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SURGICAL PROCEDURES WERE DEEMED DISCRETE EVENTS WHICH DID NOT ANTICIPATE FURTHER TREATMENT, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant oncologist, Khulpateea, was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the malpractice complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The court held that the “continuous treatment doctrine” did not apply to extend the statute. Plaintiff's decedent saw Khulpateea several times, after referral from decedent's gynecologist, and Khulpateea performed surgical procedures on decedent. It was only the last procedure which discovered the cancer. Each procedure was deemed to constitute a discrete event which did not anticipate ongoing treatment by Khulpateea:

“To establish that the continuous treatment doctrine applies, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate that there was a course of treatment, that it was continuous, and that it was in respect to the same condition or complaint underlying the claim of malpractice'” … . “Continuity of treatment is often found to exist when further treatment is explicitly anticipated by both physician and patient as manifested in the form of a regularly scheduled appointment for the near future, agreed upon during th[e] last visit, in conformance with the periodic appointments which characterized the treatment in the immediate past'” … . Here, the plaintiff failed to show that there was a continuous course of treatment. The diagnostic services performed by Khulpateea were discrete and complete, and not part of a course of treatment … . Moreover, the plaintiff failed to submit evidence showing that the decedent and Khulpateea contemplated further treatment after the follow-up visit … . The decedent did not schedule another appointment with Khulpateea until she returned to see him in 2005, and she only did so then because [her gynecologist] referred her to him … . Nisanov v Khulpateea, 2016 NY Slip Op 02062, 2nd Dept 3-23-16

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, SURGICAL PROCEDURES WERE DEEMED DISCRETE EVENTS WHICH DID NOT ANTICIPATE FURTHER TREATMENT, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (SURGICAL PROCEDURES WERE DEEMED DISCRETE EVENTS WHICH DID NOT ANTICIPATE FURTHER TREATMENT, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)/CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, SURGICAL PROCEDURES WERE DEEMED DISCRETE EVENTS WHICH DID NOT ANTICIPATE FURTHER TREATMENT, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)

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HOSPITAL NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY MENTALLY ILL PATIENT FOUR DAYS AFTER DISCHARGE.

The Second Department determined defendant hospital (HHC) was entitled to summary judgment in an action stemming from injuries caused by a mentally ill patient after discharge from defendant hospital. The patient, four days after discharge, attacked and stabbed employees of the residential facility where the patient resided. The hospital medical records supported the conclusion the patient did not qualify for involuntary psychiatric observation at the time of his release. The plaintiff's expert's opposing affidavit was conclusory and speculative:

“[D]octors or a governmental subdivision of the State that employs them cannot be held responsible for damages resulting from the actions of a psychiatric patient who has been released when the patient's release is a matter of professional judgment” … . For liability to attach, it must be shown that the decision to release the patient was “something less than a professional medical determination” founded upon careful examination of the patient … . “Evidence of a difference of opinion among experts does not provide an adequate basis for a prima facie case of malpractice” … . * * *

… [T]he plaintiffs submitted an expert affirmation opining that HHC deviated from accepted standards of medical practice and failed to make a careful examination by failing to contact [the patient's] psychiatric providers … and his … caseworker to inquire as to his condition and history of violence before making the determination whether to discharge him, and that those deviations proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries. However, the expert failed to explain what, if any, information HHC did not already have which those parties could have provided, and which would have been necessary for a careful examination of whether [the patient] continued to meet the legal criteria for involuntary psychiatric observation, care, and treatment. The expert also failed to address the evidence that [the patient] did not meet the criteria for involuntary psychiatric observation, care, and treatment at the time of his discharge … . Stephen v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 01827, 2nd Dept 3-16-16

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, HOSPITAL NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY MENTALLY ILL PATIENT FOUR DAYS AFTER DISCHARGE)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (HOSPITAL NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY MENTALLY ILL PATIENT FOUR DAYS AFTER DISCHARGE)

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DOCTOR CONDUCTED AN ADEQUATE SUICIDE ASSESSMENT.

The Second Department determined plaintiff raised a triable question of fact whether defendant neurologist (Lombard) conducted an adequate suicide assessment of plaintiff's decedent. Plaintiff's decedent committed suicide one week after the assessment:

The evidence submitted in support of [defendants'] motion, including an expert affirmation of a psychiatrist, demonstrated, prima facie, that Lombard did not depart from good and accepted standard of medical practice in his treatment of the decedent … . However the [defendants] failed to establish, prima facie, that none of the alleged departures was a proximate cause of the decedent's death, as the affirmation of the … expert was silent on the issue of proximate cause. As such, in order to defeat the motion, the plaintiff was only required to show the existence of a triable issue of fact as to a departure from good and accepted medical practice … .

The plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Lombard departed from good and accepted medical practice by failing to obtain the decedent's records from his prior mental health care providers, including the records from the … emergency room where the decedent had been seen earlier on the day he met with Lombard, and by conducting an inadequate suicide assessment … , such that Lombard's treatment decision was “something less than a professional medical determination” … . “A decision that is without proper medical foundation, that is, one which is not the product of a careful examination, is not to be legally insulated as a professional medical judgment” … . Gallen v County of Rockland, 2016 NY Slip Op 01803, 2nd Dept 3-16-16

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DOCTOR CONDUCTED AN ADEQUATE SUICIDE ASSESSMENT)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DOCTOR CONDUCTED AN ADEQUATE SUICIDE ASSESSMENT)/SUICIDE  (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DOCTOR CONDUCTED AN ADEQUATE SUICIDE ASSESSMENT)

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EXPERT EVIDENCE IMPROPERLY PRECLUDED, NEW TRIAL BEFORE A DIFFERENT JUDGE ORDERED.

The First Department concluded the trial judge improperly precluded the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action from presenting expert evidence alleging defendant doctor departed from the standard of care by failing to tie off plaintiff's decedent's femoral artery. The First Department determined the relevant theory had been raised in the bills of particular and notice of the expert's testimony had been timely provided (eight months before trial). A new trial was ordered before a different judge because the record demonstrated the trial judge's bias in favor of the defendants:

The trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the motion and in dismissing the complaint based on the preclusion of evidence. Defendants' argument that they had no notice of plaintiffs' theory and were unfairly surprised is unavailing. The theory concerning vascularization of decedent's left leg was adequately disclosed in plaintiff's original and supplemental bills of particulars. Further, while CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) does not require a party to retain an expert at any particular time … , here plaintiff served the CPLR 3101(d) expert disclosure notice about eight months before trial, which was sufficient notice … . Furthermore, during that period, defense counsel were present at several pretrial conferences and raised no objections to the expert disclosure, nor did they reject the notice… .

Given the improper preclusion of evidence, plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial … . Further, the matter should be remitted for trial before a different Justice, as the record shows that the trial court was biased in favor of defendants … . Dedona v DiRaimo, 2016 NY Slip Op 01779, 1st Dept 3-15-16

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EXPERT EVIDENCE IMPROPERLY PRECLUDED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (EXPERT EVIDENCE IMPROPERLY PRECLUDED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/EVIDENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EXPERT EVIDENCE IMPROPERLY PRECLUDED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/JUDGES (BIAS IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS REQUIRED ASSIGNMENT OF NEW TRIAL TO A DIFFERENT JUDGE)

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FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE SCARRING WAS DISCUSSED PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF THE CONSENT FORM, AND FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE GONE THROUGH WITH THE SURGERY DESPITE FULL DISCLOSURE ABOUT SCARRING, REQUIRED DENIAL OF PHYSICIAN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Second Department determined defendant physician (Barazani) was not entitled to summary judgment on the “lack of informed consent” cause of action, despite the plaintiff’s signing of a consent form. Although the consent form mentioned scarring as a possibility, there was no showing the defendant discussed scarring with the plaintiff before the consent form was signed. In addition, there was no showing plaintiff would have gone through with the surgery had scarring been adequately discussed. [Another example of the need for a defendant seeking summary judgment to affirmatively address every possible theory of recovery.]:

 

To establish a cause of action to recover damages for malpractice based on lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the person providing the professional treatment failed to disclose alternatives thereto and failed to inform the patient of reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the treatment, and the alternatives, that a reasonable medical practitioner would have disclosed in the same circumstances, (2) that a reasonably prudent patient in the same position would not have undergone the treatment if he or she had been fully informed, and (3) that the actual procedure performed for which there was no informed consent was the proximate cause of the injury (see Public Health Law § 2805-d[1]…).

Here, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging lack of informed consent. The mere fact that the plaintiff signed a consent form does not establish the defendants’ prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … . The consent form provided by the defendants and signed by the plaintiff warned generally that there was a risk of scarring after the biopsy was conducted. However, the deposition testimony of the plaintiff and Barazani, which was submitted by the defendants in support of their motion, revealed a factual dispute as to whether Barazani properly advised the plaintiff of the risk of scarring before she signed the form … . The defendants also failed to establish, prima facie, that if the plaintiff had received full disclosure, she still would have consented to the procedure … . Schussheim v Barazani, 2016 NY Slip Op 00958, 2nd Dept 2-10-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, INFORMED CONSENT, DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO AFFIRMATIVELY DEMONSTRATE SCARRING DISCUSSED PRIOR TO SIGNING OF CONSENT FORM AND FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE GONE THROUGH WITH THE SURGERY DESPITE FULL DISCLOSURE REQUIRED DENIAL OF DEFENSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (INFORMED CONSENT, DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO AFFIRMATIVELY DEMONSTRATE SCARRING DISCUSSED PRIOR TO SIGNING OF CONSENT FORM AND FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE GONE THROUGH WITH THE SURGERY DESPITE FULL DISCLOSURE REQUIRED DENIAL OF DEFENSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION)

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EXPERT AFFIDAVITS, SUBMITTED SOLELY ON THE ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE COURT, EVEN THOUGH THE EXPERTS WERE NOT QUALIFIED TO ASSESS WHETHER THE DEFENDANT CHIROPRACTOR DEVIATED FROM THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF CARE.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, determined affidavits by an orthopedist and a radiologist (Dr. Meyer and Dr. Coyne) submitted in support of defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been accepted by Supreme Court as admissible evidence of proximate cause of plaintiff’s back injury, even though the orthopedist and radiologist were not qualified to offer an opinion on whether defendant chiropractor deviated from the appropriate standard of care. Supreme Court had rejected the affidavits on the ground the orthopedist and radiologist were not qualified to assess the level of care provided by the defendant chiropractor. However, the affidavits addressed only the issue of proximate cause, stating that plaintiff’s injuries pre-dated the alleged negligent treatment by the chiropractor. Because the assessment of proximate cause was within the orthopedist’s and radiologist’s areas of expertise, the affidavits were admissible. However, the denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was affirmed because the defendant’s affidavit stating he did not deviate from the proper standard of chiropractic care was conclusory:

 

Physicians offering opinions in medical, dental, podiatric, chiropractic, or other specialty malpractice actions must establish their credentials in order for their expert opinions to be considered by courts. They do so by being specialists in the field that is the subject of the action, or if not specialists in the same field, then by possessing the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge, or experience from which it can be assumed that the opinion rendered is reliable … . Thus, when a physician offers an expert opinion outside of his or her specialization, a foundation must be laid tending to support the reliability of the opinion rendered … .

Here, the opinions of Dr. Meyer and Dr. Coyne would not be admissible on the issue of the defendant’s alleged deviation or departure from the standard of chiropractic care, as neither physician indicated any familiarity with the standards of chiropractic practice. However, the opinions of Dr. Meyer and Dr. Coyne were not proffered to address the issue of whether the defendant deviated or departed from the relevant chiropractic standard of care. Rather, the affirmations of both physicians were clearly and narrowly drawn to address only the separate element of proximate cause. Bongiovanni v Cavagnuolo, 2016 NY Slip Op 00638, 2nd Dept 2-3-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EXPERT AFFIDAVITS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED ON NARROW ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (EXPERT AFFIDAVITS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED ON THE NARROW ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE)/EVIDENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EXPERT AFFIDAVITS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED ON THE NARROW ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE)/EXPERT OPINION (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EXPERT AFFIDAVITS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED ON THE NARROW ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE)

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REQUESTS FOR RECORDS OF SURGICAL PROCEDURES PERFORMED ON NON-PARTIES AND RECORDS OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST DEFENDANT SURGEON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined certain discovery requests made by plaintiff in a medical malpractice action should not have been denied. Plaintiff alleged defendant surgeon’s (Panos’) and defendant hospital’s (Vassar’s) negligence were related to the unprecedented number of surgeries performed by defendant surgeon. Plaintiff sought all the records re: surgeries performed by defendant surgeon on the days plaintiff was operated on. The Second Department held that those records, with non-party names redacted, should be turned over but should not be disclosed beyond the parties and experts. With respect to requests for disclosure of complaints against defendant surgeon, the Second Department held that the documents should be turned over for in camera review to see if they are immune from discovery under the Public Health Law (quality assurance immunity):

 

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was, in effect, to compel Vassar to produce intraoperative records pertaining to all surgical procedures performed by Panos on any nonparty patients on the three dates that he performed surgery on the plaintiff, reflecting every medical procedure performed during those surgical procedures, and should have denied that branch of Vassar’s cross motion which was for a protective order striking the plaintiff’s demand for those records … .

… [T]he plaintiff demanded that Vassar produce copies of any written complaints made to Vassar regarding Panos and any written responses thereto. Contrary to Vassar’s contention, these demands specified the documents to be disclosed with reasonable particularity (see CPLR 3120[2]…). Vassar further contends that these documents are immune from discovery pursuant to the quality assurance privilege (see Education Law § 6527[3], Public Health Law § 2805-m…). “Records generated at the behest of a quality assurance committee for quality assurance purposes . . . should be privileged, whereas records simply duplicated by the committee are not necessarily privileged” … . Since it is impossible on this record to determine whether the subject documents were generated at the behest of a quality assurance committee for quality assurance purposes, we remit the matter for an in camera inspection of the documents requested … .  Gabriels v Vassar Bros. Hosp., 2016 NY Slip Op 00478, 2nd Dept 1-27-16

 

CONVERSION (CAUSE OF ACTION TIME-BARRED)/REPLEVIN (CAUSE OF ACTION TIME-BARRED)/UNJUST ENRICHMENT (CAUSE OF ACTION TIME-BARRED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CONVERSION, REPLEVIN AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES OF ACTION TIME-BARRED)

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THE ELEMENTS OF A LACK-OF-INFORMED-CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION WERE NOT ACCURATELY STATED IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT SHEET; MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court, in the interest of justice, because the jury instructions and verdict sheet did not accurately state the elements of malpractice based upon a lack of informed consent. Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict should have been granted. The elements of a “lack of informed consent” cause of action were explained:

“[L]ack of informed consent is a distinct cause of action requiring proof of facts not contemplated by an action based merely on allegations of negligence” … . To establish a cause of action to recover damages for malpractice based on lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that the person providing the professional treatment failed to disclose alternatives thereto and failed to inform the patient of reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the treatment, and the alternatives, that a reasonable medical practitioner would have disclosed in the same circumstances, (2) that a reasonably prudent patient in the same position would not have undergone the treatment if he or she had been fully informed, and (3) that the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury” … . “The third element is construed to mean that the actual procedure performed for which there was no informed consent must have been a proximate cause of the injury” … . ” To state it in other terms, the causal connection between a doctor’s failure to perform his [or her] duty to inform and a patient’s right to recover exists only when it can be shown objectively that a reasonably prudent person would have decided against the procedures actually performed. Once that causal connection has been established, the cause of action in negligent malpractice for failure to inform has been made out and a jury may properly proceed to consider plaintiff’s damages’ ” … . Figueroa-Burgos v Bieniewicz, 2016 NY Slip Op 00329, 2nd Dept 1-20-16

NEGLIGENCE (VERDICT SHEET DID NOT ACCURATELY STATE THE ELEMENTS OF A LACK-OF-INFORMED-CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (VERDICT SHEET DID NOT ACCURATELY STATE THE ELEMENTS OF A LACK-OF-INFORMED-CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (VERDICT SHEET DID NOT ACCURATELY STATE THE ELEMENTS OF A LACK-OF-INFORMED-CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/JURIES (JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT SHEET DID NOT ACCURATELY STATE THE ELEMENTS OF A LACK-OF-INFORMED-CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT SHEET DID NOT ACCURATELY STATE THE ELEMENTS OF A LACK-OF-INFORMED-CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/VERDICT SHEET (JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT SHEET DID NOT ACCURATELY STATE THE ELEMENTS OF A LACK-OF-INFORMED-CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/INFORMED CONSENT, LACK OF (JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT SHEET DID NOT ACCURATELY STATE THE ELEMENTS OF A LACK-OF-INFORMED-CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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JURY CONFUSION, STEMMING FROM THE WORDING OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT SHEET, MANDATED A NEW TRIAL.

The First Department, in three, two-justice concurring opinions, determined plaintiff’s motion to set aside the jury verdict should have granted on “jury confusion” grounds. Plaintiff had a kidney removed for his father’s transplant procedure. A “knot pusher device” was left inside plaintiff, and he underwent a second surgery to remove it. The jury, based on the special verdict sheet, indicated leaving the “knot pusher device” inside plaintiff was not the proximate cause of his injury, but the jury sent out a note stating the plaintiff should be awarded $50,000 for having to undergo the second procedure:

 

An examination of the record reveals that the special verdict sheet was “unclear and confusing” …, because it did not provide for an award of damages caused by the need to undergo a second surgery. The confusing and ambiguous wording of the verdict sheet caused the jurors to experience substantial confusion in reaching their verdict … . While “[t]he ambiguity had been brought to the attention of the trial Justice before the jury was discharged and could have been corrected or at least clarified at that time” …, the court did not do so and a new trial  … is required to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Srikishun v Edye, 2016 NY Slip Op 00315, 1st Dept 1-19-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (CONFUSION CAUSED BY SPECIAL VERDICT SHEET MANDATED A NEW TRIAL)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CONFUSION CAUSED BY SPECIAL VERDICT SHEET MANDATED A NEW TRIAL)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT BECAUSE OF JURY CONFUSION STEMMING FROM THE VERDICT SHEET SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/JURIES (NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DUE TO CONFUSION STEMMING FROM THE SPECIAL VERDICT SHEET)/VERDICT SHEET (CONFUSING SPECIAL VERDICT SHEET WARRANTED A NEW TRIAL)

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DOCTORS, WHO ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO WARN PATIENT OF DISORIENTING EFFECTS OF DRUGS, OWED A DUTY OF CARE TO PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS STRUCK BY A VEHICLE DRIVEN BY THE PATIENT.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over an extensive dissenting opinion by Judge Stein (in which Judge Abdus-Salaam concurred), determined a medical malpractice complaint alleging defendant hospital and doctors owed a duty of care to plaintiff, who was injured by a patient, should not have been dismissed. The patient was treated with drugs which could impair her ability to drive but allegedly was not warned of that effect by the treating doctors.  Shortly after leaving the hospital, the patient crossed a double yellow line and struck plaintiff's vehicle. The Court of Appeals held that the injured plaintiff's complaint, which alleged the negligent failure to warn the patient of the impairment of the ability to drive, stated a cause of action, sounding in medical malpractice, against the defendant hospital and doctors:

Here, put simply, to take the affirmative step of administering the medication at issue without warning [the patient] about the disorienting effect of those drugs was to create a peril affecting every motorist in [the patient's] vicinity. Defendants are the only ones who could have provided a proper warning of the effects of that medication. Consequently, on the facts alleged, we conclude that defendants had a duty to plaintiffs to warn [the patient] that the drugs administered to her impaired her ability to safely operate an automobile … . Davis v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 2015 NY Slip Op 09229, CtApp 12-16-15

NEGLIGENCE (DOCTORS OWED DUTY OF CARE TO PERSON INJURED BY DRUGGED PATIENT)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (DOCTORS OWED DUTY OF CARE TO PERSON INJURED BY DRUGGED PATIENT)/MEDICAL MALPRACTIVE (FAILURE TO WARN PATIENT OF DISORIENTING EFFECT OF ADMINISTERED DRUGS)

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