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BY THE TERMS OF THE MANAGING AGENT’S CONTRACT WITH THE COOPERATIVE, THE MANAGING AGENT DID NOT FULLY ASSUME THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE COOPERATIVE PREMISES SUCH THAT THE AGENT WOULD BE LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL ON THE PREMISES; THE MANAGING AGENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this slip and fall case, determined the defendant managing agent was not liable based on the terms of managing agent’s contract with the cooperative where plaintiff fell:

Where … a managing agent is accused of nonfeasance which causes injury to a third party, it is subject to liability only where it has complete and exclusive control of the management and operation of the property in question … . A managing agent is not in complete and exclusive control of the premises where the owner has reserved to itself a certain amount of control in the written agreement … . …

… [T]he terms of the management agreement … established (1) that the resident manager, who was an employee of the cooperative, was responsible for supervising all personnel, including the maintenance staff, (2) that all personnel were employees of the cooperative, and (3) that all maintenance, repairs, and inspections were performed by the resident manger or members of the maintenance staff. Cacciuottolo v Brown Harris Stevens Mgt., 2021 NY Slip Op 04656, Second Dept 8-11-21​

 

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