You are here: / Education-School Law
,

PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF BEING STRUCK BY A BASEBALL DURING TRYOUTS CONDUCTED IN THE GYMNASIUM DUE TO WEATHER.

The Third Department determined defendant school district was entitled to summary judgment in this sports injury case. Plaintiff (Legac) was struck in the face by a baseball during tryouts held in the gymnasium (due to weather). The Third Department held that the school district demonstrated plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury. He was an experienced baseball player and was aware of the way the baseball was being hit by the coach and the way the baseball reacted when striking the gymnasium floor:

​

While Legac testified that he believed that Potter was hitting the ball “too hard” and that the baseball traveled faster on the gymnasium floor than it would have on a baseball field, such conditions were open and obvious and clearly appreciated by Legac, who had the opportunity to watch the players ahead of him complete the ground ball fielding drill and had observed the ball interact with the flooring over three days of indoor tryouts … . Inasmuch as the conditions inherent in the indoor ground ball fielding drill were readily apparent to Legac and the risk of being struck by a ball was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of engaging in that drill, we find that defendants established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint … . Legac v South Glens Falls Cent. Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 04182, 3rd Dept 5-25-17

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF BEING STRUCK BY A BASEBALL DURING TRYOUTS CONDUCTED IN THE GYMNASIUM DUE TO WEATHER)/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (SPORTS, PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF BEING STRUCK BY A BASEBALL DURING TRYOUTS CONDUCTED IN THE GYMNASIUM DUE TO WEATHER)/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF BEING STRUCK BY A BASEBALL DURING TRYOUTS CONDUCTED IN THE GYMNASIUM DUE TO WEATHER)/BASEBALL (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, SPORTS, PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF BEING STRUCK BY A BASEBALL DURING TRYOUTS CONDUCTED IN THE GYMNASIUM DUE TO WEATHER)

,

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION AGAINST SCHOOL DISTRICT PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, STUDENT ASSAULTED INFANT PLAINTIFF.

The Second Department determined the negligent supervision action against the school district, stemming from an assault by a student against the infant plaintiff (another student), properly survived summary judgment. The Second Department noted that the school, as opposed to the school district, is not an entity which can be sued. The decision includes a concise but complete explanation of the relevant law. Here the district was aware the infant plaintiff had been harassed by the student before and the student punched the infant plaintiff while a teacher was present in a classroom. The punch was immediately preceded by a couple of minutes of harassment of the infant plaintiff by the assailant:

​

… [T]he School District has not shown, prima facie, that the incident “involved the type of unforeseeable, spontaneous acts of violence for which school districts cannot be held liable” … , or that the teacher had no time to prevent the infant plaintiff’s injuries and, therefore, the alleged negligent supervision was not a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s injuries … . Moreover, the School District did not demonstrate, prima facie, that the infant plaintiff voluntarily entered into a fight with the classmate; rather, the infant plaintiff’s testimony demonstrated the existence of triable issues of fact as to whether he acted in self-defense … . Because the School District did not meet its prima facie burden, we do not consider the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ opposition papers … . Guerriero v Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 03736, 2nd Dept 5-10-17

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION AGAINST SCHOOL DISTRICT PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, STUDENT ASSAULTED INFANT PLAINTIFF)/NEGLIGENCE (SCHOOL DISTRICT, NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION AGAINST SCHOOL DISTRICT PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, STUDENT ASSAULTED INFANT PLAINTIFF)/ASSAULT (STUDENT ON STUDENT, NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION AGAINST SCHOOL DISTRICT PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, STUDENT ASSAULTED INFANT PLAINTIFF)

,

SCHOOL OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO STUDENT STRUCK BY A CAR AFTER LEAVING THE SCHOOL WITH PERMISSION.

The Second Department determined defendant school did not owe a duty of care to a student who was struck by a car one block from the school after leaving the school with permission:

​

A school’s duty to supervise the students in its charge arises from its physical custody and control over them … . “When that custody ceases because the child has passed out of the orbit of its authority in such a way that the parent is perfectly free to reassume control over the child’s protection, the school’s custodial duty also ceases”… . “Generally, a school cannot be held liable for injuries that occur off school property and beyond the orbit of its authority” … .

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the infant plaintiff had left school grounds with the permission of his mother and, thus, was no longer in the defendants’ custody or under their control and was outside the orbit of their authority … . The defendants also demonstrated, prima facie, that the infant plaintiff was not released into a foreseeably hazardous setting that the defendants had a hand in creating … . Donofrio v Rockville Ctr. Union Free Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 02774, 2nd Dept 4-12-17

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (SCHOOL OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO STUDENT STRUCK BY A CAR AFTER LEAVING THE SCHOOL WITH PERMISSION)/NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, SCHOOL OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO STUDENT STRUCK BY A CAR AFTER LEAVING THE SCHOOL WITH PERMISSION)

, , ,

SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED.

The Third Department, hearing an Article 78 petition, over an extensive two-justice dissent, annulled the determination of SUNY Postdam which found student petitioner guilty of sexual misconduct and expelled him. The court noted its discomfort with several procedural issues and with the punishment imposed. The Third Department held that the determination was not supported by substantial evidence:

​

The complainant’s account was set forth by others who had conversed with her, with the Hearing Board considering written notes prepared by respondent Annette Robbins, SUNY’s director of student conduct and community standards, and the hearing testimony of a campus police officer. * * *

… [H]earsay must be “sufficiently relevant and probative [if it is] to constitute substantial evidence” … and, “when the hearsay evidence is seriously controverted, common sense and elemental fairness suggest that it may not constitute the substantial evidence necessary to support the [challenged] determination” … .

Petitioner testified at the hearing and, while the broad contours of his account matched those of the complainant, their accounts differed on the critical issue of consent. * * *

​

… [W]e feel the need to comment on the circumstances leading to its imposition. Upon petitioner’s appeal from the decision of the Hearing Board, the Appellate Board, sua sponte and without any explanation, recommended enhancing the penalty to expulsion. …  While nothing in the student code of conduct expressly prohibits the Appellate Board from recommending, and SUNY’s president from ultimately imposing, a more severe sanction upon a disciplined student’s appeal, nor does the student code of conduct explicitly advise an appealing student that such a consequence may inure as a result of an appeal. We are troubled by the absence of any such clear articulation that an enhanced penalty may result from a student’s choice to appeal the underlying determination and believe that, in this context, fairness warrants a clear and conspicuous advisement to that effect. Matter of Haug v State Univ. of N.Y. At Potsdam, 2017 NY Slip Op 02708, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/EVIDENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,  (SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (MISCONDUCT, SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/HEARSAY (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)

, ,

MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF, A SCHOOL BUS MATRON INJURED ON THE BUS, DID NOT HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SCHOOL DISTRICT.

The Second Department determined defendant school district’s motion to set aside the verdict in this personal injury case was properly granted. Plaintiff was a matron on a school bus. The bus suddenly stopped when a student grabbed the steering wheel and plaintiff fell. The Second Department explained the criteria for a motion to set aside a verdict as a matter of law and held the school district could not be liable unless there was a special relationship between the plaintiff and the district (no special relationship was demonstrated):

​

“To be awarded judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401, a defendant must show that, upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no rational basis by which the jury could find for the plaintiff against the moving defendant” … . “The plaintiff’s evidence must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that can be reasonably drawn therefrom” … . …

​

With regard to teachers, administrators, or other adults on or off school premises, a special relationship with a municipal defendant can be formed in three ways: “(1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation” … .

A special relationship based upon a duty voluntarily assumed by the municipality requires proof of the following four elements: “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking” … . Moreover, “[t]he assurance by the municipal defendant must be definite enough to generate justifiable reliance by the plaintiff” … . Destefano v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02626, 2nd Dept 4-5-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF, A SCHOOL BUS MATRON INJURED ON THE BUS, DID NOT HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SCHOOL DISTRICT)/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW  (MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF, A SCHOOL BUS MATRON INJURED ON THE BUS, DID NOT HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SCHOOL DISTRICT)/CIVIL PROCEDURE  (MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF, A SCHOOL BUS MATRON INJURED ON THE BUS, DID NOT HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SCHOOL DISTRICT)/SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF, A SCHOOL BUS MATRON INJURED ON THE BUS, DID NOT HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SCHOOL DISTRICT)

, ,

TERMINATION OF OUT OF WORK SCHOOL DISTRICT EMPLOYEE PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW IS NOT ARBITRABLE, PETITION TO STAY ARBITRATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department determined the school district’s petition to stay arbitration should have been granted. A school district employee, Turco, was injured on the job and was out of work on Workers’ Compensation leave for more than a year. The district terminated his employment pursuant to Civil Service Law 71. Turco filed a grievance with his union alleging the termination violated the collective bargaining agreement. The Second Department held that the matter was not arbitrable because of the conflict between the agreement and the statute:

Despite the general policy favoring the resolution of disputes by arbitration, some matters, because of competing considerations of public policy, cannot be heard by an arbitrator. “If there is some statute, decisional law or public policy that prohibits arbitration of the subject matter of dispute, . . . the claim is not arbitrable'” … . Indeed, the public policy exception can be invoked as a threshold issue to preclude arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503 … . “Preemptive judicial intervention in the arbitration process is warranted where the arbitrator [cannot] grant any relief without violating public policy” … . * * *

Here, the district terminated Turco’s employment pursuant to Civil Service Law § 71. Section 71 provides that a public employer may terminate an employee who is absent due to an occupational disability for a cumulative period of one year if the employee remains physically or mentally unable to return to work … . Matter of Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of Middletown N.Y. v Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 02421, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

, ,

STATE’S RULING SCHOOL DISTRICT VIOLATED INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES ACT NOT FINAL, ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING CHALLENGING RULING PROPERLY DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals determined the petitioner school district could not bring an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the state’s finding that the district’s dispute resolution practices for placing students with disabilities violated federal (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act [IDEA]) and state law because the state’s decision was not final:

In 2012, the State found that the District’s dispute resolution practices violated federal and state law and directed the District to take corrective action. Although the State informed the District that failure to comply could result in further enforcement actions, including withholding federal funds, the State did not make a final decision to withhold funds.

A proceeding under CPLR article 78 “shall not be used to challenge a determination which is not final or can be adequately reviewed by appeal to a court or to some other body or officer” … . Likewise, this Court has recognized that “[t]o challenge an administrative determination, the agency action must be final and binding upon the petitioner” … . In addition, in the absence of injury, there is no standing to bring an article 78 proceeding … .

Assuming, without deciding, that a school district may bring an article 78 proceeding to challenge a final determination by the State under the IDEA, here, the State has not made a final determination, the District has not shown that it has exhausted its administrative remedies, and the District is unable to articulate any actual, concrete injury that it has suffered at this juncture. Accordingly, the District’s petition was properly dismissed. Matter of East Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist. v King, 2017 NY Slip Op 02360, CtApp 3-28-17

 

,

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim for a student (Lopez) allegedly injured in gym class was properly denied:

Here, the petitioner failed to establish that the City had acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the accident or a reasonable time thereafter (see General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]). While the petitioner alleges that the physical education teacher invented the particular exercise and was present when Lopez was injured, she failed to submit any evidence that the City acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying their negligence claims … . Thus, the City had no reason to conduct a prompt investigation into the purported negligence … .

The petitioner also failed to proffer evidence establishing a reasonable excuse for her failure to serve a timely notice of claim … . Lopez’s infancy, without any showing of a nexus between the infancy and the delay, was insufficient to constitute a reasonable excuse … . Moreover, the assertion by the petitioner that she was consumed with Lopez’s medical care was also insufficient to constitute a reasonable excuse, as it was not supported by any evidence demonstrating that the delay in serving a notice of claim was directly attributable to Lopez’s medical condition … .

Finally, the petitioner failed to present “some evidence or plausible argument” supporting a finding that the City was not substantially prejudiced by the 11-month delay in serving a notice of claim … . Matter of Ramos v Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 01868, 2nd Dept 3-15-17

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)/NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)

, ,

TERMINATION OF TEACHER BASED ON HER SUBMISSION OF INACCURATE TIME SHEETS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE.

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the termination of a teacher for submitting inaccurate time sheets was not warranted. The teacher had an unblemished record and the misconduct was precipitated by Hurricane Sandy, which flooded her home and the home of her disabled student:

Petitioner filled out the time sheets in question in advance of the dates to which those time sheets pertained. Although she did not, in fact, proceed to provide instruction to the disabled student on the days set forth in those time sheets, she submitted the time sheets without correction on a subsequent date. Because petitioner instructed other students on each of the dates in question, she would have received the same salary regardless of how many students she had instructed or how many hours she had spent with them, and thus derived no benefit from her actions. Petitioner’s misconduct is more a matter of lax bookkeeping than implementation of any venal scheme. There was no scheme to defraud or theft of services on petitioner’s part, and the harm to the public and to the DOE was mitigated. * * *

At the hearing, petitioner admitted that she was guilty of submitting reports stating that she had provided instruction to the disabled student on certain dates when she had not done so and that she had reported to various schools and libraries on certain dates when she had not done so. As petitioner acknowledges, her misconduct warrants punishment, since the disabled student was deprived of the services of a teacher for two months. Petitioner does not seek to set aside the findings of misconduct contained in the hearing officer’s opinion, but only to modify the penalty imposed on her. She has acknowledged her error in judgment and has pledged to change her practices and never to repeat the error. There is no evidence that “petitioner could not remedy her behavior” … . Matter of Beatty v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 01628, 1st Dept 3-2-17

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (TERMINATION OF TEACHER BASED ON HER SUBMISSION OF INACCURATE TIME SHEETS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (EDCUATION-SCHOOL LAW, TERMINATION OF TEACHER BASED ON HER SUBMISSION OF INACCURATE TIME SHEETS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE)/MUNICIPAL LAW (EDCUATION-SCHOOL LAW, TERMINATION OF TEACHER BASED ON HER SUBMISSION OF INACCURATE TIME SHEETS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE)

,

REQUEST TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s request for leave to file a late notice of claim should have been denied. Plaintiff student was allegedly injured at school in a collision with another student at recess. The Second Department held that plaintiff (1) did not demonstrate the school’s timely awareness of the negligent supervision allegations (knowledge of plaintiff’s injury not enough), (2) did not present a reasonable excuse for the failure to timely file, and (3) did not demonstrate the school was not prejudiced by the delay (therefore the burden did not shift to the school to demonstrate prejudice):

… [A]s to the issue of substantial prejudice, the petitioners presented no “evidence or plausible argument” that their delay in serving a notice of claim did not substantially prejudice the appellant in defending on the merits … . The petitioners contend that the appellant has not been substantially prejudiced in its defense because the condition of the accident location has not changed. The condition of the accident location is irrelevant, however, to the petitioners’ claim of negligence—that the appellant was negligent in its supervision of students during a noon recess— and, thus, to the issue of substantial prejudice as well. The petitioners also assert that there were no known witnesses to the incident and, therefore, their delay in filing a notice of claim did not substantially prejudice the appellant in its ability to investigate. This contention runs counter to the petitioners’ allegation that the incident, a collision between the infant petitioner and another student, occurred during a group activity. Lastly, the petitioners contend that the availability of records as to the infant petitioner’s injuries establishes a lack of substantial prejudice. The medical records, however relevant to the issue of damages, have little, if anything, to do with the appellant’s ability to conduct an investigation as to its liability … . Thus, their availability does not support the petitioners’ argument that the appellant has not been substantially prejudiced. Inasmuch as the petitioners failed to present any evidence or plausible argument that the appellant has not been substantially prejudiced by the delay, the appellant never became required to make “a particularized evidentiary showing” that they were substantially prejudiced … . Matter of A.C. v West Babylon Union Free School Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 01351, 2nd Dept 2-22-17

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (REQUEST TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, REQUEST TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED) /NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, REQUEST TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy