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PLAINTIFF-CONTRACTOR’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE VALUE OF THE WORK PRECLUDED RECOVERY UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY; CRITERIA FOR AMENDMENT OF A COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO TRIAL PROOF DESCRIBED.

In an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, the Second Department determined Supreme Court properly allowed amendment of the pleadings to conform with the proof, which was consistent with an action for quantum meruit. Plaintiff contractor was unable to show the value of the work performed, so plaintiff’s Lien Law and quantum meruit actions failed. Similarly, the defendants failed to prove they ended up paying more than the original agreed price for the work. So defendants’ counterclaims for breach of contract and damages failed. With respect to the amendment of the complaint to conform to the proof, and the flaws in plaintiff’s proof of the value of plaintiff’s work, the court wrote:

Pursuant to Lien Law § 3, a contractor who performs labor or furnishes materials for the improvement of real property with the consent, or at the request of, the owner “shall have a lien for the principal and interest, of the value, or the agreed price, of such labor . . . or materials upon the real property improved or to be improved and upon such improvement.” “A lienor may seek amounts due from both written contracts and from change orders for extras, depending on whether the owner gave his consent for the extra work” … . The lienor’s right to recover is limited by the contract price or the reasonable value of the labor and materials provided … . The lienor has the burden of establishing the amount of the outstanding debt by proffering proof either of the price of the contract or the value of labor and materials supplied … .

… [P]laintiff failed to offer bills, invoices, receipts, time sheets, checks, or any other evidence which would establish the cost of materials, work done by subcontractors, or the number of hours he worked on the job and proffered no explanation for his failure to present this evidence. He likewise failed to provide any detailed description of the work performed, the cost of any portion of the work, or the hourly rate at which he valued his labor. Indeed, at trial, the plaintiff admitted that the sum asserted in his lien was only an estimate. … .

Pursuant to CPLR 3025(c), a trial court may permit the amendment of pleadings before or after judgment to conform them to the evidence “upon such terms as may be just” … .Here, although the complaint sought recovery in the form of foreclosure on his mechanic’s lien, at trial, the plaintiff sought to conform the pleadings to the proof and assert a cause of action for recovery in quantum meruit. The Supreme Court granted that motion, and therefore, contrary to the defendants’ contention, that theory of recovery was properly before the court. * * *

Here, although the plaintiff presented evidence satisfying … three elements [of quntum meruit], this cause of action must fail for the same reason that the cause of action to foreclose his mechanic’s lien must fail; namely, his failure to present any evidence of the value of the materials supplied or services rendered. DiSario v Rynston, 2016 NY Slip Op 02611, 2nd Dept 4-6-16

CONTRACT LAW (PLAINTIFF-CONTRACTOR’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE VALUE OF THE WORK PRECLUDED RECOVERY UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY)/QUANTUM MERUIT (PLAINTIFF-CONTRACTOR’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE VALUE OF THE WORK PRECLUDED RECOVERY UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY)/MECHANIC’S LIEN (PLAINTIFF-CONTRACTOR’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE VALUE OF THE WORK PRECLUDED RECOVERY UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY)/LIEN LAW (PLAINTIFF-CONTRACTOR’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE VALUE OF THE WORK PRECLUDED RECOVERY UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY)/EVIDENCE (PLAINTIFF-CONTRACTOR’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE VALUE OF THE WORK PRECLUDED RECOVERY UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CRITERIA FOR AMENDMENT OF A COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO TRIAL PROOF DESCRIBED)/COMPLAINT, AMENDMENT OF (CRITERIA FOR AMENDMENT OF A COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO TRIAL PROOF DESCRIBED)

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FATHER DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED ON BEHALF OF HIS INFANT SON TO THE RECORDING OF THREATS MADE AGAINST HIS SON BY DEFENDANT; ABSENT THE VICARIOUS CONSENT, THE RECORDING WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED ILLEGAL EAVESDROPPING AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE IN COURT.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a three-judge dissent, determined father’s recording of threats made to his infant son by mother’s boyfriend was not eavesdropping, which is prohibited by statute. Rather, father was deemed to have consented to the recording on his son’s behalf. Father had attempted to call the child’s mother. For some reason, the cell phone call went through but was not picked up by anyone. Father could hear the boyfriend threaten to beat his son. Using a cell phone function, the boyfriend’s words were recorded. The boyfriend was subsequently arrested for assault against the child and endangering the welfare of a child. The recording was played at trial. Recording conversations is prohibited in New York as illegal eavesdropping, unless one of the parties to the conversation consents. Here, the Court of Appeals determined the eavesdropping prohibition did not apply because the child was deemed to have consented to the recording. In addition, the Court of Appeals found the trial judge’s erroneous jury instruction, which allowed the jury to consider an accomplice theory not charged in the indictment, constituted harmless error. The court concluded, based upon the trial evidence, the jury could not have convicted the defendant of any offense other than what was charged. With respect to the recorded conversation, the court wrote:

There is no basis in legislative history or precedent for concluding that the New York Legislature intended to subject a parent or guardian to criminal penalties for the act of recording his or her minor child’s conversation out of a genuine concern for the child’s best interests. By contrast, the vicarious consent doctrine recognizes the long-established principle that the law protects the right of a parent or guardian to take actions he or she considers to be in his or her child’s best interests. Yet it also recognizes important constraints on that right, by requiring that the parent or guardian believe in good faith that it is necessary for the best interests of the child to make the recording, and that this belief be objectively reasonable. People v Badalamenti, 2016 NY Slip Op 02556, CtApp 2016

CRIMINAL LAW (EASVESDROPPING, FATHER DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED ON BEHALF OF HIS INFANT SON TO THE RECORDING OF THREATS MADE AGAINST HIS SON BY DEFENDANT; ABSENT THE VICARIOUS CONSENT, THE RECORDING WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED ILLEGAL EAVESDROPPING AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE IN COURT)/EVIDENCE (EASVESDROPPING, FATHER DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED ON BEHALF OF HIS INFANT SON TO THE RECORDING OF THREATS MADE AGAINST HIS SON BY DEFENDANT; ABSENT THE VICARIOUS CONSENT, THE RECORDING WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED ILLEGAL EAVESDROPPING AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE IN COURT)/EASVESROPPING FATHER DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED ON BEHALF OF HIS INFANT SON TO THE RECORDING OF THREATS MADE AGAINST HIS SON BY DEFENDANT; ABSENT THE VICARIOUS CONSENT, THE RECORDING WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED ILLEGAL EAVESDROPPING AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE IN COURT)/PARENT-CHILD (EASVESDROPPING, FATHER DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED ON BEHALF OF HIS INFANT SON TO THE RECORDING OF THREATS MADE AGAINST HIS SON BY DEFENDANT; ABSENT THE VICARIOUS CONSENT, THE RECORDING WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED ILLEGAL EAVESDROPPING AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE IN COURT)

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COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY; THERE IS NO HEIGHTENED STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY EVIDENCE; RATHER THE USUAL PROBATIVE VS PREJUDICIAL BALANCING TEST APPLIES.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined, under an abuse of discretion standard, evidence of third-party culpability was properly excluded as speculative. Defendant was not, therefore, deprived of his constitutional right to present a complete defense when the trial court precluded evidence the defendant’s brother, Warren, was the beneficiary of a $500,000 life insurance policy taken out by the murder victim.  Here defense counsel made no specific attempt to demonstrate Warren killed the victim. Defense counsel made only vague assertions “others” could have committed the crime. The Court of Appeals made it clear there is no heightened standard for the admissibility of evidence of third-party culpability. Rather courts should apply the usual balancing test and exclude such evidence where it has slight probative value and a strong potential for undue prejudice, delay and confusion or where the evidence is so remote it does not connect the third party to the crime:

… [A]dmission of third-party culpability evidence does not necessarily require a specific accusation that an identified individual committed the crime. For example, a proffer of an unknown DNA profile may be sufficient. And we reject the trial court’s assertion that such a specific accusation “is an essential element of third-party culpability.” Such a requirement would conflict with the balancing analysis that we … reaffirm today. Nevertheless, defense counsel’s argument must be assessed based on the proffer as articulated … . The trial court was within its discretion in finding that proffer speculative and in determining the evidence to support it would have caused undue delay, prejudice, and confusion. People v Powell, 2016 NY Slip Op 02555, CtApp 4-5-16

CRIMINAL LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY, THERE IS NO HEIGHTENED STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY EVIDENCE, RATHER THE USUAL PROBATIVE VS PREJUDICIAL BALANCING TEST APPLIES)/THIRD PARTY CULPABILITY (CRIMINAL LAW, THERE IS NO HEIGHTENED STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY EVIDENCE, RATHER, THE USUAL PROBATIVE VS PREJUDICIAL BALANCING TEST APPLIES)

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DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGES TO THE HARVESTING FOR USE AT TRIAL OF RECORDINGS OF PHONE CALLS MADE BY INMATES DURING PRE-TRIAL INCARCERATION REJECTED; THE PRACTICE HOWEVER WAS NOT CONDONED AND THE PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANTS WHO CANNOT MAKE BAIL WAS EXPRESSLY NOTED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, with a concurring opinion by Judge Pigott, rejected defendant’s challenge to the use at trial of recordings of his phone calls made from Rikers Island during pre-trial incarceration. Prosecutors routinely request recordings of nonprivileged inmate phone calls and pour through them for use at trial. The Court of Appeals did not condone the practice, and the concurring opinion laid out how access to the phone calls prejudices defendants who cannot make bail:

In order to properly address and frame defendant’s legal claims, we first clarify what defendant does not allege on this appeal. He does not allege that any conversations with his defense counsel were recorded and admitted at trial, or that the Department permits such monitoring. To the contrary, defendant recognizes that the Operations Order expressly prohibits the recording and monitoring of conversations with an inmate’s attorney. Nor does defendant assert that the intention of the City’s regulation or the Department’s Operations Order is to create and collect information strictly for use by the prosecution against a detainee at trial. Defendant candidly admits that the Department has a legitimate interest in recording and monitoring detainee telephone communications.

Defendant instead challenges what he describes as the Department’s practice of “automatic, unmonitored harvesting of intimate conversations of pre-trial inmates,” and the subsequent dissemination of the Department’s recordings to District Attorneys’ offices for use in criminal prosecutions. Defendant claims the practice violated his right to counsel, exceeds the scope of the Department’s regulatory authority, and was conducted without defendant’s consent. The claims are either without merit or unpreserved and therefore do not warrant reversal and a new trial. People v Johnson, 2016 NY Slip Op 02552, CtApp 4-5-16

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGES TO THE HARVESTING FOR USE AT TRIAL OF RECORDINGS OF PHONE CALLS MADE BY INMATES DURING PRE-TRIAL INCARCERATION REJECTED; THE PRACTICE HOWEVER WAS NOT CONDONED AND THE PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANTS WHO CANNOT MAKE BAIL WAS EXPRESSLY NOTED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGES TO THE HARVESTING FOR USE AT TRIAL OF RECORDINGS OF PHONE CALLS MADE BY INMATES DURING PRE-TRIAL INCARCERATION REJECTED; THE PRACTICE HOWEVER WAS NOT CONDONED AND THE PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANTS WHO CANNOT MAKE BAIL WAS EXPRESSLY NOTED)/INMATES (RECORDED PHONE CALLS, DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGES TO THE HARVESTING FOR USE AT TRIAL OF RECORDINGS OF PHONE CALLS MADE BY INMATES DURING PRE-TRIAL INCARCERATION REJECTED; THE PRACTICE HOWEVER WAS NOT CONDONED AND THE PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANTS WHO CANNOT MAKE BAIL WAS EXPRESSLY NOTED)

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DEFENSE COUNSEL’S DECISION TO FOREGO A REQUEST TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED UPON TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY A SOUND STRATEGIC REASON, COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE NOT INEFFECTIVE.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, over an extensive two-judge dissenting opinion, determined defense counsel's failure to request the reopening of the suppression hearing based upon trial testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance. The Appellate Division had previously reversed the trial court's suppression of defendant's statements. At trial the detective who took the statements from the defendant gave an account which differed from the detective's hearing testimony. The inconsistent testimony related to the second of the two statements made by the defendant during interrogation. In response to defendant's motion to vacate the judgment of conviction on ineffective-assistance grounds, the People provided an affidavit from defense counsel which explained the strategy underlying the decision to forego a request to reopen the suppression hearing. “… Counsel averred that he had believed that defendant's second statement would almost certainly be admitted into evidence at trial and that therefore he had focused on using the exculpatory preface of the first statement to cast doubt on the probative worth of defendant's more incriminating subsequent comments.” The court found the explanation of the defense strategy to be sound:

Defense counsel did not deprive defendant of the effective assistance of counsel when he decided not to move to reopen the suppression hearing … . Because the Appellate Division had rejected counsel's original arguments for suppression of the [second] statement prior to trial and cited a number of factors that remained extant throughout the proceedings in this case, counsel reasonably thought that the statement would be admitted into evidence regardless of any new developments, and instead of making what he sensibly thought was a longshot motion to reopen the hearing, he decided to use the exculpatory portion of defendant's first statement to undermine the credibility of the second statement and place it in context. People v Gray, 2016 NY Slip Op 02476, CtApp 3-31-16

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DECISION TO FOREGO A REQUEST TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED UPON TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY A SOUND STRATEGIC REASON, COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE NOT INEFFECTIVE)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DECISION TO FOREGO A REQUEST TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED UPON TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY A SOUND STRATEGIC REASON, COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE NOT INEFFECTIVE)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DECISION TO FOREGO A REQUEST TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED UPON TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY A SOUND STRATEGIC REASON, COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE NOT INEFFECTIVE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DECISION TO FOREGO A REQUEST TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED UPON TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY A SOUND STRATEGIC REASON, COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE NOT INEFFECTIVE)

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FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS WEAPON CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

The Court of Appeals determined defendant, who was charged with criminal possession of a weapon, was not afforded effective assistance of counsel in that defense counsel did not move to suppress the weapon. The matter was remitted for a suppression hearing. The underlying facts were not addressed in the decision. People v Bilal, 2016 NY Slip Op 02475, CtApp 3-31-16

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS WEAPON CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS WEAPON CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS WEAPON CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)

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IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over an extensive dissenting opinion by Judge Fahey, determined the defendant should have been allowed to submit evidence of third-party culpability and ordered a new trial in this felony murder/rape case. The majority acknowledged the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. However, the third-party culpability evidence—hearsay admissions about the crime allegedly made to the declarant's cellmate in prison—qualified as statements against penal interest. Applying a balancing test, the Court of Appeals concluded the probative value of the hearsay was such that it was an abuse of discretion, as a matter of law, to exclude it:

Where, as here, the defendant makes an offer of proof to the court explaining the basis for a third-party culpability defense and connecting the third-party to the crime, and the probative value of the evidence “plainly outweighs the dangers of delay, prejudice and confusion,” then it is “error as a matter of law” to preclude the defendant from presenting such proof to the jury… .People v DiPippo, 2016  NY Slip Op 02279, CtApp 3-29-16

CRIMINAL LAW (IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST)/HEARSAY (CRIMINAL LAW, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST)/STATEMENT AGAINST PENAL INTEREST  (CRIMINAL LAW, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST)/THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY (CRIMINAL LAW, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST)

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PEOPLE DID NOT DELIBERATELY CALL WITNESS FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF ELICITING THE ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; PEOPLE’S OWN WITNESS PROPERLY IMPEACHED WITH PRIOR STATEMENT; EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EFFECT OF EVENT STRESS ON IDENTIFICATION PROPERLY PRECLUDED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined (1) the People did not improperly call an eyewitness to the shooting to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury; (2) the People were properly allowed to impeach the eyewitness with his statement made to police at the time of the incident; and (3) expert testimony offered by the defense on the effect of “event stress” on the identification of the defendant was properly precluded. A Frye hearing was not required before preclusion. The expert witness was allowed to testify about “weapon focus” and “witness confidence.” With respect to a witness' invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury, the court explained the analytical criteria:

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution directs that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” (US Const Amend V). When a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury, “the effect of the powerful but improper inference of what the witness might have said absent the claim of privilege can neither be quantified nor tested by cross-examination, imperiling the defendant's right to a fair trial” … . It is therefore reversible error for the trial court to permit the prosecutor to deliberately call a witness for the sole purpose of eliciting a claim of privilege … . The critical inquiry is whether the prosecution exploited the witness's invocation of the privilege, either by attempting “to build its case on inferences drawn from the witness's assertion of the privilege” or utilizing those inferences to “unfairly prejudice [the] defendant by adding 'critical weight' to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination” … . People v Berry, 2016 NY Slip Op 02283, CtApp 3-29-16

CRIMINAL LAW (PEOPLE DID NOT DELIBERATELY CALL WITNESS FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF ELICITING THE ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION)/CRIMINAL LAW (PEOPLE'S OWN WITNESS PROPERLY IMPEACHED WITH PRIOR STATEMENT)/CRIMINAL LAW (EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EFFECT OF EVENT STRESS ON IDENTIFICATION PROPERLY PRECLUDED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PEOPLE DID NOT DELIBERATELY CALL WITNESS FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF ELICITING THE ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PEOPLE'S OWN WITNESS PROPERLY IMPEACHED WITH PRIOR STATEMENT)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EFFECT OF EVENT STRESS ON IDENTIFICATION PROPERLY PRECLUDED)/IDENTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EFFECT OF EVENT STRESS ON IDENTIFICATION PROPERLY PRECLUDED)

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REDACTED STATEMENT OF CO-DEFENDANT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF BRUTON RULE, CONVICTION REVERSED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a two-judge dissenting opinion, determined the redacted statement of a co-defendant (Villanueva), in its written form, left no doubt that the statement implicated defendant in this gang-assault murder case.  The error was not harmless and defendant's conviction was therefore reversed:

… [T]he written statement was not “effectively redacted so that the jury would not interpret its admissions as incriminating the nonconfessing defendant[s]” … . Rather, the statement, with large, “blank [spaces] prominent on its face, . . . 'facially incriminat[ed]'” a codefendant because it “involve[d] inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial” … . Any juror “wonder[ing] to whom the blank might refer need[ed] only lift his [or her] eyes to [Villanueva's codefendants], sitting at counsel table, to find what [would] seem the obvious answer” … . In our view, the replacement of the identifying descriptors of defendant with blank spaces did not leave “the slightest doubt as to whose name[] had been blacked out, but even if there had been, that blacking out itself would have not only laid the doubt but underscored the answer” … , particularly after the court instructed the jury that it was not to speculate about the redactions in any way. The redacted statement both “indicat[ed] to the jury that the original statement contained actual names” or clearly identifying descriptors and, “even if the very first item introduced at trial[,] [it] would immediately inculpate [a codefendant] in the charged crime”  … . Therefore, we conclude that its admission violated the Bruton rule. People v Cedeno, 2016 NY Slip Op 02281, CtApp 3-29-16

Similar issue and result in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a three-judge dissenting opinion— People v Johnson, 2016 NY Slip Op 02282, CtApp 3-29-16

CRIMINAL LAW (REDACTED STATEMENT OF CO-DEFENDANT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF BRUTON RULE, CONVICTION REVERSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, REDACTED STATEMENT OF CO-DEFENDANT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF BRUTON RULE, CONVICTION REVERSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, REDACTED STATEMENT OF CO-DEFENDANT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF BRUTON RULE, CONVICTION REVERSED)/BRUTON RULE (CRIMINAL LAW, REDACTED STATEMENT OF CO-DEFENDANT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF BRUTON RULE, CONVICTION REVERSED)

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STRIKING OF PLEADINGS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE.

The Fourth Department concluded sanctions for spoliation of evidence were appropriate, but striking defendant's pleadings was too severe a sanction. Plaintiff alleged injury from glass which fell out of defendant's (IGT's) video slot machine. Although the complaint was filed in 2008, the request to maintain the condition of the machine was not made until 2010 and the request to examine the machine was not made until 2011. The machine had been scrapped in the regular course of business in 2008:

… [W]e conclude that plaintiffs established that some sanction is warranted because IGT negligently failed to preserve the machine, but plaintiffs failed to show that the destruction of the machine was intentional or contumacious, to warrant the sanctions imposed by the court. To the contrary, the only evidence in the record concerning this issue is that IGT scrapped the machine in the normal course of business, as part of the removal and destruction of a large number of machines to create additional space in the casino. In addition, IGT established that the machine was removed from the casino at the request of the casino's owners, who were no longer parties to this action, which belies plaintiffs' contention that IGT removed and destroyed the machine for litigation purposes.

Contrary to plaintiffs' further contention, they failed to establish that the machine was destroyed before they had an opportunity to inspect it, and thus plaintiffs failed to establish that the extreme sanctions of striking IGT's answer and granting plaintiffs partial summary judgment on liability against IGT were warranted … . Mahiques v County of Niagara, 2016 NY Slip Op 02190, 4th Dept 3-25-16

NEGLIGENCE (STRIKING OF PLEADINGS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE)/EVIDENCE (STRIKING OF PLEADINGS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE)/SPOLIATION (STRIKING OF PLEADINGS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE)

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