You are here: / / DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1)...

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD AND HAD NOT TIED OFF HIS LANYARD (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, modifying Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined that defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) should not have been granted. There were questions of fact whether plaintiff’s fall could have been prevented by an available safety device. Plainitiff was not tied off, but there was testimony he couldn’t have accomplished the work if he were tied off with a six foot lanyard. Although a 25 foot lanyard was available, plaintiff fell 25 to 30 feet and the retractable lanyard may not have prevented the injury:

“A violation occurs where a scaffold or elevated platform is inadequate in and of itself to protect workers against the elevation-related hazards encountered while assembling or dismantling that device, and it is the only safety device supplied or any additional safety device is also inadequate” … . …

We conclude that defendants’ own submissions raised triable issues of fact with respect to the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. In support of their contentions that plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries, defendants submitted plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which he testified that he chose to unhook his safety lanyard and detach the bridge scaffolding sheet without the benefit of the lanyard or other safety device. The six-foot lanyard given to him was not an adequate safety device, however, because plaintiff also testified that it was too short to permit plaintiff to reach the final clip anchoring the bridge scaffolding sheet, even if he had moved the fall arrest system cable to a location closer to that clip. Furthermore, although defendants submitted evidence that other safety devices were generally available on the work site, they failed to establish as a matter of law that an adequate safety device was present that would have prevented plaintiff “from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to . . . [his] person” … . For example, defendants failed to establish as a matter of law that a 20- or 25-foot lanyard, which appears to have been the next length available on the work site, would have prevented plaintiff’s fall by virtue of the fact that it was retractable. It therefore cannot be concluded on this record that plaintiff’s use of that alternative lanyard would have made any substantial difference in plaintiff’s injuries … . Martin v Niagara Falls Bridge Commn., 2018 NY Slip Op 04452, Fourth Dept 6-15-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD AND HAD NOT TIED OFF HIS LANYARD (FOURTH DEPT))/SCAFFOLDS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD AND HAD NOT TIED OFF HIS LANYARD (FOURTH DEPT))

You might also like
MOTHER’S ATTORNEY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT NOTICE TO MOTHER WHO DID NOT ATTEND THE TERMINATION-OF-PARENTAL-RIGHTS HEARING; THE DEFAULT ORDER TERMINATING MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS THEREFORE IMPROPER AND APPEAL IS NOT PRECLUDED (FOURTH DEPT).
LOCAL LAW PROHIBITING SHORT-TERM RENTAL OF PROPERTIES WHERE THE OWNER DOES NOT RESIDE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A REGULATORY TAKING (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS PRESCRIBED ATIVAN, WHICH CAUSES DROWSINESS, IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM, WAS DISCHARGED WHILE UNDER ITS INFLUENCE AND WAS INVOLVED IN A CAR ACCIDENT; THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAUSES OF ACTION BASED ON THE ALLEGEDLY NEGLIGENT DISCHARGE AND THE ALLEGED FAILURE TO EXPLAIN THE EFFECTS OF ATIVAN BOTH SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FOURTH DEPT).
THE CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSE (ARIZONA) IN THE CONTRACT IS ENFORCEABLE AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY AN ARGUMENT QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF A CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSE; THE FACT THAT THE NEW YORK PLAINTIFF WILL HAVE TO TRAVEL TO ARIZONA DOES NOT AFFECT THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSE (FOURTH DEPT).
Officer Outside Village Limits Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Arrest for Traffic Offenses but Arrest for DWI Okay
LABOR LAW 198-b, WHICH PROHIBITS AN EMPLOYER’S COLLECTING KICKBACKS FROM AN EMPLOYEE, DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST THE EMPLOYER (FOURTH DEPT).
Construction at County Airport Was a Governmental Function—County is Therefore “Immune” from a Suit Alleging the Construction Caused a Highway White-Out Condition Which Resulted in Plaintiff’s-Decedent’s Death in a Collision
A FACTUAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD CONVICTION AND THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE NEGLECT PETITION WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED; FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE NEGLECT ALLEGATIONS BASED ON THE CRIMINAL CONVICTION (FOURTH DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON TWO REMOTE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS HARMLESS... QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), LABOR LAW 241 (6), AND COMMON LAW...