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No Error in Using Interpreter Who Was Acquainted With Complainants​

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott (with a dissent by Judge Rivera), the Court of Appeals determined the denial of defense counsel’s request to replace a state-employed court interpreter because he was acquainted with the complainants was not an abuse of discretion:

The interpreter complied with his ethical obligation by notifying the court that he was a friend of complainant husband. Upon receiving that information, the court questioned the interpreter as to whether he (1) knew the facts of the case, and (2) would be uncomfortable translating for complainant wife. Having received a negative answer to both questions, the trial court allowed defense counsel to question the interpreter. Satisfied that its questioning and that of defense counsel uncovered no bias on the part of the interpreter, the court properly exercised its discretion in not removing him.  People v Lee, No 111, CtApp, 5-30-13

 

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Absent Defendant Did Not Receive Effective Assistance of Counsel​

The Court of Appeals held that a defendant who was absent from his trial received ineffective assistance of counsel:

It is well established that a defendant may not, by his absence alone, “waive his right to effective assistance of counsel” …. Although a defendant’s willful absence from trial surely hampers an attorney’s ability to represent the client adequately and must be taken into consideration, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that counsel’s lack of participation during the jury trial amounted to the ineffective assistance of counsel. On this record, including defendant’s cooperation with his attorney in formulating a defense before absconding, there was a “reasonable basis for an active defense” ….  People v Diggins, No 96, CtApp, 5-30-13

 

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Failure to Raise Denial of Constitutional Right to Present a Complete Defense Precluded Appeal

The Second Department noted that the defendant’s failure to raise the denial of his constitutional right to present a complete defense and confront witnesses (re: cross-examination of victim about an alleged motive to fabricate) at trial rendered the issue unpreserved for appellate review.  People v Simmons, 2013 NY Slip Op 03861, 2nd Dept, 5-29-13

 

Court Did Not Abuse Discretion In Not Sentencing Pursuant to Jenna’s Law Even Though Defendant Qualified​

The Second Department, over a dissent by Justice Balkin, affirmed a determinate sentence of five years in prison.  The sentencing court chose not to apply Penal Law 60.12 (Jenna’s Law) which allows indeterminate terms of imprisonment for first-time violent felons if the victim’s domestic violence was a factor in the commission of the crime (criteria met by the defendant).  The sentencing court noted that the defendant would probably never commit another crime, but imposed the sentence as a deterrent to others:

While the court accurately noted that the sentence would have limited deterrent and rehabilitative impact on this particular defendant, the court’s aim in imposing the sentence was, in large part, to deter others from engaging in similar misconduct. Indeed, the court stated at sentencing that “[s]ociety certainly must be concerned with self-help, violent behavior that is not sanctioned by law.” Since the court viewed general deterrence as an overriding sentencing principle, we cannot say that the emphasis was erroneous or that the interest of justice calls for a reduction in the defendant’s sentence …. People v Sheehan, 2013 NY Slip Op 03859, 2nd Dept, 5-29-13

 

10-Year Period for Predicate Felony Tolled by Incarceration​

The Second Department noted that incarceration tolls the 10-year period for consideration of a predicate felony:

Although the period of time between the defendant’s 1999 conviction and the commission of the felonies for which he stands convicted in this case was more than 10 years, the 1999 conviction constituted a predicate felony for purposes of second felony offender sentencing, since the 10-year statutory period was tolled while the defendant was incarcerated from May 5, 2000, to February 22, 2007 (see Penal Law §§ 70.06[1][b][iv], [v]; 70.70[3][b][i]). People v McCray, 2013 NY Slip Op 03857, 2nd Dept, 5-29-13

 

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No Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity—Frisk of Defendant Improper​

Applying a “DeBour” analysis, the Second Department determined the police did not have the right to frisk the defendant.  The police approached the defendant because he was holding two or three cigarettes and the police thought he may be selling loose cigarettes.  The police noticed evidence of gang membership and defendant acknowledged being a member. The police asked defendant if he had a weapon and defendant did not answer.  At that point, based on seeing a bulge in defendant’s pocket, the defendant was frisked and searched. The Court wrote:

The level one request for information may include ” basic, nonthreatening questions regarding, for instance, identity, address or destination'” …. However, ” [o]nce the officer asks more pointed questions that would lead the person approached reasonably to believe that he or she is suspected of some wrongdoing . . . the officer is no longer merely seeking information'” … and the encounter has become a level-two common-law inquiry, which must be supported by ” “a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot”‘” …”[A] police officer who asks a private citizen if he or she is in possession of a weapon must have founded suspicion that criminality is afoot” ….

“[T]o elevate the right of inquiry to the right to forcibly stop and detain, the police must obtain additional information or make additional observations of suspicious conduct sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior” …. ” [I]nnocuous behavior alone will not generate a founded or reasonable suspicion that a crime is at hand'” …. Thus, “in order to justify a frisk of a suspect’s outer clothing, a police officer must have “knowledge of some fact or circumstance that supports a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed or poses a threat to safety”‘”…. Even assuming that the police were justified in conducting a level-two common-law inquiry, they lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to support a level-three encounter consisting of a pat-down or “stop-and-frisk” search… .  People v Kennebrew, 2013 NY Slip Op 03854, 2nd Dept, 5-29-13

STREET STOPS

Insufficient Evidence of Depraved Indifference Assault and Assault on a Police Officer

The Second Department determined there was insufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions for depraved indifference assault and assault on a police officer.  The facts did not demonstrate defendant acted with depraved indifference, nor was the injured police officer engaged in a “lawful duty” when he stopped defendant’s car in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity:

Under these facts, where the defendant was attempting to get away from the officers’ unlawful questioning, where the injuries were caused not by the direct crash, but when the police car pivoted after being hit, and where it all happened in an instant, “the evidence did not establish the degree of depravity and indifference to human life required for depraved indifference [assault]” ….  * * *

A person commits the crime of assault on a police officer when, “with intent to prevent a . . . police officer . . . from performing a lawful duty, he [or she] causes serious physical injury to” the officer (Penal Law § 120.08). “To sustain a conviction of assault in the second [or first] degree under Penal Law § 120.05(3), the People must establish that the injured police officer was engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the assault by the defendant” … .Here, the police conduct in pulling in front of the defendant’s parked vehicle so as to block his ability to pull out of the parking space “constituted a stop, which required reasonable suspicion that the defendant [was] either involved in criminal activity or posed some danger to the police”…. However, Sergeant Pagnotta’s testimony was clear that, at no time prior to the positioning of the police car so as to block the defendant’s vehicle, nor during the ensuing encounter after Sergeant Pagnotta got out of the police car and approached the window of the defendant’s vehicle, was the defendant observed to be engaged in any criminal activity, or in any activity that would have aroused reasonable suspicion.  People v Hurdle, 2013 NY Slip Op 03849, 2nd Dept, 5-29-13

 

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Grabbing and Spinning a Person Does Not Constitute Unlawful Imprisonment​

The Second Department determined that grabbing a woman by the waist, spinning her around and releasing her did not amount to unlawful imprisonment:

…[T]he evidence was legally insufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree (see Penal Law § 135.05). At the fact-finding hearing, the complaining witness testified that the appellant grabbed her by the waist and spun her around, and that, when she ordered him to release her, he immediately complied. This evidence was legally insufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant “restrict[ed] a person’s movements intentionally and unlawfully in such manner as to interfere substantially with [her] liberty by moving [her] from one place to another, or by confining [her] either in the place where the restriction commence[d] or in a place to which [s]he ha[d] been moved, without consent and with knowledge that the restriction [was] unlawful” (Penal Law § 135.00; see Penal Law § 135.05…).  Matter of Terry JP, 2013 NY Slip Op 03844, 2nd Dept, 5-29-13

 

Matter Remitted; County Court Did Not Follow Procedure Mandated by Drug Law Reform Act

In remitting the matter, the Third Department explained County Court failed to follow the procedure mandated by the Drug Law Reform Act:

The record contains no written order denying defendant’s application for resentencing and setting forth County  Court’s “findings of fact and the reasons for such order” as is required under the Drug Law Reform Act (L 2004, ch 738, § 23). Absent the necessary written order, we are without jurisdiction to consider defendant’s appeal … .  People v Allen, 104967, 3rd Dept, 5-23-13​

 

Transfer to Another County for Probation Did Not Divest Sentencing Court of Jurisdiction Over Defendant’s Violation of His Intermittent Sentence​

In this case Columbia County Court sentenced defendant to intermittent imprisonment in the Columbia County jail and five years probation in Greene County where defendant resided.  After defendant failed to report to Columbia County Jail, County Court revoked the intermittent sentence and sentenced defendant to four months. Defendant contended Columbia County Court had relinquished jurisdiction by transferring the probation term to Greene County.  The Third Department disagreed:

Defendant’s reliance on CPL 410.80 – which provides for transfer of probation supervision by the sentencing court to the Probation Department in the jurisdiction (county) where  the defendant  resides at sentencing –  is misplaced … . Defendant was not charged  with violating probation but, rather, was  alleged to have violated his intermittent sentence of imprisonment.  The transfer in CPL  410.80 (2) of “all powers  and  duties” of the sentencing court over supervision of probationers to the receiving court does not, as defendant argues, divest the sentencing court of its express jurisdiction to modify  or revoke a sentence of intermittent imprisonment pursuant to Penal Law § 85.05 (1) (b) … . People v Dick, 104424, 3rd Dept, 5-23-13

 

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