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OWNER PROPERLY FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR REFUNDING OVERCHARGES COLLECTED BY THE PRIME TENANT WHICH HAD CREATED AN ILLUSORY TENANCY TO CIRCUMVENT THE NYC RENT STABILIZATION LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, determined that the NYC Department of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) had the authority to sua sponte vacate a nonfinal order under the Rent Stabilization Code and DHCR correctly found that petitioner 333 East 49th Partnership, LP (the owner) was responsible for refunding the overcharge collected by the prime tenant, on the grounds that the prime tenant created an illusory tenancy. The opinion is complex and comprehensive and cannot be fairly summarized here:

Section 2529.9 of the Rent Stabilization Code * * * authorizes DHCR to reopen, sua sponte, a proceeding at any time upon a finding of irregularity of vital matters, fraud or illegality, upon notice to the parties … . * * *

The rent stabilization laws [RSL] are designed “to prevent exactions of unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents and rental agreements and to forestall profiteering, speculation and other disruptive practices … . The Rent Stabilization Code expressly provides that the legal regulated rents and other requirements “shall not be evaded, either directly or indirectly, in connection with the renting or leasing or the transfer of a lease for housing accommodations” … .

An illusory tenancy exists when the prime tenant rents an apartment for the sole purpose of re-leasing it, at a profit, or otherwise subverts the protections of the RSL … .

DHCR’s finding that the owner may be held accountable for the overcharge is not irrational or arbitrary and capricious. DHCR is not restricted, as the owner argues, to only take into account whether the owner overcharged the subtenant and actually collected rent in excess of the lawful stabilized rent. Rather, DHCR may consider that the owner “derived substantial benefits from the scheme and was aware of the nature of [the prime tenant’s] activities” … . * * *

Rent Stabilization Code 2526.1(a)(1) imposes treble damages upon owners who “have collected any rent . . . in excess of the legal regulated rent” … . However, as noted above, RSL 26-511(c)(12)(e) merely states that “where a tenant violates the provisions of subparagraph (a)” with regard to overcharging a subtenant, “the subtenant shall be entitled to damages of three times the overcharge” … . DHCR’s interpretation of these statutes to impose treble damages upon the owner, under these circumstances, is rational and thus, entitled to deference … .  Matter of 333 E. 49th Partnership, LP v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 2018 NY Slip Op 05735, First Dept 8-9-18

LANDLORD-TENANT (RENT STABILIZATION LAW, OWNER PROPERLY FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR REFUNDING OVERCHARGES COLLECTED BY THE PRIME TENANT WHICH HAD CREATED AN ILLUSORY TENANCY TO CIRCUMVENT THE RENT STABILIZATION LAW (FIRST DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC, RENT STABILIZATION LAW, OWNER PROPERLY FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR REFUNDING OVERCHARGES COLLECTED BY THE PRIME TENANT WHICH HAD CREATED AN ILLUSORY TENANCY TO CIRCUMVENT THE RENT STABILIZATION LAW (FIRST DEPT))/RENT STABILIZATION LAW (NYC, OWNER PROPERLY FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR REFUNDING OVERCHARGES COLLECTED BY THE PRIME TENANT WHICH HAD CREATED AN ILLUSORY TENANCY TO CIRCUMVENT THE RENT STABILIZATION LAW (FIRST DEPT))/ILLUSORY TENANT (RENT STABILIZATION LAW, OWNER PROPERLY FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR REFUNDING OVERCHARGES COLLECTED BY THE PRIME TENANT WHICH HAD CREATED AN ILLUSORY TENANCY TO CIRCUMVENT THE RENT STABILIZATION LAW (FIRST DEPT))

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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, IF THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS IT IS WAIVED, JUDGE CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, raised the statute of limitations defense in this foreclosure action:

Supreme Court erred in sua sponte raising the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations and directing the dismissal of the complaint on that ground. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which is waived by a party unless it is raised either in a responsive pleading, or by motion prior to the submission of a responsive pleading (see CPLR 3211[e]…). “A court may not take judicial notice,’ sua sponte, of the applicability of a statute of limitations if that defense has not been raised” … . Here, the defendant neither answered the complaint nor submitted a pre-answer motion which raised the statute of limitations defense. 352 Legion Funding Assoc. v 348 Riverdale, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 05662, Second Dept 8-8-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, IF THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS IT IS WAIVED, JUDGE CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IT (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ( JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, IF THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS IT IS WAIVED, JUDGE CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IT (SECOND DEPT))/JUDGES (SUA SPONTE, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, IF THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS IT IS WAIVED, JUDGE CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IT (SECOND DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, IF THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS IT IS WAIVED, JUDGE CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IT (SECOND DEPT))

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COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined Supreme Court exceeded its authority when it vacated an arbitration award and the court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the police officer (Lee) seeking Municipal Law 207-c benefits in another arbitration proceeding handled by a union lawyer:

Lee established that the court failed to acquire personal jurisdiction over her in the proceeding to confirm the arbitration award … because the City never properly served her … . Nor did the court acquire personal jurisdiction over Lee by the unauthorized appearance of the Union’s attorney “on behalf of Katherine Lee.” Contrary to the City’s contention, there is no evidence that Lee expressly or implicitly authorized the Union’s attorney to represent her at any stage of the proceedings. …

We further conclude that the court erred in sua sponte vacating its prior order and judgment, which confirmed the arbitration award … , and directing further arbitration. … A court has authority to “vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice” … . That authority, however, is not unlimited… . “A court’s inherent power to exercise control over its judgments is not plenary, and should be resorted to only to relieve a party from judgments taken through [fraud,] mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” … .

In vacating the order and judgment, … the court “exceeded the narrow bounds within which courts are authorized to alter [arbitration] awards” … . None of the bases in CPLR 7511 (b) or (c) for vacating or modifying an arbitration award applies to the arbitrator’s failure to award the City a specific dollar amount for the value of benefits received by Lee, and the court had no power to disturb the award apart from the grounds set forth in those subdivisions  … . Matter of City of Syracuse (Lee), 2018 NY Slip Op 05077, Third Dept 7-6-18

​ARBITRATION (MUNICIPAL LAW, COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (MUNICIPAL LAW, COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ARBITRATION,  COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))

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DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF OR A CHANCE TO OBJECT TO A 20 POINT ASSESSMENT MADE BY THE JUDGE SUA SPONTE, NEW HEARING ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, ordering a new SORA hearing, determined defendant did not have notice of or an opportunity to object to a 20 point assessment made by the judge sua sponte:

“A defendant has both a statutory and constitutional right to notice of points sought to be assigned to him or her so as to be afforded a meaningful opportunity to respond to that assessment” … . To that end, SORA requires the People to provide defendant with written notice, at least 10 days prior to the hearing, if they intend to seek a presumptive risk level classification that differs from the Board’s recommendation along with their reasons for doing so… . Similarly, “a court’s sua sponte departure from the Board’s recommendation at the hearing, without prior notice, deprives the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to be respond” … . People v Maus, 2018 NY Slip Op 04796, Third Dept 6-28-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF OR A CHANCE TO OBJECT TO A 20 POINT ASSESSMENT MADE BY THE JUDGE SUA SPONTE, NEW HEARING ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF OR A CHANCE TO OBJECT TO A 20 POINT ASSESSMENT MADE BY THE JUDGE SUA SPONTE, NEW HEARING ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))

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IN THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING, THE JUDGE HAD THE POWER TO CORRECT AN INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE JUDGMENT AND THE UNDERLYING DECISION BUT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO CHANGE THE JUDGMENT BASED UPON NEW EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in a divorce action, determined that the judge properly corrected a mistake in the judgment of divorce, but improperly made a change in the judgment based on new evidence:

… [T]he Supreme Court, sua sponte, directed the parties to appear … . … [T]he defendant and his counsel appeared, but the plaintiff failed to appear. The court expressed its concern about a letter it had received indicating that the defendant had failed to disclose a variable supplemental pension plan. The court further noted that the third decretal paragraph of the judgment did not reflect the intent expressed in the court’s underlying decision, inasmuch as the judgment failed to provide that changes in the value of the retirement assets since the commencement of the action were to be shared equally. An amended judgment was entered thereafter modifying so much of the third decretal paragraph of the original judgment as was necessary to conform the judgment to the underlying decision, and modifying the fourth decretal paragraph of the original judgment to include a reference to the previously undisclosed variable supplemental pension plan. The defendant appeals from the amended judgment.

The Supreme Court had the authority to modify the third decretal paragraph of the original judgment, given the discrepancy between the terms of that decretal paragraph and the underlying decision. “A judgment . . . must conform strictly to the court’s decision. Where there is an inconsistency between a judgment . . . and the decision upon which it is based, the decision controls” …

However, the Supreme Court was without authority, sua sponte, to modify the fourth decretal paragraph of the original judgment to add a reference to the variable supplemental pension plan, as this was a substantive modification based on new evidence that had not previously been submitted to the court. Such a modification goes beyond the court’s inherent authority to correct a “mistake, defect or irregularity” in the original judgment “not affecting a substantial right of a party” … . Mascia v Mascia, 2018 NY Slip Op 03523, Second Dept 5-16-18

​FAMILY LAW (JUDGMENTS, IN THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING, THE JUDGE HAD THE POWER TO CORRECT AN INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE JUDGMENT AND THE UNDERLYING DECISION BUT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO CHANGE THE JUDGMENT BASED UPON NEW EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))/JUDGMENTS ( IN THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING, THE JUDGE HAD THE POWER TO CORRECT AN INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE JUDGMENT AND THE UNDERLYING DECISION BUT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO CHANGE THE JUDGMENT BASED UPON NEW EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))/JUDGES (IN THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING, THE JUDGE HAD THE POWER TO CORRECT AN INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE JUDGMENT AND THE UNDERLYING DECISION BUT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO CHANGE THE JUDGMENT BASED UPON NEW EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))

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THE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR A VIDEOTAPE OF AN INTERVIEW OF THE CHILD (ALLEGED) VICTIM IN THIS SEXUAL OFFENSE CASE, THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED BY A PRIVATE PARTY AND WAS DISCOVERABLE ONLY IF IT CONSTITUTED BRADY (EXCULPATORY) MATERIAL, THE JUDGE DID NOT VIEW THE TAPE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WAS BRADY MATERIAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined a County Court judge did not have the authority to grant the defense request for a videotape of an interview of the child (alleged) victim in this sexual offense case. The child was interviewed by a private child advocacy group (Bivona). The only ground upon which the court could grant the request was that the videotape constituted exculpatory (Brady) material. However, the judge did not conduct an in camera review of the tape, and therefore had no basis for determining the tape was exculpatory. The petitioner here (the DA) brought this Article 78 proceeding to prohibit the respondent (the judge) from allowing defense counsel to review the tape:

… [R]espondent issued a written order acknowledging that the video recording did not constitute Rosario material and that he thus lacked any authority to order its disclosure on that ground … . Instead, respondent concluded that the video recording could potentially contain exculpatory evidence, which petitioner would be obligated to disclose under Brady v Maryland … . Respondent determined that neither he nor the “untrained prosecutor” could make the determination whether the person interviewing the child “employ[ed] suggestive interrogation techniques.” Rather, “only defense counsel, with full knowledge of the defendant’s case[, could] make the proper assessment.” As a result, respondent again ordered petitioner to permit defendant’s attorney to inspect the video recording. * * *

… [A] prosecutor possesses some discretion in deciding what evidence should be disclosed to the defense … but, “where a request [for Brady material] is made and there is some basis’ for believing that the prosecutor may be in possession of potentially exculpatory material, deference to the prosecutor’s discretion must give way, and the duty to determine the merits of the request for disclosure then devolves on the trial court’ “… . Nevertheless, “[d]iscovery which is unavailable pursuant to the statute may not be ordered based on principles of due process because there is no general constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases’ “… .

Here, there has been no determination that the video recording contains exculpatory evidence, and thus defendant has no right to disclosure thereof. Inasmuch as respondent required petitioner to disclose evidence before determining whether defendant is entitled to such disclosure, we conclude that respondent acted in excess of his authority and that a writ of prohibition is the appropriate remedy … . Matter of Doorley v Castro, 2018 NY Slip Op 02939, Fourth Dept 4-27-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, JUDGES, THE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR A VIDEOTAPE OF AN INTERVIEW OF THE CHILD (ALLEGED) VICTIM IN THIS SEXUAL OFFENSE CASE, THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED BY A PRIVATE PARTY AND WAS DISCOVERABLE ONLY IF IT CONSTITUTED BRADY (EXCULPATORY) MATERIAL, THE JUDGE DID NOT VIEW THE TAPE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WAS BRADY MATERIAL (FOURTH DEPT))/JUDGES (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, PROHIBITION,  THE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR A VIDEOTAPE OF AN INTERVIEW OF THE CHILD (ALLEGED) VICTIM IN THIS SEXUAL OFFENSE CASE, THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED BY A PRIVATE PARTY AND WAS DISCOVERABLE ONLY IF IT CONSTITUTED BRADY (EXCULPATORY) MATERIAL, THE JUDGE DID NOT VIEW THE TAPE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WAS BRADY MATERIAL (FOURTH DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, JUDGES, PROHIBITION, HE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR A VIDEOTAPE OF AN INTERVIEW OF THE CHILD (ALLEGED) VICTIM IN THIS SEXUAL OFFENSE CASE, THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED BY A PRIVATE PARTY AND WAS DISCOVERABLE ONLY IF IT CONSTITUTED BRADY (EXCULPATORY) MATERIAL, THE JUDGE DID NOT VIEW THE TAPE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WAS BRADY MATERIAL (FOURTH DEPT))/BRADY MATERIAL (CRIMINAL LAW, JUDGES, PROHIBITION, HE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR A VIDEOTAPE OF AN INTERVIEW OF THE CHILD (ALLEGED) VICTIM IN THIS SEXUAL OFFENSE CASE, THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED BY A PRIVATE PARTY AND WAS DISCOVERABLE ONLY IF IT CONSTITUTED BRADY (EXCULPATORY) MATERIAL, THE JUDGE DID NOT VIEW THE TAPE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WAS BRADY MATERIAL (FOURTH DEPT))/PROHIBITION (JUDGES, CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, THE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR A VIDEOTAPE OF AN INTERVIEW OF THE CHILD (ALLEGED) VICTIM IN THIS SEXUAL OFFENSE CASE, THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED BY A PRIVATE PARTY AND WAS DISCOVERABLE ONLY IF IT CONSTITUTED BRADY (EXCULPATORY) MATERIAL, THE JUDGE DID NOT VIEW THE TAPE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WAS BRADY MATERIAL (FOURTH DEPT))

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SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ASSURE DEFENDANT OF ADMISSION INTO THE SHOCK PROGRAM, DEFENDANT’S PLEA VACATED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the sentencing court did not have the authority to promise defendant would go to “shock camp” and defendant had relied on the judge’s promise when he pled guilty:

The record establishes that the court believed it had the authority to grant defendant admission into a shock incarceration program and that it made such admission a condition of defendant’s guilty plea. At sentencing, the court acted in accordance with its perceived authority and the plea agreement by imposing a term of incarceration of 1½ to 3 years “with shock camp.” There is no dispute that defendant was not admitted into a shock incarceration program.

We agree with defendant that the court had no authority to assure him of admission into a shock incarceration program or to impose such as part of the sentence … . Inasmuch as the record establishes that defendant, in accepting the plea, relied on a promise of the court that could not, as a matter of law, be honored, defendant is entitled to vacatur of his guilty plea … . People v Smith, 2018 NY Slip Op 03025, Fourth Dept 4-27-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ASSURE DEFENDANT OF ADMISSION INTO THE SHOCK PROGRAM, DEFENDANT’S PLEA VACATED (FOURTH DEPT))/JUDGES (CRIMINAL LAW, SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ASSURE DEFENDANT OF ADMISSION INTO THE SHOCK PROGRAM, DEFENDANT’S PLEA VACATED (FOURTH DEPT))/SENTENCING (SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ASSURE DEFENDANT OF ADMISSION INTO THE SHOCK PROGRAM, DEFENDANT’S PLEA VACATED (FOURTH DEPT))/SHOCK CAMP (CRIMINAL LAW, SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ASSURE DEFENDANT OF ADMISSION INTO THE SHOCK PROGRAM, DEFENDANT’S PLEA VACATED (FOURTH DEPT))

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JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL BY ASKING QUESTIONS OF WITNESSES AND INTERRUPTING CROSS-EXAMINATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the judge deprived defendant of a fair trial by asking questions of witnesses and interrupting cross-examination:

The principle restraining the court’s discretion is that a trial judge’s “function is to protect the record, not to make it” (… . Indeed, when the trial judge interjects often and indulges in an extended questioning of witnesses, even where those questions would be proper if they came from trial counsel, the trial judge’s participation presents significant risks of prejudicial unfairness … . Accordingly, while a trial judge may intervene in a trial to clarify confusing testimony and facilitate the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial, the court may not take on “the function or appearance of an advocate” … .

Here, the Supreme Court interjected itself into the questioning of witnesses more than 50 times, asking more than 400 questions. The court elicited step-by-step details from several officers regarding their observations and actions during their apprehension of the defendant. In addition, the court elicited and assisted in developing facts damaging to the defense on direct examination of the People’s witnesses, bolstering the witnesses’ credibility. The court also interrupted cross-examination and generally created the impression that it was an advocate on behalf of the People. People v Hinds, 2018 NY Slip Op 02804, Second Dept 4-25-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL BY ASKING QUESTIONS OF WITNESSES AND INTERRUPTING CROSS-EXAMINATION (SECOND DEPT))/JUDGES (CRIMINAL LAW, JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL BY ASKING QUESTIONS OF WITNESSES AND INTERRUPTING CROSS-EXAMINATION (SECOND DEPT))

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HOMEOWNER WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION ON THAT GROUND (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure proceeding, determined the homeowner had waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction and therefore the judge erred by, sua sponte, dismissing the complaint on that ground:

The Supreme Court erred in sua sponte raising and considering the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. The homeowner waived this defense by failing to move to dismiss the complaint on this ground within 60 days of serving his answer … . As the homeowner waived this defense, it was error for the court, sua sponte, to direct dismissal of the complaint on this basis … .

Since, in the order appealed from, the plaintiff’s motion, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint and for an order of reference was, in effect, denied as academic in light of the Supreme Court’s directing dismissal of the complaint, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a determination of the plaintiff’s motion on the merits … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cajas, 2018 NY Slip Op 02159, Second Dept 3-28-18

FORECLOSURE (HOMEOWNER WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION ON THAT GROUND (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DEFENSE OF LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, FORECLOSURE, HOMEOWNER WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION ON THAT GROUND (SECOND DEPT))/JURISDICTION, LACK OF PERSONAL (JUDGES, FORECLOSURE, HOMEOWNER WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION ON THAT GROUND (SECOND DEPT))/JUDGES (SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL, FORECLOSURE, HOMEOWNER WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION ON THAT GROUND (SECOND DEPT))/SUA SPONTE (LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, FORECLOSURE, HOMEOWNER WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION ON THAT GROUND (SECOND DEPT))

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SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF PETITION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, LACK OF STANDING IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that lack of standing is not a jurisdictional defect and held that the court’s sua sponte dismissal of an Article 78/declaratory judgment petition was an abuse of discretion:

We agree with petitioners that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in sua sponte dismissing the petition. “[U]se of the [sua sponte] power of dismissal must be restricted to the most extraordinary circumstances”… . No such extraordinary circumstances are present in this case. Contrary to the court’s determination, “a party’s lack of standing does not constitute a jurisdictional defect and does not warrant sua sponte dismissal of a complaint” … . We therefore reverse the judgment insofar as appealed from in the exercise of discretion and reinstate the petition … . Matter of Associated Gen. Contrs. of NYS, LLC v New York State Thruway Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 02075, Fourth Dept 3-23-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF PETITION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, LACK OF STANDING IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT (FOURTH DEPT))/STANDING (CIVIL PROCEDURE, SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF PETITION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, LACK OF STANDING IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT (FOURTH DEPT))/JUDGES  (SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF PETITION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, LACK OF STANDING IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT (FOURTH DEPT))/SUA SPONTE (SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF PETITION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, LACK OF STANDING IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT (FOURTH DEPT))

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