You are here: / Labor Law-Construction Law

GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200 OR COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s knee injury stemming from carrying a heavy beam down stairs was not covered under Labor Law 240 (1). The court further found that defendant general contractor (Talisen) did not exercise sufficient supervisory control over plaintiff’s work to be liable under Labor Law 200 or common law negligence:

Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty imposed on an owner or a general contractor to provide construction site workers with a safe place to work … . Where a plaintiff’s claims implicate the means and methods of the work, an owner or a contractor will not be held liable under Labor Law § 200 unless it had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work. General supervisory authority to oversee the progress of the work is insufficient to impose liability… . ” A defendant has the authority to control the work for the purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed'” … . If the challenged means and methods of the work are those of a subcontractor, and the owner or contractor exercises no supervisory control over the work, no liability attaches under Labor Law § 200 or the common law … .

In this case, Talisen met its prima facie burden of demonstrating a lack of sufficient supervisory control over the plaintiff’s work to subject it to liability under either Labor Law § 200 or common-law negligence. In support of its motion, Talisen presented the deposition testimony of its project superintendent as well as the owner of Premier showing that decisions regarding the means and methods for carrying the beam were the responsibility of Premier. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Sullivan v New York Athletic Club of City of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 04591, Second Dept 6-20-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200 OR COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT))/GENERAL CONTRACTOR (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200 OR COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT))

KNEE INJURY CAUSED BY CARRYING A HEAVY STEEL BEAM DOWN STAIRS IS NOT A COVERED ACCIDENT UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action was properly granted and defendant’s (Premier’s) motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff injured his knee carrying a heavy steel beam down some stairs. The court held that the incident was not encompassed by Labor Law 240 (1):

… [T]he plaintiff did not establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, since he failed to demonstrate that his injury was caused by an elevation-related hazard encompassed by Labor Law § 240(1). The plaintiff’s evidence demonstrated that the cause of his injury was the weight of the beam he was carrying. The mere fact that the plaintiff was injured by the weight of a heavy object being lifted or carried does not give rise to liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) … . The Court of Appeals has “repeatedly held, implicitly and explicitly, that it is not enough that a plaintiff’s injury flowed directly from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person, even where a device specified by the statute might have prevented the accident” … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).

Premier established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action through evidence that the plaintiff was injured by the weight of the beam as opposed to an elevation-related risk … . Sullivan v New York Athletic Club of City of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 04590, Second Dept 6-20-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (KNEE INJURY CAUSED BY CARRYING A HEAVY STEEL BEAM DOWN STAIRS IS NOT A COVERED ACCIDENT UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT))

,

QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), LABOR LAW 241 (6), AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS USING THE TOP HALF OF AN EXTENSION LADDER AND THE LADDER SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined neither party was entitled to summary judgment on Labor Law 240 (1), Labor Law 241 (6) and common law negligence causes of action stemming from plaintiff’s use of the top half of an extension ladder that slipped out from under him. With respect to the common law negligence cause of action against the property owner, the court explained:

Where the injured worker’s employer provides the allegedly defective equipment, the analysis turns on whether the defendant owner had the authority to supervise or control the work … . Where, however, the defendant owner provides the allegedly defective equipment, the legal standard “is whether the owner created the dangerous or defective condition or had actual or constructive notice thereof” … , because in that situation the defendant property owner “is possessed of the authority, as owner, to remedy the condition” of the defective equipment … . Contrary to defendants’ contention, they failed to establish as a matter of law that they did not create the dangerous condition of the ladder or have either actual or constructive notice of it. Moreover, “the absence of rubber shoes on a ladder is a visible and apparent defect,’ evidence of which may be sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on the issue of constructive notice” … . Sochan v Mueller, 2018 NY Slip Op 04457, Fourth Dept 6-15-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), LABOR LAW 241 (6), AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS USING THE TOP HALF OF AN EXTENSION LADDER AND THE LADDER SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FOURTH DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), LABOR LAW 241 (6), AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS USING THE TOP HALF OF AN EXTENSION LADDER AND THE LADDER SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FOURTH DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), LABOR LAW 241 (6), AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS USING THE TOP HALF OF AN EXTENSION LADDER AND THE LADDER SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FOURTH DEPT))

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD AND HAD NOT TIED OFF HIS LANYARD (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, modifying Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined that defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) should not have been granted. There were questions of fact whether plaintiff’s fall could have been prevented by an available safety device. Plainitiff was not tied off, but there was testimony he couldn’t have accomplished the work if he were tied off with a six foot lanyard. Although a 25 foot lanyard was available, plaintiff fell 25 to 30 feet and the retractable lanyard may not have prevented the injury:

“A violation occurs where a scaffold or elevated platform is inadequate in and of itself to protect workers against the elevation-related hazards encountered while assembling or dismantling that device, and it is the only safety device supplied or any additional safety device is also inadequate” … . …

We conclude that defendants’ own submissions raised triable issues of fact with respect to the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. In support of their contentions that plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries, defendants submitted plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which he testified that he chose to unhook his safety lanyard and detach the bridge scaffolding sheet without the benefit of the lanyard or other safety device. The six-foot lanyard given to him was not an adequate safety device, however, because plaintiff also testified that it was too short to permit plaintiff to reach the final clip anchoring the bridge scaffolding sheet, even if he had moved the fall arrest system cable to a location closer to that clip. Furthermore, although defendants submitted evidence that other safety devices were generally available on the work site, they failed to establish as a matter of law that an adequate safety device was present that would have prevented plaintiff “from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to . . . [his] person” … . For example, defendants failed to establish as a matter of law that a 20- or 25-foot lanyard, which appears to have been the next length available on the work site, would have prevented plaintiff’s fall by virtue of the fact that it was retractable. It therefore cannot be concluded on this record that plaintiff’s use of that alternative lanyard would have made any substantial difference in plaintiff’s injuries … . Martin v Niagara Falls Bridge Commn., 2018 NY Slip Op 04452, Fourth Dept 6-15-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD AND HAD NOT TIED OFF HIS LANYARD (FOURTH DEPT))/SCAFFOLDS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD AND HAD NOT TIED OFF HIS LANYARD (FOURTH DEPT))

,

PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN ALTERATION WHEN HE FELL FROM AN A FRAME LADDER AND WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, RECOVERY NOT PRECLUDED ON THE GROUND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS THE ONLY WITNESS OR ON THE GROUND OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) action stemming from a fall from an A frame ladder. Plaintiff was engaged in “alteration” within the meaning of the statute. The fact that plaintiff was the sole witness to the action did not preclude summary judgment. The fact that plaintiff may have been comparatively negligent did not preclude summary judgment:

Partial summary judgment on the issue of liability was properly granted in favor of plaintiff in this action where plaintiff was injured when he fell from a six-foot A-frame ladder while performing work on the sprinkler system in defendant’s building … . According to plaintiff, as he was tightening a bolt, the ladder moved and he fell to the floor. Contrary to defendant’s contention, the record shows that the work that plaintiff was engaged in at the time of his accident constituted an alteration within the meaning of section 240(1). Such work included reconfiguring the premises’ sprinkler system to comply with the fire code and entailed, inter alia, cutting and removing pipes, relocating pipes and valves, and installing components … .

That plaintiff is the sole witness to the accident does not preclude summary judgment in his favor where nothing in the record contradicts his account or raises an issue of fact as to his credibility … . Furthermore, any failure on plaintiff’s part to ensure that his coworker had properly set up the ladder would, at most, constitute comparative negligence, a defense inapplicable to a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action … . Concepcion v 333 Seventh LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 04422, First Dept 6-14-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN ALTERATION WHEN HE FELL FROM AN A FRAME LADDER AND WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, RECOVERY NOT PRECLUDED ON THE GROUND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS THE ONLY WITNESS OR ON THE GROUND OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (FIRST DEPT))/ALTERATION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN ALTERATION WHEN HE FELL FROM AN A FRAME LADDER AND WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, RECOVERY NOT PRECLUDED ON THE GROUND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS THE ONLY WITNESS OR ON THE GROUND OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN ALTERATION WHEN HE FELL FROM AN A FRAME LADDER AND WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, RECOVERY NOT PRECLUDED ON THE GROUND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS THE ONLY WITNESS OR ON THE GROUND OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (FIRST DEPT))/COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN ALTERATION WHEN HE FELL FROM AN A FRAME LADDER AND WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, RECOVERY NOT PRECLUDED ON THE GROUND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS THE ONLY WITNESS OR ON THE GROUND OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (FIRST DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN ALTERATION WHEN HE FELL FROM AN A FRAME LADDER AND WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, RECOVERY NOT PRECLUDED ON THE GROUND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS THE ONLY WITNESS OR ON THE GROUND OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (FIRST DEPT))

PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, MAKESHIFT LADDER SLID OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff alleged a makeshift ladder slid out from under him. A co-worker’s statement that plaintiff may have missed the last step did not refute plaintiff’s statement that the ladder slid out from under him:

Plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim with his testimony that the makeshift ladder on which he was descending after detaching a crane cable from the top of an eight-foot C-box slid out from under him … .

In opposition, defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The affidavit of plaintiff’s coworker, who stated that “[he] observed [plaintiff] fall from the ladder after he appeared to have missed’ the last step,” does not raise a triable issue as to whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident, as it does not refute plaintiff’s assertion that the ladder slid out from beneath him … . Nolan v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2018 NY Slip Op 04293, First Dept 6-12-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, MAKESHIFT LADDER SLID OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FIRST DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, MAKESHIFT LADDER SLID OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FIRST DEPT))

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact (1) whether one defendant, the general contractor Russco, could be liable under Labor Law 240 (1) for plaintiff’s fall from a ladder based upon contractual safety responsibilities, and (2) whether another defendant, Ruggles, could be liable under Labor Law 240 (1) as a statutory agent of the owner exercising supervision and control over the work:

… [T]he contract … provides that Russco [the general contractor] is responsible for “taking all reasonable safety precautions to prevent injury or death to persons or damage to property” and that such responsibility extends “to the protection of all employees on the Project and all other persons who may be affected by the Work in any way” … . The project is defined in the contract as “construction of all Tenant Improvements for a retail store.” Reading these contractual provisions together creates ambiguity as to whether Russco’s site safety obligations extended to the signage and awning work that plaintiff was performing when his accident occurred. * * *

The Labor Law § 240(1) claim should not be dismissed as against Ruggles. “Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners, general contractors, and their agents to provide proper protection to persons working upon elevated structures” … . “To be treated as a statutory agent, the subcontractor must have been delegated the supervision and control either over the specific work area involved or the work which [gave] rise to the injury'” … . “[O]nce a subcontractor qualifies as a statutory agent, it may not escape liability by the simple expedient of delegating that work to another entity”  … .

Ruggles is a proper Labor Law § 240(1) defendant because it was a statutory agent of Express, the owner of the project. White v 31-01 Steinway, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 04279. First Dept 6-12-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))/SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTORY AGENT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED IT WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER OR GENERAL CONTRACTOR (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s (Pumpcrete’s) motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action should have been granted, but a question of fact precluded summary judgment in favor of Pumpcrete on the common law negligence cause of action:

Plaintiff was injured while guiding a concrete pump hose that was attached to a truck owned and operated by defendant Pumpcrete Corporation (Pumpcrete). An obstruction formed in the pump hose, causing wet concrete to suddenly be ejected from the hose and knocking plaintiff off of the scaffolding upon which he was standing. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was working for the general contractor, which had hired Pumpcrete to supply the concrete pumping equipment. …

With respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action … , we note that, “while under that statute owners and general contractors are generally absolutely liable for statutory violations . . . , other parties may be liable under th[at] statute[ ] only if they are acting as the agents of the owner or general contractor by virtue of the fact that they had been given the authority to supervise and control the work being performed at the time of the injury” … . Pumpcrete satisfied its initial burden of establishing as a matter of law that it was not an agent of the owner or general contractor by submitting deposition testimony from plaintiff and the Pumpcrete pump operator that Pumpcrete lacked authority to supervise or control plaintiff’s work, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response … . Rohr v Dewald, 2018 NY Slip Op 04160, Fourth Dept 6-8-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED IT WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER OR GENERAL CONTRACTOR (FOURTH DEPT))

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SAFETY DEVICES FOR LIFTING HEAVY MOTOR WERE AVAILABLE, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined there was a question of fact whether safety devices were available precluded granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff was injured lifting a heavy motor onto a scissor lift. Defendant’s foreman testified he had never manually lifted a motor onto a scissors lift and safety devices for lifting the motor must have been available:

In support of the motion, plaintiffs submitted the deposition testimony of plaintiff set forth above, as well as that of his coworker and a foreman. Plaintiff’s coworker testified that he had performed work on 30 or 40 such doors and had manually lifted the motor onto a scissor lift every time. Conversely, the foreman, who was not on location on the date of the injury, testified that he had performed work on “over a thousand” such doors and had “never lifted a motor manually onto a scissor lift.” The foreman found it “hard to believe” that hoists, blocks, pulleys, ropes, or other safety devices were not available on site.

We conclude that plaintiffs failed to meet their initial burden on their motion inasmuch as their evidentiary submissions created issues of fact whether plaintiff’s “injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential” … . Smiley v Allgaier Constr. Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 04130, Fourth Dept 6-8-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SAFETY DEVICES FOR LIFTING HEAVY MOTOR WERE AVAILABLE, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))

TWO TO THREE FOOT FALL OF HEAVY STEEL PLATE WHICH WAS BEING HOISTED IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL NOT DE MINIMUS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the two to three foot fall of a heavy steel plate that was being hoisted was covered by Labor Law 240 (1):

Plaintiff was injured when the nylon sling attaching a one-to-two ton steel plate to an excavator snapped, causing the heavy plate to fall to the ground, bounce, and sever the pole of a nearby street sign. The impact caused the sign to be propelled toward plaintiff, hitting his right forearm and causing him serious personal injuries. …

… [T]he photographs taken immediately before the accident show that the steel plate was about two or three feet above the ground. This elevation differential cannot be viewed as de minimis, given the weight of the steel plate and the amount of force it generated over the course of its relatively short descent … . Makkieh v Judlau Contr. Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 04112, First Dept 6-7-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (TWO TO THREE FOOT FALL OF HEAVY STEEL PLATE WHICH WAS BEING HOISTED IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL NOT DE MINIMUS (FIRST DEPT))

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy