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STIPULATION WHICH WAS NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNENFORCEABLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined a stipulation which was not merged into the judgment of divorce should not have been dismissed as unenforceable:

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It is well settled that a party to a stipulation that is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce “cannot challenge the [enforceability of the] stipulation by way of motion but, rather, must do so by commencement of a plenary action” … . Conversely, a party seeking to enforce the terms of such a stipulation may do so either by a motion to enforce the judgment … . In this case, the issue whether the stipulation was enforceable was not properly before the court because defendant did not commence a plenary action challenging its enforceability. Rather, plaintiff moved to enforce the judgment incorporating the stipulation, and defendant effectively conceded that the stipulation was enforceable when she asserted that the only questions before the court were the valuation of her master’s degree and the extent of plaintiff’s marital interest therein. Thus, we conclude that the court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion on the ground that the stipulation was unenforceable … . Anderson v Anderson, 2017 NY Slip Op 06786, Fourth Dept 9-29-17

FAMILY LAW (DIVORCE, STIPULATION WHICH WAS NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNENFORCEABLE (FOURTH DEPT))/STIPULATIONS (DIVORCE, STIPULATION WHICH WAS NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNENFORCEABLE (FOURTH DEPT))/DIVORCE (STIPULATION WHICH WAS NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNENFORCEABLE (FOURTH DEPT))

EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD, NEGLECT DETERMINATION CANNOT STAND (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that respondent was legally responsible for the child, therefore the neglect finding could not stand:

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… [T]he evidence does not support Family Court’s determination that he is a person legally responsible for the child … , and the court therefore erred in determining that he neglected the child … . Even giving deference to the court’s credibility determinations … , we conclude that petitioner’s witnesses established that respondent and the mother of the child had been living together for some unspecified period of time, but there was nothing further to show that respondent acted “as the functional equivalent of a parent in a familial or household setting” … . There was no testimony that respondent, the mother, and the child were “living together as a family” … , or that respondent provided childcare or financial support, or performed any household duties … . Matter of Kameron V. (Eva V.), 2017 NY Slip Op 06782, Fourth Dept 9-29-17

FAMILY LAW (EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD, NEGLECT DETERMINATION CANNOT STAND (FOURTH DEPT))/NEGLECT (EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD, NEGLECT DETERMINATION CANNOT STAND (FOURTH DEPT))

ADOPTION OF CHILD BORN TO A SURROGATE WHILE THE PARTNERS WERE LEGALLY MARRIED UNDER BRITISH LAW WAS PROPERLY VACATED, DURING THE ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS THE COURT WAS MISINFORMED ABOUT ONE OF THE PARTNER’S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CHILD (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined Family Court properly vacated an adoption because one of the parties (Ming) who had parental rights was not notified of the adoption proceedings and the court was not fully or accurately informed of Ming’s involvement with the child. Ming was legally married to Marco under British law. Both Ming and Marco had contributed sperm and a surrogate carried the baby. The child was conceived with Marco’s sperm and Marco was ultimately awarded custody. After Ming moved back to England, Carlos, Marco’s new partner, adopted the child. It was that adoption which was properly vacated:

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It is undisputed that Ming and Marco’s marriage in the UK was effective as of August 2008. New York courts as a matter of comity will recognize such out-of-state marriages … . The child was born in 2014, as the result of jointly executed surrogacy agreements, at a time when the couple was considered legally married, thus giving rise to the presumption that the child is the legitimate child of both Marco and Ming .,, . After the child was born, Marco, Ming and the child lived together as a family, and the couple took affirmative steps in the UK to establish Ming’s parental rights in accordance with UK law. Under these circumstances, the Missouri judgment in 2014 awarding Marco sole and exclusive custody of the child, as opposed to the egg donor and surrogate, was insufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.

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… Marco and Ming were deemed legally married when they embarked on the surrogacy process to have a child together .., . Accordingly, the child was born in wedlock, and Ming was entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding … . …

… The adoption petition required petitioner to give a sworn statement that the child to be adopted was not the subject of any proceeding affecting his or her custody or status. Even though petitioner was aware of the Florida divorce action before finalization of the adoption, he failed to disclose the action to the court, instead averring in a supplemental affidavit that there had been no change in circumstances “whatsoever” since the filing of the adoption petition. Matter of Maria-Irene D., 2017 NY Slip Op 06716, First Dept 9-28-17

 

FAMILY LAW (ADOPTION OF CHILD BORN TO A SURROGATE WHILE THE PARTNERS WERE LEGALLY MARRIED UNDER BRITISH LAW WAS PROPERLY VACATED, DURING THE ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS THE COURT WAS MISINFORMED ABOUT ONE OF THE PARTNER’S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CHILD (FIRST DEPT))/ADOPTION (ADOPTION OF CHILD BORN TO A SURROGATE WHILE THE PARTNERS WERE LEGALLY MARRIED UNDER BRITISH LAW WAS PROPERLY VACATED, DURING THE ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS THE COURT WAS MISINFORMED ABOUT ONE OF THE PARTNER’S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CHILD (FIRST DEPT))/MARRIAGE  (ADOPTION OF CHILD BORN TO A SURROGATE WHILE THE PARTNERS WERE LEGALLY MARRIED UNDER BRITISH LAW WAS PROPERLY VACATED, DURING THE ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS THE COURT WAS MISINFORMED ABOUT ONE OF THE PARTNER’S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CHILD (FIRST DEPT))

WIFE NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON A LATE LUMP SUM PAYMENT, HUSBAND NOT ENTITLED TO RECOUP OVERPAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, under the particular facts, determined the wife was not entitled to post or pre-judgment interest on a late $1,000,000 lump sum payment which was part of a stipulation of settlement in this divorce action. The court noted that the husband was not entitled to recoup an overpayment of maintenance/child support as a matter of public policy:

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… [T]he award to the defendant of $19,241.31, representing an alleged overpayment of maintenance, was improper. The recoupment of overpayments of maintenance and/or child support is generally against public policy, since those payments are deemed to have been spent for that purpose… . Further, voluntary payments are generally not credited against amounts currently due … . The voluntary payments were made, at least in part, because the plaintiff was unable to satisfy certain mortgage liens on the real property transferred to her because the defendant did not transfer the $1,000,000 distributive award to her in a timely manner. O’Donnell v O’Donnell, 2017 NY Slip Op 06540, Second Dept 9-20-17

FAMILY LAW (WIFE NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON A LATE LUMP SUM PAYMENT, HUSBAND NOT ENTITLED TO RECOUP OVERPAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE (SECOND DEPT))/DIVORCE (WIFE NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON A LATE LUMP SUM PAYMENT, HUSBAND NOT ENTITLED TO RECOUP OVERPAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE (SECOND DEPT))/MAINTENANCE (WIFE NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON A LATE LUMP SUM PAYMENT, HUSBAND NOT ENTITLED TO RECOUP OVERPAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE (SECOND DEPT))/CHILD SUPPORT (WIFE NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON A LATE LUMP SUM PAYMENT, HUSBAND NOT ENTITLED TO RECOUP OVERPAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE (SECOND DEPT))

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FAMILY COURT EXERCISED THE PROPER LEVEL OF CONSIDERATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN THIS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING, THE MOOTNESS EXCEPTION APPLIED TO THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined Family Court gave proper consideration to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in evaluating the termination of parental rights. The main issue raised at the permanency hearing was “to what degree the [foster care] agency was required to accommodate the parents’ cognitive disabilities when discharging its obligation to pursue the goal of return to parent.” The First Department also found that the mootness exception applied to the appeal (the issue is likely to come up again):

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While Family Court correctly determined that the ADA is not applicable to this proceeding (see Matter of La’Asia Lanae S., 23 AD3d 271 [1st Dept 2005]), the law makes clear, as Family Court recognized and the parties in this case agreed, that “the agencies’ efforts towards a permanency plan must be tailored to the particular circumstances and individuals in a given case” … . As the Family Court held in La’Asia  … (91 Misc 2d 28, 42-43 …) , in the context of termination of parental rights actions, a court may properly look to the ADA’s standards for guidance in evaluating whether “diligent efforts” were made by the agency under Social Services Law § 384-b(7). The Family Court here acknowledged that it was required to consider the mother’s special needs when determining if the agency’s efforts were reasonable in this case. After evaluating the agency’s efforts in that light, the court found that the agency satisfied its obligation to tailor its efforts to the mother’s needs … and that the agency’s reunification efforts were reasonable under the circumstances … .

In precluding litigation of ADA claims during the permanency hearing, but considerate of its purpose to guide the reasonable efforts analysis, the Family Court properly complied with the requirements as set forth by the court in the La’Asia case. Matter of Lacee L. (Stephanie L.–Dekodia L.), 2017 NY Slip Op 06418, First Dept 9-12-17

 

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT EXERCISED THE PROPER LEVEL OF CONSIDERATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN THIS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING, THE MOOTNESS EXCEPTION APPLIED TO THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/PARENTAL RIGHTS (FAMILY COURT EXERCISED THE PROPER LEVEL OF CONSIDERATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN THIS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING, THE MOOTNESS EXCEPTION APPLIED TO THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (MOOTNESS EXCEPTION, FAMILY COURT EXERCISED THE PROPER LEVEL OF CONSIDERATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN THIS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING, THE MOOTNESS EXCEPTION APPLIED TO THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/MOOTNESS EXCEPTION  (APPEALS, FAMILY COURT EXERCISED THE PROPER LEVEL OF CONSIDERATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN THIS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING, THE MOOTNESS EXCEPTION APPLIED TO THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA)  (FAMILY COURT EXERCISED THE PROPER LEVEL OF CONSIDERATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN THIS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING, THE MOOTNESS EXCEPTION APPLIED TO THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))

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RELIGIOUS LIFESTYLE RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON MOTHER VIOLATED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, FATHER’S DESIRE TO RAISE AND EDUCATE THE CHILDREN IN THE HASIDIC TRADITION WAS IN THE CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged per curiam opinion, determined that a change in circumstances warranted a modification of the stipulation of settlement of a divorce action. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here. At issue was the extent of the religion-related requirements of the stipulation of settlement. Father objected to the lifestyle changes associated with mother’s open acknowledgment that she is gay and the presence of O, a transgender man, in the home. The court held that the religion-based restrictions placed upon mother’s lifestyle, stemming from Supreme Court’s finding that the religious aspects of the stipulation were paramount, violated her constitutional rights. Rather than the religious concerns, the analysis must focus on the best interests of the children. To that end, the Second Department determined certain aspects of the stipulation concerning the father’s desire to raise and educate the children in the Hasidic tradition were in the children’s best interests:

… [T]he Supreme Court improperly directed that enforcement of the parties’ stipulation of settlement required the mother to practice full religious observance in accordance with the Hasidic practices of ultra Orthodoxy during any period in which she has physical custody of the children and at any appearance at the children’s schools. Although the court accepted the father’s argument that the religious upbringing clause “forb[ids] [the mother from] living a secular way of life in front of the children or while at their schools,” the plain language of the parties’ agreement was “to give the children a Hasidic upbringing” … . The parties’ agreement does not require the mother to practice any type of religion, to dress in any particular way, or to hide her views or identity from the children. Nor may the courts compel any person to adopt any particular religious lifestyle … . * * *

Contrary to the mother’s contention, the weight of the evidence demonstrates that it is in the children’s best interests to continue to permit the father to exercise final decision-making authority over the children’s education and to continue to permit him to require the children to practice full religious observance in accordance with the Hasidic practices of ultra Orthodoxy while they are in his custody, or in the custody of a school that requires adherence to such practices. Weisberger v Weisberger, 2017 NY Slip Op 06212, Second Dept 8-16-17

FAMILY LAW (RELIGIOUS LIFESTYLE RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON MOTHER VIOLATED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, FATHER’S DESIRE TO RAISE AND EDUCATE THE CHILDREN IN THE HASIDIC TRADITION WAS IN THE CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS (SECOND DEPT))/CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW, RELIGIOUS LIFESTYLE RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON MOTHER VIOLATED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, FATHER’S DESIRE TO RAISE AND EDUCATE THE CHILDREN IN THE HASIDIC TRADITION WAS IN THE CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS (SECOND DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (RELIGION, FAMILY LAW, RELIGIOUS LIFESTYLE RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON MOTHER VIOLATED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, FATHER’S DESIRE TO RAISE AND EDUCATE THE CHILDREN IN THE HASIDIC TRADITION WAS IN THE CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS (SECOND DEPT))/RELIGION (FAMILY LAW, CUSTODY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, RELIGIOUS LIFESTYLE RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON MOTHER VIOLATED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, FATHER’S DESIRE TO RAISE AND EDUCATE THE CHILDREN IN THE HASIDIC TRADITION WAS IN THE CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS (SECOND DEPT))

CHILD WAS ENTITLED TO A FINDING THAT REUNIFICATION WITH HIS MOTHER IN EL SALVADOR WAS NOT VIABLE DUE TO PARENTAL NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, over a dissent, determined the child was entitled to a finding that reunification with his mother in El Salvador would not be viable in this special juvenile immigrant status proceeding:

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… [W]here, as here, the Family Court’s credibility determination is not supported by the record, this Court is free to make its own credibility assessments and overturn the determination of the hearing court … . Based upon our independent factual review, we conclude that the record supports a finding that reunification of the child with his mother is not a viable option based upon parental neglect. The record reflects that the mother failed to meet the educational needs of the child… . The child testified that, although he was prevented from attending school by gang members who beat him while walking to school, the mother did not arrange for transportation, which was within her financial means, but instead, told him to stay home. Additionally, the child was expelled from one school due to excessive tardiness, and he failed the seventh grade … . Further, the mother did not provide adequate supervision, often leaving the then eight-year-old child home alone at night in the neighborhood where he had encountered the gang violence … . …

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Since the record is sufficient for this Court to make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law, we find that reunification of the child with one or both of his parents is not viable due to parental neglect … . Matter of Dennis X.G.D.V., 2017 NY Slip Op 06080, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

FAMILY LAW (SPECIAL JUVENILE IMMIGRANT STATUS, CHILD WAS ENTITLED TO A FINDING THAT REUNIFICATION WITH HIS MOTHER IN EL SALVADOR WAS NOT VIABLE DUE TO PARENTAL NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIAL JUVENILE IMMIGRANT STATUS (FAMILY LAW, CHILD WAS ENTITLED TO A FINDING THAT REUNIFICATION WITH HIS MOTHER IN EL SALVADOR WAS NOT VIABLE DUE TO PARENTAL NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT))

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CHILD ABUSE ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, NO NEED TO DEMONSTRATE WHICH OF THE TWO RESPONDENTS ABUSED THE CHILD (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the child abuse allegations against mother and grandmother (respondents) were supported by a preponderance of the evidence. It was not necessary to prove which of them abused the child (Syriah):

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The evidence submitted on petitioner’s direct case supports the court’s finding that respondents abused Syriah by showing that, while she was in their care, Syriah suffered an injury that would not ordinarily occur absent an act or omission of the person responsible for her care … .”[Petitioner] was not required to establish whether the mother or the [grandmother] actually inflicted the injuries, or whether they did so together”… .

A preponderance of the evidence supports the court’s conclusion that Syriah’s injuries were inflicted and not accidentally caused. She suffered a traumatic brain injury, which resulted in anoxic ischemic encephalopathy and subdural hematoma, from which she died. Doctor Cahill, a pediatrician qualified as an expert in child abuse pediatrics, opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Syriah’s injuries were the result of a shaking event. Among other things, Syriah had no skull fracture, and, as one expert testified, without a skull fracture, the most likely explanation for subdural hemorrhage and anoxic change is vigorous shaking.

Respondents failed to demonstrate that Syriah’s injuries “could reasonably have occurred accidentally” so as to rebut petitioner’s prima facie showing of abuse … . The testimony of petitioner’s experts ruled out the possibility that the injuries were caused, as respondents contend, by a short fall from a mattress to the floor. Indeed, respondents’ own experts testified that it would be “unusual” and “extremely rare” for a child to suffer the injuries that Syriah suffered from a short fall.  Matter of Syriah J. (Esther J.), 2017 NY Slip Op 06048, First Dept 8-8-17

 

FAMILY LAW (CHILD ABUSE, EVIDENCE, CHILD ABUSE ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, NO NEED TO DEMONSTRATE WHICH OF THE TWO RESPONDENTS ABUSED THE CHILD (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, CHILD ABUSE ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, NO NEED TO DEMONSTRATE WHICH OF THE TWO RESPONDENTS ABUSED THE CHILD (FIRST DEPT))/CHILD ABUSE (FAMILY LAW, EVIDENCE, CHILD ABUSE ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, NO NEED TO DEMONSTRATE WHICH OF THE TWO RESPONDENTS ABUSED THE CHILD (FIRST DEPT))

FAMILY COURT HAD THE POWER TO RETROACTIVELY DISMISS A NEGLECT PETITION AND IMPOSE A SUSPENDED JUDGMENT AFTER MOTHER DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO CARE FOR HER CHILDREN (FIRST DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, in a matter of first impression, determined that Family Court had the power to retroactively impose a suspended judgment and dismiss a neglect petition. Mother had consented to a neglect finding but subsequently turned her life around and demonstrated the ability to care for her four children:

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This Family Court Act article 10 child neglect proceeding raises an issue of apparent first impression for this Court: whether the Family Court properly granted respondent mother a suspended judgment, “retroactively,” in order to vacate a neglect finding and dismiss a neglect proceeding. Initially, the mother consented to a neglect finding and the Family Court’s dispositional order released the children to the mother, under the supervision of petitioner, Administration for Children Services (ACS), for 12 months. At the end of this period, upon satisfactorily completing the terms of the dispositional order, the mother made a postdisposition motion to modify the dispositional order. The court granted a suspended judgment, retroactively, due to the mother’s compliance with the conditions of the dispositional order, and vacated the neglect finding, as consistent with the children’s best interest. [W]e find not only that the Family Court Act permits such a retroactive remedy, but that the remedy served the children’s best interest under the circumstances of this case. Matter of Leenasia C. (Lamarriea C.–Maxie B.), 2017 NY Slip Op 06050, First Dept 8-8-17

FAMILY LAW (NEGLECT, FAMILY COURT HAD THE POWER TO RETROACTIVELY DISMISS A NEGLECT PETITION AND IMPOSE A SUSPENDED JUDGMENT AFTER MOTHER DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO CARE FOR HER CHILDREN (FIRST DEPT))/NEGLECT (FAMILY COURT HAD THE POWER TO RETROACTIVELY DISMISS A NEGLECT PETITION AND IMPOSE A SUSPENDED JUDGMENT AFTER MOTHER DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO CARE FOR HER CHILDREN (FIRST DEPT))

AFTER MOTHER CONSENTED TO A NEGLECT FINDING AND THE CHILD WAS PLACED IN KINSHIP FOSTER CARE, MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED UNSUPERVISED VISITATION WITHOUT A HEARING 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother should not have been awarded unsupervised visitation without a hearing. Mother had previously consented to a neglect finding and the child had been placed in kinship foster care:

“In a child protective proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, [t]he best interests of the children determine whether visitation should be permitted to a parent who has committed abuse or neglect. Pursuant to Family Court Act § 1061, the court may modify any order issued during the course of a child protective proceeding for good cause shown.’ As with the initial order, the modified order must reflect a resolution consistent with the best interests of the children after consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances”…  “Before making children available for unsupervised visits, a Family Court must find that a person with a history of abuse or neglect of her children has successfully overcome her prior inclinations and behavior patterns, despite what may be the best of intentions”… . Where facts material to a best interests analysis, and the circumstances surrounding such facts, remain in dispute, a hearing is required … .

Under the circumstances of this case, a hearing was necessary to determine whether unsupervised overnight visitation between the mother and the child was in the child’s best interests … . Matter of Jeanette V. (Marina L.), 2017 NY Slip Op 05741, 2nd Dept 7-19-17

FAMILY LAW (VISITATION, AFTER MOTHER CONSENTED TO A NEGLECT FINDING AND THE CHILD WAS PLACED IN KINSHIP FOSTER CARE, MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED UNSUPERVISED VISITATION WITHOUT A HEARING 2ND DEPT)/VISITATION (FAMILY LAW, AFTER MOTHER CONSENTED TO A NEGLECT FINDING AND THE CHILD WAS PLACED IN KINSHIP FOSTER CARE, MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED UNSUPERVISED VISITATION WITHOUT A HEARING 2ND DEPT)/NEGLECT (VISITATION, AFTER MOTHER CONSENTED TO A NEGLECT FINDING AND THE CHILD WAS PLACED IN KINSHIP FOSTER CARE, MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED UNSUPERVISED VISITATION WITHOUT A HEARING 2ND DEPT)

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