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Defendant Did Not Demonstrate Standing to Challenge Search of Vehicle

The Third Department determined the defendant did not demonstrate he had standing to contest the inventory search of a vehicle, parked and empty at the time the police seized it, which turned up a weapon.  A police officer had seen the defendant driving the vehicle just before it was seized and a confidential informant had told the police where the defendant kept a handgun in the vehicle. Because the People did not rely solely on the statutory presumption of possession of a weapon (Penal Law 265.15 (3)) the defendant needed to allege and demonstrate standing.  Because the defendant did not own the vehicle and denied driving it on the day it was seized, he was unable to challenge the search:

A defendant seeking to suppress evidence has the burden to allege and, if disputed, establish standing to challenge a search … . “Standing exists where a defendant was aggrieved by a search of a place or object in which he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy” … . While a defendant is entitled to “automatic standing” if the People “rely solely on the statutory presumption [of possession of a weapon] contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (3) to establish his [or her] guilt” …, defendant here cannot rely on that exception to his burden regarding standing. The People did not depend entirely upon the statutory presumption of standing, but had other evidence, including one officer who witnessed defendant driving the vehicle and the CI who provided information that defendant had a handgun in the vehicle and where within the vehicle the gun would be located … . Inasmuch as defendant did not own the BMW and denied that he was driving it on the day in question, he failed to allege any legitimate expectation of privacy in that vehicle. People v Anderson, 2014 NY Slip Op 04269, 3rd Dept 6-12-14

 

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