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LAWSUIT ALLEGING CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT FUNDING FOR CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Troutman, determined a lawsuit brought by a charter school network and students (infant plaintiffs), alleging deficient funding for charter-school facilities violated the Education Article and equal protection, should have been dismissed in its entirety. Although the network was deemed to have the capacity to sue under the Education Article, it did not have standing to sue because the article protects students not schools. The infant plaintiffs’ cause of action under the Education Article was deficient because it did not plead a district-wide funding problem. The disparity in facilities funding between charter and public schools was deemed to have a rational basis. The “disparate impact” cause of action failed to allege discriminatory intent.  Brown v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06566, 4th Dept 10-7-16

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (LAWSUIT ALLEGING CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT FUNDING FOR CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY)/CHARTER SCHOOLS (LAWSUIT ALLEGING CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT FUNDING FOR CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY)

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CHAIN BETWEEN TWO POLES NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION, SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined the defendant school district did not demonstrate a chain stretched between two poles, over which plaintiff tripped and fell at a pep rally, was an open and obvious condition. Therefore the school’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied:

There is no duty to warn of a condition which is open and obvious and not inherently dangerous … . “The issue of whether a dangerous condition is open and obvious is fact-specific, and usually a question for a jury” … . “A condition that is ordinarily apparent to a person making reasonable use of his or her senses may be rendered a trap for the unwary where the condition is obscured or the plaintiff is distracted’ … .

Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the chain was open and obvious given the crowd and lighting conditions at the time of the accident … . Since the defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers … . Simon v Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 06486, 2nd Dept 10-5-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (CHAIN BETWEEN TWO POLES NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION, SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED)/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (TRIP AND FALL, CHAIN BETWEEN TWO POLES NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION, SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED)/SLIP AND FALL (CHAIN BETWEEN TWO POLES NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION, SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED)

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TERMINATION OF TENURED TEACHER WAS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR WHICH DID NOT VIOLATE ANY RULE.

The First Department, over a dissent, determined termination of a tenured teacher for inappropriate behavior which did not violate any rule was too severe a sanction. It was alleged, inter alia, the teacher asked his eighth-grade female students about their older sisters and accepted the phone number of one 23-year-old sister:

Based on all the circumstances of the case, including the lack of any prior allegations of misconduct against petitioner during 13 years of service and the fact that the misconduct does not violate any specific rule or regulation, we find the penalty of termination sufficiently disproportionate to the offenses to shock the conscience … .

Moreover, petitioner had never been warned or reprimanded regarding the conduct at issue, and, contrary to the conclusion of the Hearing Officer, there is no evidence that a warning or reprimand or other penalty short of termination would not have caused petitioner to cease the objectionable conduct immediately.

While we share some of our dissenting colleague’s concern regarding petitioner’s behavior and his failure to express any deeper understanding of the inappropriate nature of his actions, we do not agree that the law supports petitioner’s termination at this time. Matter of Williams v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06184, 1st Dept 9-27-16

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (TERMINATION OF TENURED TEACHER WAS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR WHICH DID NOT VIOLATE ANY RULE)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (TEACHERS, TERMINATION OF TENURED TEACHER WAS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR WHICH DID NOT VIOLATE ANY RULE)/TEACHERS (TERMINATION OF TENURED TEACHER WAS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR WHICH DID NOT VIOLATE ANY RULE)

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CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION IN COMPLAINTS ALLEGING THE STATE HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY FUND NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS ADEQUATELY PLED; MUNICIPALITY (CITY OF YONKERS), HOWEVER, DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, determined plaintiffs (parents of students, among others) had sufficiently pled certain causes of action based upon the state’s alleged failure to adequately fund New York City public schools. The complex discussion cannot be summarized here. With respect to a municipality’s (here, the City of Yonkers’) lack of standing standing to sue the state in this context, the court explained:

The City of Yonkers maintains that it has capacity to sue …, asserting that the educational funding cuts have deprived it of a proprietary interest in the Foundation Aid monies calculated to be apportioned to it by formula pursuant to the 2007 Budget and Reform Act. This argument is unpersuasive. Contrary to Yonkers’s contention, the proprietary interest exception does not apply where a municipality has “a mere hope or expectancy” of receiving funds … , but instead “relate[s] to funds or property of a municipal corporation in its possession or to which it had a right to immediate possession” … . The Foundation Aid monies provided for under the 2007 Budget and Reform Act (codified in Education Law § 3602) are the product of a complex formula that turns on the application of numerous variables, including things like a school district’s “daily attendance figures” … . Sums allocated pursuant to the formula therefore vary from year to year. Moreover, any sums provided for by Foundation Aid must themselves be the subject of a separate budgetary appropriation; absent such appropriation, they do not exist (see State Finance Law §§ 4[1]; 40[2][a]). Thus, the Foundation Aid formula does not create any “specific sum of money” that would “create[] a proprietary interest” in any school district … . Aristy-Farer v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 05960, 1st Dept 9-8-16

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION IN COMPLAINTS ALLEGING THE STATE HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY FUND NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS ADEQUATELY PLED; MUNICIPALITY (CITY OF YONKERS), HOWEVER, DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE)/MUNICIPAL LAW (CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION IN COMPLAINTS ALLEGING THE STATE HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY FUND NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS ADEQUATELY PLED; MUNICIPALITY (CITY OF YONKERS), HOWEVER, DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE)

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TEACHER’S PETITION TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S JOB PERFORMANCE RATING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed the teacher’s Article 78 petition seeking review of the NYC Department of Education’s (DOE’s) job performance rating. The court explained the review criteria in the context of a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action:

“On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), all of the allegations in the petition are deemed true and the petitioner is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference” … . In determining such a motion, the sole criterion is whether the petition sets forth allegations [*2]sufficient to make out a claim that the determination sought to be reviewed was ” made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion” … . When evidentiary material outside the pleading’s four corners is considered, and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the pleader has a cause of action, not whether the pleader has stated one and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the pleader is not a fact at all, and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate … .

Applying this standard, the petition and the documents annexed to it establish a cognizable claim that the respondents’ determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. Contrary to the respondents’ contention, the petitioner’s claim is not a mere disagreement as to whether the rating of “unsatisfactory” was deserved. Rather, as set forth in the petition, the petitioner alleges that the process used by the respondents in arriving at the rating was based on a failure to observe her entire class lesson, faulty background knowledge, and unlawful procedure. Matter of Kunik v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2016 NY Slip Op 05812, 2nd Dept 8-17-16

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (TEACHER’S PETITION TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S JOB PERFORMANCE RATING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (TEACHER’S PETITION TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S JOB PERFORMANCE RATING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/TEACHERS (TEACHER’S PETITION TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S JOB PERFORMANCE RATING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)

STATUTE ALLOWING PROPERTY OWNERS TO CHOOSE SCHOOL DISTRICTS DOES NOT APPLY TO CONDOMINIUMS WHICH LIE ON THE BORDER BETWEEN TWO DISTRICTS.

The Second Department, affirming Supreme Court’s grant of a motion to set aside plaintiffs’ verdict, determined the statute which allows a property owner to select a school district when the boundary between school districts passes through the owner’s property does not apply to condominiums. The case turned on the interpretation of the statute, which referred only to boundaries passing through single family residences:

… [T]he plain language of Education Law § 3203(1)(b) and its legislative history demonstrate that the statute is applicable only where property is improved by one single family dwelling unit, and not multiple single family dwelling units, and where the school district boundary line intersects property that the dwelling unit is located on. The Supreme Court properly determined that the subject 28-unit condominium complex is not “an owner-occupied single family dwelling unit” located on property intersected by a boundary line within the meaning of Education Law § 3203(1)(b). Therefore, the court properly granted those branches of the school defendants’ motion which were to set aside the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs … . Palm v Tuckahoe Union Free School Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 05558. 2nd Dept 7-20-16

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (STATUTE ALLOWING PROPERTY OWNERS TO CHOOSE SCHOOL DISTRICTS DOES NOT APPLY TO CONDOMINIUMS WHICH LIE ON THE BORDER BETWEEN TWO DISTRICTS)/SCHOOL DISTRICTS (STATUTE ALLOWING PROPERTY OWNERS TO CHOOSE SCHOOL DISTRICTS DOES NOT APPLY TO CONDOMINIUMS WHICH LIE ON THE BORDER BETWEEN TWO DISTRICTS)

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SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR OFF-CAMPUS ASSAULT.

The Second Department, over a dissent, determined plaintiff-student’s complaint against the school was properly dismissed. Plaintiff was attacked by several alleged gang members shortly after leaving school grounds. The court held there was no evidence plaintiff was released by the school into a dangerous situation which the school had a hand in creating:

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the assault occurred at a time when the plaintiff was not on school property and no longer in the defendant’s custody or under its control and was, thus, outside of the orbit of its authority … . The defendant also demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff was not released into a foreseeably hazardous setting that the defendant had a hand in creating … . Diaz v Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 05485, 2nd Dept 7-13-16

NEGLIGENCE (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR OFF-CAMPUS ASSAULT)/EDUCATIOON-SCHOOL LAW (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR OFF-CAMPUS ASSAULT)/ASSAULT  (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR OFF-CAMPUS ASSAULT)

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SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY TO STUDENT DURING RECESS.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant school could not be held liable for a student’s injury during recess. There was adequate supervision. The student, who had a medical condition and was standing in an area where students were not allowed to play sports, was struck by a ball kicked by another student:

“Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” … . “Schools are not insurers of safety, however, for they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students; therefore, schools are not to be held liable for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another'” … .

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they provided adequate supervision to the infant plaintiff during recess … , and, in any event, that any alleged lack of supervision was not a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s injuries … . Perez v Comsewogue School Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 05488, 2nd Dept 7-13-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY TO STUDENT DURING RECESS)/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY TO STUDENT DURING RECESS)/NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY TO STUDENT DURING RECESS)

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SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR STUDENT’S FALL ON SNOW-COVERED, ICY PLAYGROUND, STUDENTS TOLD TO STAY OFF PLAYGROUND.

The Third Department determined the complaint against the school district stemming from infant plaintiff’s fall on the school playground should have been completely dismissed. The students were told to stay on the blacktop area adjacent to the playground because the playground had ice and snow on it:

Where, as here, the underlying accident “occurs in so short a span of time that even the most intense supervision could not have prevented it, lack of supervision is not the proximate [cause] of the injury and summary judgment in favor of the school defendant is warranted” … . * * *

We reach a similar conclusion with regard to plaintiff’s premises liability claim. To prevail on its motion for summary judgment, defendant was required to “establish as a matter of law that it maintained the [playground] in question in a reasonably safe condition and that it neither created the allegedly dangerous condition existing thereon nor had actual or constructive notice thereof” … . * * * … [D]efendant’s expert opined that there was “no requirement or obligation for [defendant] to clean snow and ice off of the playground surface” — a task that would have been “nearly impossible” due to the rubberized surface material. With respect to the playground equipment itself, defendant’s expert concluded that, inasmuch as plaintiff and her classmates were instructed not to use such equipment, defendant was not required to clear the equipment of snow and ice … . Such proof was, in our view, sufficient to discharge defendant’s initial burden on its motion for summary judgment. Elbadwi v Saugerties Cent. Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 05421, 3rd Dept 7-7-16

NEGLIGENCE (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR STUDENT’S FALL ON SNOW-COVERED, ICY PLAYGROUND, STUDENTS TOLD TO STAY OFF PLAYGROUND)/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR STUDENT’S FALL ON SNOW-COVERED, ICY PLAYGROUND, STUDENTS TOLD TO STAY OFF PLAYGROUND)/NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR STUDENT’S FALL ON SNOW-COVERED, ICY PLAYGROUND, STUDENTS TOLD TO STAY OFF PLAYGROUND)/PREMISES LIABILITY (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR STUDENT’S FALL ON SNOW-COVERED, ICY PLAYGROUND, STUDENTS TOLD TO STAY OFF PLAYGROUND)

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NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM HARASSMENT AND BULLYING BY FELLOW STUDENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined infant plaintiff had raised a question of fact whether the school was liable for negligent supervision stemming from harassment and bullying by fellow students. The Third Department further determined the Dignity for All Students Act (Education Law section 10) does not create a private right of action. With respect to negligent supervision, the court wrote:

“Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” … . “In that regard, a school district is held to the same degree of care as would a reasonably prudent parent placed in comparable circumstances” … . “In determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated” … . Furthermore, the injuries sustained by a plaintiff must be proximately caused by the school’s breach of its duty to provide adequate supervision … . Such issues regarding adequate supervision and proximate cause are generally questions left to the trier of fact to resolve … . Motta v Eldred Cent. Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 05424, 3rd Dept 7-7-16

NEGLIGENCE (NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM HARASSMENT AND BULLYING BY FELLOW STUDENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM HARASSMENT AND BULLYING BY FELLOW STUDENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/BULLYING (NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM HARASSMENT AND BULLYING BY FELLOW STUDENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM HARASSMENT AND BULLYING BY FELLOW STUDENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

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