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PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED DIVING UNDER A TRUCK WHEN THERE WAS AN EXPLOSION AS A BROKEN UTILITY POLE WITH LIVE ELECTRIC WIRES WAS BEING HOISTED; THE WORK WAS NOT ROUTINE MAINTENANCE SO THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION; QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT THE CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION AND SUPERVISORY CONTROL PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON THE LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendants’ summary judgment motion on the Labor Law 241(6) and 200 causes of action should not have been granted. Plaintiff was 150 feet away from a broken utility pole which needed to be removed. The pole was damaged when struck by a vehicle and the attached electric wires were live. Plaintiff was injured diving under a truck when there was an explosion as the pole was being hoisted:

… [T]he defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the work they were performing at the time of the incident constituted routine maintenance or repairs not within the ambit of Labor Law § 241(6) … . The defendants’ evidentiary submissions indicated that the incident occurred while the defendants were hoisting a portion of the utility pole to enable the total replacement of the pole, which had been severely damaged after a vehicle hit the pole. Thus, the defendants’ evidentiary submissions did not demonstrate, prima facie, that the work involved merely “replacing components that require replacement in the course of normal wear and tear” …. . * * *

… [T]he defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they had no authority to supervise or control the work being performed by the defendants’ own employees at the time of the incident … . Further, to the extent the plaintiff alleged that the incident was caused by a dangerous condition, the defendants did not address the issues of whether they created or had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition … . Accordingly, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 … . Ricottone v PSEG Long Is., LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06155, Second Dept 11-29-23

Practice Point: Labor Law 241(6) does not apply to routine maintenance. Replacing a utility pole struck by a vehicle is not routine maintenance.

Practice Point: Where there is a question of fact about the cause of dangerous condition and whether defendant has supervisory control over the worksite, summary judgment in favor of defendant on a Labor Law 200 cause of action is precluded.

 

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THE JURY’S FINDING THAT THE SCAFFOLD PROVIDED ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS SCAFFOLD-FALL CASE WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; NEW TRIAL REQUIRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, setting aside the defense verdict and ordering a new trial in this Labor Law 240(1) scaffold-fall action, determined the scaffold did not adequately protect the plaintiff:

The scaffold on which plaintiff was working at the time of his accident failed to adequately protect him from a height-related hazard when his core drill jerked, causing him to fall backward … . “It does not matter whether plaintiff’s fall was the result of the scaffold . . . tipping, or was due to plaintiff misstepping off its side. In [either] of those circumstances, either defective or inadequate protective devices constituted a proximate cause of the accident” …  Since the remedy for a verdict that is against the weight of the evidence is a new trial … , the issues of whether defendants violated Labor Law § 240 (1), whether such violation proximately caused plaintiff’s accident and injuries, and damages should be retried. Isaac v 135 W. 52nd St. Owner LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06085, First Dept 11-28-23

Practice Point: In this Labor Law 240(1) scaffold-fall case, the jury’s finding that the scaffold provided plaintiff with adequate protection was deemed against the weight of the evidence. Where a jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence, a new trial is required.

 

AFTER REMOVING THE FLASHING AND CAULKING AROUND A SECOND-STORY WINDOW, PLAINTIFF WAS GIVEN PERMISSION TO LOWER THE LIFT TO THE GROUND TO GO THE BATHROOM; THE UNSECURED WINDOW FELL ON HIS HEAD; PLAINTIFF WAS NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) action. After the flashing and caulking around the second-story window were removed, plaintiff was given permission to go to the bathroom and he lowered the scissors lift he was working from to the ground. The unsecured window fell and struck plaintiff on the head:

… [I]nasmuch as the record establishes that plaintiff and the supervisor were working together on the scissor lift to remove the window by prying off the metal flashing and removing the caulk, and that the supervisor then granted plaintiff permission to use the bathroom and lowered the lift to the ground while leaving the window unsecured on the second story of the building when the window was susceptible to falling, it cannot be said that plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . We thus conclude that plaintiff’s “conduct during the [window removal] process ‘raises, at most, an issue concerning his comparative negligence, which is not an available defense under Labor Law § 240 (1)’ ” … . Reyes v Episcopal Senior Hous. Greece, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 05898, Fourth Dept 11-17-23

Practice Point: Apparently because plaintiff’s supervisor gave plaintiff permission to lower the lift to go to the bathroom, leaving the second-story window he was working on unsecured, plaintiff was not the “sole proximate cause” of the accident (which would preclude Labor Law 240(1) liability). At most he was comparatively negligent, which is not a bar to summary judgment.

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN AN “ALTERING” ACTIVITY COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240 AND THE ACCIDENT–AN OBJECT FALLING DOWN A MANHOLE AND STRIKING PLAINTIFF–WAS ELEVATION-RELATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was engaged in work covered by Labor Law 240 and the accident–an object falling down a manhole and striking plaintiff–was elevation-related:

Plaintiff established that he was engaged in an “altering” activity as enumerated by Labor Law § 240(1). … [P]laintiff’s work involved more than “feeding cable through a preexisting hole.” Rather, it was part of a much larger, multi-worker project to install a fiber optic network through a 20-manhole structure where none had previously existed, with the ultimate goal of installing the cables into the school buildings, which would necessarily require drilling holes into the foundation of the school buildings in order to reach the communications room … . …

… [T]he vacuum that fell from ground level into the manhole and struck plaintiff on the head posed the type of elevation-related risk covered by Labor Law § 240(1) … . Keilitz v Light Tower Fiber N.Y., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 05661, First Dept 11-9-23

Practice Point: Here the plaintiff was installing a fiber optic network and was struck by an object which fell down the manhole he was in. He was engaged in “altering” within the meaning of Labor Law 240. The accident was elevation-related within the meaning of Labor Law 240. He was entitled to summary judgment.

 

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PLAINTIFF TRIPPED OVER A PIECE OF PLYWOOD COVERING A SMALL HOLE; DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT IT LACKED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION; THE LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 200 cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged he tripped and fell when his foot stuck a piece of plywood covering a hole. Defendant did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice of the condition:

… [T]he defendant failed to show, prima facie, that it lacked constructive knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition … since it did not submit any evidence that the plywood was a latent defect that could not have been discovered upon a reasonable inspection … . Therefore, the defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200. Freyberg v Adelphi Univ., 2023 NY Slip Op 05589, Second Dept 11-8-23

Practice Point: Labor Law 200 causes of action are analyzed under standard negligence principles. Even though the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action was properly dismissed because the Industrial Code provision did not apply to the plywood covering a small hole, the Labor Law 200 cause of action should not have been dismissed because the defendant simply did not address it. To warrant dismissal the defendant was required to demonstrate it did not have constructive knowledge of the alleged tripping hazard.

 

THE TRIPPING HAZARD IN A WALKWAY VIOLATED THE INDUSTRIAL CODE; PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action. Plaintiff tripped on a bowed piece of Masonite that was in a walkway, a violation of the Industrial Code:

Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to workers by complying with specific safety rules and regulations set out in the Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) … . “To succeed on a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable under the circumstances of the accident” … . The plaintiff here relies upon 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll passageways shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from any other obstructions or conditions which could cause tripping.”

The plaintiff demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) by tendering evidence establishing that while performing construction work, he fell over a tripping hazard in a passageway … , in the form of a raised or bowed piece of Masonite board, and that this unsafe condition was the proximate cause of his injuries … . Tompkins v Turner Constr. Co., 2023 NY Slip Op 05631, Second Dept 11-8-23

Practice Point: Where the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury is a condition which violates the Industrial Code, here a tripping hazard in a walkway, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on a Labor Law 241(6) cause of action.

 

IN A FALLING OBJECT CASE WHERE INADEQUATE SAFETY EQUIPMENT IS ALLEGED, THE FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE OBJECT WAS DOES NOT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action in this falling object case. Plaintiff did not see or know what struck him. There was a hole in the protective netting:

… [T]he fact that the injured plaintiff could not identify the object that struck him or its origin did not preclude summary judgment in plaintiffs’ favor. A plaintiff’s prima facie case in a Labor Law § 240(1) action involving falling objects is not dependent on whether the plaintiff observed the object that hit him … . Further, a plaintiff is not required to show the exact circumstances under which the object fell, where a lack of a protective device proximately caused the injuries … . Here, plaintiff testified that he was struck on the head and neck by an unknown object while working on an outrigging platform on the 25th floor of the building under construction. He also testified that he heard workers stripping wood on the floors above him at the time of the accident, and submitted photographs depicting a large hole in the safety netting that served as overhead protection. This evidence was sufficient to establish prima facie that the accident was the result of a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) … . In opposition, defendants failed to provide any version of the accident under which they could not be held liable, making summary judgment appropriate … . Harsanyi v Extell 4110 LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 05313, First Dept 10-19-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff alleged he was struck by a falling object and the safety netting was inadequate. The fact that he did not know what the object was did not preclude summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action.

 

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THE SCAFFOLD COLLAPSED ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; THE HEARSAY SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION DID NOT DEFEAT THE MOTION (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action in this scaffold-collapse case. Plaintiff alleged he was told to assemble use the scaffold despite mismatched parts. The defendants relied on hearsay statements attributed to Sabato, plaintiff’s supervisor, to the effect that Sabato told plaintiff to wait until the correct scaffold parts were supplied. Hearsay alone will not defeat a summary judgment motion:

… [T]estimony establishing that a safety device collapsed is sufficient for a prima facie showing on liability … . * * *

Because defendants’ submissions in opposition rely entirely on Sabato’s inadmissible hearsay statements, they are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s conduct — namely, using a scaffold that he was allegedly instructed not to use – may be the sole proximate cause for his accident and therefore warrant a denial of plaintiff’s motion … . Garcia v 122-130 E. 23rd St. LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 05096, First Dept 10-10-23

Practice Point: The collapse of a scaffold warrants summary judgment on a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Hearsay alone offered in opposition will not defeat the motion.

 

PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THE SCAFFOLD FROM WHICH HE FELL DID NOT HAVE GUARDRAILS; HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this scaffold-fall case was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff demonstrated the scaffold lacked guardrails. That was enough:

Plaintiff … established prima facie that defendant violated Labor Law § 240(1) and that the violation proximately caused his injuries, as his uncontroverted affidavit demonstrated that the scaffold supplied to him for the work he was performing lacked guardrails and that no other protective devices were provided to protect him from falling. The motion was not premature as defendants failed to show what discovery was needed or what any additional discovery could be expected to reveal (see CPLR 3212 [f] …). Velasquez v 94 E. 208 St. Partners LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 05110, First Dept 10-10-23

Practice Point: Here, falling from a scaffold with no guardrails warranted summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action.

 

A FALL OF 2O TO 25 FEET FROM A RAMP USED TO TRANSPORT MATERIALS IS COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) (FIRST DEPT.)

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action based upon his falling off a ramp. The fact that the ramp was not a substitute for a ladder or a scaffold was not relevant:

That the ramp was not intended to be used as a substitute for a ladder or scaffold, but rather was used to transport materials, is of no moment. Whether an accident involving a ramp is encompassed by Labor Law § 240(1) turns on a number of factors, the primary one being whether the ramp covered a significant elevation differential … . Here … the height differential from the top of the ramp to the ground was 20 to 25 feet…. . Liu v Whitestar Consulting & Contr., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 04821, First Dept 9-28-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff fell 20 to 25 feet from a ramp used to transport materials. The fact that the ramp was not a substitute for a ladder or a scaffold did not place the accident beyond the reach of Labor Law 240(1). The extent of the elevation of the ramp was determinative.

 

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