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THE DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS MADE TO A CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES CASEWORKER SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; THE CASEWORKER, UNDER THE FACTS, ACTED AS AN AGENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT DURING THE INTERVIEW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the statements made by defendant to a Child Protective Services (CPS) caseworker should have been suppressed because, under the facts, she was acting as an agent of law enforcement at the time of the interview:

… [T]he CPS caseworker testified at the Huntley hearing that, at the time she interviewed defendant, she was aware that defendant was being held on criminal charges and that he was represented by counsel. She further testified that she worked on a multidisciplinary task force composed of social services and law enforcement agencies, through which she received training on interviewing individuals accused of committing sexual offenses. Additionally, in keeping with task force protocol directing her to report to law enforcement any inculpatory statements made during CPS interviews, the CPS caseworker called the investigating officer immediately following the interview with defendant and promptly went to his office to report defendant’s statements. Under the circumstances of this case as reflected at the hearing, although the police did not specifically direct the CPS caseworker to conduct the interview on a specific date or time or accompany her to the interview … , we conclude that the CPS caseworker here had a “cooperative working arrangement” with police such that she was acting as an agent of the police when she interviewed defendant and relayed his incriminatory statements … . The statements were thus obtained in violation of defendant’s right to counsel, and the court erred in refusing to suppress them … . Further, because defendant’s statements to the CPS caseworker were the only statements in which he admitted to having sexual contact with the victim, we cannot say that there is “no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the plea” … . People v Desjardins, 2021 NY Slip Op 04465, Fourth Dept 7-16-21

 

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SUPREME COURT DID NOT WEIGH THE CONFLICTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ABOUT WHETHER PETITIONER SEX-OFFENDER SUFFERED FROM A MENTAL ABNORMALITY REQUIRING CONFINEMENT PURSUANT TO THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW; MATTER SENT BACK FOR A NEW HEARING BEFORE A DIFFERENT JUDGE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court in this sex-offender Mental-Hygiene-Law proceeding, determined the court did not base its decision to discharge and release the petitioner on the expert evidence presented at the hearing. The matter was sent back for a new hearing before a different judge:

The State’s expert here diagnosed petitioner with ASPD [antisocial personality disorder] with narcissistic features and the condition of psychopathy, and the expert testified that those diagnoses, together with petitioner’s enduring hostility towards women, collectively constitute a mental abnormality within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 (i). She acknowledged that the scientific community has been debating for decades whether psychopathy is a distinct condition from ASPD, but she opined that they were indeed separate conditions. Petitioner’s expert, on the other hand, diagnosed petitioner with ASPD but testified that petitioner had no other conditions in addition to that diagnosis that would render him a sex offender within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law article 10. He further testified that psychopathy was simply an extreme variant of ASPD and should not be considered a condition separate from ASPD.

The court determined that a diagnosis of psychopathy or psychopathic features is still only a diagnosis of ASPD alone and thus, under Donald DD. (24 NY3d at 190), could not constitute an “other condition” to provide a basis for a finding of a mental abnormality. … [I] so holding, the court did not resolve the conflict between the experts regarding ASPD and psychopathy by weighing their testimony but rather made a determination that, generally speaking and without regard to petitioner’s specific case, a finding of ASPD and psychopathy can never provide a basis for a finding of mental abnormality. Contrary to the court’s apparent conclusion, “the Court of Appeals in Donald DD. did not state that diagnosis of ASPD with psychopathy is insufficient to support a finding of mental abnormality” … . When supported by expert testimony, a diagnosis of ASPD and psychopathy is legally sufficient to provide a basis for a finding of mental abnormality Inasmuch as there was conflicting expert opinion on the matter, the court should have weighed the testimony of the experts in rendering its determination whether petitioner suffers from a mental abnormality … . Matter of Application for Discharge of Doy S. v State of New York. 2021 NY Slip Op 04456, Fourth Dept 7-16-21

 

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FAMILY COURT’S FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS OF THE PARENTS BEFORE AWARDING SOLE CUSTODY TO FATHER REQUIRED REMITTAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined the psychological evaluations should have been made before awarding sole custody of the child to father:

The mother’s mental and emotional health was the central issue contested in this proceeding, and we conclude that the court abused its discretion in making its determination and awarding the father sole custody of the child without first considering the results of the psychological evaluations that it ordered … . Although a psychological expert testified at the fact-finding hearing on behalf of the father, that expert interviewed the parties and the subject child to assess whether the child had been sexually abused, and therefore he did not provide much information on the mother’s emotional functioning, the impact her mental health issues had on [*2]her ability to parent the child, or the fitness of either parent. Thus, on this record, we cannot say that there was sufficient evidence for the court to resolve the custody dispute without considering the court-ordered psychological examinations of the parents … . Matter of Pontillo v Johnson-Kosiorek, 2021 NY Slip Op 04455, Fourth Dept 7-16-21

 

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IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION AGAINST A SCHOOL DISTRICT, THE DISTRICT DEMONSTRATED A STUDENT’S SEXUAL ASSAULT OF PLANTIFF WAS NOT FORESEEABLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined the defendant school district demonstrated a student’s sexual assault of plaintiff was not foreseeable:

… [D]efendant met its … burden on the motion by establishing that the “sexual assault against [plaintiff by the student] was an unforeseeable act that, without sufficiently specific knowledge or notice, could not have been reasonably anticipated” … , and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . Defendant’s submissions, including plaintiff’s testimony, established the undisputed fact that plaintiff and the student did not know each other and did not have any prior interactions before the sexual assault … . Although the student had an extensive and troubling disciplinary history that resulted in several detentions and suspensions, such history did not contain any infractions for physically aggressive conduct directed at other people, sexually inappropriate behavior, or threats of physical or sexual violence … .

… [W]hile the student’s history involved attendance issues, insubordination toward school staff, inappropriate verbal outbursts, being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, possession and sale of drugs, and academic problems, that history did not raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the injury-causing conduct inasmuch as it was not similar to the student’s physically and sexually aggressive behavior that injured plaintiff … . “More significantly, [the student’s] prior history did not include any sexually aggressive behavior” … . We also agree with defendant that the court impermissibly drew an unsubstantiated and speculative inference that the student’s disclosure to a school social worker about being a victim of sexual abuse during his childhood, coupled with his substance abuse, should have provided defendant with notice of the student’s propensity to commit sexual assault … . Knaszak v Hamburg Cent. Sch. Dist., 2021 NY Slip Op 04441, Fourth Dept 7-16-21

 

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IN A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION, THE APPELLATE COURT DETERMINED COUNTY COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY APPLY THE DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE-SURVIVOR’S-ACT CRITERIA IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT FOR THE MURDER OF HER ABUSIVE HUSBAND; SENTENCES SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rivera, reversed County Court’s application of the Domestic Violence Survivor’s Act (social Services Law 459-a) and significantly reduced the sentences for murder and possession of a weapon. Defendant shot and killed her husband. The jury rejected defendant’s “battered women’s syndrome” defense. But the Second Department found that the criteria for sentence reduction under the DV Survivor’s Act had been met by the evidence:

… [W]e hold that the County Court did not properly apply the DV Survivor’s Act when sentencing the defendant. Upon considering the plain language of the DV Survivor’s Act, the legislative history of the statute, and the particular circumstances of this case, we modify the judgment, on the facts and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing (1) the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of murder in the second degree from an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 19 years to life to a determinate term of imprisonment of 7½ years to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision, and (2) the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree from a determinate term of imprisonment of 15 years to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision to a determinate term of imprisonment of 3½ years to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision, which terms shall run concurrently with each other. * * *

Upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the crime, as well as the history, character, and condition of the defendant, we conclude that a sentence in accordance with the DV Survivor’s Act is warranted. The defendant is a 32-year-old mother of two young children, and has no known prior arrests or convictions. The defendant testified that she was repeatedly physically and sexually abused by Grover, as well as by other men in her past, and reportedly was sexually assaulted at the age of five. However, our examination under this factor does not end there. We also consider, among other things, the details of the crimes, including that the defendant shot Grover in the head as he was lying on the couch. Grover’s fatal injury was described as a hard contact wound in which the gun fired by the defendant was pressed against Grover’s skin, leaving a muzzle imprint. People v Addimando, 2021 NY Slip Op 04364, Second Dept 7-15-21

 

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DEFEFNDANT’S STATEMENTS WERE ADMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION TO THE MIRANDA REQUIREMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the statements defendant made while handcuffed were admissible because the statements were made in response to questions posed for safety reasons and not to elicit an incriminating response:

County Court also properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the statement that he made to law enforcement while being patted down. Although defendant was handcuffed, in custody and had not been advised of his Miranda rights when he was asked by Haven whether the handgun that was retrieved from his back pocket was loaded, said inquiry was not made to elicit an incriminating response, but was made for the purpose of alleviating the inherent risk of securing a potentially loaded weapon and protecting the safety of defendant, responding officers and those other individuals present during the execution of the warrant … . Accordingly, [the] question fell squarely within the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement and, therefore, suppression of defendant’s statement was appropriately denied … . People v Rashid, 2021 NY Slip Op 04390, Second Dept 7-15-21

 

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THE BANK’S EVIDENCE OF STANDING DID NOT INCLUDE THE BUSINESS RECORDS REFERRED TO IN THE LOAN SERVICER’S AFFIDAVIT, RENDERING THE AFFIDAVIT HEARSAY; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the evidence purporting to demonstrate the bank’s standing in this foreclosure action was insufficient. Therefore the bank’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted:

… [T]he plaintiff submitted an affidavit of possession from Nichole Renee Williams, an employee of its loan servicer, who averred, inter alia, that, based upon her review of business records purportedly attached to the motion papers, the plaintiff was in physical possession of the note on the date of commencement of the action. However, the plaintiff failed to identify and produce those business records referred to by Williams in her affidavit. “[E]vidence of the contents of business records is admissible only where the records themselves are introduced” … . “[I]t is the business record itself, not the foundational affidavit, that serves as proof of the matter asserted” … . Since Williams’ purported knowledge of the date that the plaintiff received the original note was based upon her review of unidentified and unproduced business records, her affidavit constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked probative value … . Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Oziel, 2021 NY Slip Op 04388, Second Dept 7-15-21

 

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MOTHER VIOLATED A COURT ORDER BY RELOCATING TO ARIZONA WITH THE CHILD; HOWEVER, HER ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC ABUSE BY FATHER WERE CREDIBLE AND WARRANTED GRANTING HER CROSS PETITION TO RELOCATE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Troutman, determined mother’s cross petition to relocate with the child was properly granted, despite mother’s violation of a court order prohibiting her from permanently leaving Monroe County with the child without father’s consent, or without a court order allowing relocation. Mother testified that father was abusive and she feared for her life at times. Father denied all allegation of abuse. Family Court found mother’s testimony credible and did not credit father’s testimony:

Courts place considerable weight on the effect of domestic violence on the child … , particularly when a continuing pattern of domestic violence perpetrated by the child’s father compels the mother to relocate out of legitimate fear for her own safety … , or where the father minimized the past incidents of domestic violence … . Indeed, where domestic violence is alleged in a petition for custody, “the court must consider the effect of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the child” … .

… [T]he court appropriately considered the fact that the mother unilaterally removed the child from the jurisdiction, determining that the mother “did not relocate to separate the father from the child, but instead acted in good faith to escape the threat of domestic violence” … . Although the court did not countenance the mother’s decision to relocate without permission, “it was the father’s [violent] conduct that prompted [her] move to [Arizona] in the first instance and triggered the resulting disruption of his relationship with his daughter” … . Furthermore, although the court did not expressly engage in the analysis required under Tropea (87 NY2d at 740-741), according deference to the court’s factual findings and credibility assessments … we conclude that “there is a sound and substantial basis in the record supporting the court’s determination that ‘relocation would enhance the child[‘s life] economically, emotionally, and educationally, and that the child[‘s] relationship with the father could be preserved through a liberal parental access schedule including, but not limited to, frequent communication and extended summer and holiday visits’ ” … . Matter of Edwards v Ferris, 2021 NY Slip Op 04306, Fourth Dept 7-9-21

 

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THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE WORN STEP IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether defendants had constructive notice of the condition of a step in this slip and fall case:

… [T]he affidavit of plaintiff’s expert and the photographic evidence were sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to constructive notice. The expert opined that the condition depicted in the photographs violated the Building Code and that the step was worn for several years prior to the accident. Furthermore, the photographs depicted a condition that a jury might find was present for a sufficient time for defendants to have discovered and remedied it … . Martinez v 560-568 Audubon Realty LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 04277, First Dept 7-8-21

 

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THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE JURY INSTRUCTION REQUIRED REVERSAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined County Court should not have denied defendant’s request for a circumstantial evidence jury instruction:

… [T]here was no direct evidence identifying defendant as the shooter or as having possessed a loaded firearm. Indeed, there was no DNA or fingerprint evidence linking defendant to the Colt .45 caliber handgun that was recovered near the scene or the shell casing and projectiles that were found to have been fired from that gun … . Further, the surveillance footage — which only distantly captured the incident — did not depict defendant with a firearm. Nor was it possible to discern from the footage who shot the victim. …

Despite denying defendant’s request for a circumstantial evidence charge, County Court nonetheless gave a modified version of the charge. This modified version, however, was wholly inadequate. Most importantly, the modified version failed to include a critical component of the circumstantial evidence charge — namely, “‘that it must appear that the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence'” … . Given that County Court improperly denied defendant’s request for a circumstantial evidence charge and that the modified charge was insufficient, “the jury could not have known of its duty to apply the circumstantial evidence standard to the prosecution’s entire case” … . People v Taylor, 2021 NY Slip Op 04258, Third Dept 7-8-21

 

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