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TOWING OF DEFENDANT’S CAR (AND INVENTORY SEARCH) AFTER DEFENDANT’S ARREST FOR SHOPLIFTING WAS CONSISTENT WITH POLICE DEPARTMENT’S WRITTEN POLICY.

The Court of Appeals, over a dissent, determined the police properly towed defendant’s car (which resulted in an inventory search) after defendant’s arrest for shoplifting. The towing of the car was consistent with the provisions of the police department’s written policy:

… [T]he police officers’ decision to tow defendant’s vehicle, which was parked in the same parking lot in which defendant was arrested, was properly made in accordance with “standard criteria” set forth in the police department’s written policy … . Those criteria, among other things, limit an officer’s discretion to tow a vehicle upon a driver’s arrest to situations in which such action is necessary to ensure the safety of the vehicle and its contents and where releasing the vehicle to an owner or designee is not otherwise appropriate. Upon defendant’s arrest, the vehicle would have been left unattended indefinitely in the complainant’s private parking lot, which had a history of vandalism, and the complainant requested that the police remove the vehicle. In our view, the officers’ decision to tow the vehicle was, therefore, consistent with a community caretaking function … . Moreover, there is no indication that the officers suspected that they would discover evidence of further criminal activity in defendant’s vehicle, or that they towed the vehicle for that purpose … . People v Tardi, 2016 NY Slip Op 07822, CtApp 11-21-16

CRIMINAL LAW (TOWING OF DEFENDANT’S CAR (AND INVENTORY SEARCH) AFTER DEFENDANT’S ARREST FOR SHOPLIFTING WAS CONSISTENT WITH POLICE DEPARTMENT’S WRITTEN POLICY)/INVENTORY SEARCH (TOWING OF DEFENDANT’S CAR (AND INVENTORY SEARCH) AFTER DEFENDANT’S ARREST FOR SHOPLIFTING WAS CONSISTENT WITH POLICE DEPARTMENT’S WRITTEN POLICY)/TOWING (TOWING OF DEFENDANT’S CAR (AND INVENTORY SEARCH) AFTER DEFENDANT’S ARREST FOR SHOPLIFTING WAS CONSISTENT WITH POLICE DEPARTMENT’S WRITTEN POLICY

ASKING DEFENDANT WHY HE WAS NERVOUS AND WHETHER HE WAS CARRYING DRUGS DEEMED INVASIVE QUESTIONING, SUPPRESSION GRANTED.

The Fourth Department determined asking defendant (who was on a bicycle and properly stopped) why he was so nervous and whether he was carrying drugs was invasive questioning unsupported by an indication of criminal activity. Suppression of defendant’s statements and seized evidence should have been granted:

… [F]ollowing the permissible stop of defendant on his bicycle, the officers improperly escalated the encounter to a level two common-law inquiry by asking defendant why he was so nervous and whether he was carrying drugs. The officers’ inquiries, which involved “invasive questioning” that was “focuse[d] on the possible criminality” of defendant … , were not supported by the requisite founded suspicion of criminality … . The testimony at the suppression hearing establishes that the officers observed nothing indicative of criminality, and we conclude that defendant’s nervousness upon being confronted by the police did not give rise to a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot … . Because defendant’s inculpatory oral response to the impermissible accusatory questioning resulted in the seizure of the drugs from defendant’s pocket and a postarrest written statement from defendant, the drugs and the oral and written statements must be suppressed … . People v Freeman, 2016 NY Slip Op 07784, 4th Dept 11-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (ASKING DEFENDANT WHY HE WAS NERVOUS AND WHETHER HE WAS CARRYING DRUGS DEEMED INVASIVE QUESTIONING, SUPPRESSION GRANTED)/SUPPRESSION (ASKING DEFENDANT WHY HE WAS NERVOUS AND WHETHER HE WAS CARRYING DRUGS DEEMED INVASIVE QUESTIONING, SUPPRESSION GRANTED)/STREET STOPS (ASKING DEFENDANT WHY HE WAS NERVOUS AND WHETHER HE WAS CARRYING DRUGS DEEMED INVASIVE QUESTIONING, SUPPRESSION GRANTED)

ASKING DEFENDANT WHY HE WAS NERVOUS DEEMED A NONINCRIMINATING QUESTION, SUPPRESSION PROPERLY DENIED.

The Fourth Department determined the police officer’s asking defendant (a passenger in a car pulled over for a traffic infraction) why he was nervous was a nonincriminating question. Therefore defendant’s statement he had “a little bit of weed” and the results of a search were not subject to suppression:

We conclude that, after the stop, the officer was permitted to approach defendant as a passenger in the vehicle and ask nonincriminating questions … . Contrary to defendant’s contention, the officer’s question in response to defendant’s manifest nervousness did not “exceed[ ] a request for information and the question[ ] was neither invasive nor focused on possible criminality” … . Indeed, defendant’s admission that he possessed marihuana in response to the officer’s inquiry “went far beyond what the officer’s words could reasonably expect to evoke” … . People v Williams, 2016 NY Slip Op 07776, 4th Dept 11-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (ASKING DEFENDANT WHY HE WAS NERVOUS DEEMED A NONINCRIMINATING QUESTION, SUPPRESSION PROPERLY DENIED)/SUPPRESSION (ASKING DEFENDANT WHY HE WAS NERVOUS DEEMED A NONINCRIMINATING QUESTION, SUPPRESSION PROPERLY DENIED)/STREET STOPS (ASKING DEFENDANT WHY HE WAS NERVOUS DEEMED AN NONINCRIMINATING QUESTION, SUPPRESSION PROPERLY DENIED)

NOT ASKING A GRAND JURY TO CONSIDER A CHARGE FOR WHICH SOME EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED DID NOT AMOUNT TO WITHDRAWAL OF THE CHARGE (WHICH WOULD REQUIRE JUDICIAL PERMISSION TO RE-PRESENT).

The Fourth Department determined that not asking a grand jury to consider a charge is not the same as withdrawing a charge from the grand jury (which would require a judge’s permission to re-present):

… [T]he Court of Appeals has made clear that, ” [b]efore a grand jury may be said to have acted upon a charge, there must be some indication that it knew about it’ ” (Wilkins, 68 NY2d at 274). Moreover, “[t]here is no evidence in this record that would raise the primary concern of . . . Wilkins, namely that the People withdrew [the criminal sale charges] in order to present [them] to a more compliant grand jury” … . The People’s decision not to present the criminal sale charges for the consideration of the first grand jury is not ” fundamentally inconsistent with the objectives underlying CPL 190.75′ ” … , and we therefore conclude that this case does not present those ” limited circumstances’ ” to which the holding of Wilkins applies (id.). People v Lopez, 2016 NY Slip Op 07772, 4th Dept 11-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (NOT ASKING A GRAND JURY TO CONSIDER A CHARGE FOR WHICH SOME EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED DID NOT AMOUNT TO WITHDRAWAL OF THE CHARGE, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE JUDICIAL PERMISSION TO RE-PRESENT)/GRAND JURIES (NOT ASKING A GRAND JURY TO CONSIDER A CHARGE FOR WHICH SOME EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED DID NOT AMOUNT TO WITHDRAWAL OF THE CHARGE, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE JUDICIAL PERMISSION TO RE-PRESENT)

JUDGE SHOULD HAVE MADE AN INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF JUROR BIAS BASED UPON AN OBSERVATION DURING A RECESS, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the trial judge should have inquired further into the allegation of juror bias. One of defendant’s friends told the court two jurors were overheard referring to defendant as a scumbag during a recess:

“If at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and before the rendition of its verdict, . . . the court finds, from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve in the case . . . the court must discharge such juror” (CPL 270.35 [1]). The standard for discharging a sworn juror is satisfied ” when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict’ ” … . There is a well-established framework by which the court must evaluate a sworn juror who, for one reason or another, may possess such a state of mind … .

To make a proper determination, the court “must question each allegedly unqualified juror individually in camera in the presence of the attorneys and defendant” (Buford, 69 NY2d at 299). “In a probing and tactful inquiry, the court should evaluate the nature of what the juror has seen, heard, or has acquired knowledge of, and assess its importance and its bearing on the case” (id.). During the inquiry, “the court should carefully consider the juror’s answers and demeanor to ascertain whether [his or] her state of mind will affect [his or] her deliberations” (id.). That accomplished, the court must place the reasons for its ruling on the record (see id.).

It has been emphasized repeatedly that ” each case must be evaluated on its unique facts’ ” … . To that end, the court must hold a Buford inquiry whenever there are facts indicating the possibility of juror bias, and must not base its ruling on speculation … . Not only does the court’s failure to hold an inquiry under such circumstances constitute reversible error, but its failure to place the reasons for its ruling on the record also constitutes reversible error … . Such errors are not subject to harmless error analysis … . People v Kuzdzal, 2016 NY Slip Op 07768, 4th Dept 11-18-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (JUDGE SHOULD HAVE MADE AN INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF JUROR BIAS BASED UPON AN OBSERVATION DURING A RECESS, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/JURORS (CRIMINAL LAW, JUROR BIAS, JUDGE SHOULD HAVE MADE AN INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF JUROR BIAS BASED UPON AN OBSERVATION DURING A RECESS, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)

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STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT REQUIRED AFFIRMANCE OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION MOTION.

The Court of Appeals, affirming the denial of a suppression motion, explained the standard of review in the Court of Appeals for mixed questions of law and fact:

… [P]olice were dispatched … after an anonymous caller informed a 911 operator that two black males were walking back and forth … carrying silver colored guns on their waists. One individual was described as wearing a white t-shirt with red letters. The other was wearing a black t-shirt.

Two uniformed police officers, each driving a marked patrol car, responded to a radio dispatch concerning the 911 call. The first officer to arrive observed two black males walking side-by-side … . One male had a black t-shirt and the other male wore a two-toned blue jacket, over what appeared to the officer to be a light-colored t-shirt. The officer parked his vehicle and approached the men on foot. As soon as they saw the officer, one man fled into a backyard and the other man, defendant, continued to walk southbound … . The officer pursued the fleeing man with his gun drawn and observed the man hide what was later discovered to be a handgun underneath a pile of leaves.

When the second officer arrived at the scene, he observed the fleeing man run into the backyard with the first officer running after him and defendant walking … . No one else was in the area. As the second officer parked and exited his vehicle, defendant yelled an expletive and fled. The officer gave chase and observed a handgun fall from defendant’s waist.

The [Appellate Division] explained that defendant’s flight upon seeing the second officer exit his vehicle provided the officer with the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to warrant his pursuit of defendant, and the fact that defendant dropped the gun during the pursuit gave rise to probable cause to arrest … .

The issue of whether the second officer had reasonable suspicion to pursue defendant is a mixed question of law and fact, limiting our review … . Because there is record support for the determination of the lower courts, we affirm … . People v Gayden, 2016 NY Slip Op 07702, CtApp 11-17-16

CRIMINAL LAW (STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT REQUIRED AFFIRMANCE OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION MOTION)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT REQUIRED AFFIRMANCE OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION MOTION)/STREET STOPS (STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT REQUIRED AFFIRMANCE OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION MOTION)/SUPPRESS, MOTIONS TO (STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT REQUIRED AFFIRMANCE OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION MOTION)

PAUCITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED TO DEFENDANT CONCERNING THE BASIS FOR HER ARREST WARRANTED A SUPPRESSION HEARING DESPITE THE CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS IN THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

The First Department determined the conclusory allegations in defendant’s motion to suppress were sufficient, under the circumstances, to warrant a suppression hearing:

In People v Wynn (117 AD3d 487 [1st Dept 2014]), we held that the court erred in summarily denying the motion of defendant’s codefendant to suppress statements and physical evidence as the fruits of an unlawful arrest, notwithstanding the conclusory nature of the factual allegations in her suppression motion, where “[a]lthough the People provided defendant with extensive information about the facts of the crime and the proof to be offered at trial, they provided no information whatsoever, at any stage of the proceedings, about how defendant came to be a suspect, and the basis for her arrest, made hours after the crime at a different location” (id. at 487-488). Because the factual allegations in the People’s pleadings and relevant disclosures were materially the same in this case, we conclude that defendant’s motion to suppress, although it asserted nothing more than that probable cause was lacking, was sufficient under the circumstances to entitle him to a hearing. Unlike the situation in People v Lopez (5 NY3d 753, 754 [2005]), defendant’s statement did not “on its face show[] probable cause for defendant’s arrest.” People v Terry, 2016 NY Slip Op 07751, 1st Dept 11-17-16

CRIMINAL LAW (PAUCITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED TO DEFENDANT CONCERNING THE BASIS FOR HER ARREST WARRANTED A SUPPRESSION HEARING DESPITE THE CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS IN THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS)/SUPPRESS, MOTION TO (STATEMENTS, PAUCITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED TO DEFENDANT CONCERNING THE BASIS FOR HER ARREST WARRANTED A SUPPRESSION HEARING DESPITE THE CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS IN THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS)

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EVIDENCE OF CONSENSUAL SEXUAL ACTS WITH ADULTS, ALTHOUGH NOT PRIOR CRIMES OR BAD ACTS, PROPERLY ADMITTED TO CORROBORATE CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY. 

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, affirming the Appellate Division, determined evidence of defendant’s sexual acts with consenting adults was properly admitted to corroborate the testimony of children who described sexual abuse by the defendant. The children alleged defendant took them into a closet where he abused them (oral sex) while he smoked crack cocaine with his shirt pulled over his head. The children’s mother alleged the same scenario with her and other adults. The court noted that the consensual sexual acts with adults were not Molineux evidence because they were not prior bad acts or crimes. The only Molineux evidence was the allegation defendant smoked crack cocaine. Because all the evidence served to corroborate the children’s testimony it was not prohibited “propensity” evidence and the probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect:

… [W]e … note that evidence of defendant’s prior sexual acts with adult women is not “propensity” evidence in its traditional sense. When we limit Molineux or other propensity evidence, we do so for policy reasons, due to fear of the jury’s “human tendency” to more readily “believe in the guilt of an accused person when it is known or suspected that he has previously committed a similar crime” … . But here, that defendant had engaged in oral sex with consenting adult women, while in a closet smoking crack with his shirt pulled over his head, showed no propensity to commit the crimes for which he was on trial. That this evidence corroborated the girls’ accounts does not render it propensity evidence, because corroboration and propensity are distinct concepts. Because “there [was] a proper nonpropensity purpose, the decision whether to admit evidence of defendant’s prior . . . acts rests upon the trial court’s discretionary balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice” … . People v Brewer, 2016 NY Slip Op 07704, CtApp 11-17-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE OF CONSENSUAL SEXUAL ACTS WITH ADULTS, ALTHOUGH NOT PRIOR CRIMES OR BAD ACTS, PROPERLY ADMITTED TO CORROBORATE CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE OF CONSENSUAL SEXUAL ACTS WITH ADULTS, ALTHOUGH NOT PRIOR CRIMES OR BAD ACTS, PROPERLY ADMITTED TO CORROBORATE CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY)/MOLINEUX EVIDENCE (EVIDENCE OF CONSENSUAL SEXUAL ACTS WITH ADULTS, ALTHOUGH NOT PRIOR CRIMES OR BAD ACTS, PROPERLY ADMITTED TO CORROBORATE CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY)

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COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED INDICTMENT ON GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS IT, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY DID NOT SUPPORT THE AGENCY DEFENSE.

The Second Department determined County Court should not have dismissed the indictment upon reading the grand jury minutes, on a ground not raised by the defendant, without giving the People the opportunity to address it. County Court found that the evidence presented to the grand jury warranted the agency-defense instruction, which was not given:

The County Court erred in dismissing the indictment based upon a specific defect in the grand jury proceedings not raised by the defendant, without affording the People notice of the specific defect and an opportunity to respond (see CPL 210.45[1]…). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the People did not waive their right to notice and an opportunity to be heard by failing to move to reargue the court’s order … . Furthermore, upon our review of the record, we find that no reasonable view of the evidence presented to the grand jury warrants an instruction on the defense of agency … . The defendant’s actions were consistent with that of a “steerer,” and not a mere extension of the buyer … . In addition, because the defendant did not testify before the grand jury, no evidence was presented indicating that he did not stand to profit from the sale or that he had no independent desire to promote the transaction … . People v Cruz, 2016 NY Slip Op 07673, 2nd Dept 11-16-16

CRIMINAL LAW (COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED INDICTMENT ON GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS IT, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY DID NOT SUPPORT THE AGENCY DEFENSE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, AGENCY DEFENSE, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED INDICTMENT ON GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS IT, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY DID NOT SUPPORT THE AGENCY DEFENSE)/GRAND JURY (COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED INDICTMENT ON GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS IT, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY DID NOT SUPPORT THE AGENCY DEFENSE)/AGENCY DEFENSE (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED INDICTMENT ON GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS IT, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY DID NOT SUPPORT THE AGENCY DEFENSE)

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QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.

The Second Department determined defendant’s statements in connection with a murder charge were made in violation of his right to counsel. A new trial was ordered. At the time defendant was questioned about a robbery and a murder (the “gas station shooting”), he was represented on a marijuana charge. The robbery and murder occurred at different times and places, but defendant allegedly was the getaway driver for both. The trial court ruled the statements related to the robbery were made in violation of defendant’s right to counsel but the statements related to the murder were admissible. The Second Department noted that it is statutorily prohibited from revisiting the trial court’s suppression of the robbery statements. Since the Second Department concluded that the robbery and murder interrogations were necessarily intertwined, the murder statements should have been suppressed:

The Court of Appeals has recognized two categories of cases in which the attachment of counsel on one crime may preclude the police from interrogating a suspect on the subject of another crime. In People v Cohen (90 NY2d 632), the Court of Appeals stated that “where the two criminal matters are so closely related transactionally, or in space or time, that questioning on the unrepresented matter would all but inevitably elicit incriminating responses regarding the matter in which there had been an entry of counsel[,] . . . interrogation on the unrepresented crime is prohibited even in the absence of direct questioning regarding the crime on which counsel had appeared” … . With respect to the second category, the Court of Appeals has stated that “a statement may be subject to suppression where impermissible questioning on a represented charge was, when viewed as an integrated whole, not fairly separable from otherwise permissible questioning on the unrepresented matter and was, in fact, purposely exploited to aid in securing inculpatory admissions on the [unrepresented matter]” … . * * *

In light of the determination that the defendant’s right to counsel was violated when he was questioned with regard to the robbery charges, we further find that his right to counsel was violated by questioning on the factually interwoven homicide matter. Indeed, the robbery and the murder cases were so closely related that questioning about the gas station shooting “would all but inevitably elicit incriminating responses regarding” the robbery … . People v Henry, 2016 NY Slip Op 07676, 2nd Dept 11-16-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)

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