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ALTHOUGH THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPAIRS, THEY DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT CREATE THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF IT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant out-of-possession landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. Although the lease obligated defendants to make repairs, defendants established they did not create the alleged hazardous condition and did not have actual or constructive notice of it:

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The plaintiff allegedly was injured when he tripped and fell off of the front stoop of a house that he was renting from the defendants, who owned the house. The plaintiff testified at a deposition that, as he exited the house, he stepped out onto the landing, and then down one stair. When he realized that he forgot to lock the interior door to the house, he stepped back onto the landing and attempted to open the outer door to the house. He alleged that the outer door extended beyond the edge of the landing, which made it difficult to stand on the landing and open the door at the same time. He further alleged that, as he tried to open the outer door, he lost his footing and began to fall. He grabbed the handrail to stop his fall, but the handrail broke.

“An out-of-possession landlord that has assumed the obligation to make repairs to its property cannot be held liable for injuries caused by a defective condition at the property unless it either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it” … . Amster v Kromer, 2018 NY Slip Op 00538, Second Dept 1-31-18

NEGLIGENCE (ALTHOUGH THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPAIRS, THEY DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT CREATE THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF IT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (LANDLORD-TENANT, ALTHOUGH THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPAIRS, THEY DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT CREATE THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF IT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (SLIP AND FALL, ALTHOUGH THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPAIRS, THEY DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT CREATE THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF IT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD (SLIP AND FALL, ALTHOUGH THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPAIRS, THEY DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT CREATE THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF IT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA OF THE FALL WAS LAST CLEANED OR INSPECTED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFFS’ CASE NOT ENOUGH (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment should not have been granted to defendant in this slip and fall case. The defendant did not demonstrate when the area of the fall was last cleaned or inspected. Therefore no prima facie case was made out. Reliance on gaps in plaintiffs’ case is not enough in the summary-judgment context.

In this slip and fall action, defendant sought to demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment by merely pointing to perceived gaps in plaintiffs’ case … . Defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating when the area in question was last cleaned or inspected relative to the time when plaintiff fell … . Vargas v Riverbay Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 00520, First Dept 1-30-18

 

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA OF THE FALL WAS LAST CLEANED OR INSPECTED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFFS’ CASE NOT ENOUGH (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA OF THE FALL WAS LAST CLEANED OR INSPECTED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFFS’ CASE NOT ENOUGH (FIRST DEPT))

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NEGLIGENCE AND LABOR LAW 200 CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS ELECTROCUTION CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, NO CODE VIOLATIONS, DEFENDANTS NEVER NOTIFIED THE TRANSFORMERS IN THE ELEVATOR CONTROL ROOM CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the negligence and Labor Law 200 causes of action based upon allegations of “poor lighting” and the failure to provide a cover to protect against electrocution should have been dismissed. Plaintiff’s decedent was an elevator mechanic who was electrocuted when he came into contact with a transformer in the elevator control room. There were no witnesses to the accident. Plaintiffs did not allege the level of lighting constituted a code violation. The absence of a cover over the transformer did not violate any applicable code and defendants were never notified of a problem with the transformers, which had been routinely inspected:

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With regard to the issue of whether defendants caused or created a hazardous condition, there is no dispute that [defendants] not design or manufacture the elevator control cabinet, or any of its electrical components, including the transformers … .

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As to whether defendants had notice of the alleged dangerous condition … the building’s property manager… testified that he was never informed that there was any problem with the elevator control cabinet or that the transformers lacked a proper cover either by the DOB or by United despite the fact that both DOB (NYC Department of Buildings) and [the defendant elevator consultant service] conducted inspections of the ninth floor motor room. [The consultant-service president] testified that a cover was not required on the transformers because the transformers were in an enclosed cabinet. …

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Even if the elevator control cabinet did not comply with the [American National Standards Institute (ANSI)] standard because the transformers did not have a cover, plaintiffs have failed to establish that defendants were required by law to comply with the … ANSI standard. Indeed, the … ANSI standard has not been adopted by or incorporated into New York City’s elevator code and ANSI itself is not a statute, ordinance or regulation. Thus, a violation thereof is not evidence of negligence … . Bradley v HWA 1290 III LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 00516, First Dept 1-30-18

NEGLIGENCE (LABOR LAW 200, ELECTROCUTION, NEGLIGENCE AND LABOR LAW 200 CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS ELECTROCUTION CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, NO CODE VIOLATIONS, DEFENDANTS NEVER NOTIFIED THE TRANSFORMERS IN THE ELEVATOR CONTROL ROOM CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION (FIRST DEPT))/LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (LABOR LAW 200, ELECTROCUTION, NEGLIGENCE AND LABOR LAW 200 CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS ELECTROCUTION CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, NO CODE VIOLATIONS, DEFENDANTS NEVER NOTIFIED THE TRANSFORMERS IN THE ELEVATOR CONTROL ROOM CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION (FIRST DEPT))/AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE (ANSI)  (LABOR LAW 200, ELECTROCUTION, NEGLIGENCE AND LABOR LAW 200 CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS ELECTROCUTION CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, NO CODE VIOLATIONS, DEFENDANTS NEVER NOTIFIED THE TRANSFORMERS IN THE ELEVATOR CONTROL ROOM CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION, VIOLATION OF AN ANSI STANDARD IS NOT EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE (FIRST DEPT))/LIGHTING (LABOR LAW 200, ELECTROCUTION, NEGLIGENCE AND LABOR LAW 200 CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS ELECTROCUTION CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, NO CODE VIOLATIONS CONCERNING THE ALLEGEDLY INADEQUATE LIGHTING ALLEGED, DEFENDANTS NEVER NOTIFIED THE TRANSFORMERS IN THE ELEVATOR CONTROL ROOM CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS BUS-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE, EVEN IF THE CROSSING LIGHT CHANGED WHILE PLAINTIFF WAS CROSSING HE WAS ENTITLED TO PROCEED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this bus-pedestrian accident case should have been granted. The court noted that even if the cross signal changed while plaintiff was crossing, he was permitted to proceed once he started crossing:

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Plaintiff established his entitlement to partial summary judgment through his testimony that he was crossing the intersection within the crosswalk and with the light in his favor, when defendants’ bus struck him while making a left turn … .. The testimony of defendant bus driver does not contradict plaintiff’s testimony that he was in the crosswalk, since the driver did not see plaintiff until the moment of impact. The driver’s observation of a white crossing signal before commencing his turn also does not contradict plaintiff’s testimony that he started crossing with the light in his favor. …

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The court should not have considered the videotape footage defendants provided as defendants neither authenticated it nor even showed that it had any relevance to the accident at issue … . It indicates, at most, that it was raining. Even if it showed, as defendants claim, that the pedestrian cross signal changed as plaintiff was crossing, that would not help defendants, as plaintiff was permitted to proceed across the avenue, once he started crossing with the signal in his favor (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1112 [b], [c]…). Torres v Werner Bus Lines, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 00483, First Dept 1-25-18

NEGLIGENCE (BUS-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT, PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS BUS-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE, EVEN IF THE CROSSING LIGHT CHANGED WHILE PLAINTIFF WAS CROSSING HE WAS ENTITLED TO PROCEED (FIRST DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW  (BUS-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT, PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS BUS-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE, EVEN IF THE CROSSING LIGHT CHANGED WHILE PLAINTIFF WAS CROSSING HE WAS ENTITLED TO PROCEED (FIRST DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS  (BUS-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT, PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS BUS-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE, EVEN IF THE CROSSING LIGHT CHANGED WHILE PLAINTIFF WAS CROSSING HE WAS ENTITLED TO PROCEED (FIRST DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS BUS-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE, EVEN IF THE CROSSING LIGHT CHANGED WHILE PLAINTIFF WAS CROSSING HE WAS ENTITLED TO PROCEED (FIRST DEPT))

TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION BUT TOW TRUCK WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendant’s tow truck merely furnished the condition for the rear-end collision and was not the proximate cause. The tow truck driver was in the process of hooking up a car (a Jetta) to tow it off the expressway when the Jetta was struck from behind by an intoxicated driver (Ripoli) who had fallen asleep. Plaintiff was a passenger in the Jetta:

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Defendants-appellants are entitled to summary judgment, because the tow truck driver’s affirmative negligence, if any, did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which plaintiff’s injury was made possible… .. There is no allegation that their actions violated a traffic regulation and the record shows that the tow truck driver was in the process of securing the vehicle to tow it off the expressway when the accident happened.

Plaintiff’s assertion that the accident would not have occurred if the tow truck driver had placed additional flares or moved the ones that the police officers had placed, displayed cones or removed the Jetta from the location sooner is speculative and insufficient to raise an issue of fact, because it is undisputed that Ripoli fell asleep before his vehicle rear- ended the Jetta … . McLean v Ripoli, 2018 NY Slip Op 00461, First Dept 1-25-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/CONDITION FOR THE ACCIDENT (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/PROXIMATE CAUSE  (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CITY CREATED THE ROADWAY SINKHOLE BY INADEQUATE REPAIR, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs had raised a question of fact whether the city created the dangerous condition, a sinkhole in the roadway, which caused plaintiffs injuries after a wheel on their police car went into the hole:

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… [P]laintiffs have met their burden of showing that there are triable issues of fact as to whether the City’s affirmative negligence created the defect … . Specifically, plaintiff’s testimony and affidavit demonstrate that the City attempted to repair the sinkhole on August 27, 2011. Moreover, the City has conceded based on the CAR report that it worked to fill the sinkhole on August 27, 2011 (eleven days prior to the accident) and August 28, 2011 (ten days prior to the accident). The affidavit of plaintiffs’ expert raises the issues of whether the City’s affirmative repair of the sinkhole negligently created a defective condition causing the repair to fail immediately after it was made. There is nothing in the record here to indicate that the dangerous condition in question developed over time … . Bania v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 00470, First Dept 1-25-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CITY CREATED THE ROADWAY SINKHOLE BY INADEQUATE REPAIR, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FIRST DEPT))/HIGHWAYS AND ROADS (MUNICIPAL LAW, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, NEGLIGENCE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CITY CREATED THE ROADWAY SINKHOLE BY INADEQUATE REPAIR, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FIRST DEPT))/SINKHOLES (MUNICIPAL LAW, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, NEGLIGENCE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CITY CREATED THE ROADWAY SINKHOLE BY INADEQUATE REPAIR, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FIRST DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (SINKHOLES, MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CITY CREATED THE ROADWAY SINKHOLE BY INADEQUATE REPAIR, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FIRST DEPT))

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RELEASE WHICH PERTAINED TO MEDICAL CENTER AND ANY JOINT TORTFEASORS DID NOT PRECLUDE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST SURGEONS WHO WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE MEDICAL CENTER, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a release which related to a medical center and any joint tortfeasors did not preclude a medical malpractice action against doctors who were not employees of the medical center. The plaintiff had undergone surgery for a deviated septum. During the surgery plainitff’s teeth were damaged by the anesthesiologist, an employee of the medical center. The medical center settled with the plaintiff and plaintiff signed a release. The medical malpractice action against the surgeons was not related to the damaged teeth:

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… [T]he release is unambiguously limited to tortfeasors jointly liable with the Medical Center. “At common law the joint and several liability imposed on joint tort-feasors was indivisible, and any one of the joint tort-feasors was liable to the injured party for the entire damage”… . A hospital is not vicariously liable for the malpractice of independently retained doctors who are not employees of the hospital or are not held out as agents of the hospital … . Here, the defendants do not contend that the defendant doctors were employees of the Medical Center, or that they held themselves out as agents of the Medical Center. As such, there would be no basis for joint liability with the Medical Center. Further, the injuries claimed in this action are different from those claimed against and settled with the Medical Center. The lost crown and broken teeth caused by the anesthesiologist, an employee of the Medical Center, are completely distinct from the damages claimed in this action. Hoffmann v Horn, 2018 NY Slip Op 00414, Second Dept 1-24-18

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, RELEASE WHICH PERTAINED TO MEDICAL CENTER AND ANY JOINT TORTFEASORS DID NOT PRECLUDE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST SURGEONS WHO WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE MEDICAL CENTER, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ( RELEASE WHICH PERTAINED TO MEDICAL CENTER AND ANY JOINT TORTFEASORS DID NOT PRECLUDE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST SURGEONS WHO WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE MEDICAL CENTER, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (RELEASES, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, RELEASE WHICH PERTAINED TO MEDICAL CENTER AND ANY JOINT TORTFEASORS DID NOT PRECLUDE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST SURGEONS WHO WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE MEDICAL CENTER, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/RELEASES (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, RELEASE WHICH PERTAINED TO MEDICAL CENTER AND ANY JOINT TORTFEASORS DID NOT PRECLUDE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST SURGEONS WHO WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE MEDICAL CENTER, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT)

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OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF A LEAKING WATER HEATER IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendant out of possession landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case was properly denied. The lease imposed a duty to repair (here plaintiff slipped on water from a leaking water heater) and the landlord’s papers did not demonstrate a lack of actual or constructive notice:

 

An out-of-possession landlord and its agent are not liable for injuries caused by dangerous conditions on leased premises in the absence of a statute imposing liability, a contractual provision placing the duty to repair on the landlord, or a course of conduct by the landlord giving rise to a duty … .

Here, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint. They submitted a copy of the lease, which established that Felice was required to remedy “any defective condition in any plumbing, heating system or electrical lines located in the demised premises” following prompt notice by the tenant. The defendants’ submissions, however, failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact, including whether they had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly defective hot water heater, thereby placing upon them the duty to repair it pursuant to the lease. Accordingly, the motion was properly denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers … . Irizarry v Felice Realty Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 00415, Second Dept 1-24-18

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF A LEAKING WATER HEATER IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (NEGLIGENCE, SLIP AND FALL, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF A LEAKING WATER HEATER IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD  (NEGLIGENCE, SLIP AND FALL, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF A LEAKING WATER HEATER IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF A LEAKING WATER HEATER IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

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INSURANCE BROKER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERED REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS PROCURED, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the defendant insurance broker’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged, under a negligence theory, that the broker failed to procure sufficient uninsured motorist coverage. The papers submitted by the broker failed to demonstrate the amount of coverage requested was procured. Therefore the motion should have been denied without consideration of the opposing papers:

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An insurance broker may be held liable under theories of breach of contract or negligence for failing to procure insurance upon a showing by the insured that the agent or broker failed to discharge the duties imposed by the agreement to obtain insurance, either by proof that it breached the agreement or because it failed to exercise due care in the transaction … .

Here, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because they submitted insufficient evidence that they procured the amount of coverage that the plaintiff engaged them to procure … . Giamundo v Cleveland Dunn 2nd, 2018 NY Slip Op 00411, Second Dept 1-24-18

INSURANCE LAW (INSURANCE BROKER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERED REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS PROCURED, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (INSURANCE LAW, INSURANCE BROKER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERED REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS PROCURED, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/INSURANCE BROKER (NEGLIGENCE, (INSURANCE BROKER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERED REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS PROCURED, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS NOT LIABLE FOR SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant out-of-possession landlords’ motion for summary judgment should have been granted in this sidewalk slip and fall case:

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Defendants cannot be held liable for injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff when he slipped on snow and ice on the sidewalk adjacent to their property, because they were out-of-possession landlords with no contractual obligation to keep the sidewalks clear of snow and ice, and the presence of snow and ice does not constitute a significant structural or design defect … . Xiang Fu He v Troon Mgt., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 00382, First Dept 1-23-18

NEGLIGENCE (OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS NOT LIABLE FOR SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL (FIRST DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (NEGLIGENCE, SLIP AND FALL, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS NOT LIABLE FOR SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS NOT LIABLE FOR SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL (FIRST DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS NOT LIABLE FOR SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL (FIRST DEPT))/OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD (NEGLIGENCE, SLIP AND FALL, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS NOT LIABLE FOR SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL (FIRST DEPT))

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