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Arbitration, Contract Law, Insurance Law

THE ARBITRATOR’S RULING IN THIS STATUTORY, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the arbitrator’s ruling in this no=fault insurance case was arbitrary and capricious, noting that judicial review of statutory, compulsory arbitration is more stringent than review of a voluntary agreement to arbitrate. Plaintiff GEICO paid the injured driver’s no-fault benefits and sought reimbursement from the insurer of the loaner car involved in the accident. The arbitrator denied reimbursement and the Second Department reversed:

Where, as here, the obligation to arbitrate arises through a statutory mandate, the arbitrator’s determination is subject to “closer judicial scrutiny” under CPLR 7511(b) than it would receive had the arbitration been conducted pursuant to a voluntary agreement between the parties … . To be upheld, an award in a compulsory arbitration proceeding “must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious” … . “Moreover, with respect to determinations of law, the applicable standard in mandatory no-fault arbitrations is whether ‘any reasonable hypothesis can be found to support the questioned interpretation'” … . …

The arbitrator’s interpretation of the rental agreement … as relieving [defendant insurance company] of its obligation to provide mandatory personal injury protection (hereinafter PIP) coverage was contrary to 11 NYCRR part 65, which provides … that all motor vehicle insurance policies must contain a mandatory PIP endorsement; expressly sets forth the language of the PIP endorsement; permits deviations from the prescribed language only upon prior approval; and prohibits any release, express or implied, from mandatory or optional PIP benefits … . Matter of GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v Wesco Ins. Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 06926, Second Dept 12-7-22

Similar issues and result in Matter of Wesco Ins. Co. v GEICO Indem. Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 06933, Second Dept 12-7-22

​Practice Point: The Second Department explained that the criteria for judicial review of statutory, compulsory arbitration is more stringent than for judicial review of arbitration by voluntary agreement.

 

December 7, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-12-07 09:36:532022-12-11 11:06:52THE ARBITRATOR’S RULING IN THIS STATUTORY, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
Contract Law, Education-School Law, Employment Law, Insurance Law

REDUCTION OF PETITIONER-SCHOOL-DISTRICT EMPLOYEE’S RETIREMENT HEALTH BENEFITS BELOW THE LEVEL AFFORDED ACTIVE EMPLOYEES VIOLATES INSURANCE LAW 4235 (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the school district’s reduction of petitioner-employee’s (Perrotta’s) retirement health benefits below the level afforded active employees violated the Insurance Law:

The moratorium law [Insurance Law 4235] sets “‘a minimum baseline or “floor” for retiree health benefits'” which is “‘measured by the health insurance benefits received by active employees . . . In other words, the moratorium [law] does not permit an employer to whom the statute applies to provide retirees with lesser health insurance benefits than active employees'” … . Thus, a school district may not diminish retirees’ health insurance benefits unless it makes “a corresponding diminution in the health insurance benefits or contributions of active employees” … . The purpose of the moratorium law is to protect the rights of retirees who “‘are not represented in the collective bargaining process, [and] are powerless to stop unilateral depreciation or even elimination of health insurance benefits once the contract under which they retired has expired'” … .

Here, since Perrotta submitted evidence establishing that the district diminished the health insurance contribution rate for certain retirees, and the district failed to proffer evidence that it made a corresponding diminution in the health insurance benefits or contributions for active employees, its determination violated the moratorium law. … Supreme Court should have granted the petition and annulled the district’s determination … . Matter of Perrotta v Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist., 2022 NY Slip Op 06704, Second Dept 11-23-22

Practice Point: Here the petitioner, a retired school district employee, successfully contested the reduction of her retirement health benefits below the level afforded active employees as a violation of Insurance Law 4235.

 

November 23, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-11-23 12:41:272022-11-27 13:21:19REDUCTION OF PETITIONER-SCHOOL-DISTRICT EMPLOYEE’S RETIREMENT HEALTH BENEFITS BELOW THE LEVEL AFFORDED ACTIVE EMPLOYEES VIOLATES INSURANCE LAW 4235 (SECOND DEPT). ​
Contract Law, Insurance Law, Labor Law, Unemployment Insurance

EVEN IF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE INSURER AND CLAIMANT INSURANCE BROKER INCLUDED ALL THE STATUTORY FACTORS IN LABOR LAW 511, THE BROKER WILL BE CONSIDERED AN EMPLOYEE IF THE SERVICES ACTUALLY PROVIDED BY THE BROKER ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the insurance company, Paul Revere, did not demonstrate that claimant insurance broker was not an employee. Claimant was entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

Labor Law § 511 (21) provides that “[t]he term ’employment’ shall not include the services of a licensed insurance agent or broker if,” among other things, “the services performed by the agent or broker are performed pursuant to a written contract” … that, in turn, contains seven statutorily enumerated provisions … . Here, the Board concluded that two of the seven statutory requirements were absent from the written agreement entered into between claimant and Paul Revere — specifically, provisions demonstrating that claimant was “permitted to work any hours he . . . chooses” … and was “permitted to work out of his . . . own office or home or the office of the person for whom services are performed” … . Paul Revere disagrees, contending that article XI (A) of the written contract satisfies such requirements by providing that “Paul Revere shall not exercise nor have the right to exercise direction or control over [claimant’s] time, when or how [claimant] may work, or over the activities of [claimant].”

… [W]e agree with the Board that the conclusory and sweeping language employed in article XI (A) of the contract does not satisfy the requirements of Labor Law § 511 (21) (d) (iii) and (iv). … [E]ven assuming, without deciding, that the written agreement between Paul Revere and claimant did … fulfill all of the statutory requirements, we agree with the Board’s further conclusion that the parties’ conduct was inconsistent with the provisions of Labor Law § 511 (21) and, therefore, the services performed by claimant do not fall within the statutory exclusion…. . …

… [T]he statute requires both that the contract at issue contain the seven enumerated provisions and “that the services performed by the insurance agent or broker actually be consistent with those provisions” … . Matter of Hoyt (Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.–Commissioner of Labor), 2022 NY Slip Op 06518, Third Dept 11-17-22

Practice Point: Even if the contract between the insurer and claimant insurance broker includes all the statutory provisions in Labor Law 511 (such that the broker would not be considered an employee for unemployment insurance purposes), if the services actually performed by the broker are not consistent with those contract provisions the broker may be deemed an employee eligible for benefits.

 

November 17, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-11-17 09:40:472022-11-20 10:10:16EVEN IF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE INSURER AND CLAIMANT INSURANCE BROKER INCLUDED ALL THE STATUTORY FACTORS IN LABOR LAW 511, THE BROKER WILL BE CONSIDERED AN EMPLOYEE IF THE SERVICES ACTUALLY PROVIDED BY THE BROKER ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS (THIRD DEPT).
Contract Law, Insurance Law

THE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY EXCLUSION IN THE NAIL SALON’S INSURANCE POLICY IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND EXCLUDES INJURY RESULTING FROM A “COSMETIC SERVICE;” PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE CONTRACTED AN INFECTION DURING A PEDICURE; COVERAGE WAS PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the “professional liability” exclusion from the insured nail salon’s policy applied and coverage was properly denied. Plaintiff alleged she contracted an infection during a pedicure:

… [T]he professional liability exclusion states—in clear and unmistakable language—that the insured’s policy “does not apply to ‘bodily injury’ . . . due to . . . [t]he rendering of or failure to render cosmetic . . . services or treatments.” We agree with defendant that, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, “[t]here is no ambiguity in the wording of the exclusion” inasmuch as it is susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation: there is no coverage for bodily injury due to (i.e., “caused by”) the rendering (i.e., the performance) of a cosmetic service or treatment (e.g., a pedicure) … . Thus, employing ” ‘the test to determine whether an insurance contract is ambiguous [by] focus[ing] on the reasonable expectations of the average insured upon reading the policy and employing common speech’ ” … , we conclude that the exclusion is unambiguous because the average insured would understand the policy to exclude coverage for injuries caused by the performance of acts that constitute part of the pedicure service … . Walker v Erie Ins. Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 06332, Fourth Dept 11-10-22

Practice Point: Where an exclusion in an insurance policy is unambiguous it will be enforced. Here the nail salon’s insurance policy had a professional liability exclusion. Plaintiff alleged she contracted an infection during a pedicure. The pedicure was deemed included in the exclusion of bodily injury caused by the rendering of a cosmetic service (i.e., a pedicure).

 

November 10, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-11-10 20:33:062022-11-11 20:54:38THE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY EXCLUSION IN THE NAIL SALON’S INSURANCE POLICY IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND EXCLUDES INJURY RESULTING FROM A “COSMETIC SERVICE;” PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE CONTRACTED AN INFECTION DURING A PEDICURE; COVERAGE WAS PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT).
Attorneys, Insurance Law

THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY DEFENDANT IN THIS SUIT BY THE INSURER TO DISCLAIM COVERAGE WAS PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS MATERIAL PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the information sought by defendant (Charleus) in this insurance coverage dispute was privileged as material prepared in anticipation of litigation. Plaintiff insurance company brought this suit against the defendant, who was injured in a car accident involving its insured, to disclaim coverage because of the insured’s lack of cooperation:

“[A]n insurance company’s claim file is conditionally exempt from disclosure as material prepared in anticipation of litigation” ( … see CPLR 3101 [d] [2]). Nevertheless, material prepared in anticipation of litigation may be subject to disclosure upon “a party’s showing that he or she is in substantial need of the material and is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material by other means without undue hardship” … . Here, we conclude that the materials sought by Charleus and ordered by the court to be disclosed following its in camera review constitute material prepared in anticipation of litigation … and were prepared at a time after plaintiff had already determined to reject and defend against the claim made by Charleus … .

Because the materials sought by Charleus and ordered to be disclosed by the court’s order were prepared in anticipation of litigation and because Charleus has not made a showing justifying disclosure … , we modify the order by denying the motion in its entirety and granting the cross motion. Merchants Preferred Ins. Co. v Campbell, 2022 NY Slip Op 06370, Fourth Dept 11-10-22

Practice Point: In this suit by an insurer to disclaim coverage of defendant’s injuries stemming from an accident with the insured, the information sought by defendant was prepared in anticipation of litigation and was therefore protected by attorney-client privilege.

 

November 10, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-11-10 10:21:202022-11-13 11:12:19THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY DEFENDANT IN THIS SUIT BY THE INSURER TO DISCLAIM COVERAGE WAS PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS MATERIAL PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION (FOURTH DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Insurance Law

THE BREACH OF CONTRACT (FIRE INSURANCE POLICY) CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT DID NOT GIVE NOTICE OF THE CLAIM THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE REFORMED BASED UPON MUTUAL MISTAKE; THEREFORE THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CONFORM THE PLEADINGS TO THE PROOF AND THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE ENDORSEMENT REQUIRING A SPRINKLER SYSTEM ON THE INSURED PREMISES WAS INCLUDED IN THE POLICY BY MUTUAL MISTAKE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined plaintiff should not have been allowed to conform the pleadings to the proof and the jury should not have considered whether the contract, an insurance policy, should be reformed based upon mutual mistake. The complaint alleged defendant insurer breached the contract (the policy) by refusing to pay for fire damage. The insurance policy included a Protective Safeguards Endorsement (PSE) which required plaintiff to have a sprinkler system in good working order. The buildings apparently were vacant and did not have sprinkler systems. Based on testimony given at trial, plaintiff argued inclusion of the PSE was a mutual mistake and the contract (policy) should be reformed to exclude it. The jury and the appellate division so found. But the Court of Appeals held the courts should not have looked beyond the four corners of the pleadings, and the pleadings did not give notice of the reformation action:

[CPLR] Section 203 (f) requires the court to determine solely whether a plaintiff’s or a defendant’s original pleading gives notice of the transactions or occurrences underlying the proposed amendment …

To plead reformation, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts supporting a claim of mutual mistake, meaning that “the parties have reached an oral agreement and, unknown to either, the signed writing does not express that agreement” … . Given the “heavy presumption that a deliberately prepared and executed written instrument manifests the true intention of the parties, . . . [t]he proponent of reformation must show in no uncertain terms, not only that mistake or fraud exists, but exactly what was really agreed upon between the parties” … .

In contrast, to plead a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff usually must allege that: (1) a contract exists … ; (2) plaintiff performed in accordance with the contract … ; (3) defendant breached its contractual obligations … ; and (4) defendant’s breach resulted in damages … . …

The complaint … alleges that plaintiffs complied “with all of the conditions precedent and subsequent pursuant to the terms of the subject policy.” This … allegation is fatal to plaintiffs’ assertion that the complaint provides notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proved in support of a reformation claim. In fact, if anything, it suggests the opposite because, by asserting total compliance, plaintiffs necessarily disclaimed any challenge to the policy’s terms, specifically the PSE. 34-06 73, LLC v Seneca Ins. Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 06029, CtApp 10-27-22

Practice Point: Here the complaint alleged defendant insurer breached the policy by refusing to pay for fire damage. The insured buildings were vacant and did not have sprinkler systems. The policy included an endorsement requiring sprinkler systems. The insurer refused payment citing plaintiff’s failure to comply with the “sprinkler” endorsement. Based on trial evidence, plaintiff moved to conform the pleadings to the proof to include a cause of action for reformation of the contract alleging that the endorsement requiring sprinkler systems was included by mutual mistake and should be excluded from the policy. The Court of Appeals ruled the complaint did not give notice of the reformation cause of action. Therefore the jury should have been allowed to consider it. The trial verdict, reforming the contract to exclude the “sprinkler” endorsement, and the affirmance by the appellate division were reversed.

 

October 27, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-10-27 20:06:592022-10-28 21:21:50THE BREACH OF CONTRACT (FIRE INSURANCE POLICY) CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT DID NOT GIVE NOTICE OF THE CLAIM THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE REFORMED BASED UPON MUTUAL MISTAKE; THEREFORE THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CONFORM THE PLEADINGS TO THE PROOF AND THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE ENDORSEMENT REQUIRING A SPRINKLER SYSTEM ON THE INSURED PREMISES WAS INCLUDED IN THE POLICY BY MUTUAL MISTAKE (CT APP).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Insurance Law, Negligence

THE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THE TRIALS OF TWO ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE SAME FIRE, WHERE ONE PARTY WAS BOTH A DEFENDANT AND A PLAINTIFF, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; ANY PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM THE JURY’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF INSURANCE (ONE OF THE ACTIONS IS AGAINST AN INSURER) CAN BE HANDLED WITH JURY INSTRUCTIONS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the motion to consolidate the trials of two actions stemming from the same fire which damages two adjoining properties should have been granted. The court noted that one party is both a plaintiff and a defendant:

Although a motion pursuant to CPLR 602(a) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court … , consolidation or joinder for trial is favored to avoid unnecessary duplication of trials, save unnecessary costs and expense, and prevent an injustice which would result from divergent decisions based on the same facts … . “Where common questions of law or fact exist, a motion [pursuant to CPLR 602(a)] to consolidate [or for a joint trial] should be granted, absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right by the party opposing the motion” … .

Here … the two actions involve common questions of law and fact. Assuming, arguendo, that the respondents would be prejudiced if the two actions are tried before the same jury since it would bring to the jury’s attention the existence of insurance … , any such prejudice is outweighed by the possibility of inconsistent verdicts if separate trials ensue … . Furthermore, the possibility of such prejudice can be mitigated by appropriate jury instructions … . Moreover, a joint trial, rather than consolidation, is appropriate where a party is both a plaintiff and a defendant … . Calle v 2118 Flatbush Ave. Realty, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 05981, Second Dept 10-26-22

Practice Point: Here the motion pursuant to CPLR 602 to consolidate the trials of two actions stemming from the same fire should have been granted. One party was both a defendant and a plaintiff. The fact that consolidation would bring the existence of insurance to the jury’s attention (one of the parties is an insurer), although prejudicial, can be handled by jury instructions.

 

October 26, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-10-26 14:04:502022-10-29 14:27:12THE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THE TRIALS OF TWO ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE SAME FIRE, WHERE ONE PARTY WAS BOTH A DEFENDANT AND A PLAINTIFF, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; ANY PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM THE JURY’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF INSURANCE (ONE OF THE ACTIONS IS AGAINST AN INSURER) CAN BE HANDLED WITH JURY INSTRUCTIONS (SECOND DEPT). ​
Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Consumer Law, Insurance Law

​ AN AMENDED REGULATION DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF LIFE-INSURANCE AND ANNUITY CONSUMERS IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS AND WAS PROPERLY CRAFTED AND ISSUED BY THE NYS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, reversing the appellate division, determined an amended regulation designed to protect the interests of life-insurance and annuity consumers was not void for vagueness and was properly crafted and issued by the NYS Department of Financial Services (DFS):

The amendment addressed concerns that the purchase of annuities and life insurance had become increasingly complex with more products available to purchase. DFS reasoned that consumers, finding themselves more reliant on professional advice in order to understand the options available and to make purchasing decisions, had become more susceptible to producers and insurers recommending transactions that prioritized their own compensation over the consumer’s best interest … . The amendment … extended the scope of the regulation to cover both annuity and life insurance contracts, and created a new standard applicable when producers and insurers make “recommendations” to consumers. The amended regulation, which applies to both “sales transactions” and “in-force transactions” … , requires that producers, or insurers when no producer is involved, act in the “best interest of the consumer” when making a “recommendation” … .

The producer or insurer must, among other things: make “reasonable efforts” to obtain the consumer’s “suitability information”; base any recommendation “on an evaluation of the relevant suitability information” that “reflects the care, skill, prudence, and diligence that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use under the circumstances then prevailing”; “[o]nly [consider] the interests of the consumer . . . in making the recommendation” and not be influenced by compensation or other incentives; recommend only “suitable” transactions; and have a “reasonable basis” to believe that the consumer has been reasonably informed of the features of the policy, the potential consequences of the transactions, both favorable and unfavorable, and that the consumer would benefit from certain features of the policy and the particular policy as a whole … . Matter of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Fin. Servs., 2022 NY Slip Op 05917, CtApp 10-20-22

Practice Point: An amended regulation designed to protect the interests of life-insurance and annuity consumers is not void for vagueness and was properly created and issued by the NYS Department of Financial Services. The amendment seeks to ensure the advice given to consumers does not place the financial compensation of the insurer ahead of the best interests of the consumer.

 

October 20, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-10-20 15:14:182022-10-21 15:47:02​ AN AMENDED REGULATION DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF LIFE-INSURANCE AND ANNUITY CONSUMERS IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS AND WAS PROPERLY CRAFTED AND ISSUED BY THE NYS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES (CT APP).
Evidence, Insurance Law, Negligence

THE MAJORITY DETERMINED PLAINTIFF DID NOT TIE HIS DIMINISHED RANGE OF MOTION TO THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, AS OPPOSED TO HIS PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS, AND THEREFORE PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE “SERIOUS INJURY;” THE DISSENT ARGUED THE NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT (DEFENDANTS’ TRUCK REAR-ENDED PLAINTIFF’S CAR AT 45 MILES PER HOUR) SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AND DEFENDANT MUST TAKE THE PLAINTIFF AS HE OR SHE FINDS HIM (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff did not raise a question of fact about whether he suffered serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law 5102 in this rear-end traffic accident case. [Editor’s Note: Decisions determining whether plaintiff suffered “serious injury” within the meaning of the No-Fault Law are not covered in the New York Appellate Digest because each analysis is necessarily unique and fact-specific. This “serious injury” decision has been summarized because there is a two-justice dissent arguing (1) the nature of the accident, defendants’ truck rear-ending plaintiff’s car at 45 miles per hour, should have been considered, (2) the defendant must take the plaintiff as he or she finds him, and (3) there are questions of fact whether plaintiff’s pre-existing conditions were aggravated by the accident.]:

… [P]laintiff did not provide … objective medical evidence distinguishing his preexisting back condition from its purported exacerbation in the November 2016 accident — such as, for example, proof tying the diminished ranges of motion observed by [plaintiff’s expert] in March 2021 to the November 2016 accident rather than plaintiff’s prior degenerative back problems — or demonstrating a causal link between any exacerbation and the self-reported limitations on plaintiff’s activities for purposes of his 90/180-day claim … .

From the dissent:

The facts regarding the accident are not in dispute. Defendant Alton E. Horn was driving a 1998 Kenworth tractor trailer at a speed of 45 miles per hour when he rear-ended plaintiff. While we could find no postaccident photographs of the vehicles in the record, Horn stated that the impact bent his bumper and pushed the hood up on his tractor trailer, and plaintiff referred to his vehicle as “totaled.” Plaintiff was removed from the scene by ambulance and was administered morphine en route to the hospital. Although plaintiff was released from the hospital that night, he reported that he was bedridden for the next 10 days. During oral argument, defendants’ counsel urged us to ignore these facts attendant to the actual accident, however we could find no case law that mandates that the Court leave its common sense at the door. Simply put, the facts do matter. Finally, it is undisputed that, although plaintiff had not undergone surgery to alleviate the discomfort in his lower back before the accident, he has since.

… [E]very first-year law student is aware of the eggshell plaintiff axiom, namely that the defendant must take the plaintiff as he or she finds him, i.e., the plaintiff may recover to the extent that the accident aggravated his or her preexisting conditions … . Lemieux v Horn, 2022 NY Slip Op 05739, Second Dept 10-13-22

Practice Point: The majority concluded the plaintiff’s evidence did not link his current range of motion limitations to the traffic accident, as opposed to his pre-existing conditions. Therefore plaintiff did not demonstrate “serious injury” within the meaning of the Insurance Law. The two-justice dissent argued the nature of the accident–defendants’ truck rear-ended plaintiff’s car at 45 miles per hour–and plaintiff’s medical evidence raised a question of fact about whether plaintiff’s pre-existing conditions were aggravated by the accident.

 

October 13, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-10-13 09:39:002022-10-18 09:34:26THE MAJORITY DETERMINED PLAINTIFF DID NOT TIE HIS DIMINISHED RANGE OF MOTION TO THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, AS OPPOSED TO HIS PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS, AND THEREFORE PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE “SERIOUS INJURY;” THE DISSENT ARGUED THE NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT (DEFENDANTS’ TRUCK REAR-ENDED PLAINTIFF’S CAR AT 45 MILES PER HOUR) SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AND DEFENDANT MUST TAKE THE PLAINTIFF AS HE OR SHE FINDS HIM (THIRD DEPT). ​
Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Insurance Law, Medical Malpractice

THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD AND MUTUAL MISTAKE; PLAINTIFFS-PHYSICIANS ALLEGED THE FORMS THE EMPLOYER REQUIRED THEM TO SIGN CONSENTING TO THE DISTRIBUTION (TO THE EMPLOYER) OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE DEMUTUALIZATION OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURER WERE INVALID (FIRST DEPT).

The Frist Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the complaint by physicians against their employer/malpractice-insurance-policy-administrator stated causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and mutual mistake. The dispute centers on whether the physicians or the employer which paid the malpractice insurance premiums are/is entitled to the proceeds when the insurer (MLMIC) demutualized. The employer had the physicians sign forms consenting to distributing the proceeds to the employer. The physicians allege the consent forms are invalid:

Plaintiffs allege that the forms by which they authorized MLMIC to distribute their demutualization proceeds to defendant are invalid because defendant obtained them in breach of its fiduciary duty, by fraud, or due to mutual mistake. If these forms are invalid, then the demutualization proceeds belong to plaintiffs … .

Transactions between a fiduciary and beneficiary are voidable if the fiduciary acts in its own interest and does not fully disclose all material facts … . Defendant is alleged not only to have withheld the policyholder information statement from plaintiffs, but to have significantly misrepresented their contents for its own gain. These allegations, which are not conclusively refuted by the documentary evidence, are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fraud is another basis for rescinding the consent forms … . Plaintiffs also properly allege constructive fraud, because they were owed a fiduciary duty by defendant and so were “warranted to . . . relax the care and vigilance they would ordinarily exercise in the circumstances” … . …

Mutual mistake “may not be invoked by a party to avoid the consequences of its own negligence” … . For the purposes of this motion to dismiss, however, it cannot be said as a matter of law that plaintiffs were negligent … . Cordaro v AdvantageCare Physicians, P.C., 2022 NY Slip Op 05267, First Dept 9-27-22

Practice Point: The complaint adequately alleged the employer, which also served at the medical malpractice insurance policy administrator, breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiffs-physicians by requiring them to consent to the distribution (to the employer) of the proceeds of the demutualization of the medical malpractice insurance carrier. The complaint also sufficiently alleged fraud, constructive fraud and mutual-mistake causes of action.

 

September 27, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-09-27 10:30:192022-09-29 11:07:21THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD AND MUTUAL MISTAKE; PLAINTIFFS-PHYSICIANS ALLEGED THE FORMS THE EMPLOYER REQUIRED THEM TO SIGN CONSENTING TO THE DISTRIBUTION (TO THE EMPLOYER) OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE DEMUTUALIZATION OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURER WERE INVALID (FIRST DEPT).
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