You are here: / Human Rights Law
,

PLAINTIFF RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER SHE WAS THE VICTIM OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION; UPON HER RETURN FROM MATERNITY LEAVE SHE WAS TOLD HER POSITION HAD BEEN ELIMINATED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s gender-discrimination action against defendant employer should not have been dismissed. Upon returning from maternity leave, plaintiff was informed her management-level position had been eliminated and replaced by a position for which she was not qualified. Defendant did offer plaintiff a job as a temporary social worker at the same salary:

“Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is a form of gender discrimination” … . …

… [T]he defendant failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the position offered to the plaintiff involved a materially adverse change in the terms of her employment, since the social worker position did not involve any of the management responsibilities that the plaintiff had performed … . …

… [T[here were triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s supervisor, Segree, made remarks [re: her pregnancy] indicative of a discriminatory motive to terminate the plaintiff’s employment … . …

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, it also failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the proffered explanation for terminating the plaintiff’s employment was a pretext for discrimination … . Although McDonald averred that the plaintiff’s employment was terminated because she had no business education and no sales or marketing experience, he acknowledged that a business education was not required. Lefort v Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 2022 NY Slip Op 01294, Second Dept 3-2-22

 

,

PLAINTIFF’S “INVOLUNTARY RESIGNATION,” HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND RETALIATION ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff’s employment discrimination and retaliation action properly survived summary judgment. Among the issues presented by the allegations was whether she “involuntarily resigned” because of the intolerably hostile work environment. Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to sexual harassment and was retaliated against after she complained about her treatment:

In our view, the broader account by plaintiff of a hostile work environment, Hawkins’ [plaintiff’s supervisor] behavior in placing plaintiff, but not a similarly situated man, on a PIP [performance improvement plan], and what plaintiff described as a wholly inadequate response by Russo [human resources official] to her August 2017 complaint about the situation reflect questions of fact as to whether plaintiff was subjected to a work environment so hostile that her only alternative was resignation and whether that hostility arose from a discriminatory motive … . Defendants attempted to rebut the presumption of discrimination arising from those facts via the affidavit of Hawkins, who averred in conclusory fashion that the other employee he supervised was performing better than plaintiff at the time she was placed on a PIP and that the other employee was also placed on a PIP at some point. Hawkins, however, gave no detail as to how the other employee compared to plaintiff on the performance metrics, failed to deny that the other employee was also underperforming on those metrics in July 2017 and offered no explanation as to why he did not seek to place both on a PIP at that time. Long v Aerotek, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 00915, Third Dept 2-10-22

 

, ,

PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were triable issues of fact in this employment discrimination case:

Plaintiff, an African American female, raises triable issues of fact whether her October 2017 termination (adverse employment action) was in retaliation for her verbal complaints (protected activity) concerning racist comments defendant Annie Liu allegedly uttered at work … . A question of fact exists as to whether plaintiff complained in July or August 2017. If plaintiff’s testimony is credited, the time frame between the discriminatory comments, plaintiff’s complaints, and her firing is evidence of a causal connection between the protected activity and her termination two months later … . Contrary to defendants’ argument, it is unclear from the record whether an intervening event occurred to dispel an inference of a causal relationship. Moreover, issues of fact also exist as to whether defendants’ proffered explanation for terminating plaintiff’s employment was pretextual … . Cancel v Global Fertility & Genetics, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 00811, First Dept 2-8-22

 

,

THE FACT THAT THE CITY BUILDING CODE DID NOT REQUIRE DISABLED-ACCESS TO THE THIRD FLOOR OF DEFENDANT RESTAURANT DID NOT CONFLICT WITH THE FACT THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW MAY REQUIRE SUCH ACCESS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff, a disabled wheelchair user, had standing to bring a discrimination action against defendant restaurant alleging the third floor of the restaurant was not accessible. The fact that the NYC Building Code did not require disabled-access to the third floor based on the square-footage did not conflict with the Human Rights Law which may require access:

The Building Code and disability discrimination laws serve different purposes and can easily be enforced and harmonized. The Building Code serves foremost to ensure safety in construction and maintenance of structures. The accessibility provision at issue simply states that no disabled access is required for building areas which measure less than 2,500 square feet. The provision does not prohibit building owners from providing such access — it simply provides that, for purposes of the Building Code, no such access is required.

The disability discrimination laws are designed, as pertinent here, to ensure that disabled persons have reasonable access to public accommodations. While the Building Code might not require disabled access under the circumstances present here, this does not mean that more may not be required under the State and City Human Rights Laws’ (HRLs) disability discrimination provisions. In this, there is no conflict. To the extent there is any tension between the Building Code’s provisions and the HRLs, such tension may be remedied by the rule of reasonableness which is an integral component of the HRLs’ requirement that disabled persons be reasonably accommodated (see Executive Law § 296[c][i]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[15][b]). Jones v McDonald’s Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 00814, First Dept 2-8-22

 

, , ,

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DEFAULTING DEFENDANT-ATTORNEY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED GENDER DISCRIMINATION AND INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BY DEFENDANT-ATTORNEY’S WITHHOLDING REQUESTED LEGAL SERVICES AND ENGAGING IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s complaint against the defaulting attorney-defendant should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged defendant attorney discriminated against her by depriving her of the legal services she sought in connection with a sexual assault. Plaintiff alleged she was sexually harassed by defendant attorney. The matter was sent back to determine damages:

“[B]y defaulting, a defendant admits all traversable allegations contained in the complaint, and thus concedes liability, although not damages” … . “Some proof of liability is also required to satisfy the court as to the prima facie validity of the uncontested cause of action,” but the standard of proof is “minimal,” “not stringent” … .

… [P]laintiff averred that defendant … used his position of authority and confidence as an attorney to gain her trust, and then discriminated against her by withholding the legal services she sought in connection with litigation related to a sexual assault of plaintiff and using the pretext of offering such services to harass and subject her to unwelcome sexual conduct and advances. …

Plaintiff established claims under New York State Executive Law § 269(2)(a) (State HRL) that defendant … discriminated against plaintiff based on her gender … . [P]laintiff also made a prima facie showing that defendant[‘s] … discriminatory behavior violated the City HRL … . [P]laintiff established her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress by demonstrating that defendant … engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct through his deliberate and malicious campaign of harassment, while disregarding a substantial probability that doing so would cause severe emotional distress to her, and that his conduct did in fact did cause her severe emotional distress … . Petty v Law Off. of Robert P. Santoriella, P.C., 2021 NY Slip Op 07527, First Dept 12-28-21

 

,

PETITIONER, A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE AND THE ONLY FEMALE MANUAL-LABOR EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, DEMONSTRATED SHE WAS TERMINATED SOLELY BECAUSE OF HER GENDER; SUPREME COURT PROPERLY REINSTATED HER WITH BACK PAY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined petitioner, a probationary employee of the Department of Public Works (DPW), was terminated based solely upon her gender and was properly reinstated with back pay:

Despite receiving two interim probationary reports that indicated her performance was satisfactory during the course of her employment, on April 3, 2018, petitioner was called to a meeting with respondent Daniel Crandell, DPW’s Commissioner, at which she was terminated after being told that she was “just not a good fit.” Although petitioner received a written termination letter at the close of that meeting, petitioner received no prior warning or notice of any problematic conduct. Notably, petitioner was the only female employee of DPW that was in a position of manual labor at the time of her termination. * * *

“Judicial review of the discharge of a probationary employee is limited to whether the determination was made in bad faith or for an improper or impermissible reason” … . * * *

Supreme Court found that, “[i]n the absence of any credible evidence that her work performance provided a basis for her termination, [it was] compelled to find that the only reason she was terminated was because of her gender.” Significantly, the court found respondents’ assertions regarding “[p]etitioner’s alleged argumentative attitude” to “reflect more of a post-termination justification for her dismissal than a valid or proper basis for the termination of her employment.” … [R]espondents failed to meet their burden of establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose for petitioner’s termination … . Matter of Triumpho v County of Schoharie, 2021 NY Slip Op 06727, Third Dept 12-2-21

 

, ,

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF’S HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT ALLEGATIONS DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE APPLICABLE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROVISIONS, THE ALLEGATIONS DID STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE MORE PROTECTIVE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (CT APP).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the complaint stated a hostile work environment cause of action under the more protective New York City Human Rights Law, but not under the New York State Human Rights Law:

… [A]lthough the motion court properly concluded that it does not rise to the level of “severe and pervasive” under the applicable pre-2019 State HRL, plaintiff has raised triable issues of fact regarding the hostile work environment claims under the more protective City HRL … . There was evidence that in May and September 2015, several of plaintiff’s coworkers referred to him by using the Spanish word for “monkey,” a racially humiliating and degrading term. Further, the evidence suggested that other coworkers and supervisors, if not everyone at the restaurant, knew that certain employees were using that term to refer to plaintiff … . Under these circumstances, triable issues exist as to whether this rises above the level of a “truly insubstantial” case … . The evidence also raised triable issues as to whether plaintiff was treated differently from other employees of his ethnic background because of his skin color … .

… [T]riable issues of fact exist as to whether defendant was liable for the comments of its workers, and whether defendant took “immediate and appropriate corrective action” to prevent the conduct … . Pichardo v Carmine’s Broadway Feast Inc, 2021 NY Slip Op 06565, First Dept 11-23-21

 

, ,

SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS; THE CONDUCT OCCURRED WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PHYSICALLY IN NEW YORK AND DID NOT HAVE ANY IMPACT ON THE TERMS, CONDITIONS OR EXTENT OF HER EMPLOYMENT WITHIN NEW YORK; THE FACTS WERE NOT DESCRIBED (FIRST DEPT).

​The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the hostile work environment claims under the Human Rights Law. The facts were not explained. The conduct occurred when plaintiff was “physically situated outside of New York” and did not have any impact on the “terms, conditions or extent of her employment” within New York:

Supreme Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Human Rights Law claims … . Defendants’ alleged conduct occurred while plaintiff was “physically situated outside of New York” … , and did not have “any impact on the terms, conditions or extent of her employment . . . within the boundaries of New York” … . “The fact that the alleged discriminatory acts . . . occurred in New York is insufficient to plead impact in New York” … . Jarusauskaite v Almod Diamonds, Ltd., 2021 NY Slip Op 05460, First Dept 10-12-21

 

, ,

PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE CORRECTION LAW BY ALLEGING HIS APPLICATION FOR REEMPLOYMENT AFTER COMPLETION OF HIS SENTENCE (60 DAYS INCARCERATION) WAS DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a concurring opinion, reversing the Appellate Division, determined plaintiff’s complaint stated a cause of action for discrimination under the Correction Law, which prohibits discrimination based upon criminal convictions in the context of applications for employment. Plaintiff had kept his employer informed of a criminal charge against him which had not yet gone to trial and was told he would not lose his job if he was sentenced to incarceration. Plaintiff was sentenced to 60 days and his employment was terminated:

The statutes do not categorically preclude consideration of a prospective employee’s criminal history and expressly permit the denial of employment or licensing if there is (1) a “direct relationship” between the previous criminal offense and the specific employment or license, or (2) if granting the request for employment or a license “would involve an unreasonable risk” to the property, safety, or welfare “of specific individuals or the general public” (Correction Law § 752). Thus, under the statutory scheme, reliance on a previous criminal offense when denying an application for employment or a license is not necessarily unlawful … . Whether an exception applies depends on factors identified in Correction Law § 753 such as, among other things, the relationship between the specific employment duties and the criminal offense as well as the amount of time that has elapsed since the offense occurred … . Under these provisions, when filling positions, public and private employers must treat job applicants with prior convictions equitably “while also protecting society’s interest in assuring performance [of job duties] by reliable and trustworthy persons” … . * * *

… [P]laintiff alleged that he was terminated for job abandonment soon after he was incarcerated. Applying our liberal standard, the complaint … may be read to allege that, after he completed his sentence, he applied for reemployment … and [defendant] denied the application solely because of the prior conviction. Sassi v Mobile Life Support Servs., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 05449, CtApp 10-12-21

 

,

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION DEFENDANT SUPERVISOR CONDITIONED HIS SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF AT WORK ON HER COMPLIANCE WITH HIS DEMANDS FOR SEX SUPPORTED PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES RE: DEFENDANT SUPERVISOR AND DEFENDANT EMPLOYER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the punitive damages request in this employment discrimination action should not have been dismissed:

The request for punitive damages should be reinstated. [defendant] Ravich’s conduct in conditioning his support of plaintiff at work on her compliance with his demands for sex, if proven, would be sufficient to demonstrate discrimination “with willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or a conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard” … . Punitive damages could also be awarded against the TCW defendants if they are found vicariously liable for this conduct, although they would be entitled to mitigate such damages with proof of policies established to deter discrimination … . Tirschwell v TCW Group Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 03397, First Dept 5-27-21

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy