You are here: / Foreclosure
,

CONDITIONAL ORDER DID NOT MEET THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF CPLR 3216, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the conditional order requiring that a note of issue or motion be filed by plaintiff bank within ninety days did not meet the requirements of a notice pursuant to CPLR 3216. Therefore the administrative dismissal of the foreclosure action was invalid:

“CPLR 3216 permits a court, on its own initiative, to dismiss an action for want of prosecution where certain conditions precedent have been complied with” … . As relevant here, an action cannot be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216(a) “unless a written demand is served upon the party against whom such relief is sought' in accordance with the statutory requirements, along with a statement that the default by the party upon whom such notice is served in complying with such demand within said ninety day period will serve as a basis for a motion by the party serving said demand for dismissal as against him for unreasonably neglecting to proceed'” … . While a conditional order of dismissal may have “the same effect as a valid 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216” … , the conditional order here “was defective in that it failed to state that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice will serve as a basis for a motion' by the court to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute” … . Moreover, the conditional order failed to satisfy the notice requirement on the additional ground that there was “no indication that the plaintiff's counsel was present at the status conference at which the court issued the conditional order of dismissal,” nor was there “evidence that the order was ever properly served upon the plaintiff” … . In the absence of proper notice, “the court was without power to dismiss the action for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the conditional order of dismissal” … . Lastly, the Supreme Court erred in administratively dismissing the action without further notice to the parties and without benefit of further judicial review … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Bastelli, 2018 NY Slip Op 05822, Second Dept 8-22-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CONDITIONAL ORDER DID NOT MEET THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF CPLR 3216, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (CIVIL FORECLOSURE, CONDITIONAL ORDER DID NOT MEET THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF CPLR 3216, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3216 (CONDITIONAL ORDER DID NOT MEET THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF CPLR 3216, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

,

NO REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO SEEK A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in this foreclosure action should have been granted. Plaintiff did not seek a default judgment within one year and did not provide an excuse for the delay:

The plaintiff failed to seek a default judgment on the unanswered complaint within one year after the default, as required by CPLR 3215(c) … . To avoid dismissal of the action as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its delay in seeking a default judgment and a potentially meritorious cause of action… . The plaintiff failed to offer a reasonable excuse for its delay in seeking a default judgment. Since the plaintiff failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for its delay in seeking a default judgment, this Court need not consider whether it had a potentially meritorious cause of action… .

A defendant may waive the right to seek a dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by serving an answer or taking any other steps which may be viewed as a formal or informal appearance … . Here, the defendants did not appear in the action, either formally or informally. Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Heilpern, 2018 NY Slip Op 05752, Second Dept 8-15-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DEFAULT, NO REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO SEEK A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR, DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3215 (DEFAULT, NO REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO SEEK A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR, DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/DEFAULT JUDGMENT (CIVIL PROCEDURE, NO REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO SEEK A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR, DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, DEFAULT, NO REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO SEEK A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR, DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

, ,

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED A FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF STANDING, WHICH IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL AND COULD NOT BE RAISED BY A DEFAULTING DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed a foreclosure complaint based upon an alleged failure of a condition precedent, and the judge should not have addressed the issue of standing, which was not a jurisdictional issue and was not, and could not be, raised by defendant, who had defaulted:

“A court's power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal” … . Here, the Supreme Court was not presented with any extraordinary circumstances warranting a sua sponte dismissal of the complaint… . The plaintiff's alleged failure to satisfy a condition precedent in the mortgage by failing to provide the defendant with 30 days' written notice of his default in making mortgage payments, even if true, did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to enter a judgment of foreclosure and sale … .

To the extent that the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the plaintiff's standing in the order appealed from, a party's lack of standing does not constitute a jurisdictional defect and does not warrant a sua sponte dismissal of the complaint by the court Moreover, since the defendant defaulted in appearing or answering the complaint, and failed to move to vacate his default, he is precluded from asserting lack of standing as a defense … . Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Campbell, 2018 NY Slip Op 05749, Second Dept 8-15-18

FORECLOSURE (JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED A FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF STANDING, WHICH IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL AND COULD NOT BE RAISED BY A DEFAULTING DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED A FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF STANDING, WHICH IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL AND COULD NOT BE RAISED BY A DEFAULTING DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT))

, ,

BANK MUST DEMONSTRATE IT HAS STANDING TO FORECLOSE TO ESTABLISH BOTH A VALID NOTICE OF THE ACCELERATION OF THE NOTE AND A VALID NOTICE OF THE DE-ACCELERATION OF THE NOTE, BANK WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DISMISS THE ACTION SEEKING TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE A NOTE AND MORTGAGE ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GROUNDS, AND PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THE BANK HAD NOT VALIDLY DE-ACCELERATED THE NOTE TO STOP THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this action to cancel and discharge a note and mortgage pursuant to Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1501 was properly denied, but defendant’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 should not have been granted. Plaintiff argued the debt had been accelerated and the statute of limitations for foreclosure had passed, defendant argued it had de-accelerated the debt and the statute had not run.  The court, disagreeing with the 1st Department, noted that the language in a letter to the effect that the failure to cure the delinquency within 30 days “will result in acceleration” of the note does not constitute sufficient notice of the acceleration such that the statute of limitations starts to run. In addition, the court held, as a matter of first impression, standing to bring the foreclosure action is a pre-requisite both for a valid acceleration and a valid de-acceleration of the note:

Courts must … be mindful of the circumstance where a bank may issue a de-acceleration letter as a pretext to avoid the onerous effect of an approaching statute of limitations and to defeat the property owner’s right pursuant to RPAPL 1501 to cancel and discharge a mortgage and note. Here, however, the de-acceleration letter containing a clear and unequivocal demand that the homeowner meet her prospective monthly payment obligations constitutes a de-acceleration in fact and cannot be viewed as pretextual in any way.  …

We hold for the first time in the Appellate Division, Second Department, that just as standing, when raised, is a necessary element to a valid acceleration, it is a necessary element, when raised, to a valid de-acceleration as well.

Here, the de-acceleration notice … does not establish that [defendant] had standing to de-accelerate the earlier demand that the plaintiff’s mortgage debt be paid in its entirety, and no other evidence submitted … demonstrates that it had standing.  Milone v US Bank Natl. Assn., 2018 NY Slip Op 05760, Second Dept 8-15-18

FORECLOSURE (BANK MUST DEMONSTRATE IT HAS STANDING TO FORECLOSE TO ESTABLISH BOTH A VALID NOTICE OF THE ACCELERATION OF THE NOTE AND A VALID NOTICE OF THE DE-ACCELERATION OF THE NOTE, BANK WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DISMISS THE ACTION SEEKING TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE A NOTE AND MORTGAGE ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GROUNDS AND PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THE BANK HAD NOT VALIDLY DE-ACCELERATED THE NOTE TO STOP THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, BANK MUST DEMONSTRATE IT HAS STANDING TO FORECLOSE TO ESTABLISH BOTH A VALID NOTICE OF THE ACCELERATION OF THE NOTE AND A VALID NOTICE OF THE DE-ACCELERATION OF THE NOTE, BANK WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DISMISS THE ACTION SEEKING TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE A NOTE AND MORTGAGE ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GROUNDS AND PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THE BANK HAD NOT VALIDLY DE-ACCELERATED THE NOTE TO STOP THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (FORECLOSURE, BANK MUST DEMONSTRATE IT HAS STANDING TO FORECLOSE TO ESTABLISH BOTH A VALID NOTICE OF THE ACCELERATION OF THE NOTE AND A VALID NOTICE OF THE DE-ACCELERATION OF THE NOTE, BANK WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DISMISS THE ACTION SEEKING TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE A NOTE AND MORTGAGE ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GROUNDS AND PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THE BANK HAD NOT VALIDLY DE-ACCELERATED THE NOTE TO STOP THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE (SECOND DEPT))

, , ,

DESPITE THE TERMS OF THE REAL PROPERTY PURCHASE CONTRACT, WHICH PURPORTED TO REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT PURCHASER TO FORFEIT ALL MONTHLY PAYMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE AND VACATE THE PROPERTY UPON DEFAULT, DEFENDANT HAD ACQUIRED EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY, PLAINTIFFS’ ONLY AVAILABLE REMEDIES ARE TO BRING AN ACTION TO FORECLOSE OR AN ACTION FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiffs, who had effectively taken back a mortgage on property sold to defendant, could not enforce the purchase contract which purported to declare the contract null and void and require the defendant to vacate the property upon default. Defendant, by making substantial monthly payments pursuant to the contract, had acquired equitable title to the property. Plaintiffs only available remedies are foreclosure or an action at law for the purchase price:

A rider to the [purchase] contract contained a provision providing that in the event the defendant defaulted in making payments under the contract and failed to cure, and that said default resulted in the plaintiffs' inability to pay an existing mortgage on the property, the defendant forfeited all monies paid as liquidated damages, the contract was deemed null and void, and the premises were to be vacated in good condition. * * *

“The execution of a contract for the purchase of real estate and the making of a partial payment gives the contract vendee equitable title to the property” … . “[T]he vendor merely holds the legal title in trust for the vendee, subject to the vendor's equitable lien for the payment of the purchase price in accordance with the terms of the contract” … . Accordingly, the vendee under a land sale contract has acquired an interest in the property that must be extinguished before the vendor can resume possession, notwithstanding whether a provision in the contract provides that in the event of the vendee's uncured default in payment, the vendor has the right to declare the contract terminated and repossess the premises… . A vendor may not enforce his rights by an action in ejectment, but must instead proceed to foreclose the vendee's equitable title or bring an action at law for the purchase price … .

The defendant, having executed a contract for the purchase of property from the plaintiffs, and having made substantial payments to the plaintiffs pursuant to the contract, held equitable title to the property… . Under these circumstances, upon the defendant's default in making payments under the contract, the plaintiffs could not seek relief pursuant to the provision of the rider that provided for the contract to be deemed null and void, the premises vacated, and the defendant to forfeit all monies paid as liquidated damages. The plaintiffs were required to proceed to foreclose the defendant's equitable title or bring an action at law for the purchase price … . Russell v Pisana, 2018 NY Slip Op 05789, Second Dept 8-15-18

FORECLOSURE (DESPITE THE TERMS OF THE REAL PROPERTY PURCHASE CONTRACT, WHICH PURPORTED TO REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT PURCHASER TO FORFEIT ALL MONTHLY PAYMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE  AND VACATE THE PROPERTY UPON DEFAULT, DEFENDANT HAD ACQUIRED EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY, PLAINTIFFS' ONLY AVAILABLE REMEDIES ARE TO BRING AN ACTION TO FORECLOSE OR AN ACTION FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY LAW  (DESPITE THE TERMS OF THE REAL PROPERTY PURCHASE CONTRACT, WHICH PURPORTED TO REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT PURCHASER TO FORFEIT ALL MONTHLY PAYMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE  AND VACATE THE PROPERTY UPON DEFAULT, DEFENDANT HAD ACQUIRED EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY, PLAINTIFFS' ONLY AVAILABLE REMEDIES ARE TO BRING AN ACTION TO FORECLOSE OR AN ACTION FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE (SECOND DEPT))/REAL ESTATE  (DESPITE THE TERMS OF THE REAL PROPERTY PURCHASE CONTRACT, WHICH PURPORTED TO REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT PURCHASER TO FORFEIT ALL MONTHLY PAYMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE  AND VACATE THE PROPERTY UPON DEFAULT, DEFENDANT HAD ACQUIRED EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY, PLAINTIFFS' ONLY AVAILABLE REMEDIES ARE TO BRING AN ACTION TO FORECLOSE OR AN ACTION FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (REAL ESTATE, DESPITE THE TERMS OF THE REAL PROPERTY PURCHASE CONTRACT, WHICH PURPORTED TO REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT PURCHASER TO FORFEIT ALL MONTHLY PAYMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE  AND VACATE THE PROPERTY UPON DEFAULT, DEFENDANT HAD ACQUIRED EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY, PLAINTIFFS' ONLY AVAILABLE REMEDIES ARE TO BRING AN ACTION TO FORECLOSE OR AN ACTION FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE (SECOND DEPT))

, ,

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, IF THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS IT IS WAIVED, JUDGE CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, raised the statute of limitations defense in this foreclosure action:

Supreme Court erred in sua sponte raising the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations and directing the dismissal of the complaint on that ground. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which is waived by a party unless it is raised either in a responsive pleading, or by motion prior to the submission of a responsive pleading (see CPLR 3211[e]…). “A court may not take judicial notice,’ sua sponte, of the applicability of a statute of limitations if that defense has not been raised” … . Here, the defendant neither answered the complaint nor submitted a pre-answer motion which raised the statute of limitations defense. 352 Legion Funding Assoc. v 348 Riverdale, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 05662, Second Dept 8-8-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, IF THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS IT IS WAIVED, JUDGE CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IT (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ( JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, IF THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS IT IS WAIVED, JUDGE CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IT (SECOND DEPT))/JUDGES (SUA SPONTE, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, IF THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS IT IS WAIVED, JUDGE CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IT (SECOND DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, IF THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS IT IS WAIVED, JUDGE CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IT (SECOND DEPT))

,

ALTHOUGH THE LACK OF STANDING DEFENSE TO A FORECLOSURE ACTION IS WAIVED IF NOT ASSERTED IN THE ANSWER OR A PRE-ANSWER MOTION TO DISMISS, IT MAY BE ADDED TO AN ANSWER AMENDED BY LEAVE OF COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in the context of a foreclosure action, determined that, although the lack of standing defense is waived if not asserted in the answer or a pre-answer motion to dismiss, the defense can be added in an answer amended by leave of court:

“[A]n argument that a plaintiff lacks standing, if not asserted in the defendant’s answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint, is waived pursuant to CPLR 3211(e)” … . “Defenses waived under CPLR 3211(e) can nevertheless be interposed in an answer amended by leave of court pursuant to CPLR 3025(b), as long as the amendment does not cause the other party prejudice or surprise resulting from the delay, and is not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit”… . “The decision of whether to allow an amendment is committed almost entirely to the [motion] court’s discretion'” … .

Here, in opposition to that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for leave to amend his answer to add the affirmative defense of lack of standing, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of any prejudice or surprise that would result from the amendment, or that the proposed affirmative defense was palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit … . U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Carter, 2018 NY Slip Op 05618, Second Dept 8-1-18

 

BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank was not entitled to summary judgment in this foreclosure action. The bank did not demonstrate compliance with the notice requirements of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1304:

In moving for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Timeka J. Motlow, a representative of its loan servicer, who stated that “[t]he records I have reviewed indicate that the attached 90-day pre-foreclosure notice was mailed to [the defendant] at the property address of the real estate at issue herein and to the last know address of the borrower(s).” However, Motlow did not have personal knowledge of the purported mailing and failed to make the requisite showing that she was familiar with the plaintiff’s mailing practices and procedures, and therefore did not establish “proof of a standard office practice and procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed” … .

Moreover, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it had standing to commence the action … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Henderson, 2018 NY Slip Op 05071, Second Dept 7-5-18

​FORECLOSURE (BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

, ,

BANK WAS REQUIRED TO GIVE DEFENDANT NOTICE OF ITS MOTIONS FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE AND JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE BECAUSE DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT OCCURRED MORE THAN A YEAR BEFORE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FAILURE OF NOTICE PROPERLY RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff bank was required to provide notice of its motions for an order of reference and a judgment of foreclosure which were made more than a year after defendant’s default. Therefore defendant’s motion to vacate the order of reference and judgment of foreclosure should have been granted. The court noted that the failure of notice was properly raised for the first time on appeal:

The defendant was entitled to notice of the plaintiff’s motions for an order of reference and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale pursuant to CPLR 3215(g)(1), which provides, in relevant part, that such notice to a defendant who has not appeared is required “if more than one year has elapsed since the default.” Here, the defendant defaulted in November 2009, and the plaintiff moved for an order of reference in March 2013, more than three years later. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the issue of its failure to comply with CPLR 3215(g)(1) may be raised for the first time on appeal … . The failure to give a party proper notice of a motion deprives the court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion and renders the resulting order void … . Citimortgage, Inc. v Reese, 2018 NY Slip Op 04527, Second Dept 6-20-18

​FORECLOSURE (BANK WAS REQUIRED TO GIVE DEFENDANT NOTICE OF ITS MOTIONS FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE AND JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE BECAUSE DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT OCCURRED MORE THAN A YEAR BEFORE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FAILURE OF NOTICE PROPERLY RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, BANK WAS REQUIRED TO GIVE DEFENDANT NOTICE OF ITS MOTIONS FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE AND JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE BECAUSE DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT OCCURRED MORE THAN A YEAR BEFORE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FAILURE OF NOTICE PROPERLY RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3215 (FORECLOSURE, BANK WAS REQUIRED TO GIVE DEFENDANT NOTICE OF ITS MOTIONS FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE AND JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE BECAUSE DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT OCCURRED MORE THAN A YEAR BEFORE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FAILURE OF NOTICE PROPERLY RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT))

, ,

PROOF OF MAILING OF THE REQUIRED NOTICE DEFICIENT, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank was not entitled to summary judgment in this foreclosure action because the proof of mailing of the required notice did not meet the requirements of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1304:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it strictly complied with RPAPL 1304. “[P]roper service of RPAPL 1304 notice on the borrower or borrowers is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action, and the plaintiff has the burden of establishing satisfaction of this condition” … . Here, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the “affidavit of mailing” of a vice president for loan documentation of its loan servicer was insufficient to establish that the notice was sent to the defendant in the manner required by RPAPL 1304, as the loan servicer did not provide proof of a standard office mailing procedure and provided no independent proof of the actual mailing … . US Bank N.A. v Sims, 2018 NY Slip Op 04374, Second Dept 6-13-18

​FORECLOSURE (NOTICE, PROOF OF MAILING OF THE REQUIRED NOTICE DEFICIENT, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (FORECLOSURE, PROOF OF MAILING OF THE REQUIRED NOTICE DEFICIENT, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FORECLOSURE, MAILING, NOTICE, PROOF OF MAILING OF THE REQUIRED NOTICE DEFICIENT, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/MAILING (FORECLOSURE,  PROOF OF MAILING OF THE REQUIRED NOTICE DEFICIENT, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy