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Evidence Defendant Had Victimized Other Children Justified Upward Departure in SORA Proceeding

The Second Department determined that clear and convincing evidence defendant had victimized other children justified an upward departure in the SORA proceeding:

…[T]he court’s classification of the defendant as a level three sex offender was justified. The People proved by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had engaged in sexual misconduct with children other than the child whose victimization led to the defendant’s conviction. This constituted aggravating factors of a kind not otherwise taken into account by the guidelines that warranted an upward departure to level three … . People v DeJesus, 2014 NY Slip Op 03815, 2nd Dept 5-28-14

 

“Serious Physical Injury” Element of Gang Assault Not Supported by Legally Sufficient Evidence

The Second Department determined the evidence of the “serious physical injury” element of the gang assault charge was not supported by legally sufficient evidence:

The defendant challenges his conviction of gang assault in the first degree, asserting that the People failed to present legally sufficient evidence that [the victim] suffered a “serious physical injury,” which is defined as “physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ” (Penal Law § 10.00[10]). * * *

Although [the victim] was stabbed in the right flank, his wounds required no stitches, and there was no evidence that he suffered any permanent damage to his kidney, which suffered a small laceration. Moreover, when he was examined, [the victim] was oriented and alert, able to converse, and had normal vital signs and blood pressure. Further, the only evidence of protracted disfigurement or impairment of health was that he had a scar, which the jury saw, and that he felt pain on the scar. The record, however, includes no description of the scar or what, if any, limitations [the victim] suffered as a result of his injury. Thus, the People failed to adduce legally sufficient evidence that [the victim] suffered a “serious physical injury” within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(10), which is an element of gang assault in the first degree … . People v Mazariego, 2014 NY Slip Op 03863, 2nd Dept 5-28-14

 

Defendant’s Refusing to Be Interviewed by the Probation Department Was a Valid Ground for Sentence Enhancement

The Second Department determined the defendant’s refusing to be interviewed by the probation department was a valid ground for a sentence enhancement:

A defendant’s “failure to abide by a condition of a plea agreement to truthfully answer questions asked by [a]; probation department is an appropriate basis for the enhancement of the defendant’s sentence” … . Here, the plea condition requiring the defendant to cooperate with the Dutchess County Office of Probation and Community Corrections (hereinafter the OPCC) was explicit and objective, and the plea allocution reveals that the defendant acknowledged, understood, and accepted such condition … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly imposed an enhanced sentence based upon the defendant’s violation of the condition by refusing to be interviewed by the OPCC. People v Mazyck, 2014 NY Slip Op 03864, 2nd Dept 5-28-14

 

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Quantity and Nature of Child Pornography Warranted an Upward Departure in a SORA Proceeding

The Second Department determined the quantity and nature of the child pornography in defendant’s possession warranted an upward departure in a SORA proceeding:

…[I]n light of the large quantity of child pornography recovered from the defendant’s possession and the nature of that material, which included, among other things, images and videos depicting the torture of children, the County Court properly determined that there were aggravating factors not adequately taken into account by the SORA guidelines … . Upon making such a determination, the court providently exercised its discretion in granting the People’s application for an upward departure from the presumptive sex offender risk level … . People v Rotunno, 2014 NY Slip Op 03817, 2nd Dept 5-28-14

 

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Suicide Notes Not Protected by Marital Privilege—Substance Had Been Revealed to Third Parties

The Second Department determined that suicide notes left by the defendant were not protected by the marital privilege:

“One spouse may not, without consent, disclose a confidential communication made by the other during marriage (CPLR 4502 [b]; CPL 60.10)” … .. While a suicide note can be a communication made during marriage for the purpose of the privilege …, the spousal privilege falls “when the substance of a communication . . . is revealed to third parties” … . Here, the substance of the communication between the defendant and his wife of his intention to commit suicide through taking large quantities of Xanax was revealed by the defendant to Officer Johnstone, his neighbor, and the nurse who happened upon the scene of the accident. In addition, the defendant left the notes on the kitchen counter and directly addressed his children, as well as his wife, in one of the notes. Thus, the Supreme Court properly determined that the notes were not protected by the marital privilege … . People Jacob, 2014 NY Slip Op 03861, 2nd Dept 5-28-14

 

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Loss of Small Portion of Stenographic Record Did Not Require Reversal

The First Department noted that the loss of some of the stenographic minutes of a trial did not require reversal. The trial court had conducted a reconstruction hearing:

The loss of a relatively small portion of the stenographic record does not require reversal of defendants’ convictions … . The court conducted a reconstruction hearing at which various participants in the trial presented their recollections, to the extent possible, of the brief portions of the trial for which minutes are not available. When viewed in light of the presumption of regularity (id. at 796), the facts adduced at the reconstruction hearing regarding the missing pages support an inference that the missing minutes would not have revealed any significant appellate issues. People v Negron, 2014 NY Slip Op 03752, 1st Dept 5-22-14

 

Applicant Eligible for Relief Under Drug Sentencing Reform Statute Must Be Afforded a Hearing

The Third Department noted that an applicant who is eligible of for a relief under the “drug sentencing reform” statute, CPL 440.46, must be afforded a hearing.  People v Cain, 2014 NY Slip Op 03711, 3rd Dept 5-22-14

 

Supreme Court Should Have Proceeded to Second Step of Defendant’s “Batson” Challenge Alleging the Prosecutor’s Exclusion of Jurors on the Basis of Race

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have proceeded to the second step of a “Batson” challenge alleging the prosecutor was excluding jurors on the basis of race.  The matter was sent back for a completion of the process:

As the United States Supreme Court stated in Batson v Kentucky (476 US 79), “[s];election procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice” (id. at 87). The first step under Batson requires a defendant to make a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose” … . This first step “is not to be onerous,” and is satisfied “by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred” … . When a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral explanation for the challenged peremptory exclusions … .

The defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination based on the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude the only two prospective jurors who were black, the same race as the defendant. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s finding, under the circumstances of this case, those facts were sufficient to create an inference of purposeful discrimination in the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to strike the only two jurors in the venire who were black … .

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have proceeded with the second step and, if applicable, the third step of the Batson inquiry. People v Chery, 2014 NY Slip Op 03697, 2nd Dept 5-21-14

 

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Statement About Gang Affiliation Should Have Been Suppressed—Not Merely “Pedigree” Information

The Second Department determined that defendant’s statement about his gang affiliation should have been suppressed. The defendant had not yet been read his Miranda rights.  The People’s argument that the statement was simply part of so-called “pedigree” information (like “address” and “phone number”) was rejected.  The error was deemed harmless however.  People v Hiraeta, 2014 NY Slip Op 03698, 2nd Dept 5-21-14

 

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Supreme Court’s Finding Respondent Was No Longer Suffering from a Dangerous Mental Condition Reversed

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, over a partial dissent, determined Supreme Court erred in finding that the respondent no longer suffers from a dangerous mental condition and could be released from a secure psychiatric facility.  Respondent is now 74 years old and had stabbed a woman 20 years ago.  He refuses to take medication and he refused to undergo a psychiatric evaluation by the Office of Mental health. There were stark differences in the assessment of his mental condition presented at a hearing pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 330.20.  The experts arguing for continued retention were named Simon-Phelan and Formica:

Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03(20) defines a mental illness as “an affliction with a mental disease or mental condition which is manifested by a disorder or disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment to such an extent that the person afflicted requires care, treatment and rehabilitation” (Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03[20]).

Upon our review of the record, we find that the credible evidence established that the respondent suffers from a mental illness, the first element of a dangerous mental disorder (see CPL 330.20[1];[c]). Simon-Phelan and Formica opined that the respondent suffers from bipolar disorder, along with various personality disorders, whether narcissistic, grandiose, or antisocial. Most relevant, the respondent’s behaviors, consistently displayed over the past 20 years, as thoroughly documented throughout the record, are indicative of these disorders. These behaviors include his aggressive and violent acts, his abrasiveness when speaking to others, his refusal to follow rules, his inappropriate sexual advances, his inflated self-esteem, his high level of energy, his excessive writing, and his overzealousness with respect to litigation … . Although the categorization of the respondent’s mental illness has differed between mental health professionals, a number of professionals have drawn the same conclusions as Simon-Phelan and Formica, dating back as far as 1994. As one psychiatrist put it in 2003, the debate about whether the respondent’s “pathology is Axis I or Axis II or some combination thereof . . . can be carried on indefinitely,” but when one considers his symptomatic exacerbation, poor judgment, and poor impulse control, all of which continue to exist, he remains in “the category of dangerously mentally ill.” Matter of Marvin P, 2014 NY Slip Op 03690, 2nd Dept 5-21-14

 

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