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NEW YORK LAW APPLIED WHERE BOTH PLAINTIFF AND HIS EMPLOYER ARE CANADIAN, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS SHOCKED BY ELECTRIC WIRES ON THE FLOOR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION.

The First Department determined New York law applied here where plaintiff and plaintiff’s employer, Nygard, a third-party defendant, are Canadian and further held plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 241(6) cause of action. Plaintiff was shocked by electric wires which were on the floor of the workplace:

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To the extent, if any, Manitoba law, unlike New York law, might prohibit the third-party claims asserted by defendants (both domiciled in New York) against Manitoba-domiciliary Nygard, plaintiff’s employer, the availability of a third-party claim against plaintiff’s employer is governed by the law of the place of injury — here, New York — “where the local law of each litigant’s domicile favors that party, and the action is pending in one of those jurisdictions” … . The application of New York law on this issue is appropriate because this state, where the accident occurred, “is the place with which both [defendants and Nygard] have voluntarily associated themselves” … , and “comports with the reasonable expectations of [these] parties in conducting their business affairs” … .

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Plaintiff was engaged in “construction” work at the time of the incident (Labor Law § 241[6]), and Owner’s attempt to isolate the activities in which plaintiff was involved at the moment of the incident ignores the general context of the work … . Further, the record established a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.13(b)(4), which requires that workers who may come into contact with an electric power circuit be protected against electric shock “by de-energizing the circuit and grounding it or by guarding such circuit by effective insulation or other means.” That plaintiff was electrically shocked, as confirmed by another Nygard International employee, demonstrated that the circuit was not de-energized, grounded, or guarded by effective insulation. Plaintiff also established that the violation of the provision was a result of negligence … . Owner’s contention that an issue of fact exists as to plaintiff’s comparative negligence is unavailing. Plaintiff testified that he had objected to having the temporary lighting work performed in the manner that it was done, and that Nygard International’s principal overruled him. The principal’s insistence that plaintiff perform the temporary wiring work, despite plaintiff’s objections, established negligence by Nygard, for which Owner is vicariously liable … . O’Leary v S&A Elec. Contr. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 02888, 1st Dept 4-13-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (NEW YORK LAW APPLIED WHERE BOTH PLAINTIFF AND HIS EMPLOYER ARE CANADIAN, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS SHOCKED BY ELECTRIC WIRES ON THE FLOOR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION)/CIVIL PROCEDURE  (NEW YORK LAW APPLIED WHERE BOTH PLAINTIFF AND HIS EMPLOYER ARE CANADIAN, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS SHOCKED BY ELECTRIC WIRES ON THE FLOOR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION)/CHOICE OF LAW (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (NEW YORK LAW APPLIED WHERE BOTH PLAINTIFF AND HIS EMPLOYER ARE CANADIAN, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS SHOCKED BY ELECTRIC WIRES ON THE FLOOR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION)

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION APPLIED (LABOR LAW 240 (1)) AND WHETHER DEFENDANT CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (LABOR LAW 200).

The Third Department determined there were questions of fact whether defendant intended to reside in the two-family home plaintiff was working on (thereby triggering the homeowner’s exemption from Labor Law liability) and whether defendant created a dangerous condition by providing a ladder that was too short. Therefore defendant’s motions for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) and 200 causes of action were properly denied:

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“Although Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 each ‘impose nondelegable duties upon contractors, owners and their agents to comply with certain safety practices for the protection of workers engaged in various construction-related activities . . .[,] the Legislature has carved out an exemption for the owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work'”… . The exemption stems from the legislative determination “that the typical homeowner is no better situated than the hired worker to furnish appropriate safety devices and to procure suitable insurance protection”… . The exemption does not “encompass homeowners who use their one or two-family premises entirely and solely for commercial purposes”… . In this regard, “renovating a residence for resale or rental plainly qualifies as work being performed for a commercial purpose” … . The relevant inquiry is “‘the homeowners’ intentions at the time of the injury underlying the action'” … .

Despite defendant’s submissions indicating that he intended to use the house, at least in part, as his own residence, defendant also submitted the deposition of plaintiff, who testified that defendant had told him that he planned to rent both halves of the two-family home. Thus, defendant’s submissions, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, failed to meet his prima facie burden of establishing his entitlement to the homeowner’s exemption … . …

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Where, as here, the injured worker contends that the underlying “accident arose not from the manner in which the work was performed, but rather from an allegedly dangerous condition at the work site, liability for a violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence will be imposed if the property owner created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it, and failed to remedy the condition within a reasonable amount of time”…  . According to plaintiff’s deposition testimony, defendant created the dangerous condition that caused his fall and failed to remedy it despite plaintiff’s complaints. More specifically, and according to plaintiff, defendant supplied plaintiff with a ladder that was too short for the fascia project that defendant had asked him to complete and, despite plaintiff voicing his concerns about the ladder, defendant told plaintiff that the project needed to be completed before plaintiff left that day. Plaintiff further testified that defendant thereafter held the same ladder that plaintiff had indicated was too short while plaintiff climbed it and then reached to attempt the fascia work before falling. Vogler v Perrault, 2017 NY Slip Op 02857, 3rd Dept 4-13-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION APPLIED (LABOR LAW 240 (1)) AND WHETHER DEFENDANT CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (LABOR LAW 200))/HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION APPLIED (LABOR LAW 240 (1)) AND WHETHER DEFENDANT CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (LABOR LAW 200))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION APPLIED (LABOR LAW 240 (1)) AND WHETHER DEFENDANT CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (LABOR LAW 200))

QUESTION OF FACT, CREATED BY CONFLICTING EXPERTS, WHETHER OUTSIDE STEEL STAIRCASE WAS SAFE FOR USE IN WET WEATHER, PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a three-judge dissenting opinion, determined plaintiff’s summary judgment motion on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action should not have been granted. Plaintiff fell down a temporary steel staircase which was wet from rain. There were conflicting expert affidavits about the safety of the stairs:

To the extent the Appellate Division opinion below can be read to say that a statutory violation occurred merely because plaintiff fell down the stairs, it does not provide an accurate statement of the law. As we have made clear, the fact that a worker falls at a construction site, in itself, does not establish a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) … . Moreover, the present case is distinguishable from “cases involving ladders or scaffolds that collapse or malfunction for no apparent reason” where we have applied “a presumption that the ladder or scaffolding device was not good enough to afford proper protection” … .

Here, by contrast, there are questions of fact as to whether the staircase provided adequate protection. As noted above, defendants’ expert opined that the staircase was designed to allow for outdoor use and to provide necessary traction in inclement weather. Moreover, defendants’ expert opined that additional anti-slip measures were not warranted. In addition, he disputed the assertions by plaintiff’s expert that the staircase was worn down or that it was unusually narrow or steep. In light of the above, plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability. O’Brien v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2017 NY Slip Op 02466, CtApp 3-30-17

 

FALL FROM FIRST FLOOR TO BASEMENT FLOOR IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), THE UNGUARDED OPENING VIOLATED A PROVISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE.

The Fourth Department, overruling precedent, determined a fall from the first floor through an unguarded opening to the basement floor was a covered event under Labor Law 240 (1) and the unguarded opening violated a provision of the Industrial Code.  The decision covers a number of other substantive issues (not summarized here) including statutory agent liability, Labor Law 200 and common law negligence liability, and indemnfication:

We agree with plaintiffs that the court erred in denying that part of their motion seeking partial summary judgment on liability on their Labor Law § 240 (1) claim and in granting, instead, those parts of the motion of Gates and cross motion of Nolan seeking dismissal of that claim against them. We therefore further modify the order by denying those parts of the motion and cross motion, reinstating that claim, and granting that part of plaintiffs’ motion. As a preliminary matter, we note that the court relied on our decision in Riley v Stickl Constr. Co. (242 AD2d 936) for its determination that a fall from the first floor through an unguarded opening to the basement is not a fall from an elevated worksite within the meaning of section 240 (1). To the extent that Riley stands for the proposition that a worker falling from the first floor to the basement is not protected by section 240 (1), that decision is no longer to be followed. Instead, we conclude that, because there was a “difference between the elevation level of the required work and a lower level” … , and “[b]ecause plaintiff fell through an opening in the floor, [plaintiffs are] entitled to judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240 (1)”… .

We further conclude that the court erred in denying that part of plaintiffs’ motion seeking summary judgment on the limited issue whether 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (b) (1) was violated, and we therefore further modify the order accordingly. That regulation, which is sufficiently specific to support a cause of action under Labor Law § 241 (6) … , requires protection from hazardous openings. It is undisputed that the protective railings and the plywood cover had been removed from the stairwell opening and that plaintiff fell through the opening to the floor below. McKay v Weeden, 2017 NY Slip Op 02327, 4th Dept 3-24-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (FALL FROM FIRST FLOOR TO BASEMENT FLOOR IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), THE UNGUARDED OPENING VIOLATED A PROVISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE)

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY THE PLACEMENT OF THE SCAFFOLD OR THE ABSENCE OF RAILINGS.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether plaintiff’s fall was caused by the placement of the scaffold or the absence of railings on the scaffold:

We conclude that plaintiff failed to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law under that statute. Specifically, we conclude that there is an issue of fact whether the scaffold failed to provide proper protection because it was not properly placed, thereby precipitating plaintiff’s fall, or ” whether plaintiff simply lost his balance and fell’ ” when his head struck the beam … . Plaintiff likewise failed to establish as a matter of law that the lack of safety railings on the scaffold, as required by 12 NYCRR 23-5.18 (b) … , is a sufficient basis for a determination of liability under section 240 (1) that the scaffold failed to provide plaintiff proper protection. Rather, we conclude that there is an issue of fact whether the presence of rails would have prevented his fall … . Kopasz v City of Buffalo, 2017 NY Slip Op 02305, 4th Dept 3-24-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY THE PLACEMENT OF THE SCAFFOLD OR THE ABSENCE OF RAILINGS)/SCAFFOLDS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY THE PLACEMENT OF THE SCAFFOLD OR THE ABSENCE OF RAILINGS)

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NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT FOR LABOR LAW ACTION AGAINST CITY NOT PREEMPTED BY LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT.

The Second Department determined plaintiff was required to file a notice of claim in his Labor Law action against the city. The notice of claim requirement was not preempted by the Longshoreman’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). Plaintiff was injured while doing overhaul work in a the Brooklyn Navy Yard:

The LHWCA provides nonseaman maritime workers with the right to bring no-fault workers’ compensation claims against their employer, pursuant to 33 USC § 904(b), and negligence claims against the vessel, pursuant to 33 USC § 905(b). As to those two categories of defendants, 33 USC § 905(a) and (b) expressly preempt all other claims, but 33 USC § 933(a) expressly preserves all claims against third parties … . “Importantly, § 933 recognizes that a covered employee may have tort remedies against third parties under federal or state law. Section 933 preserves and codifies a maritime worker’s common law right to pursue a negligence claim against a third party that is not the employer or a coworker; it does not create a cause of action nor establish a third party’s liability for negligence” … . Fernandez v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02022, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT FOR LABOR LAW ACTION AGAINST CITY NOT PREEMPTED BY LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT FOR LABOR LAW ACTION AGAINST CITY NOT PREEMPTED BY LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNCIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT FOR LABOR LAW ACTION AGAINST CITY NOT PREEMPTED BY LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT)/LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT FOR LABOR LAW ACTION AGAINST CITY NOT PREEMPTED BY LONGSHOREMAN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT)

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TREE CUTTING NOT COVERED, PILE OF DEBRIS NOT A STRUCTURE, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200.

The Second Department, in the course of a decision addressing the exclusivity of a Workers’ Compensation recovery and Labor Law 240(1), 241(6) and 200 causes of action, noted that tree cutting was not covered under Labor Law 240(1) and a pile of debris was not a structure within the meaning of Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6). The court further noted that defendant (LLC), as an out of possession landlord, was not liable under Labor Law 200 for either the manner in which work is done or a dangerous condition:

The Supreme Court … properly granted that branch of the respondents’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against the LLC, as tree cutting and removal are not activities covered by those statutory provisions … , and the evidence established, as a matter of law, that the mound of old tennis court clay, sand, rocks, and other construction debris was not a “structure” under the Labor Law … . Moreover, the respondents established, prima facie, that the tree cutting and removal was ” routine maintenance outside of a construction or renovation context'” … . …

The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the respondents’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence insofar as asserted against the LLC. “Labor Law § 200 is a codification of a property owner’s common-law duty to provide workers at a site with a reasonably safe place to work” … . To the extent that the plaintiff’s claims are based on the manner in which the work was performed, the respondents established, prima facie, that the LLC did not have authority to supervise or control the means and method of the work … . Likewise, to the extent the plaintiff’s claims were based on a dangerous condition on the premises, by presenting the lease between the LLC and the camp, the respondents also established, prima facie, that the LLC, as an out-of-possession landlord, was not responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries … . The LLC relinquished control of the subject property to the camp and placed all responsibility for landscaping and maintenance work on the camp … . Although the LLC reserved a right of entry under the lease, here, this did not provide a sufficient basis on which to impose liability upon the LLC for injuries caused by a dangerous condition, as the condition did not violate a specific statute, nor was it a significant structural or design defect … . Derosas v Rosmarins Land Holdings, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 02019, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (TREE CUTTING NOT COVERED, PILE OF DEBRIS NOT A STRUCTURE, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200)/TREE CUTTING (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, TREE CUTTING NOT COVERED, PILE OF DEBRIS NOT A STRUCTURE, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200)/STRUCTURE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, TREE CUTTING NOT COVERED, PILE OF DEBRIS NOT A STRUCTURE, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200)/LANDLORD-TENANT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, TREE CUTTING NOT COVERED, PILE OF DEBRIS NOT A STRUCTURE, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200)

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PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INJURED ON THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION WERE VIABLE HOWEVER, USE OF ALIAS WAS NOT A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.

The Second Department determined the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action should have been dismissed because plaintiff was not injured on the construction site but rather on a storage site a few blocks away. Plaintiff was injured when he stepped in a hole. However the Labor Law 200 cause of action was viable. The Second Department also determined the plaintiff’s use of an alias to bring suit was not a fraud upon the court (plaintiff is an undocumented immigrant) but held that the complaint should be amended to reflect his actual name:

Turning to the plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action, Royal and Vista established, prima facie, that at the time of the accident the plaintiff was not working in a construction area within the meaning of Labor Law § 241(6) … . They submitted evidence which established that the lot where the accident occurred was located several blocks away from the construction area, and was used to store materials. There was no construction taking place at the lot, and the plaintiff’s accident occurred as he was taking materials to a truck so they could be transported to the construction site. In opposition to this prima facie showing by Royal and Vista, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. …

With respect to the plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action, this accident arose not from the manner in which the work was performed, but rather from an allegedly dangerous condition at the work site. Under such circumstances, liability may be imposed if the property owner created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it, and failed to remedy the condition within a reasonable amount of time … . Similarly, a general contractor may be held liable in common-law negligence and under Labor Law § 200 if it had control over the work site and actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition … . Bessa v Anflo Indus., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 02013, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INJURED ON THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION WERE VIABLE HOWEVER)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INJURED ON THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION WERE VIABLE HOWEVER, USE OF ALIAS WAS NOT A FRAUD UPON THE COURT)/ALIAS (BRINGING SUIT USING AN ALIAS WAS NOT A FRAUD ON THE COURT)/FRAUD (FRAUD UPON THE COURT, BRINGING SUIT USING AN ALIAS WAS NOT A FRAUD ON THE COURT)

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OBJECT THAT FELL WAS THE TYPE OF OBJECT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN SECURED WITH A SAFETY DEVICE ENUMERATED IN THE LABOR LAW STATUTE.

The Second Department determined summary judgment should not have been granted to plaintiff on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff fell off a scissors lift when what he alleged was a “beam” came down from above him. The object which came down was also described as a “duct.” The Second Department found there was a question of fact whether the object which came down should have been secured by a safety device enumerated in the Labor Law statute:

The evidence submitted by the plaintiff was insufficient to establish that the beam in question fell due to the absence or inadequacy of an enumerated safety device. Specifically, there was a question of fact as to the nature of the “beam” at issue. The plaintiff alternately described it as a flat or narrow “metal slab supposedly made of Steel but it was mostly [copper],” or an iron or steel “beam.” The plaintiff’s supervisor described it as “like old duct work, metal studs,” and a representative of [defendant] described it as a “duct” or “ductwork.” Although the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of an expert who opined that a contractor’s lift should have been provided to hold “the beam” as it was being cut, the expert, whose opinion was rendered after reviewing the relevant deposition transcripts, failed to identify a basis for concluding that the object at issue was a “beam” or otherwise explain why a contractor’s lift was required to hold the object at issue, and thereby establish that this was “a situation where a hoisting or securing device of the kind enumerated in the statute would have been necessary or even expected” … . Romero v 2200 N. Steel, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 02075, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OBJECT THAT FELL WAS THE TYPE OF OBJECT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN SECURED WITH A SAFETY DEVICE ENUMERATED IN THE LABOR LAW STATUTE)

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PLAINTIFF’S INABILITY TO PINPOINT THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL FROM A LADDER DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THERE WAS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE CAUSE.

The First Department determined plaintiff’s inability to state exactly how the accident happened did not warrant summary judgment. Circumstantial evidence established that the bottom of plaintiff’s ladder slid out from under him:

“A plaintiff’s inability to testify exactly as to how an accident occurred does not require dismissal where negligence and causation can be established with circumstantial evidence” … . Plaintiff established his entitlement to partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, despite his admitted inability to remember the specifics of the accident, through the submission of a workers’ compensation report and the statement of defendant … , both of which established that the accident occurred when the bottom of the ladder from which plaintiff was descending suddenly slipped out from under him, causing him to fall to the ground … . Weicht v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 01995, 1st Dept 3-21-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF’S INABILITY TO PINPOINT THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL FROM A LADDER DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THERE WAS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE CAUSE)/EVIDENCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF’S INABILITY TO PINPOINT THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL FROM A LADDER DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THERE WAS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE CAUSE)/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF’S INABILITY TO PINPOINT THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL FROM A LADDER DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THERE WAS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE CAUSE)

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