You are here: / Criminal Law
, ,

APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MAKE A MOTION ALERTING THE APPELLATE COURT TO A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION WHICH CAME DOWN AFTER THE BRIEFS WERE FILED BUT BEFORE THE APPELLATE RULING; MOTION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department granted the defendant’s motion for writ of error coram nobis on the ground appellate counsel was ineffective. Although the Court of Appeals decision mandating that sentencing judges consider youthful offender status came down after the briefs were filed, appellate counsel should have made a motion to raise the issue:

Defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to raise an issue on direct appeal, specifically, whether Supreme Court failed to determine whether defendant should be afforded youthful offender status. Upon our review of the motion papers and under the circumstances presented here, we conclude that appellate counsel’s representation was not constitutionally adequate. “As held by the Court of Appeals in People v Rudolph (21 NY3d 497, 501 [2013]), CPL 720.20 (1) requires ‘that there be a youthful offender determination in every case where the defendant is eligible, even where the defendant fails to request it, or agrees to forgo it as part of a plea bargain’ ” …  Here, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the court considered whether to adjudicate defendant a youthful offender, even though defendant, who was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]) was presumably eligible … . Although the Court of Appeals decided Rudolph after appellate counsel filed the briefs on appeal and shortly before this Court affirmed defendant’s judgment on appeal, the standard of meaningful representation required appellate counsel to, after Rudolph was decided, seek to file an appropriate motion in this Court in order to raise the argument that Rudolph requires that the sentence must be vacated and the matter remitted for determination of defendant’s youthful offender status …  The order of July 5, 2013 is vacated and this Court will consider the appeal de novo … . Defendant is directed to file and serve his records and brief with this Court on or before January 23, 2023. People v Nathan, 2022 NY Slip Op 05479, Fourth Dept 9-30-22

Practice Point: A motion for writ of error coram nobis is a post-appeal tool for arguing appellate counsel was ineffective. Here a Court of Appeals decision requiring sentencing judges to consider youthful offender status even if not raised by the defendant came down after the briefs were filed but before the ruling. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to make a motion alerting the appellate court to the new law.

 

,

THE JUDGE INCORRECTLY PARAPHRASED THE JURY NOTE; CONVICTION REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s condition, determined that the judge did not adequately inform counsel of the contents of a jury note:

The record reflects that the court received the note from the jury and properly marked it as a court exhibit. The jury note stated, in relevant part, “[p]lease go over manslaughter vs murder 2 elements of the charges from your instructions” … . The court did not read the note verbatim and the record does not reflect that the court showed the note to the parties. Rather, the record reflects that the court informed the parties that the jury wanted the court to “go over the instructions for manslaughter and [m]urder in the [s]econd [d]egree” … . We conclude that by improperly paraphrasing the jury note, the court failed to give meaningful notice of the note … . Contrary to the People’s contention, the difference between the content of the note and the court’s words altered the meaning of the jury’s request … . People v Zenon, 2022 NY Slip Op 05446, Fourth Dept 9-30-22

Practice Point: Here the judge paraphrased the jury note in a way which altered its meaning. Conviction reversed.

 

, , ,

DEFENSE COUNSEL MISTAKENLY FAILED TO NOTIFY THE PROSECUTION OF AN ALIBI WITNESS; DEFENSE COUNSEL ADMITTED HE HAD NO EXCUSE FOR HIS MISTAKE; BECAUSE THE FAILURE WAS NOT DELIBERATE AND WAS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN A TACTICAL ADVANTAGE, THE DEFENSE MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO SERVE A LATE NOTICE OF ALIBI SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT),

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction on the two relevant counts, determined defense counsel’s failure to timely notify the prosecution of an alibi witness was not deliberate and the defense motion to serve a late notice of alibi should have been granted:

… [O]n the day prior to jury selection, defendant filed a motion to permit the late service of a notice of alibi with respect to the first two counts of the indictment. In an affirmation in support of the motion, defense counsel explained that, just days after defendant’s arraignment on the indictment, defendant informed him of the existence of a potential alibi witness, and defense counsel’s investigator confirmed the alibi with the witness a week later. Defense counsel averred that, despite his awareness of that witness, he failed to notify the court and the prosecutor of the existence of the witness simply through his own negligence. Defense counsel had no objection to a brief adjournment for the People to investigate the alibi. Defense counsel’s averments and statements to the court established that his failure to comply with the time limits of CPL 250.20 was not willful or motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage but simply a mistake … and, under these circumstances, defendant’s constitutional right to offer the testimony of the alibi witness outweighed any prejudice to the People or their interest in having the trial begin as scheduled … . The court therefore abused its discretion in precluding the testimony of the alibi witness (see Green, 70 AD3d at 45-46). The evidence against defendant was not overwhelming, and thus the harmless error doctrine is inapplicable here … . People v Thomas, 2022 NY Slip Op 05430, Fourth Dept 9-30-22

Practice Point: The failure to notify the prosecution of an alibi witness was an inadvertent mistake. The defense motion for permission to serve a late notice of alibi should have been granted. The denial of the motion denied defendant a fair trial.

 

, ,

TINTED WINDOWS CONSTITUTED A VALID REASON FOR THE VEHICLE STOP; THE VALIDITY OF THE IMPOUNDMENT OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE AND THE INVENTORY SEARCH WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE TINTED-WINDOWS STOP, THE IMPOUNDMENT AND THE INVENTORY SEARCH WERE INVALID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined (1) the vehicle stop based upon tinted windows was valid, (2) the impoundment of defendant’s vehicle (defendant did not have a license); was proper, and (3) the inventory search of the vehicle was valid: Marijuana and and a firearm were found in the search of the vehicle:

… [W]indow tint violations are a recognized basis for stopping a motor vehicle. The legal test, according to the Court of Appeals, is whether the police officer reasonably believes the windows to be over-tinted in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(12-a)(b) … . Officer Sepulveda’s testimony that he could not see into the defendant’s vehicle meets that test. …

The defendant’s contention on appeal that the impoundment and initial inventory search of the Nissan was unlawful was not raised before the Supreme Court and is therefore unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] …), and we decline to reach that contention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction…. .

From the dissent:

I respectfully dissent in part and vote to reverse the judgment insofar as reviewed for several reasons. First, the People failed to establish a sufficient basis for the police stop of the defendant’s vehicle. Second, the People failed to establish the legality of the impoundment of the defendant’s vehicle. Third, the People failed to establish the validity of the purported inventory search of the defendant’s vehicle. People v Biggs, 2022 NY Slip Op 05328, Second Dept 9-28-22

Practice Point: Tinted windows is a valid reason for a vehicle stop. The extensive dissent in this case called into question the validity of the tinted-windows stop, the impoundment of the vehicle and the inventory search of the vehicle.

 

,

THE JUDGE ASKED THE ADMITTEDLY BIASED JUROR WHETHER HE COULD DISREGARD A POLICE OFFICER’S TESTIMONY IF HE FELT THE OFFICER WAS LYING AND THE JUROR SAID HE COULD; THE QUESTION AND ANSWER DID NOT PROVIDE AN UNEQUIVOCAL ASSURANCE THE JUROR COULD RENDER A VERDICT SOLELY ON THE EVIDENCE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the judge’s questions for the juror, who expressed a bias in favor of police officer, did not elicit an unequivocal assurance the juror could put aside the bias and render a verdict solely on the evidence:

The challenged panelist, who had many connections to law enforcement, stated “I’m definitely bias[ed] toward law enforcement, toward police officers. I know a lot of cops. If you ask me a plain question, I’ll say yes.” …

… [T]he court asked if the panelist could “evaluate the testimony,” and if a witness was “not telling the truth” and “happen[ed] to be a police officer,” would he “disregard that just because [his] best friend is a cop?” The court’s question was not properly framed to elicit an assurance of impartiality. When the panelist, somewhat confused by the court’s inquiry, replied, “No, if I’m understanding your question, I wouldn’t,” he did no more than confirm that in the event he actually found an officer’s testimony to be perjurious, the panelist would not overlook that fact because of his pro-police bias. The court’s next question — “You would be able to evaluate?” — and the panelist’s response that he “would be able to,” likewise fell short of the required express and unequivocal declaration … . “If there is any doubt about a prospective juror’s impartiality, trial courts should err on the side of excusing the juror, since at worst the court will have replaced one impartial juror with another” … . People v Tate, 2022 NY Slip Op 05286, First Dept 9-27-22

Practice Point: Here the potential juror acknowledged his bias in favor of police officers. The judge asked the juror if he could ignore a police officer’s testimony if he felt the officer was lying and the juror said he could. The First Department did not view the question and answer as providing an unequivocal assurance the juror could put aside his bias and render a verdict solely on the evidence. Conviction reversed.

 

THE RECORD OF THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS DID NOT EXPLAIN OR JUSTIFY THE SHACKLING OF DEFENDANT’S HANDS DURING HIS TESTIMONY; EVEN IF HIS HANDS WERE UNDER THE TABLE, THE INABILITY TO USE HIS HANDS DURING HIS TESTIMONY WAS PREJUDICIAL; CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing the conviction by guilty plea and dismissing the indictment, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined the record did not explain or otherwise support the shackling of defendant’s hands when he testified before the grand jury:

An actual justification for the use of physical restraints, specific to the defendant, is … necessary when a defendant testifies before a grand jury; in such context, the People are required to articulate a reasonable basis on the record for their use … . That threshold showing must be made on the record at the commencement of the proceeding, outside the presence of the grand jury…. .

… Review of the confidential grand jury minutes reveals that there was no relevant information offered to support the use of restraints. Shackling incarcerated defendants before the factfinder without revealing an adequate basis for doing so cannot be countenanced. …  Although the People assert that the hand shackles were hidden by the table at which defendant sat, this is disputed and was similarly unaddressed upon the record of proceedings.  It bears noting that it is customary for many people to use hand gestures in the course of describing events; for this reason, the inability to show one’s hands may connote or communicate that one is not trustworthy. Put another way, hiding one’s hands may be interpreted as withholding, may communicate in body language that one has “something to hide.” … .

… [T]here were no cautionary instructions addressing the shackles … , and the evidence presented was not so overwhelming as to eliminate the potential for prejudice … . People v Cain, 2022 NY Slip Op 05239, Third Dept 9-22-22

Practice Point: The record of grand jury proceedings must explain and justify the shackling of defendant’s hands during his testimony. Here the record did not address the shackling. Defendant’s conviction was reversed.

 

, ,

EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE SORA RISK-LEVEL ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING, HE DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL; COUNSEL DID NOT COMMUNICATE WITH DEFENDANT AND DID NOT PRESENT A DEFENSE; ORDER REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined that, although defendant waived his right to be present at the SORA risk-assessment proceeding, he did not waive his right to effective assistance of counsel. Counsel did not communicate with the defendant and did not present a defense at the hearing:

“SORA defendants have the right to the effective assistance of counsel, pursuant to the Due Process Clauses contained in the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution and article I, § 6 of the NY Constitution, because the statutory right to counsel in such proceedings … would otherwise be rendered meaningless, and because SORA determinations affect a defendant’s liberty interest” … . Moreover, “[a] fundamental aspect of the attorney-client relationship is communication” and “we have noted that an attorney’s responsibility in the representation of any client requires consulting with and counseling the client” … . Defendant waived his right to be present at the hearing but did not waive his right to challenge the Board’s risk assessment and the People’s proof … . During the hearing, counsel admitted that he lacked “the benefit of [defendant’s] input” in proceeding with the matter and County Court acknowledged that counsel was at a “disadvantage” because he had not had a chance to speak with defendant. The record further reflects that counsel failed to present a defense or raise any objections and did not require the People to present any proof at the hearing. People v Moore, 2022 NY Slip Op 05242, Third Dept 9-22-22

Practice Point: Even where a defendant waives his right to appear at a SORA risk-assessment proceeding, he is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. Counsel, to be effective, must communicate with the defendant and present a defense.

 

,

RETROACTIVE IMPOSTION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL SEX OFFENDER VICTIM FEE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Christopher, determined the retroactive imposition of the supplemental sex offender victim fee did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the US Constitution. The fee was deemed to have a revenue-generating purpose, not a punitive purpose, and was not so punitive in effect as to negate the revenue-generating purpose. The court noted two two decisions (People v Bradshaw, 76 AD3d 566, People v Diggs, 73 AD3d 1210).should no longer be followed:

… [A] review of the legislative history of the 2004 amendment pursuant to which the supplemental sex offender victim fee was added to Penal Law § 60.35, reveals that it was part of an act entitled “Appropriations-Budgets,” that enacted “into law major components of legislation which are necessary to implement the state fiscal plan for the 2004-2005 state fiscal year” … . …

Next, we proceed to the second step of the inquiry, and consider whether the statute is punitive in effect … . In so doing, we consider the following factors articulated in Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez (372 US 144): “[1] whether the sanction involved an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned” … . People v Bradshaw, 2022 NY Slip Op 05216, Second Dept 9-21-22

Practice Point: Retroactive imposition of the supplemental sex offender victim fee does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause. The purpose of the fee is to generate revenue, not to punish. The fee is not so punitive in nature as to negate its revenue-generating purpose.

 

, ,

DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON WHETHER COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO INFORM HIM OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS GUILITY PLEA AND FOR FAILING TO NEGOTIATE A PLEA TO AN OFFENSE WHICH DID NOT MANDATE DEPORTATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant was entitled to a hearing on his motion to vacate his conviction by guilty plea on ineffective assistance ground. Defendant alleged counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to inform him deportation would be mandatory and (2) for not negotiating a plea to an offense which would not mandate deportation:

… [T]he defendant’s contention that his counsel misadvised him as to the immigration consequences of his plea of guilty is not contradicted by the record, and is arguably supported by the representations made by counsel on the record … , which suggest that counsel did not realize that the defenses to deportation which the defendant might have raised in immigration court would be barred by his plea. In any event, the record does not support a conclusion that there is “no reasonable possibility” that the defendant’s allegations are true (CPL 440.30[4][d] …). Furthermore, the defendant’s averments, including that he has resided in the United States since he was 16 years old, and that he had a child when he entered his plea of guilty, sufficiently demonstrate the existence of a question of fact as to whether it was reasonably probable that the defendant would not have entered a plea of guilty if he had been correctly advised of the deportation consequences of the plea … .

… [T]he defendant was entitled to a hearing on his contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon his counsel’s failure to attempt to negotiate a more favorable plea. The defendant’s allegation that the People offered another plea which would not have constituted an aggravated felony under federal immigration law demonstrated “a reasonable possibility that his plea counsel could have secured a plea deal with less severe immigration consequences” … . People v Alexander, 2022 NY Slip Op 05215, Second Dept 9-21-22

Practice Point: Here defendant was entitled to a hearing on whether his attorney was ineffective for (1) failing to inform him deportation was mandatory for the offense to which he pled guilty and (2) failing to negotiate a plea to an offense which did not mandate deportation.

 

, ,

DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO HEARINGS ON HER SECOND MOTION TO VACATE HER CONVICTION ON THE GROUNDS OF NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, ACTUAL INNOCENCE AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant was entitled to a hearing on her motion to vacate her convictions of predatory sexual assault of a child. Defendant presented affidavits from six witnesses stating the victim had recanted her trial testimony. Defendant’s motion warranted hearings on: (1) the newly discovered evidence (the recantation); (2) actual innocence; and (3) ineffective assistance (failure to present expert evidence to refute the People’s reliance of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome [CSAAS]):

To prevail [the newly-discovered evidence] claim, a defendant bears the burden of establishing that the evidence meets “the following requirements: (1) it must be such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) it must have been discovered since the trial; (3) it must be such as could have not been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4) it must be material to the issue; (5) it must not be cumulative to the former issue; and[] (6) it must not be merely impeaching or contradicting the former evidence” … . * * *

… [W]e conclude that the six affidavits, together with the copies of text messages between victim B and some of the affiants,[FN1] were sufficient to warrant the holding of a hearing, such that County Court’s denial of defendant’s motion on the ground of newly discovered evidence in the absence of such a hearing was error … . * * *

… [D]efendant has established her entitlement to a hearing on her claim of actual innocence. “A prima facie showing of actual innocence is made out when there is a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the court” … .* * *

… [A] defendant may establish that he or she was denied meaningful representation in connection with the failure to call an expert witness by “demonstrat[ing] that such testimony was available, that it would have assisted the jury in its determination or that he [or she] was prejudiced by its absence” … . People v Werkheiser, 2022 NY Slip Op 05188, Third Dept 9-15-22

Practice Point: Here the defendant was entitled to hearings on her second motion to vacate her convictions for predatory assault of the child. She presented newly-discovered evidence (the victim’s recantation) requiring a hearing. Her claims of actual innocence and ineffective assistant (failure to refute the People’s reliance on CSAAS) also warranted hearings.

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy