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Plea of “Nolo Contendere” to a Sex Offense in Florida Constitutes a “Conviction” of a Sex Offense Requiring Registration in New York

Petitioner pled “nolo contendere” to a sex offense in Florida. Petitioner contended that the offense was based on his having consensual sex with a 15-year-old classmate when petitioner was 18.  The Florida court withheld adjudication. The Court of Appeals determined petitioner was required to register as a sex offender upon his move to New York. The “nolo contendere” plea meets the definition of “conviction” in New York. A “sex offender” in New York is one who has been “convicted” of a “sex offense” which includes a felony in another jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender (the case here):

We held in People v Daiboch (265 NY 125 [1934]), … that the entry of a nolo contendere plea in another jurisdiction, followed by a judgment placing the defendant on probation for two years, was a prior conviction for purposes of sentencing the defendant as a second offender. Although Daiboch did not involve SORA, we confronted the same issue presented by this case: whether a defendant's out-of-state nolo contendere plea for which a non-incarceratory sentence was imposed qualifies as a conviction in New York. Nolo contendere pleas, like Alford pleas, are “no different from other guilty pleas” (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 475 [2000] [recognizing that an Alford plea may generally be used for the same purposes as any other conviction]). And because New York defines a conviction to include the entry of a guilty plea, regardless of the subsequent sentence or judgment, the ultimate disposition of petitioner's Florida conviction is irrelevant. New York distinguishes between a conviction and a “judgment of conviction,” the latter of which includes “a conviction and the sentence imposed thereon” (CPL 1.20 [15]). As we have previously observed, the Legislature intended the Criminal Procedure Law to provide the “definitive meaning” of the term “conviction” for other criminal statutes, and it meant what it said when it defined “conviction” separately from a judgment or sentence … . Matter of Kasckarow v Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders of State of N.Y., 2015 NY Slip Op 03878, CtApp 5-7-15

 

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Admission of Child Abuse Made by Defendant to Psychiatrist Protected by Physician-Patient Privilege—Even Though the Admission Can Be Disclosed in Child Protective Proceedings, the Privilege Applies in a Criminal Trial

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined that an admission of child sexual abuse made to the defendant's psychiatrist was privileged.  The psychiatrist should not have been allowed to testify about the admission at defendant's trial.  The error was not harmless. The Court made it clear that the relaxed evidentiary standards in child protective proceedings where physicians are required to report abuse, do not extend to the context of a criminal trial where the defendant's liberty is at stake:

The Legislature has determined that the protection of children is of paramount importance, so much so that it has either limited or abrogated the privilege through statutory enactments.

The People erroneously assert that these exceptions place offenders on notice that the physician-patient privilege does not apply to statements or admissions triggering a duty to disclose. But it is one thing to allow the introduction of statements or admissions in child protection proceedings, whose aim is the protection of children, and quite another to allow the introduction of those same statements, through a defendant's psychiatrist, at a criminal proceeding, where the People seek to punish the defendant and potentially deprive him of his liberty. Evidentiary standards are necessarily lower in the former proceedings than in the latter because the interests involved are different. Thus, the relaxed evidentiary standards in child protection proceedings lend no credence to the People's argument that defendant should have known that any admission of abuse he made to his psychiatrist would not be kept confidential. People v Rivera, 2015 NY Slip Op 03764, CtApp 5-7-15

 

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Police Officer’s Draping Defendant’s Striped Shirt Over Defendant’s Chest During a Show-Up Identification Was Tantamount to Pointing Out the Defendant as the Perpetrator—Victim Had Told the Police the Perpetrator Was Wearing a Striped Shirt

The Second Department, over a dissent, determined the show-up identification procedure was unduly suggestive, requiring suppression of the identification testimony and a new trial. The defendant did not match the description of a person who had just robbed the victim at knife-point. However, the victim said the robber was wearing a brown and white striped shirt.  When a police officer spotted the defendant, he was shirtless but was carrying a red and white striped shirt. The victim was driven to where the defendant was being held, but she was only able to identify the defendant as the robber after an officer draped the striped shirt over his chest:

Here, the active police involvement in the identification process—the police officers’ draping of the shirt over the defendant’s chest immediately after the complainant had hesitated in identifying the shirtless defendant as the perpetrator and before she did identify him—renders this showup identification procedure unduly suggestive … . The actions taken by the police officers suggested to the complainant that the defendant was the perpetrator. Although the complainant saw the shirtless defendant, she did not identify him as the perpetrator until after the police held the striped shirt up against him. This action by the police is akin to the police having pointed out the defendant as the perpetrator … . People v James, 2015 NY Slip Op 03864, 2nd Dept 5-6-15

 

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Defendant’s Limited Right to Seek the Advice of an Attorney Before Consenting to a Breathalyzer Test Was Violated When the Sheriff’s Department Administered the Test Without First Telling Defendant an Attorney Had Communicated with the Sheriff’s Department on Her Behalf

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, over a dissent, determined defendant's breathalyzer test results were properly suppressed.  After her arrest for Driving While Intoxicated, the defendant did not ask to speak with an attorney and consented to the test.  However, her family communicated with an attorney who called before the breathalyzer test was administered and told the sheriff's department not to test or question the defendant.  The Court of Appeals determined the sheriff's department was obligated to inform the defendant about the attorney's communication before administering the test:

In People v Gursey (22 NY2d 224 [1968])… we recognized a limited right of the accused to seek legal assistance in alcohol-related driving cases. We held that, based on the warning procedure set forth in section 1194 (2) (b), “if a defendant arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol asks to contact an attorney before responding to a request to take a chemical test, the police 'may not, without justification, prevent access between the criminal accused and his lawyer, available in person or by immediate telephone communication'” … . Violation of this right to legal consultation generally requires suppression of the scientific evidence …. Because time is of the essence in obtaining accurate chemical test evidence …, we further observed in Gursey that a suspect's communication with a lawyer regarding “the exercise of legal rights should not [] extend so far as to palpably impair or nullify the statutory procedure requiring drivers to choose between taking the test or losing their licenses” … .

It is therefore well established that “there is no absolute right to refuse to take the test until an attorney is actually consulted, nor can a defendant use a request for legal consultation to significantly postpone testing” … . In other words, conferring with counsel is permissible only if “'such access does not interfere unduly'” with timely administration of the test … . * * *

In our view, the statutory right to legal consultation applies when an attorney contacts the police before a chemical test for alcohol is performed and the police must alert the subject to the presence of counsel, whether the contact is made in person or telephonically. Gursey contemplated that a lawyer retained to represent a DWI arrestee can directly communicate with the police, reasoning that “law enforcement officials may not, without justification, prevent access between the criminal accused and [the] lawyer, available in person or by immediate telephone communication, if such access does not interfere unduly” with the administration of alcohol test … . The fact that defendant consented to the breathalyzer about the same time that the attorney was communicating with the police is not dispositive since defendant, after conferring with counsel, could have revoked her consent prior to administration of the test (see generally Vehicle & Traffic Law §§ 1194 [2] [b], 1194-a [3] [c]). The police therefore must advise the accused that a lawyer has made contact on the accused's behalf … . Once so informed, the accused may choose to consult with counsel or forego that option and proceed with the chemical test. People v Washington, 2014 NY Slip Op 04190, CtApp 5-6-14

 

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Records of Pedigree Information Which Was Linked to the Defendant and Was Supplied by the Person Who Purchased a Prepaid Cell Phone Properly Admitted as Circumstantial Evidence Defendant Purchased the Phone

The First Department determined “[a]uthenticated records showing that the person who purchased a particular prepaid cell phone, which was linked to the crime, supplied pedigree information linked to defendant were properly admitted as circumstantial evidence of defendant’s identity as the purchaser of the phone. In the context of the case, the pedigree information did not constitute assertions of fact, but circumstantial evidence that the declarant was, in all likelihood, defendant … . Rather than being factual, the pedigree information was analogous to a fingerprint left on a document, tending to show the true identity of its author … . Although the purchaser of the phone was not under a business duty to provide the pedigree information, that requirement of the business records exception to the hearsay rule did not apply, because the initial declaration was independently admissible … . The possibility that the phone could have been purchased by an unknown person who had somehow acquired defendant’s pedigree information goes to weight, not admissibility.” People v Patterson, 2015 NY Slip Op 03788, 1st Dept 5-5-15

 

Accepting a Verdict Before Responding to Jury Requests for Further Instructions and a Readback of Testimony Was a Mode of Proceedings Error Requiring a New Trial

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined the trial court’s acceptance of a verdict before addressing jury notes requesting further instructions on the law and a readback of testimony constituted a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal and a new trial:

…”[T]here are few moments in a criminal trial more critical to its outcome than when the court responds to a deliberating jury’s request for clarification of the law or further guidance on the process of deliberations” … . The jury may have resolved the factual issue regarding whether the eyewitness testified that she saw defendant leave the scene without further instruction assistance from the court …. However, the request for a readback of the instruction on reasonable doubt, the determination of which is the crux of a jury’s function, and for a readback of the instruction regarding “the importance a single witness in a case versus multiple witnesses,” “demonstrates the confusion and doubt that existed in the minds of the jury with respect to . . . crucial issue[s] . . . The jury is entitled to the guidance of the court and may not be relegated to its own unfettered course of procedure” … . We therefore conclude that the court’s failure to respond to the jury’s notes seeking clarification of those instructions before the verdict was accepted “seriously prejudiced” defendant … . People v Mack, 2014 NY Slip Op 03075, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

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Hearing Required to Determine Whether Defense Counsel’s Failure to Take Appropriate Steps to Have a Federal Prisoner Testify for the Defense Constituted Ineffective Assistance

The Fourth Department determined a hearing was necessary to address defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction.  The motion papers raised the issue of whether defense counsel’s failure to take adequate steps to ensure a federal prisoner would be available to testify on behalf of the defense constituted ineffective assistance.  Defense counsel submitted an affidavit stating he believed the prisoner’s testimony would have been helpful to the defendant and his failure to have the prisoner appear was not part of a defense strategy. The court also directed that the hearing look into the credibility of the co-defendant who, in his plea colloquy, stated that he acted alone.  People v Becoats, 2014 NY Slip Op 03088, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

Superior Court Information Jurisdictionally Defective—It Did Not Include Any Offense Which Was In the Indictment, or Any Lesser Included Offense

The Fourth Department determined the failure of the superior court information (SCI) to include the offenses in the indictment, or any lesser included offenses, required reversal of the defendant’s conviction:

The two counts charged in the SCI were not offenses for which defendant was held for action of a grand jury (see CPL 195.20), i.e., those two counts were not included in the felony complaint, and they were not lesser included offenses of an offense charged in the felony complaint … . “[T]he primary purpose of the proceedings upon such felony complaint is to determine whether the defendant is to be held for the action of a grand jury with respect to the charges contained therein” (CPL 180.10 [1]). Thus, ” the waiver procedure is triggered by the defendant being held for [g]rand [j]ury action on charges contained in a felony complaint . . . and it is in reference to those charges that its availability must be measured’ ” … . Inasmuch as the SCI to which defendant pleaded guilty did not “include at least one offense that was contained in the felony complaint,” it was jurisdictionally defective … . That defect does not require preservation, and it survives defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal and his guilty plea … . People v Tun Aung, 2014 NY Slip Op 03135, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

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Competency of Evidence Before Grand Jury Not Reviewable On Appeal Where Defendant Convicted Upon Legally Sufficient Trial Evidence

In response the defendant’s claim that a child witness was allowed to testify before the grand jury without determining her testimonial capacity, the Fourth Department noted that the competency of evidence before the grand jury is not reviewable on appeal where defendant was convicted upon legally sufficient trial evidence. People v Riley, 2014 NY Slip Op 03140, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

Notations Added by Judge to Verdict Sheet to Help Jurors Differentiate the Counts Did Not Violate CPL 310.20

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, with a concurring opinion, determined that the notations added to the verdict sheet by the judge to aid the jury in differentiating the counts did not violate the Criminal Procedure Law. The defendant was charged with making purchases at several different stores with forged credit cards.  The judge added store names, dates and locations to the relevant counts on the verdict sheet.  The Court of Appeals determined the notations were of the type allowed by CPL 310.20 (2).  The Court further determined that the use of a GPS tracking device on defendant’s car constituted a warrantless search.  But the search-error was deemed harmless under the facts.  With respect to the notations on the verdict sheet, the Court wrote:

As we explained in Miller “[n]othing of substance can be included [on a verdict sheet] that the statute does not authorize” (Miller, 18 NY3d at 706 [emphasis supplied]). The verdict sheet in Miller violated section 310.20 (2) because it included a legal instruction relative to burden of proof, i.e., words or terms “of substance” (id. at 706-707 [verdict sheet asked the jury if the defendant had established by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted under extreme emotional disturbance]). Verdict sheets may not be utilized to provide legal instruction to a deliberating jury; such instruction is to be provided by the trial court in its jury charge (see CPL 310.30 [stating that during deliberations “the jury may request the court for further instruction or information with respect to the law” and the court, upon notice to and in the presence of the People and the defense, “must give such requested information or instruction as the court deems proper”]). Inclusion of legal instructions on a verdict sheet runs contrary to the statute’s intended purpose of “facilitat[ing] an orderly and intelligent deliberative process” because it enhances the risk that the jurors will perceive the annotation as having special significance as opposed to merely assisting them in distinguishing among the counts.

The annotations here could not have been interpreted by the jury as being intended for any purpose other than identifying the individual stores defendant and his codefendant were alleged to have frequented or the banks relative to certain identity theft counts. Given the number of counts, coupled with the fact that the offenses occurred at different locations at different times (and, in some instances, on different dates), the trial court appropriately included the annotations so that the jury could distinguish the submitted counts. Under the circumstances, the names of the stores clearly fall within the term “complainant” delineated in the statute. People v Lewis, 2014 NY Slip Op 02969, CtApp 5-1-14

 

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