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Evidence Seized In Violation of Probationer’s Constitutional Rights Should Not Have Been Used as the Basis for a Probation Revocation

The Fourth Department determined evidence which was suppressed because it was unconstitutionally seized could not be used to support a revocation of probation, noting that a probationer loses some privacy and Fourth Amendment rights, but not all of both:

The Court of Appeals has “recognized . . . that a probationer loses some privacy expectations and some part of the protections of the Fourth Amendment, but not all of both” …, and “that a person on parole, although legally in custody and subject to supervision, is nevertheless constitutionally entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. A person on probation, subject to similar restraints (see CPL 410.50, subds. 1, 2)[,] should be similarly protected” … . Furthermore, with respect to evidence that was illegally seized from a person under a revocable disposition, “the Court of Appeals has applied the New York constitution to suppress such evidence at a parole revocation hearing . . . , and it would seem to follow a fortiori that such evidence would not be admissible at a probation violation hearing, which is even closer to a criminal action than a parole violation hearing” … . Here, the court concluded that the stop and search of defendant and his home were violative of defendant’s rights under the Constitutions of New York and the United States. Consequently, the court erred in relying upon the evidence seized as a result of those improper searches to conclude that defendant violated a condition of his probation… . People v Robinson, 2015 NY Slip Op 03967, 4th Dept 5-8-15

 

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