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DEFENDANT OWNS A VINEYARD IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN AN ALL-TERRAIN-VEHICLE ACCIDENT; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY PURSUANT TO GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 9-103 BECAUSE THE VINEYARD WAS “SUITABLE FOR RECREATIONAL USE” (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s property (a vineyard) was suitable for recreational use and therefore defendant was entitled to immunity pursuant to General Obligations Law 9-103. Defendant was not liable for plaintiff’s injuries from an all-terrain-vehicle (ATV) accident which occurred when the driver missed a bridge over a culvert:

… “[D]efendant, as the party seeking summary judgment, ha[d] the burden of establishing as a matter of law that he is immune from liability pursuant to the statute” … . We conclude that defendant met his initial burden on the motion of establishing that the site where the accident occurred was suitable for recreational use … . The evidence defendant submitted on the motion showed that the vineyard’s dirt and grass-covered roads, as well as the bridge where the accident occurred, were physically conducive to ATV riding. Additionally, defendant established that the vineyard’s roads and the bridge were appropriate for public use for recreational ATV riding based on the uncontradicted testimony of defendant Aaron P. Gibbons, an adjoining property owner, that, over a significant period of time, he and his wife had frequently driven ATVs on the vineyard’s roads and the bridge and had often observed others doing the same. Wheeler v Gibbons, 2021 NY Slip Op 04323, Fourth Dept 7-9-21

 

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THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE WORN STEP IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether defendants had constructive notice of the condition of a step in this slip and fall case:

… [T]he affidavit of plaintiff’s expert and the photographic evidence were sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to constructive notice. The expert opined that the condition depicted in the photographs violated the Building Code and that the step was worn for several years prior to the accident. Furthermore, the photographs depicted a condition that a jury might find was present for a sufficient time for defendants to have discovered and remedied it … . Martinez v 560-568 Audubon Realty LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 04277, First Dept 7-8-21

 

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DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DECORATIVE FENCE IN THE GRASSY AREA BETWEEN THE CURB AND THE SIDEWALK WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant property-owner was not entitled to summary judgment in this slip and fall case. The plaintiff allegedly tripped over a decorative fence located in the grassy area between the curb and the sidewalk abutting defendants’ home. The defendants argued the fence was open and obvious:

“The determination of whether an asserted hazard is open and obvious cannot be divorced from the surrounding circumstances, and whether a condition is not inherently dangerous, or constitutes a reasonably safe environment, depends on the totality of the specific facts of each case” … . “A condition that is ordinarily apparent to a person making reasonable use of his or her senses may be rendered a trap for the unwary where the condition is obscured or the plaintiff is distracted” … .

Here, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the homeowner defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the decorative fence was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous given the circumstances at the time of the accident, including the lighting conditions and color of the fence … . Rosenman v Siwiec, 2021 NY Slip Op 04248, Second Dept 7-7-21

 

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IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, PROOF OF GENERAL CLEANING AND INSPECTION PRACTICES WAS NOT ENOUGH TO DEMONSTRATE THE LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF LIQUID ON THE FLOOR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant did not demonstrate it didn’t have constructive notice of the liquid on the floor in this slip and fall case. Proof of general cleaning and inspection practices is not enough:

… [T]he defendant failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether it had constructive notice of the hazardous condition and a reasonable time to correct it … . In that respect, the deposition testimony of the defendant’s witnesses as to their general cleaning and inspection practices, as well as the deposition testimony of a security supervisor surmising, based upon such general practices, when another security officer would have inspected the subject stairwell prior to the accident, was insufficient to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the defendant lacked constructive notice of the hazardous condition … . Roland v Jackson Terrace Apts., 2021 NY Slip Op 04247, Second Dept 7-7-21

 

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THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOCTRINE APPLIED TO A PLASTIC CHAIR IN THE RECREATIONAL ROOM OF DEFENDANT CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; THE CHAIR COLLAPSED WHILE CLAIMANT WAS SITTING IN IT; THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER THE CHAIR; COURT OF CLAIMS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied to a plastic chair in the recreational room of a state correctional facility. Claimant alleged the back legs of the chair broke off at the same time causing him to fall to the concrete floor:

… [T]he evidence of defendant’s exclusive control, under the circumstances of this case, was sufficiently established … . Indeed, “[a]s a species of circumstantial proof, . . . res ipsa [loquitor] does not depend on a showing that the instrumentality causing the harm was within the defendant’s exclusive control; it is enough that the degree of dominion be such that the defendant can be identified with probability as the party responsible for the injury produced” … .

… [D]efendant was “under an affirmative duty to use reasonable care in making sure that the chair it provided was safe for the purpose for which it was to be used. That [claimant] had temporary possession of the chair does not negate the inference that its sudden collapse, under normal usage, was most likely caused by defendant’s negligence” … . Moreover, defendant, who no doubt had sole and exclusive possession of the chair immediately after the accident, failed to offer any evidence to support an inference of any other possible explanation for the accident … . Draper v State of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 04163, Third Dept 7-1-21

 

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IN THIS CHILD-VICTIMS-ACT SEXUAL-ABUSE (NEGLIGENT-SUPERVISION) ACTION AGAINST THE CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF ALBANY, PLAINTIFFS’ DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR THE FILES OF SEVERAL NONPARTY PRIESTS WAS PROPERLY GRANTED ON THE GROUND THE FILES MAY REVEAL A “HABIT” OR “CUSTOM” REGARDING HOW THE DIOCESE HANDLED SUSPECTED CHILD-SEXUAL-ABUSE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiffs’ discovery request for the files of several nonparty priests in this Child-Victims-Act sexual-abuse (negligent-supervision) action against defendant Catholic Diocese of Albany was properly granted. The discovery was relevant to whether the diocese followed a “habit” or “custom” in dealing with priests suspected of sexually abusing children:

Although the Diocese raises several arguments concerning the appropriateness of habit evidence in this context — namely, that it is prejudicial and that the circumstances surrounding allegations of abuse vary and do not yield habitual responses from the Diocese — these arguments conflate plaintiffs’ requirement on their motion to compel with plaintiffs’ future requirements to introduce the files into evidence. For now, on their motion to compel discovery, plaintiffs are merely required to show that their discovery request is reasonably calculated to yield material and necessary information … . Whether plaintiffs can actually demonstrate “a sufficient number of instances” of the Diocese’s repetitive conduct in order to introduce the subject files into evidence as habit evidence is plaintiffs’ future burden … . Melfe v Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y., 2021 NY Slip Op 04179, Third Dept 7-1-21

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS DID NOT SEE THE PLAINTIFF, THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP WAS CREATED BASED UPON ANOTHER DOCTOR’S ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF BE SEEN BY THOSE DEFENDANTS WITHIN ONE OR TWO DAYS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ motions for summary judgment in this medical malpractice action should not have been granted. One of the issues was whether defendants, who had never seen plaintiff, could be found to have had a patient-physician relationship based upon the failure to schedule an appointment within the time-frame ordered by another doctor:

… [P]laintiff acknowledges that she never received treatment from or spoke with Connolly or Retina Associates. Instead, plaintiff relies on a notation in her medical records from Twin Tiers stating that Rosenberg initially requested that she be evaluated by Retina Associates within one to two days and that a later appointment was scheduled only after Connolly apparently informed Twin Tiers that she “could wait to be seen until next week.” Moreover, after allegedly giving this advice regarding timing, Retina Associates scheduled the appointment beyond that acceptable time frame — for 13 days later. * * *

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, a triable factual question exists regarding whether the notation in Twin Tiers’ chart — attributing a comment to Connolly regarding scheduling of treatment — is sufficient to establish an implied physician-patient relationship between plaintiff and Connolly or Retina Associates … . Marshall v Rosenberg, 2021 NY Slip Op 04180, Third Dept 7-1-21

 

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PETITIONER’S INCAPACITATING INJURIES EXCUSED THE DELAY IN FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM; ALTHOUGH THE MUNICIPALITY DID NOT HAVE TIMELY NOTICE OF THE POTENTIAL LAWSUIT, IT SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE FROM THE DELAY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the petitioner’s catastrophic injuries constituted a reasonable excuse for the delay in filing a notice of claim and, although the municipality did not have timely notice of the potential lawsuit, the municipality was not prejudiced by the delay:

As a result of the accident, the petitioner allegedly sustained a depressed skull fracture and a subdural hematoma with midline shift, and underwent an emergency craniotomy. The petitioner allegedly has been continuously hospitalized and confined to a bed and a wheelchair, cannot speak, and is fed through a feeding tube.

Due to a mistaken belief as to which municipality owned the location of the accident, the petitioner’s attorneys initially commenced a proceeding against the County of Nassau, the Village of Oyster Bay Cove, and the Town. However, in April 2019, the petitioner’s attorneys allegedly learned for the first time that the accident location was in Laurel Hollow. …

The petitioner’s incapacitating injuries constituted a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving Laurel Hollow with a notice of claim … . Although a police aided case report … did not provide Laurel Hollow with actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, the petitioner established that Laurel Hollow would not be prejudiced by the delay. Of note, the roller that the petitioner was operating at the time of the accident has been continuously preserved by the petitioner’s employer pursuant to a court order. Matter of Davis v Incorporated Vil. of Laurel Hollow, 2021 NY Slip Op 04133, Second Dept 6-30-21

 

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ALTHOUGH AN ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER CAN BE LIABLE FOR A DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THE GRASSY STRIP BETWEEN THE SIDEWALK AND THE CURB, HERE THE PROPERTY OWNER DEMONSTRATED HE DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION; IN ADDITION, THE VILLAGE CODE DID NOT IMPOSE TORT LIABILITY ON PROPERTY OWNERS, AN ISSUE PROPERLY CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant property-owner’s motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case should have been granted. Although, pursuant to the Vehicle and Traffic Law, defendant can be responsible for a dangerous condition in the grassy strip between the sidewalk and a curb, here defendant demonstrated he did not create the condition and the village code did not impose tort liability on abutting property owners. Although the “village code” issue was not raised below, it was a purely legal issue that can be considered on appeal:

The grass strip situated between a sidewalk and a roadway is part of the sidewalk (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 144; Code of the Village of Westbury [hereinafter Village Code] § 215-2 … ). “‘An abutting landowner will be liable to a pedestrian injured by a defect in a public sidewalk only when the owner either created the condition or caused the defect to occur because of a special use, or when a statute or ordinance places an obligation to maintain the sidewalk on the owner and expressly makes the owner liable for injuries caused by a breach of that duty'” … .

Here, the defendant established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him by demonstrating that he did not create the alleged dangerous condition or cause that condition through a special use of the sidewalk … . In addition, while Village Code § 215-12 imposes a duty on owners and occupants of abutting land to keep sidewalks free of obstructions, the Village Code does not specifically impose tort liability for breach of that duty … . Although the defendant did not make an argument based on the provisions of the Village Code in support of his motion before the Supreme Court, his argument in this regard is reviewable on appeal because it is a purely legal argument that appears on the face of the record and could not have been avoided had it been raised at the proper juncture … . Lamorte v Iadevaia, 2021 NY Slip Op 04126, Second Dept 6-30-21

 

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THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED ON THE GROUND THERE WAS NO WRITTEN RETAINER AGREEMENT AND THEREFORE NO ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED WORDS AND ACTIONS SUFFICIENT TO ASSERT THE EXISTENCE OF AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the legal malpractice action should not have been dismissed on the ground there was no retainer agreement and therefore no attorney-client relationship:

As to the legal malpractice cause of action, the … defendants contend that they had no attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff. An attorney-client relationship may arise even in the absence of a written retainer agreement, and a court must look to the words and actions of the parties to determine whether such a relationship exists … . Here, according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, she sufficiently alleged the existence of an attorney-client relationship … . Edelman v Berman, 2021 NY Slip Op 04120, Second Dept 6-30-21

 

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