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Naming Different Victim Rendered Superior Court Information Jurisdictionally Defective

The Fourth Department reversed the defendant’s conviction (by guilty plea) because the superior court information (SCI) was jurisdictionally defective.  The SCI and the felony complaint named different victims:

We note that defendant’s contention that the SCI is jurisdictionally defective does not require preservation, and that contention survives defendant’s valid waiver of the right to appeal….“[T]he designation of a[n individual] in the [SCI] different from the [individual] named in the felony complaint renders the crime contained in the information a different crime entirely”…. Thus, defendant was not held for action of a grand jury on the charge in the SCI inasmuch as “it was not an offense charged in the felony complaint or a lesser-included offense of an offense charged in the felony complaint”… .   People v Stevenson, 648, 4th Dept, 6-14-13

 

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ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL, THE FAILURE TO GIVE THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL-EVIDENCE JURY INSTRUCTION WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT INSURANCE AGENT WAS NOT UNDER A DUTY TO NOTIFY THE INSURER OF THE INSURED’S DEATH OR TO MAKE SURE ADDITIONAL INSUREDS WERE NAMED ON THE POLICY AFTER THE INSURED’S DEATH; THE DECEDENT’S DAUGHTER CONTINUED TO PAY THE HOUSE INSURANCE PREMIUMS AFTER HER MOTHER’S DEATH, WHEN THE HOUSE WAS DESTROYED BY FIRE THE INSURER DISCLAIMED COVERAGE BECAUSE ONLY THE DECEDENT WAS NAMED ON THE POLICY (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT HOSPITAL’S EMERGENCY ROOM PERSONNEL WERE UNAWARE PLAINTIFF HAD EXECUTED A “MOLST” DECLINING LIFE-SAVING TREATMENT WHEN THEY PERFORMED CHEST COMPRESSIONS WHICH REVIVED PLAINTIFF BUT FRACTURED RIBS; PLAINTIFF SUFFERED ANOTHER HEART ATTACK SEVEN HOURS LATER AND DIED; A JURY AWARDED DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING; PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ARTICULATE A STANDARD OF CARE OR A VIOLATION OF A STANDARD OF CARE; THE DEFENSE MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
THIS WAS NOT A CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS, AS OPPOSED TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE FLORIDA STATUTE ALONE, CAN BE USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE FLORIDA CONVICTION ALLOWED DEFENDANT TO BE SENTENCED AS A SECOND CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT FELONY OFFENDER; THE FLORIDA STATUTE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED A PREDICATE FELONY (FOURTH DEPT). ​
THE JUDGE’S REFUSAL TO HOLD A PRE-TRIAL HUNTLEY HEARING ON THE VOLUNTARINESS OF DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR (FOURTH DEPT).

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Statement Not Tainted by Unwarned Statement Made an Hour Before; Failure to... Plea Colloquy Deficient Re: Depraved Indifference State of Mind