You are here: / Immunity
, ,

COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined the county’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied in this vehicle-accident case alleging the negligent failure to install a guardrail. The county did not demonstrate it was entitled to qualified immunity based upon a relevant highway-safety study of the area, and did not demonstrate the absence of a guardrail was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries:

A municipal defendant is entitled to qualified immunity “where a duly authorized public planning body has entertained and passed on the very same question of risk as would ordinarily go to the jury” … . Here, the evidence presented by the County failed to establish that it undertook a study which entertained and passed on the very same question of risk that is at issue in this case … . …

… [T]he County failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not have a duty to place guardrails near the concrete headwall involved in the plaintiff’s accident. …

… [T]he County’s submissions failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether its alleged negligence in failing to place guardrails near the concrete headwall … was a substantial factor in aggravating the plaintiff’s injuries … . Bednoski v County of Suffolk, 2016 NY Slip Op 08832, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/HIGHWAYS (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/GUARDRAILS (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)

,

CITY PROPERLY HELD LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT RELATED TO SPEEDING BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES TO REDUCE DRIVERS’ TENDENCY TO SPEED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a dissenting opinion, determined the city was properly held liable for an accident on a road known for speeding. Plaintiff, a twelve-year-old boy, was struck while trying to cross the road on his bicycle. The driver was going 54 miles per hour in a 30-mile-an-hour zone. The city had received numerous speeding complaints over the years and had undertaken four studies to determine whether traffic control devices should be installed on the road. Plaintiffs presented evidence that traffic control devices would not solve the speeding problem and so-called “traffic calming” measures were needed (speed humps, raised cross-walks, etc.). The Court of Appeals, affirming Supreme Court, found that maintaining safe roadways was a proprietary function, not a governmental function. Therefore there was no need for a special relationship with plaintiff as a prerequisite for liability. The court further found that the city was not entitled to qualified immunity stemming from the traffic studies, because the studies did not address “traffic calming” measures:

We do not suggest that a municipality has a proprietary duty to keep its roadways free from all unlawful or reckless driving behavior. Under the particular circumstances of this case, however, plaintiffs demonstrated that the City was made aware through repeated complaints of ongoing speeding along Gerritsen Avenue, that the City could have implemented roadway design changes in the form of traffic calming measures to deter speeding, and that the City failed to conduct a study of whether traffic calming measures were appropriate and therefore failed to implement any such measures. … [W]hether the City’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident or [the driver’s] speeding was the sole proximate cause, and whether the City was entitled to qualified immunity based on its response to those repeated complaints, were both issues to be resolved by the jury.  Turturro v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 08579, CtApp 12-22-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (CITY PROPERLY HELD LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT RELATED TO SPEEDING BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES TO REDUCE DRIVERS’ TENDENCY TO SPEED)/IMMUNITY (CITY PROPERLY HELD LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT RELATED TO SPEEDING BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES TO REDUCE DRIVERS’ TENDENCY TO SPEED)/PROPRIETARY FUNCTION (MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY PROPERLY HELD LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT RELATED TO SPEEDING BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES TO REDUCE DRIVERS’ TENDENCY TO SPEED)

,

STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO THE ABSENCE OF A GUIDE RAIL ALONG A HIGHWAY.

The Third Department affirmed the Court of Claim’s determination that the absence of a guide rail was not the proximate cause of claimant’s injuries, and the state was entitled to qualified immunity because it had reasonably concluded after a study that a guide rail was not necessary. Claimant was injured when the ambulance in which he was riding struck a stone wall near the roadway:

Defendant’s duty to maintain roads in a reasonably safe condition includes the installation of guide rails when necessary … . With respect to highway safety and design, defendant is “accorded a qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway planning decision” … . “Under this doctrine of qualified immunity, a governmental body may be held liable when its study of a traffic condition is plainly inadequate or there is no reasonable basis for its traffic plan” … . Schroeder v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 08263, 3rd Dept 12-8-16

COURT OF CLAIMS (STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO THE ABSENCE OF A GUIDE RAIL ALONG A HIGHWAY)/IMMUNITY (STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO THE ABSENCE OF A GUIDE RAIL ALONG A HIGHWAY)/QUALIFIED IMMUNITY (STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO THE ABSENCE OF A GUIDE RAIL ALONG A HIGHWAY)/HIGHWAYS AND ROADS (STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO THE ABSENCE OF A GUIDE RAIL ALONG A HIGHWAY)/GUIDE RAILS (STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO THE ABSENCE OF A GUIDE RAIL ALONG A HIGHWAY)/GUARD RAILS (STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO THE ABSENCE OF A GUIDE RAIL ALONG A HIGHWAY)

, ,

FIRE REKINDLED AFTER FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ASSURED PLAINTIFFS THE FIRE WAS OUT, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY AND PLAINTIFFS.

The Third Department determined the action against the city alleging negligence resulting in the destruction of plaintiffs’ property by fire should not have been dismissed. Fire department personnel told the plaintiffs the fire had been extinguished and that it was safe to reenter. However the fire rekindled. The Third Department held that there was a “special relationship” between the city and the plaintiffs stemming from the assurances the fire was out:

To establish a special relationship, plaintiffs were required to show: “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking” … .

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and providing them the benefit of every favorable inference …, we conclude that plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether a special relationship existed. With regard to the first element, there is no dispute that defendants’ agents dispatched the Department to plaintiffs’ residence in response to their 911 call for assistance and that the responding crew thereafter assumed control over the ongoing fire. Even if the Department’s actions in that regard simply constituted the performance of a duty owed to the public generally … , we are of the view that, by making affirmative representations to plaintiffs that the fire had been fully extinguished and that it was safe to reenter the home, the Department assumed an affirmative duty to plaintiffs … . As for the second and third elements, knowledge on the part of the Department that inaction could result in harm can be reasonably inferred from the circumstances … , and the Department’s employees undisputedly had direct contact with plaintiffs. With respect to the final element, plaintiffs allege that they relied upon the Department’s assurances that the fire was completely extinguished in choosing to leave their home unattended for the evening. Trimble v City of Albany, 2016 NY Slip Op 07912, 3rd Dept 11-23-16

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (FIRE REKINDLED AFTER FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ASSURED PLAINTIFFS THE FIRE WAS OUT, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY AND PLAINTIFFS)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, FIRE REKINDLED AFTER FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ASSURED PLAINTIFFS THE FIRE WAS OUT, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY AND PLAINTIFFS)/IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, FIRE REKINDLED AFTER FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ASSURED PLAINTIFFS THE FIRE WAS OUT, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY AND PLAINTIFFS)/FIRE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, FIRE REKINDLED AFTER FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ASSURED PLAINTIFFS THE FIRE WAS OUT, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY AND PLAINTIFFS)

, ,

COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR A LEFT TURN SIGNAL HAD BEEN STUDIED, THEREFORE THE COUNTY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON IMMUNITY GROUNDS.

The Second Department determined the county’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied in this intersection car accident case. Plaintiff alleged the county was negligent in failing to install a traffic control device with a left turn signal, because there was a designated lane for a left turn. The accident occurred when plaintiff attempted to make a left turn. Because the county did not demonstrate the issue had been adequately studied, it did not demonstrate government immunity applied. Therefore the county’s motion was properly denied without need to address the opposing papers:

A governmental entity has a duty to the public to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition … . “While this duty is nondelegable, it is measured by the courts with consideration given to the proper limits on intrusion into the [government’s] planning and decision-making functions. Thus, in the field of traffic design engineering, the State is accorded a qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway planning decision” … . Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a governmental entity may not be held liable for a highway safety planning decision unless its study of a traffic condition is plainly inadequate, or there is no reasonable basis for its traffic plan … . Immunity will apply only “where a duly authorized public planning body has entertained and passed on the very same question of risk as would ordinarily go to the jury” … .

Here, the County failed to establish that the design of the subject traffic signal, including the determination that no left-turn signal was warranted, was based on a study which entertained and passed on the very same question of risk that the plaintiff would put to a jury … . Warren v Evans, 2016 NY Slip Op 07641, 2nd Dept 11-16-16

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR A LEFT TURN SIGNAL HAD BEEN STUDIED, THEREFORE THE COUNTY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON IMMUNITY GROUNDS)/IMMUNITY (HIGHWAYS, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR A LEFT TURN SIGNAL HAD BEEN STUDIED, THEREFORE THE COUNTY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON IMMUNITY GROUNDS)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, HIGHWAYS, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR A LEFT TURN SIGNAL HAD BEEN STUDIED, THEREFORE THE COUNTY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON IMMUNITY GROUNDS)/HIGHWAYS (COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR A LEFT TURN SIGNAL HAD BEEN STUDIED, THEREFORE THE COUNTY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON IMMUNITY GROUNDS)

, , ,

COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF.

The Second Department determined the county could not be held liable for flooding by a brook which overflowed its banks. There was not special relationship between the county and the plaintiff:

“[A] municipal corporation is not liable for failure to restrain waters between banks of a stream or to keep a channel free from obstructions it did not cause. Absent any special duty owed to the private landowners, a municipal corporation cannot be held liable for failing to provide adequate flood protection” … . Here, the County demonstrated that it did not owe a special duty to the plaintiff, and that the overflow was caused by natural phenomena, rather than its conduct. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Kimball Brooklands Corp. v County of Westchester, 2016 NY Slip Op 07297, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF)/IMMUNITY (COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF)/NEGLIGENCE (FLOODING, COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (FLOODING, COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF)/FLOODING (COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF

, ,

PLAINTIFF SUING SHERIFF FOR FAILURE TO KEEP HIM SAFE FROM ASSAULT IN JAIL (1) DID NOT NEED TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM AND (2) STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEGLIGENCE.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, concerning a lawsuit alleging the Erie County Sheriff was negligent in failing to protect plaintiff from sexual assault while in jail, determined: (1) plaintiff did not need to file a notice of claim because the county can not, under the NYS Constitution, indemnify and defend the sheriff in connection with the action; (2) the complaint stated a cause of action in negligence (failure to keep an inmate safe); and (3) governmental immunity is an affirmative defense on which the sheriff bears the burden of proof which cannot be addressed at the pleading stage. The fact that the county provided law enforcement liability insurance for the sheriff did not trigger the notice of claim requirement under the Municipal Law:

… [T]hat the County agreed to provide “Liability Insurance” for the Sheriff in exchange for consideration because “policies of law enforcement liability insurance paid for by the County” had become prohibitively expensive. In resolving to act as an insurer, the County recognized — as was commonly understood at the time — that it could not statutorily obligate itself to defend and indemnify the Sheriff, as it had agreed to do for the Sheriff’s employees, under the New York State Constitution … . Absent the existence of any statutory obligation on the County to indemnify the Sheriff — as opposed to an agreement to act as his insurer — the Appellate Division correctly ruled that service of a notice of claim was not required under General Municipal Law § 50-e. …

While the State is by no means an insurer of inmate safety or required to provide unremitting surveillance in all circumstances … , we explained in Sanchez [99 NY2d 247] that, “[h]aving assumed physical custody of inmates, who cannot protect and defend themselves in the same way as those at liberty can, the State owes a duty of care to safeguard inmates, even from attacks by fellow inmates” … . Inasmuch as “the Sheriff is [similarly] prescribed, by law, to safely keep inmates of the County Jail” … , the rule set forth in Sanchez applies equally here. Villar v Howard, 2016 NY Slip Op 06944, CtApp 10-25-16

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (PLAINTIFF SUING SHERIFF FOR FAILURE TO KEEP HIM SAFE FROM ASSAULT IN JAIL (1) DID NOT NEED TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM AND (2) STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEGLIGENCE)/NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF SUING SHERIFF FOR FAILURE TO KEEP HIM SAFE FROM ASSAULT IN JAIL (1) DID NOT NEED TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM AND (2) STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEGLIGENCE)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (PLAINTIFF SUING SHERIFF FOR FAILURE TO KEEP HIM SAFE FROM ASSAULT IN JAIL (1) DID NOT NEED TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM AND (2) STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEGLIGENCE)/SHERIFF (PLAINTIFF SUING SHERIFF FOR FAILURE TO KEEP HIM SAFE FROM ASSAULT IN JAIL (1) DID NOT NEED TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM AND (2) STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEGLIGENCE)

,

DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL.

The Second Department, affirming the Court of Claims, determined the state was protected from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs were injured when a van in which they were riding struck a highway guardrail and concrete pillar. The complaint alleged the guardrail was not long enough:

To establish its entitlement to qualified immunity, the governmental body must demonstrate “that the relevant discretionary determination by the governmental body was the result of a deliberate decision-making process” … . “A municipality is entitled to qualified immunity where a governmental planning body has entertained and passed on the very same question of risk as would ordinarily go to the jury'” … . Accordingly, where the decision made by the municipality or governmental body was not the product of a governmental plan or study, the doctrine of qualified immunity is inapplicable … .

Here, the Court of Claims correctly applied the doctrine of qualified immunity based on the evidence the defendants submitted at trial that the guardrail was designed pursuant to the design standards set forth by the New York State Department of Transportation, which were the result of a deliberate decision-making process of the type afforded immunity from judicial interference … . Ramirez v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06815, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

COURT OF CLAIMS (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/IMMUNITY (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/QUALIFIED IMMUNITY (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/HIGHWAYS (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/GUARDRAILS (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)

, ,

WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARGUMENT COULD BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The First Department determined the Port Authority of NY & NJ did not waive sovereign immunity, despite several contract provisions requiring several steps to resolve disputes prior to resorting to suit. Because the notice of claim and the subsequent filing of a complaint were not timely pursuant to Unconsolidated Law 7107, the complaint was properly dismissed. The court noted that, although the waiver of sovereignty argument was not raised below, the appellate court could consider the argument (which was rejected). With respect to the powers of the appellate court in this context, the court explained:

… [W]here a party does not allege new facts, but merely raises a legal argument that appeared upon the face of the record, we are free to consider the argument “[s]o long as the issue is determinative and the record on appeal is sufficient to permit our review” … . The waiver argument presents this very circumstance, and therefore, we consider [the] waiver argument on this appeal. W&W Steel, LLC v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2016 NY Slip Op 05900, 1st Dept 8-25-16

(MUNICIPAL LAW (WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARGUMENT COULD BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)APPEALS (WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARGUMENT COULD BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARGUMENT COULD BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)

, ,

INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONARY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION.

The Second Department determined the City of New York was immune from a suit alleging the negligent investigation of child abuse, leading to the child’s death two years later. The court also noted that New York does not recognize a cause of action for negligent investigation or prosecution:

… [T]he defendants contended and established that they engaged in discretionary conduct in investigating the report of abuse in 2003, and thus cannot be held liable for the manner in which the investigation was performed under the doctrine of governmental immunity … . A government’s performance of a governmental function, when discretionary in nature, cannot result in liability .. . Discretionary acts “involve the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results” … . The defendants demonstrated that the subject investigation consisted of a series of discretionary acts … , and that this was not a situation in which no discretion or judgment was exercised. In any event, the defendants also demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that New York does not recognize a cause of action sounding in negligent investigation or negligent prosecution … . Hines v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 05794, 2nd Dept 8-17-16

NEGLIGENCE (INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONAY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION)/MUNICIPAL LAW (INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONAY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION)/GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY (INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONAY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION)/CHILD ABUSE (INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONAY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION)/NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE (INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONAY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy