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SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR DEEMED A VALID INVENTORY SEARCH, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department, over an extensive dissent, determined the search of defendant’s car was a valid inventory search:

The critical issue in this case is whether the officers’ search of the car, which was conducted back at the police district headquarters and not at the arrest location, was a legitimate inventory search. We conclude that it was. The People introduced a copy of the relevant patrol guide section outlining the procedures for inventory searches. Everything was removed from the car, under the direction of a sergeant, and even items such as nail clippers were vouchered. A contemporaneous list was made of the items that were removed, and the list was introduced at the hearing. Copies of property clerk invoices also were admitted in evidence at the hearing. The testimony at the hearing established that the officers did not exercise discretion in removing items from the car, and that the search was not a ruse to recover incriminating evidence … . People v Lee, 2016 NY Slip Op 07081, 1st Dept 10-27-16

CRIMINAL LAW (SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR DEEMED A VALID INVENTORY SEARCH, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR DEEMED A VALID INVENTORY SEARCH, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/INVENTORY SEARCH (SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR DEEMED A VALID INVENTORY SEARCH, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)

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PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT PROOF TO WARRANT A FRYE HEARING ON WHETHER A TUMOR MAY HAVE BEEN DETECTABLE BEFORE BIRTH.

The First Department, over a two justice dissent, determined plaintiffs’ experts had presented sufficient evidence to warrant a Frye hearing in this medical malpractice case. The plaintiffs’ baby suffered neurological damage caused by a rapidly growing tumor. The question tackled by the experts was whether the tumor was detectable prior to birth (ultrasound). The majority concluded plaintiffs’ experts had presented sufficient evidence that the tumor may have been detectable to warrant a hearing. The dissent argued the evidence presented by the plaintiffs’ experts was not sufficient to raise a question of fact:

Defendant’s experts established a prima facie case that the ultrasound studies were properly interpreted and that none of defendant’s acts or omissions caused the infant plaintiff’s alleged injuries. In light of plaintiffs’ expert opinions to the contrary, however, we cannot hold on the record presented to us that the opinions of plaintiffs’ experts are not generally accepted within the medical and scientific communities. Accordingly, the motion court properly set the matter down for a Frye hearing … to determine (1) whether it is generally accepted in the medical and scientific communities that a physician may offer an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to when a tumor such as the infant plaintiff’s tumor would have been detectable by ultrasound examination; and (2) whether it was possible to use any formula, including a doubling formula, to assess whether a neuroblastoma would have been detectable at the ultrasound of the infant plaintiff performed at 30.9 weeks … .

The dissent’s assertion that the opinions of plaintiffs’ experts were “speculative” and “unsupported by the record” puts the cart before the horse. As noted above, plaintiffs’ experts based their opinions partially on peer-reviewed, published articles stating that routine prenatal sonography had detected fetal neuroblastomas. Whether the information conveyed in these articles has gained general acceptance in the medical community, and thus provides support for the opinions of plaintiffs’ experts, is precisely the topic of a Frye hearing. Sepulveda v Dayal, 2016 NY Slip Op 06949, 1st Dept 10-25-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT PROOF TO WARRANT A FRYE HEARING ON WHETHER A TUMOR MAY HAVE BEEN DETECTABLE BEFORE BIRTH)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT PROOF TO WARRANT A FRYE HEARING ON WHETHER A TUMOR MAY HAVE BEEN DETECTABLE BEFORE BIRTH)/EVIDENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT PROOF TO WARRANT A FRYE HEARING ON WHETHER A TUMOR MAY HAVE BEEN DETECTABLE BEFORE BIRTH)

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PRECEDENT ALLOWING VOLUNTARY POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS TO BE USED TO IMPEACH REAFFIRMED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, reaffirmed its precedent allowing voluntary statements made after Miranda rights have been invoked to be used to impeach should the defendant take the stand:

This Court has long held that if a statement made by the defendant to the police is voluntary, it may be used for impeachment purposes; but if a statement is involuntary, it will not be admissible, even if it may be deemed reliable … . * * *

Here, County Court determined that the statements were voluntary and the Appellate Division affirmed that determination. …  …[T]here is nothing in the record to support defendant’s contention that [the interrogating officer] consciously circumvented defendant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights or otherwise rendered defendant’s statements involuntary as a matter of law. Thus, it cannot be said that County Court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to preclude the People from utilizing the statements on cross-examination or rebuttal. People v Wilson, 2016 NY Slip Op 06942, CtApp 10-25-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (PRECEDENT ALLOWING VOLUNTARY POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS TO BE USED TO IMPEACH REAFFIRMED)/EVIDENCE PRECEDENT ALLOWING VOLUNTARY POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS TO BE USED TO IMPEACH REAFFIRMED)/STATEMENTS (CRIMINAL LAW, PRECEDENT ALLOWING VOLUNTARY POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS TO BE USED TO IMPEACH REAFFIRMED

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JOURNALIST WHO INTERVIEWED DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN DEFENDANT’S MURDER TRIAL.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a reporter (Robles) who interviewed defendant could not be compelled to testify at the defendant’s murder trial and could not be compelled to turn over her interview notes. The information gathered by the reporter was not “critical or necessary” to the People’s case:

In People v Bonie (141 AD3d 401 [1st Dept 2016], lv dismissed 28 NY3d 956 [2016]), a murder case based on circumstantial evidence, we found that the outtakes of an interview of the defendant taken at a detention center in which he discussed, inter alia, the charges against him and his relationship with the victim were ” critical or necessary’ to the People’s effort to prove motive, intent, and consciousness of guilt, since they contradict[ed] defendant’s earlier statements to police” … . In contrast, in this case, the People have a videotaped confession by the defendant that has been found admissible at trial and that includes statements consistent with other evidence in the case. Under the circumstances, and in keeping with “the consistent tradition in this State of providing the broadest possible protection to the sensitive role of gathering and disseminating news of public events'” … , we find that the People have not made a “clear and specific showing” that the disclosure sought from Robles (her testimony and interview notes) is “critical or necessary” to the People’s proof of a material issue so as to overcome the qualified protection for the journalist’s nonconfidential material (Civil Rights Law § 79-h[c]). People v Juarez, 2016 NY Slip Op 06900, 1st Dept 10-20-16

CRIMINAL LAW (JOURNALIST WHO INTERVIEWED DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN DEFENDANT’S MURDER TRIAL)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, JOURNALIST WHO INTERVIEWED DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN DEFENDANT’S MURDER TRIAL)/CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (JOURNALIST WHO INTERVIEWED DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN DEFENDANT’S MURDER TRIAL)/JOURNALISTS (JOURNALIST WHO INTERVIEWED DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN DEFENDANT’S MURDER TRIAL)

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NO INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE OWNER OF HIS PROPERTY, GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REVERSED.

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s grand larceny conviction, determined there was insufficient evidence defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of his all-terrain vehicle (ATV). Defendant planned to return the ATV in exchange for return of his tools:

Larcenous intent is the “intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person” … . The terms “deprive” and “appropriate” are both essential to larcenous intent and refer to a purpose “to exert permanent or virtually permanent control over the property taken, or to cause permanent or virtually permanent loss to the owner of the possession and use thereof” … . For this reason, “[t]he mens rea element of larceny is simply not satisfied by an intent to temporarily take property without the owner’s permission” … . The proof introduced at trial supported the singular reasonable conclusion that defendant was executing a plan to temporarily deprive the tenant of the ATV in order to force him to return defendant’s missing tools … . People v Drouin, 2016 NY Slip Op 06906, 3rd Dept 10-20-16

CRIMINAL LAW (NO INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE OWNER OF HIS PROPERTY, GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REVERSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, NO INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE OWNER OF HIS PROPERTY, GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REVERSED)/LARCENY (NO INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE OWNER OF HIS PROPERTY, GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REVERSED)

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MID-TRIAL OBJECTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF EXPERT-NOTICE PROPERLY OVERRULED AS UNTIMELY.

NEGLIGENCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EVIDENCE, CIVIL PROCEDURE.

The Court of Appeals determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s expert’s testimony. The “expert-evidence” notice indicated the expert would testify about the cause of plaintiff’s decedent’s death but did not indicate the substance of the testimony. At trial the expert did not agree with the cause described in the autopsy report (pneumonia) and testified death was attributable to cardiac arrhythmia. The motion to strike argued the “expert notice” was deficient because it did not provide any detail about the expert’s opinion. Because the lack of detail was obvious pre-trial, the mid-trial objection was properly overruled:

Plaintiff made her motion mid-trial immediately prior to the expert’s testimony. Plaintiff argues that at the time of the expert exchange, she had no reason to object to the disclosure statement because the statement gave no indication that defendant would challenge plaintiff’s theory of decedent’s cause of death. Assuming defendant’s disclosure was deficient, such deficiency was readily apparent; the disclosure identified “causation” as a subject matter but did not provide any indication of a theory or basis for the expert’s opinion. This is not analogous to a situation in which a party’s disclosure was misleading or the trial testimony was inconsistent with the disclosure. Rather, the issue here was insufficiency.

The trial court’s ruling did not endorse the sufficiency of the statement but instead addressed the motion’s timeliness. The lower courts were entitled to determine, based on the facts and circumstances of this particular case, that the time to challenge the statement’s content had passed because the basis of the objection was readily apparent from the face of the disclosure statement and could have been raised — and potentially cured — before trial. Rivera v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 2016 NY Slip Op 06854, CtApp 10-20-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MID-TRIAL OBJECTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF EXPERT-NOTICE PROPERLY OVERRULED AS UNTIMELY)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (MID-TRIAL OBJECTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF EXPERT-NOTICE PROPERLY OVERRULED AS UNTIMELY)/EVIDENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EXPERT EVIDENCE, MID-TRIAL OBJECTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF EXPERT-NOTICE PROPERLY OVERRULED AS UNTIMELY)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MID-TRIAL OBJECTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF EXPERT-NOTICE PROPERLY OVERRULED AS UNTIMELY)

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ADMISSIBILITY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539.

CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, CIVIL PROCEDURE.

The Court of Appeals determined evidence which was originally generated in electronic form was admissible under CPLR 4518 (a) and CPLR 4539 (b) applies only to documents originally in hard copy and subsequently scanned into digital form. The document in question was a record of testing of the simulator solution used during an alcohol breath test:

County Court correctly held that the applicable statute is CPLR 4518 (a), which was amended in 2002 (see L 2002, ch 136, § 1) to provide that an “electronic record . . . shall be admissible in a tangible exhibit that is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record” (CPLR 4518 [a]). The statute further provides that the court “may consider the method or manner by which the electronic record was stored, maintained or retrieved in determining whether the exhibit is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record,” but “[a]ll other circumstances of the making of the memorandum or record. . . may be proved to affect its weight,” and “shall not affect its admissibility” (id. [emphasis added]).

The 2002 amendment to CPLR 4518 (a) was adopted by the legislature upon the recommendation of the Chief Administrative Judge’s Advisory Committee on Civil Practice specifically because the Committee and the legislature concluded that CPLR 4539 (b) had no application to documents originally created in electronic form. People v Kangas, 2016 NY Slip Op 06857, CtApp 10-20-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DWI, BREATH TEST, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DWI, BREATH TEST, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)DWI (BREATH TEST,  ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)/BREATH TEST (DWI, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CRIMINAL LAW, DWI, BREATH TEST, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)

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DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE.

The Second Department determined the People were entitled to a writ of prohibition re: a County Court Judge’s order that they produce the names of all lab personnel whose initials appeared on lab report concerning DNA test results. The People had notified defense counsel persons at the lab had cheated on an exam for certification for use of a DNA software program. The software program was not used in defendant’s case. The People provided defense counsel with the names of the two persons implicated in the cheating whose initials appeared on the lab report. Defense counsel requested the names of all the persons whose initials were on the report. County Court granted that request:

…[T]he only relevant inquiry is whether or not [the judge’s] actions exceeded his authorized powers … . We conclude that Judge De Rosa exceeded his authority by directing the People to make available to the defendant the full names corresponding to the initials that appear on the subject laboratory reports … . Nothing contained in CPL 240.20 imposes an obligation on the People to respond to the defendant’s questions concerning notations that appear in discoverable materials, or to affirmatively create or compile material, or obtain it from sources beyond their control … . Matter of Hoovler v De Rosa, 2016 NY Slip Op 06830, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

JUDGES (WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/PROHIBITION, WRIT OF (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE

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ERROR TO ALLOW PROSECUTOR TO IMPEACH HER OWN WITNESS WITH THE WITNESS’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

The Second Department determined the allowing the prosecutor to impeach her own witness with the witness’s grand jury testimony, allowing inadmissible hearsay, together with the prosecutor’s improper remarks in summation, required reversal in the interest of justIce:

… [A] new trial is warranted as a result of two evidentiary errors, both of which were compounded by improper remarks made during the People’s summation. Specifically, the Supreme Court allowed the prosecutor to impeach one of her own witnesses, who testified at trial that it was dark at the time of the shooting and she “couldn’t really see” the shooter. The prosecutor was permitted to read that witness’s prior grand jury testimony, in which she stated that she recognized the shooter as a person going by the nickname of E-Villain. This was error … . Moreover, during summation, the prosecutor compounded the error by improperly using the prior inconsistent statement as evidence in chief … , telling the jury that when that witness previously spoke to the police, to an assistant district attorney, and to the grand jury, “on each of those occasions, she said what it is she saw and who it is that she saw do it,” and urging the jury to find “she was not telling you the truth when she said that I now am telling you I did not see who did it, that it was too dark.” Later, the prosecutor went one step further, stating, in direct contradiction to the witness’s trial testimony, that “[she] saw who it was.”

The Supreme Court also erred in allowing another witness to testify that a “little girl said that [the defendant] shot [the victim]” … . Moreover, on summation, the prosecutor not only repeated the improper hearsay testimony but also mispresented the defendant as having told one of the witnesses, “You know what, that little girl that told you that was a hundred percent right.” People v Thomas, 2016 NY Slip Op 06851, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTOR’S IMPEACHMENT OF PEOPLE’S WITNESS WITH GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL)/APPEALS (EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/GRAND JURY (PROSECUTOR’S IMPEACHMENT OF PEOPLE’S WITNESS WITH GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL)/IMPEACHMENT (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTOR’S IMPEACHMENT OF PEOPLE’S WITNESS WITH GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, (EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)

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POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined evidence of defendant’s intoxication should not have been suppressed. The arresting officer approached defendant’s car because she was stopped for some time behind a police cruiser which was blocking the turning lane. The Second Department ruled that the officer did not need a suspicion of criminal activity to approach the defendant and ask for her license, insurance card and registration. In the course of interacting with the defendant, the officer noticed signs of intoxication:

Based on the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing, the officer had an objective, credible reason for approaching the defendant’s vehicle and asking for her license, registration, and insurance card. The defendant’s vehicle was oddly stopped in the left turning lane behind the officer’s vehicle, when it was obvious that she could not make a left turn. The defendant could have easily proceeded north on Oceanside Road, but instead stopped her vehicle for several minutes behind the officer’s vehicle. Under these circumstances, the officer had an objective, credible reason to approach the defendant’s vehicle and request information … . People v Karagoz, 2016 NY Slip Op 06842, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 CRIMINAL LAW (POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/STREET STOPS (POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/SUPPRESSION (STREET STOP, POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)

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