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RELEASE WHICH PERTAINED TO MEDICAL CENTER AND ANY JOINT TORTFEASORS DID NOT PRECLUDE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST SURGEONS WHO WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE MEDICAL CENTER, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a release which related to a medical center and any joint tortfeasors did not preclude a medical malpractice action against doctors who were not employees of the medical center. The plaintiff had undergone surgery for a deviated septum. During the surgery plainitff’s teeth were damaged by the anesthesiologist, an employee of the medical center. The medical center settled with the plaintiff and plaintiff signed a release. The medical malpractice action against the surgeons was not related to the damaged teeth:

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… [T]he release is unambiguously limited to tortfeasors jointly liable with the Medical Center. “At common law the joint and several liability imposed on joint tort-feasors was indivisible, and any one of the joint tort-feasors was liable to the injured party for the entire damage”… . A hospital is not vicariously liable for the malpractice of independently retained doctors who are not employees of the hospital or are not held out as agents of the hospital … . Here, the defendants do not contend that the defendant doctors were employees of the Medical Center, or that they held themselves out as agents of the Medical Center. As such, there would be no basis for joint liability with the Medical Center. Further, the injuries claimed in this action are different from those claimed against and settled with the Medical Center. The lost crown and broken teeth caused by the anesthesiologist, an employee of the Medical Center, are completely distinct from the damages claimed in this action. Hoffmann v Horn, 2018 NY Slip Op 00414, Second Dept 1-24-18

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, RELEASE WHICH PERTAINED TO MEDICAL CENTER AND ANY JOINT TORTFEASORS DID NOT PRECLUDE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST SURGEONS WHO WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE MEDICAL CENTER, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ( RELEASE WHICH PERTAINED TO MEDICAL CENTER AND ANY JOINT TORTFEASORS DID NOT PRECLUDE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST SURGEONS WHO WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE MEDICAL CENTER, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (RELEASES, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, RELEASE WHICH PERTAINED TO MEDICAL CENTER AND ANY JOINT TORTFEASORS DID NOT PRECLUDE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST SURGEONS WHO WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE MEDICAL CENTER, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/RELEASES (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, RELEASE WHICH PERTAINED TO MEDICAL CENTER AND ANY JOINT TORTFEASORS DID NOT PRECLUDE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST SURGEONS WHO WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE MEDICAL CENTER, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT)

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PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROPERLY SENT TO THE JURY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, DEFENDANT DOCTOR DESTROYED HAND WRITTEN NOTES MADE WHEN SEEING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A CHILD, WHO DIED BECAUSE OF THE DOCTOR’S FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE DIABETES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a comprehensive full-fledged opinion by Justice Leventhal, determined that plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages in a medical malpractice action stemming from the defendant doctor’s (Mercado’s) destruction of handwritten notes made at the time plaintiff’s decedent was seen by the doctor. Plaintiff’s decedent, a child, Claudialee, died as a result of Mercado’s failure to diagnose diabetes:

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… [W]e now hold that where, as here, a plaintiff recovers compensatory damages for a medical professional’s malpractice, a plaintiff may also recover punitive damages for that medical professional’s act of altering or destroying medical records in an effort to evade potential medical malpractice liability. Allowing an award of punitive damages for a medical professional’s act of altering or destroying medical records in an effort to evade potential medical malpractice liability will serve to deter medical professionals from engaging in such wrongful conduct, punish medical professionals who engage in such conduct, and express public condemnation of such conduct. Thus, the Supreme Court did not err in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury … . Gomez v Cabatic, 2018 NY Slip Op 00278, Second Dept 1-17-18

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROPERLY SENT TO THE JURY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, DEFENDANT DOCTOR DESTROYED HAND WRITTEN NOTES MADE WHEN SEEING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A CHILD, WHO DIED BECAUSE OF THE DOCTOR’S FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE DIABETES (SECOND DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROPERLY SENT TO THE JURY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, DEFENDANT DOCTOR DESTROYED HAND WRITTEN NOTES MADE WHEN SEEING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A CHILD, WHO DIED BECAUSE OF THE DOCTOR’S FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE DIABETES (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, DESTRUCTION OF WRITTEN NOTES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROPERLY SENT TO THE JURY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, DEFENDANT DOCTOR DESTROYED HAND WRITTEN NOTES MADE WHEN SEEING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A CHILD, WHO DIED BECAUSE OF THE DOCTOR’S FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE DIABETES (SECOND DEPT))/DAMAGES (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROPERLY SENT TO THE JURY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, DEFENDANT DOCTOR DESTROYED HAND WRITTEN NOTES MADE WHEN SEEING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A CHILD, WHO DIED BECAUSE OF THE DOCTOR’S FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE DIABETES (SECOND DEPT))/PUNITIVE DAMAGES (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROPERLY SENT TO THE JURY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, DEFENDANT DOCTOR DESTROYED HAND WRITTEN NOTES MADE WHEN SEEING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A CHILD, WHO DIED BECAUSE OF THE DOCTOR’S FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE DIABETES (SECOND DEPT))

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THE COMPLAINT, STEMMING FROM A FALL OFF A STRETCHER WHILE BEING POSITIONED FOR AN X-RAY, SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE, AND WAS THEREFORE UNTIMELY, PROPOSED NEGLIGENT HIRING CAUSE OF ACTION COULD NOT BE ADDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the complaint sounded in medical malpractice, not common law negligence, and was therefore untimely. Plaintiff alleged she fell off a stretcher as she was being positioned for a chest X-ray. The attempt to amend the complaint to allege a negligent hiring cause of action failed because the facts underlying negligent hiring were not the same as the facts underlying the original complaint. Therefore the relation-back doctrine did not apply:

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As described by plaintiff in her affidavit, the technician’s conduct in placing plaintiff’s body in a certain position, so as to obtain accurate imaging in an Xray directed by a physician at defendant hospital, bore a “substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician” … . Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint sounds in medical malpractice and was correctly dismissed as untimely (see CPLR 214-a). …

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CPLR 203(f) provides, “A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading” … .

The original complaint asserts one cause of action that arose from plaintiff’s Xray on July 5, 2012. The proposed negligent hiring and failure to promulgate regulations claims arise from different facts and implicate different duties based on conduct preceding, and separate and different from, the alleged negligence of the Xray technician on that date. Thus, the relation back doctrine is inapplicable because the facts alleged in the original complaint failed to give notice of the facts necessary to support the amended pleading … . Lang-Salgado v Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 00248, First Dept 1-16-18

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, THE COMPLAINT, STEMMING FROM A FALL OFF A STRETCHER WHILE BEING POSITIONED FOR AN X-RAY, SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE, AND WAS THEREFORE UNTIMELY, PROPOSED NEGLIGENT HIRING CAUSE OF ACTION COULD NOT BE ADDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE (FIRST DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ( THE COMPLAINT, STEMMING FROM A FALL OFF A STRETCHER WHILE BEING POSITIONED FOR AN X-RAY, SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE, AND WAS THEREFORE UNTIMELY, PROPOSED NEGLIGENT HIRING CAUSE OF ACTION COULD NOT BE ADDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, RELATION BACK DOCTRINE, THE COMPLAINT, STEMMING FROM A FALL OFF A STRETCHER WHILE BEING POSITIONED FOR AN X-RAY, SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE, AND WAS THEREFORE UNTIMELY, PROPOSED NEGLIGENT HIRING CAUSE OF ACTION COULD NOT BE ADDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE (FIRST DEPT))/RELATION BACK DOCTRINE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED NEGLIGENT HIRING CAUSE OF ACTION COULD NOT BE ADDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 214-a (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, THE COMPLAINT, STEMMING FROM A FALL OFF A STRETCHER WHILE BEING POSITIONED FOR AN X-RAY, SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE, AND WAS THEREFORE UNTIMELY, PROPOSED NEGLIGENT HIRING CAUSE OF ACTION COULD NOT BE ADDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 203 (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, THE COMPLAINT, STEMMING FROM A FALL OFF A STRETCHER WHILE BEING POSITIONED FOR AN X-RAY, SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE, AND WAS THEREFORE UNTIMELY, PROPOSED NEGLIGENT HIRING CAUSE OF ACTION COULD NOT BE ADDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFFS’ BATTERY AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DEFENDANTS PAPERS, WHICH INCLUDED PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY, DEMONSTRATED TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT (FOURTH DEPT)

The Fourth Department determined plaintiffs’ battery and medical malpractice causes of action properly survived summary judgment. The court noted that the defendants had submitted plaintiff’s testimony in support of summary judgment and thereby demonstrate triable issues of fact. With respect to the battery cause of action, the court wrote:

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It is “well settled that a medical professional may be deemed to have committed battery, rather than malpractice, if he or she carries out a procedure or treatment to which the patient has provided no consent at all’ ” … . Here, plaintiffs allege in the complaint that “defendant physician knew that . . . she was exceeding the scope of . . . plaintiff’s consent by performing a medical procedure that . . . plaintiff had not authorized” …  and, inasmuch as defendants do not challenge the battery claim with respect to the element of causation, we conclude that plaintiffs have stated such a claim. Tirado v Koritz, 2017 NY Slip Op 08954, Fourth Dept 12-22-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFFS’ BATTERY AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DEFENDANTS PAPERS, WHICH INCLUDED PLAINTIFF’s TESTIMONY, DEMONSTRATED TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT (FOURTH DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFFS’ BATTERY AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DEFENDANTS PAPERS, WHICH INCLUDED PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY, DEMONSTRATED TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT (FOURTH DEPT)/BATTERY (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, (PLAINTIFFS’ BATTERY AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DEFENDANTS PAPERS, WHICH INCLUDED PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY, DEMONSTRATED TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT (FOURTH DEPT)

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PARENTS’ MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CARE OF A CHILD BORN WITH A GENETIC DEFECT AFTER IN VITRO FERTILIZATION ACCRUES UPON THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD, NOT WHEN THE EGG WAS IMPLANTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Jude DiFiore, over a dissent, determined that the statute of limitations in these actions stemming from in vitro fertilization began to run upon the baby’s birth, not when the egg was implanted. Here the eggs were not screened for a genetic defect. The lawsuits were based upon the theory that, but for the malpractice, the babies would not have been born and sought compensation for the extraordinary expenses necessary to care for the children:

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Two couples — the Dennehys and the Farbers — sought in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment from defendant Dr. Alan Copperman at defendant Reproductive Medicine Associates of New York, LLP (RMA). The couple discussed the possibility of using an egg donor. Copperman informed each couple that RMA screened donor candidates for all known genetic conditions for which testing is available, but did not state which conditions were included in the screening. The couple then matched with an anonymous egg donor and, after consenting to the IVF procedure, the plaintiff mother was implanted with fertilized embryos using the donor eggs. Pregnancy was confirmed and the couple was discharged to their obstetrician/gynecologist. Each plaintiff mother later gave birth without complications — the Dennehys had a single infant and the Farbers had twins. Following birth, Copperman learned that the egg donor had tested positive for the Fragile X trait, a chromosomal abnormality that can result in intellectual disability and other deficits. He informed the couples within one year of the births, and testing later confirmed that the Dennehys’ infant and one of the Farbers’ twins had the full Fragile X mutation. …

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In 1978, this Court recognized a new, narrow cause of action permitting parents to recover the extraordinary care and treatment expenses “accruing as a consequence of the birth” of a child with a disability … . This claim, “founded essentially upon a theory of negligence or medical malpractice,” requires “a duty flowing from defendants to [plaintiffs] and that the breach of that duty was the proximate cause of the birth of their infants” … . The claim is restricted to those instances in which the plaintiffs can demonstrate “that but for the defendants’ breach of their duty to advise plaintiffs, the latter would not have been required to assume these [extraordinary financial] obligations” … . In other words, parents bringing this type of action may seek to recover only “‘the increased financial obligation arising from the extraordinary medical treatment rendered the child during minority'”… . No recovery is allowed for any consequent psychic or emotional damages …, nor may parents recover the ordinary costs of raising a healthy child born by reason of so-called wrongful conception… . The extraordinary expenses claim belongs to the parents alone — the child cannot bring a claim for “wrongful life” … . This is because, as a matter of public policy, an infant born in an impaired state suffers no legally cognizable injury in being born compared to not having been born at all … .

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The action’s gravamen is that, but for defendants’ negligence, the parents would not have conceived or given birth to a child requiring extraordinary expenses for treatment and care. Plaintiffs allege that, by failing to take steps to detect that the egg donor was a carrier for Fragile X and therefore that the embryo may have had the Fragile X trait, defendants left the parents in an uninformed state as to whether to avert pregnancy or birth — and the associated costs resulting from birth. Given the nature of these allegations, it follows that until the alleged misconduct results in the birth of a child, there can be no extraordinary expenses claim. Moreover, we have stated that the “legally cognizable injury” is that the parents will incur extraordinary expenses to care for and treat the child … . These expenses arise “as a consequence of the birth” … , not just the conception. Prior to a live birth, it is impossible to ascertain whether parents will bear any extraordinary expenses … . Due to these unique circumstances, the cause of action accrues upon the birth of an infant with a disability. This date appropriately balances the competing statute of limitations policy concerns — it gives parents a reasonable opportunity to bring suit while at the same time limiting claims in a manner that provides certainty and predictability to medical professionals engaged in fertility treatment and prenatal care … . B.F. v Reproductive Medicine Assoc. of N.Y., LLP, 2017 NY Slip Op 08712, CtApp 12-14-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PARENTS’ MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CARE OF A CHILD BORN WITH A GENETIC DEFECT AFTER IN VITRO FERTILIZATION ACCRUES UPON THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD, NOT WHEN THE EGG WAS IMPLANTED (CT APP))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ( PARENTS’ MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CARE OF A CHILD BORN WITH A GENETIC DEFECT AFTER IN VITRO FERTILIZATION ACCRUES UPON THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD, NOT WHEN THE EGG WAS IMPLANTED (CT APP))/IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PARENTS’ MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CARE OF A CHILD BORN WITH A GENETIC DEFECT AFTER IN VITRO FERTILIZATION ACCRUES UPON THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD, NOT WHEN THE EGG WAS IMPLANTED (CT APP))/GENETIC DEFECT (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION,  PARENTS’ MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CARE OF A CHILD BORN WITH A GENETIC DEFECT AFTER IN VITRO FERTILIZATION ACCRUES UPON THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD, NOT WHEN THE EGG WAS IMPLANTED (CT APP))/FRAGILE X TRAIT (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, PARENTS’ MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CARE OF A CHILD BORN WITH A GENETIC DEFECT AFTER IN VITRO FERTILIZATION ACCRUES UPON THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD, NOT WHEN THE EGG WAS IMPLANTED (CT APP))

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MOTION TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO ADD A NEW THEORY OF LIABILITY WHICH WAS FIRST RAISED BY PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ motion to amend the bill of particulars to add a new theory of liability should have been granted in this medical malpractice action. The amendment was based upon plaintiffs’ expert’s disclosures and the motion to amend was made shortly after the expert raised the issue:

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While leave to amend a bill of particulars is generally freely given in the absence of prejudice or surprise (see CPLR 3025[b]), where a motion for leave to amend a bill of particulars alleging a new theory of liability not raised in the claim or the original bill is made on the eve of trial, leave of court is required, and “judicial discretion should be exercised sparingly, and should be discreet, circumspect, prudent, and cautious”… . In exercising its discretion, the court should consider how long the party seeking the amendment was aware of the facts upon which the motion was predicated, whether a reasonable excuse for the delay was offered, and whether prejudice resulted therefrom … . Here, the delay would not have been prejudicial since the plaintiffs’ amendment sought to include a theory of causation of the decedent’s death raised in the defendants’ expert disclosures. Moreover, the plaintiffs did not delay in seeking the amendment after receiving the defendants’ expert disclosures, and the defendants were permitted further discovery … . Moore v Franklin Hosp. Med. Center-North Shore-Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., 2017 NY Slip Op 08263, Second Dept 11-22-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO ADD A NEW THEORY OF LIABILITY WHICH WAS FIRST RAISED BY PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/BILL OF PARTICULARS (CIVIL PROCEDURE, MOTION TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO ADD A NEW THEORY OF LIABILITY WHICH WAS FIRST RAISED BY PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT/NEGLIGENCE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO ADD A NEW THEORY OF LIABILITY WHICH WAS FIRST RAISED BY PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, MOTION TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO ADD A NEW THEORY OF LIABILITY WHICH WAS FIRST RAISED BY PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3025[b] (MOTION TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO ADD A NEW THEORY OF LIABILITY WHICH WAS FIRST RAISED BY PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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DISCOVERY STATUTE MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS DEMONSTRATING THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to discovery of contracts and agreements potentially relevant to the relationship among defendants in this medical malpractice action. The discovery statute is to be broadly construed:

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CPLR 3101(a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” The words “material and necessary” must ” be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity'” … .

Here, at his deposition, Ward testified that he was president of the PC as well as the Director of Anesthesia Services at the Medical Center. Ward further testified that there was an agreement that was executed by the Medical Center and by him in his individual capacity only, concerning, in effect, the establishment and terms of the existence of what would become the PC (hereinafter the contract). As such, and despite the fact that it was executed by Ward in his individual capacity only, the contract may provide material evidence on the issue of the Medical Center’s relationship to or control over the PC. Thus, the disclosure sought by the plaintiff, i.e., the production of the contract by Nataloni, the PC, and the Medical Center, and a knowledgeable witness from the Medical Center regarding the contract, was “[evidence] material and necessary” for the prosecution of his action … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were to compel Nataloni, the PC, and the Medical Center to produce any contracts and agreements for anesthesia services between the Medical Center and Ward, in his individual capacity only, and to compel the Medical Center to produce a witness with knowledge regarding the subject contract. The court likewise improvidently exercised its discretion in granting those branches of the separate cross motions which were for a protective order with respect to those discovery demands. Redmond v Hanypsiak, 2017 NY Slip Op 06563, Second Dept 9-20-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DISCOVERY STATUTE MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS DEMONSTRATING THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (DISCOVERY STATUTE MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS DEMONSTRATING THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (DISCOVERY STATUTE MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS DEMONSTRATING THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE SERVICE OF A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL ALLEGING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MEDICAL RECORDS PROVIDED NOTICE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s request for permission to serve a late notice of claim should have been granted. Plaintiff alleged medical malpractice in the treatment of cervical cancer. The Second Department found that the medical records themselves timely alerted the defendant municipal hospital (NHCC) to the nature of the malpractice claim. Therefore the hospital was not prejudiced by the delay in filing the notice of claim:

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“Merely having or creating hospital records, without more, does not establish actual knowledge of a potential injury where the records do not evince that the medical staff, by its acts or omissions, inflicted any injury” … . “Where the alleged malpractice is apparent from an independent review of the medical records, those records constitute actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim'” … .

Here, in support of the petition, the decedent submitted medical records and an affidavit of a physician who reviewed the records and concluded that there had been a departure from accepted medical practice … . Inasmuch as the medical records, upon independent review, suggested injury attributable to malpractice, they provided NHCC with actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim … . Furthermore, the petitioner made an initial showing that NHCC would not suffer any prejudice by the delay in serving a notice of claim, and NHCC failed to rebut the petitioner’s showing with particularized indicia of prejudice … . … [T]he lack of a reasonable excuse is not dispositive where there is actual notice and absence of prejudice …. . Matter of Breslin v Nassau Health Care Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 06440, Second Dept 9-13-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE SERVICE OF A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL ALLEGING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MEDICAL RECORDS PROVIDED NOTICE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE SERVICE OF A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL ALLEGING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MEDICAL RECORDS PROVIDED NOTICE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE SERVICE OF A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL ALLEGING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MEDICAL RECORDS PROVIDED NOTICE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE SERVICE OF A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL ALLEGING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MEDICAL RECORDS PROVIDED NOTICE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))

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DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT APPLY TO FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over an extensive dissent, determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed defendants’ motions for summary judgment in this medical malpractice. The motions were dismissed on procedural grounds because they were filed and served a few days after the 60-day deadline imposed by the local court rules. The courts had been closed when the papers were supposed to be filed due to a storm. The 2nd Department went on to determine the merits. Plaintiff had experienced headaches over a period of years and had sought treatment for them. Eventually a benign brain tumor was discovered. In removing the tumor plaintiff was rendered legally blind. The malpractice action alleged a negligent failure to diagnose the tumor, and lack of informed consent. The court held that the continuing treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations even though the treatment was for headaches, not the tumor, because the presence of the tumor had not been diagnosed. The court went on to find that the informed consent cause of action was not viable because the alleged malpractice was a failure to diagnose, not the negligent performance of a surgical procedure:

… [T]he record presents issues of fact as to continuous treatment. As is well established, “the continuous treatment doctrine tolls the Statute of Limitations for a medical malpractice action when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint” … . In addition, “[w]here the malpractice claim is based on an alleged failure to properly diagnose a condition, the continuous treatment doctrine may apply as long as the symptoms being treated indicate the presence of that condition” … . * * *

… [T]he informed consent claim lacks merit. As we have held, “[a] failure to diagnose cannot be the basis of a cause of action for lack of informed consent unless associated with a diagnostic procedure that involve[s] invasion or disruption of the integrity of the body'” … . Lewis v Rutkovsky, 2017 NY Slip Op 06342, First Dept 8-29-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION, LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT APPLY TO FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE (FIRST DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION, LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT APPLY TO FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE (FIRST DEPT))/CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE  (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION, LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT APPLY TO FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE (FIRST DEPT))/INFORMED CONSENT  (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION, LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT APPLY TO FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE (FIRST DEPT))

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FAILURE TO PROVIDE WRITTEN POST-COLONOSCOPY INSTRUCTIONS AND FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF A COLON PERFORATION CONSTITUTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant doctor’s (Aronoff’s) motion to set aside the verdict in this medical malpractice action was properly denied. Aronoff’s failure to provide plaintiff (Raymond) with written instructions and warning after the colonoscopy, and his failure to notify plaintiff after a colon perforation was discovered constituted sufficient evidence of proximate cause:

Establishing proximate cause in medical malpractice cases requires a plaintiff to present sufficient medical evidence from which a reasonable person might conclude that it was more probable than not that the defendant’s departure was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury … . “Generally, expert testimony is necessary to prove a deviation from accepted standards of medical care and to establish proximate cause” … . ” A plaintiff’s evidence of proximate cause may be found legally sufficient even if his or her expert is unable to quantify the extent to which the defendant’s act or omission decreased the plaintiff’s chance of a better outcome or increased the injury, as long as evidence is presented from which the jury may infer that the defendant’s conduct diminished the plaintiff’s chance of a better outcome or increased [the] injury'” … .

Here, there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings that Aronoff departed from accepted standards of medical practice in failing to provide Raymond with written post-colonoscopy instructions and failing to warn him as to the signs or symptoms of which he should be aware. Aronoff also failed to contact Raymond and instruct him to go to the hospital after Aro

noff had reviewed CT scan results that revealed a colon perforation. The evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s findings that these deviations proximately caused Raymond’s injuries … . Gaspard v Aronoff, 2017 NY Slip Op 06258, Second Dept 8-23-17

 

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