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CITY PROPERLY HELD LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT RELATED TO SPEEDING BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES TO REDUCE DRIVERS’ TENDENCY TO SPEED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a dissenting opinion, determined the city was properly held liable for an accident on a road known for speeding. Plaintiff, a twelve-year-old boy, was struck while trying to cross the road on his bicycle. The driver was going 54 miles per hour in a 30-mile-an-hour zone. The city had received numerous speeding complaints over the years and had undertaken four studies to determine whether traffic control devices should be installed on the road. Plaintiffs presented evidence that traffic control devices would not solve the speeding problem and so-called “traffic calming” measures were needed (speed humps, raised cross-walks, etc.). The Court of Appeals, affirming Supreme Court, found that maintaining safe roadways was a proprietary function, not a governmental function. Therefore there was no need for a special relationship with plaintiff as a prerequisite for liability. The court further found that the city was not entitled to qualified immunity stemming from the traffic studies, because the studies did not address “traffic calming” measures:

We do not suggest that a municipality has a proprietary duty to keep its roadways free from all unlawful or reckless driving behavior. Under the particular circumstances of this case, however, plaintiffs demonstrated that the City was made aware through repeated complaints of ongoing speeding along Gerritsen Avenue, that the City could have implemented roadway design changes in the form of traffic calming measures to deter speeding, and that the City failed to conduct a study of whether traffic calming measures were appropriate and therefore failed to implement any such measures. … [W]hether the City’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident or [the driver’s] speeding was the sole proximate cause, and whether the City was entitled to qualified immunity based on its response to those repeated complaints, were both issues to be resolved by the jury.  Turturro v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 08579, CtApp 12-22-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (CITY PROPERLY HELD LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT RELATED TO SPEEDING BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES TO REDUCE DRIVERS’ TENDENCY TO SPEED)/IMMUNITY (CITY PROPERLY HELD LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT RELATED TO SPEEDING BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES TO REDUCE DRIVERS’ TENDENCY TO SPEED)/PROPRIETARY FUNCTION (MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY PROPERLY HELD LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT RELATED TO SPEEDING BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES TO REDUCE DRIVERS’ TENDENCY TO SPEED)

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