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THE PHRASE “CONSUMMATION OF THE ANTICIPATED MARRIAGE” IN THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, A CONDITION PRECEDENT, MEANT THE MARRIAGE CEREMONY, NOT SEXUAL RELATIONS; THE WIFE’S ARGUMENT THAT THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE ENFORCED BECAUSE THE COUPLE NEVER HAD SEXUAL RELATIONS WAS REJECTED BY THE APPELLATE COURT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the phrase “consummation of the anticipated marriage” in the prenuptial agreement meant the marriage ceremony, not sexual relations. In these divorce proceedings, the wife argued the prenuptial agreement was unenforceable because the couple never had sexual relations and “consummation” of the marriage was a condition precedent to the prenuptial agreement:

While the word “consummation” connotes sexual relations in certain contexts, such as annulment proceedings, that is not the only meaning of the word, which may simply mean achieve or fulfill (see Black’s Law Dictionary [11th ed 2019]). The plain meaning of “consummation,” in the context of the section titled “Marriage — a Condition Precedent and Effective Date” and defining the effective date of agreement as the date of the parties’ marriage, is consummation or fulfillment of the parties’ intention to enter into a valid “marriage.” Reading the contract as a whole, this interpretation of the section effectuates the parties’ expressed intention to fix their respective rights accruing upon marriage and to avoid unnecessary and intrusive litigation in the event of divorce, and sets an ascertainable date for determining the effectiveness and enforceability of the prenuptial agreement.

In contrast, accepting the wife’s position would render the parties’ respective rights uncertain and require the court to conduct a highly intrusive hearing into the parties’ intimate relations, which is both contrary to the parties’ stated intention and impractical. Fort v Haar, 2022 NY Slip Op 05660, First Dept 10-11-22

Practice Point: The condition precedent to the prenuptial agreement was the “consummation” of the marriage. The wife argued the agreement was unenforceable because the couple never had sexual relations. The appellate court found that the word “consummation” referred to the marriage ceremony, not sexual relations, and the agreement was therefore enforceable.

 

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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED THE COURT’S AUTHORITY TO DECIDE VISITATION ISSUES TO A MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL; THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR MODIFYING VISITATION ONCE FATHER HAS GAINED INSIGHT INTO THE CHILD’S NEEDS WAS EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined the judge should not have delegated the court’s authority to decide visitation issues to a mental health professional:

… [T]he court improperly delegated to a mental health professional its authority to determine issues involving the child’s best interests — namely, when visits could resume and whether they should be supervised … . Accordingly, we modify to delete that provision of the order only. Upon an application to resume the father’s visits with the child, the applicant shall have the burden to demonstrate changed circumstances and that the modification requested is in the child’s best interests … , at which time the court may consider evidence that includes, but is not limited to, the testimony of a mental health expert about whether the father has gained insight into the child’s medical and emotional needs and the impact of his behavior on the child. Matter of M.K. v H. M., 2022 NY Slip Op 05663, First Dept 10-11-22

Practice Point: Family Court cannot delegate its authority to decide visitation issues to a mental health professional. The proper procedure for allowing father’s visitation to resume was explained, i.e., an application to resume visitation demonstrating a change in circumstances followed by an evidentiary hearing, including the testimony of a mental health expert.

 

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THE DETERIORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FATHER AND MOTHER WAS A SUFFICIENT CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES TO WARRANT AN INQUIRY RE: FATHER’S PETITION FOR A MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY; AFTER CONSIDERING THE MERITS, THE APPELLATE COURT AWARDED SOLE CUSTODY TO FATHER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined father demonstrated a change in circumstance (deterioration of the relationship with mother, inability to communicate) sufficient to warrant an inquiry into whether the joint custody arrangement should be modified, and the record supported awarding father sole custody:

… [T]he court had previously awarded joint custody to the parties on the basis that communications between them had “improved and the two were working together more than ever before, the results of which were positive for [the subject child].” However, the evidence at the hearing established that, after the initial custody award was entered, the parties reverted to ” ‘an acrimonious relationship and are not able to communicate effectively with respect to the needs and activities of their child[ ], and it is well settled that joint custody is not feasible under those circumstances’ ” … . …

… [W]e conclude that it is in the child’s best interests to award the father sole custody. Although the parties have shared alternating week custody since the entry of the prior custody order, the evidence at the hearing established that the father “provided a more stable environment for the child and was better able to nurture the child” … . The evidence further established that the mother made a concerted effort to interfere with the father’s contact with the child by, inter alia, disparaging him to educational and medical professionals, which raises a strong probability that the mother ” ‘is unfit to act as custodial parent’ ” … and warrants the grant of sole custody to the father…. . Matter of Johnson v Johnson, 2022 NY Slip Op 05651, Fourth Dept 10-7-22

Practice Point: A deterioration of the relationship between father and mother was a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant an inquiry re: father’s petition for a modification of custody. The record was sufficient for the appellate court to determined sole custody should be awarded to father.

 

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FATHER WAS NOT SERVED WITH THE ORDER OF FACT-FINDING AND DISPOSITION IN THE MANNER PRESCRIBED BY FAMILY COURT ACT 1113 (FATHER WAS SERVED BY EMAIL) AND THEREFORE THE 30-DAY APPEAL DEADLINE DID NOT APPLY; FATHER’S STRIKING THE 14-YEAR-OLD CHILD ONCE DURING A MULTI-PERSON MELEE AFTER THE CHILD BROKE THE WINDOW OF FATHER’S CAR WITH A ROCK DID NOT CONSTITUTE NEGLECT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined: (1) Family Court did not follow the statutory procedure for serving father with the order of fact-finding and disposition and, therefore, father’s appeal was timely; and (2) father’s striking the child once during a multi-person melee, after the child threw a rock at father’s car, did not constitute neglect:

… “[T]here is no evidence in the record that the father was served with the order of fact-finding and disposition by a party or the child’s attorney, that he received the order in court, or that the Family Court mailed the order to the father” … . Instead, despite using a form order that provided typewritten check boxes for the two methods of service by the court mentioned in the statute (i.e., in court or by mail) … , the court here crossed out the word “mailed” and edited the form to indicate that the order was emailed to, among others, the father’s attorney. The statute, however, does not provide for service by the court through email or any other electronic means … . … Inasmuch as the father was served the order by the court via email, which is not a method provided for in Family Court Act § 1113, and there is no indication that he was served by any of the methods authorized by the statute, we conclude that the time to take an appeal did not begin to run and that it cannot be said that the father’s appeal is untimely … .* * *

 … [W]e conclude that, “[g]iven the age of the subject child, the provocation, and the dynamics of the incident, the [father’s] act against [the child] did not constitute neglect” … . The record establishes that, during the course of a multi-person melee that included the 15-year-old sister beating up the 18-year-old daughter of the father’s girlfriend, the 14-year-old child threw a rock at the vehicle causing the window to break, to which provocation the father instantly reacted by striking the child once either in the face or the back of the head … . Petitioner presented no evidence that the child sustained any injury or required medical treatment as a result of the single strike by the father during the altercation, and the police who investigated the incident did not file any charges … . Matter of Grayson S. (Thomas S.), 2022 NY Slip Op 05649, Fourth Dept 10-7-22

Practice Point: Here father was served with the order of fact-finding and disposition by email, a method not prescribed by Family Court Act 1113. Therefore the 30-day time limit for bringing an appeal did not apply and father’s appeal was timely. Father struck the 14-year-old child once during a multi-person melee after the child broke the window of father’s car with a rock. Father’s striking the child, which did not cause injury, did not constitute neglect.

 

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A DECISION TO RETURN TO THE REGULAR ACCESS SCHEDULE OF PARENTING TIME AFTER A PERIOD OF SUPERVISED PARENTAL VISITS MUST BE BASED UPON ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE; WHERE FACTS REMAIN IN DISPUTE, A HEARING IS REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a hearing should have been held before granting defendant’s motion to return to the regular access schedule of parenting time because some facts were still in dispute:

… Supreme Court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing prior to directing that the regular access schedule as set forth in the parties’ stipulation of settlement be implemented immediately. Although the court based its determination on information contained in the parties’ applications, reports from Kids in Common, and statements from counsel for the parties and the attorney for the child during multiple conferences, Kids in Common had not yet advised that the child was ready for a fully normalized access schedule, and a decision regarding child custody and/or parental access should be based on admissible evidence … . Where, as here, facts material to a determination of what parental access is in the best interests of the child remain in dispute, a hearing is required … . Stolzenberg v Stolzenberg, 2022 NY Slip Op 05554, Second Dept 10-5-22

Practice Point: At the time defendant made a motion to return to the regular access schedule of parenting time after a period of supervised visitation facts remained in dispute. The motion should not have been granted without first holding a hearing where only admissible evidence is considered.

 

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ALTHOUGH THE JUDGE CAN PROPERLY AWARD COUNSEL FEES TO PETITIONER BASED UPON RESPONDENT’S VIOLATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION, A HEARING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the judge properly exercised discretion in awarding counsel fees to petitioner based upon appellant’s (Gorish’s) violation of an order of protection. However, the amount of counsel fees should have been determined by a hearing:

Under Family Court Act § 846-a, the court “may order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s reasonable and necessary counsel fees in connection with the violation petition where the court finds that the violation of its order was willful.” “The award of counsel fees is committed to the discretion of the Family Court” … . “[T]he reasonable amount and nature of the claimed services must be established at an adversarial hearing” … . Here, while the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding counsel fees to the petitioner, the court erred in determining the amount of the counsel fees without a hearing. Matter of Sicina v Gorish, 2022 NY Slip Op 05535, Second Dept 10-5-22

Practice Point: The violation of an order of protection is a proper ground for awarding counsel fees to the petitioner, but the amount must be determined by a hearing.

 

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EVEN THOUGH FATHER REFUSED TO COOPERATE WITH AN INVESTIGATION RELATED TO HIS PETITION FOR CUSTODY, THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED CUSTODY TO MOTHER WITHOUT FIRST HOLDING A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have awarded mother sole custody of the child without first holding a hearing:

Supreme Court directed that the Administration for Children’s Services (hereinafter ACS) conduct an investigation and directed supervised visits between the father and the child. The father failed to comply with the investigation, including refusing to provide his address to ACS, and he failed to complete the intake process for arranging the supervised visits. * * *

“[C]ustody determinations should generally be made only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry” … . “This general rule furthers the substantial interest, shared by the State, the children, and the parents, in ensuring that custody proceedings generate a just and enduring result that, above all else, serves the best interest of a child” … . “[A] court opting to forgo a plenary hearing must take care to clearly articulate which factors were—or were not—material to its determination, and the evidence supporting its decision” … .

Here, the Supreme Court erred in making a final custody determination without a hearing and without inquiring into the best interests of the child … . Matter of Jones v Rodriguez, 2022 NY Slip Op 05529, Second Dept 10-5-22

Practice Point: Despite father’s failure to cooperate with an investigation stemming from his petition for custody, the judge should have held a hearing before awarding custody to mother.

 

WHERE NEITHER PARENT CAN BE SAID TO HAVE CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE TIME, THE PARENT WITH THE GREATER RESOURCES SHOULD BE DEEMED THE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT FOR CHILD SUPPORT PURPOSES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Iannacci, in a matter of first impression in the Second Department, determined that where custody is effectively shared equally the parent with the greater resources should be deemed the noncustodial parent for child support purposes:

We conclude, to the contrary, that the court-ordered custody arrangement in this case splits the parents’ physical custody of the children in such a manner that “neither can be said to have physical custody of the children for a majority of the time” … . In such circumstances, the parent having the higher income and thus bearing the greater pro rata share of the child support obligation, here, allegedly, the father, is deemed the noncustodial parent for child support purposes … . * * *

.. [W]hile counting custodial overnights may suffice in most shared custody cases, that approach should not be applied where it does not reflect the reality of the situation. Similarly, while it may be clear in most cases which parent’s share of the parenting time constitutes the majority of custodial time … , the reality of the situation must also be considered where there is a closer division of parenting time. * * *

… [T]his is a case in which the “custodial arrangement splits the children’s physical custody so that neither can be said to have physical custody of the children for a majority of the time” … . Thus, “the parent having the greater pro rata share of the child support obligation, determined after application of the three-step statutory formula of the CSSA, should be identified as the ‘noncustodial’ parent” … . Matter of Smisek v DeSantis, 2022 NY Slip Op 05210, Second Dept 9-21-22

Practice Point: In a matter of first impression in the Second Department. the appellate court determined that where neither parent has custody of the children for a majority of the time, the parent with the greater resources should be deemed the noncustodial parent for child support purposes.

 

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THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE MOTHER PREVIOUSLY FILED FRIVOLOUS VISTATION PETITIONS; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE PROHIBITED HER FROM FILING FUTURE PETITIONS WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the judge should have prohibited mother from filing visitation petitions without leave of court:

The Family Court should not have prohibited the mother from filing petitions for visitation after October 22, 2021, without written leave of the court, since there is no basis in the record to demonstrate that the mother filed frivolous petitions or filed petitions out of ill will or spite … . Matter of Genao-Archibald v Archibald, 2022 NY Slip Op 05166, Second Dept 9-14-22

Practice Point: If there is no evidence in the record that mother previously filed frivolous or spiteful petitions for visitation, the appellate court will reverse a judge’s prohibition of future petitions without leave of court.

 

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THE FAMILY COURT JUDGE HAD REPRESENTED MOTHER IN A RELATED CUSTODY MATTER YEARS BEFORE FATHER BROUGHT A PETITION TO MODIFY CUSTODY; THE JUDGE WAS STATUTORILY DISQUALIFIED FROM THE CURRENT PROCEEDING (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department determined the Family Court judge in this custody proceeding should have recused himself because, as an attorney, he had represented the mother years before where custody was adjudicated. The judge did not remember representing mother, but disqualification was required by the applicable statute:

“A judge shall not sit as such in, or take any part in the decision of, an action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding . . . in which he [or she] has been attorney or counsel” (Judiciary Law § 14; see Rules Governing Judicial Conduct [22 NYCRR] § 100.3 [E] [1] [b] [i]). “This prohibition is absolute and establishes a bright-line disqualification rule” … . Although neither the Judiciary Law nor the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct define “an action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding” (Judiciary Law § 14), Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “claim” as “[t]he assertion of an existing right . . . to an equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional” … .

… [O]ur jurisprudence recognizes that, except in limited circumstances, a parent has an existing and ongoing right to custody of and/or visitation with his or her children … , and it is undisputed that the November 2012 default order and the order on appeal both deal with the custodial arrangement between the same two parents regarding the same three children. Under these circumstances, where the two proceedings involve the same claim of custody, guardianship, or visitation for the same children, we find that Family Court was statutorily disqualified from the instant proceedings … . Matter of John II. v Kristen JJ., 2022 NY Slip Op 05132, Third Dept 9-8-22

Practice Point: It is a bright-line statutory rule that a judge who, as an attorney, represented mother in a custody proceeding is statutorily disqualified from presiding over the same parties in a subsequent custody proceeding.

 

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