of the accident. …

[T]he County defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to the governmental function immunity defense with evidence that the conduct complained of involved the exercise of the police officers’ professional judgment, and was therefore discretionary … . Farrago v County of Suffolk, 2nd Dept 6-21-172017 NY Slip Op 05067

MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, IMMUNITY, COUNTY PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY, COMPLAINT ALLEGED MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT TRAFFIC CONTROL)/IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY, COMPLAINT ALLEGED MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT TRAFFIC CONTROL)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, IMMUNITY, COUNTY PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY, COMPLAINT ALLEGED MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT TRAFFIC CONTROL)/TRAFFIC CONTROL (MUNICIPAL LAW, IMMUNITY, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, COUNTY PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY, COMPLAINT ALLEGED MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT TRAFFIC CONTROL)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (MUNICIPAL LAW, IMMUNITY, COUNTY PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY, COMPLAINT ALLEGED MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT TRAFFIC CONTROL)

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LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO SHOWING SCHOOL WAS AWARE OF POTENTIAL LIABILITY WITHIN 90 DAYS, NO ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY, NO SHOWING SCHOOL WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined leave to file a late notice of claim should not have been granted in this gym-class injury case. There was no showing the school was made aware of its potential liability during the 90 days following the injury. Although a medical claim form was filled out and submitted to the school four days after the incident, the description of the incident did not alert the school to potential liability for the fall from gym equipment:

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Although a medical claim form was prepared and submitted to the School District four days after the accident occurred, it merely indicated that the infant petitioner lacerated his eyebrow and fractured his wrist when he fell after hanging from a pull-up bar during physical education class. Where, as here, “the incident and the injury do not necessarily occur only as the result of fault for which [the School District] may be liable”… , the School District’s “knowledge of the accident and the injury, without more, does not constitute actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim'” … . Rather, “[i]n order to have actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, [a school district] must have knowledge of the facts that underlie the legal theory or theories on which liability is predicated in the notice of claim” … . Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the medical claim form did not provide the School District with actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the petitioners’ claims that, inter alia, it was negligent in its ownership, operation, management, maintenance, and control of the area where the accident occurred, that it was negligent in its hiring, training, and supervision of its employees and agents, or that its employees were negligent in supervising the injured petitioner and responding to the accident … .

Furthermore, the petitioners failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim and for the delay in filing the petition … . While the injured petitioner here is an infant, the failure to serve a timely notice of claim and the delay in seeking leave to serve a late notice of claim were not the product of the infant petitioner’s infancy

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Finally, as to the issue of substantial prejudice, the petitioners presented no evidence or plausible argument that their delay in serving a notice of claim did not substantially prejudice the School District in defending on the merits … . The assertion contained in the affirmation of the petitioners’ attorney which was submitted in support of their motion, that the School District was not substantially prejudiced by the delay in serving a notice of claim, was conclusory and, without more, inadequate to satisfy the petitioners’ minimal initial burden with respect to this factor … . Matter of D.M. v Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 05090, 2nd Dept 6-21-17

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, NOTICE OF CLAIM, LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO SHOWING SCHOOL WAS AWARE OF POTENTIAL LIABILITY WITHIN 90 DAYS, NO ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY, NO SHOWING SCHOOL WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY)/NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO SHOWING SCHOOL WAS AWARE OF POTENTIAL LIABILITY WITHIN 90 DAYS, NO ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY, NO SHOWING SCHOOL WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO SHOWING SCHOOL WAS AWARE OF POTENTIAL LIABILITY WITHIN 90 DAYS, NO ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY, NO SHOWING SCHOOL WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY)/

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