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SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS; THE CONDUCT OCCURRED WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PHYSICALLY IN NEW YORK AND DID NOT HAVE ANY IMPACT ON THE TERMS, CONDITIONS OR EXTENT OF HER EMPLOYMENT WITHIN NEW YORK; THE FACTS WERE NOT DESCRIBED (FIRST DEPT).

​The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the hostile work environment claims under the Human Rights Law. The facts were not explained. The conduct occurred when plaintiff was “physically situated outside of New York” and did not have any impact on the “terms, conditions or extent of her employment” within New York:

Supreme Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Human Rights Law claims … . Defendants’ alleged conduct occurred while plaintiff was “physically situated outside of New York” … , and did not have “any impact on the terms, conditions or extent of her employment . . . within the boundaries of New York” … . “The fact that the alleged discriminatory acts . . . occurred in New York is insufficient to plead impact in New York” … . Jarusauskaite v Almod Diamonds, Ltd., 2021 NY Slip Op 05460, First Dept 10-12-21

 

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