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UNDER THE NEW DISCOVERY ARTICLE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW ARTICLE 245, THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO “AUTOMATIC” DISCLOSURE OF THE TESTIMONY (IN A PRIOR CASE) OF AN ARRESTING OFFICER WHICH HAD BEEN DEEMED INCREDIBLE; THE FAILURE TO TURN OVER THE EVIDENCE RENDERED THE STATEMENT OF READINESS ILLUSORY; INDICTMENT DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, affirming Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Voutsinas, determined the Certificates of Compliance filed by the People were improper and the statement of readiness was  illusory because evidence which could be used to impeach the credibility of one of the arresting officers (Lt. Ruiz) was not turned over. The indictment was dismissed on speedy-trial grounds. The opinion is comprehensive and cannot be fairly summarized here:

This appeal concerns the new disclosure obligations in criminal cases, enacted by the New York State Legislature, effective January 1, 2020, as part of sweeping criminal justice reform legislation under the new CPL article 245 … . The new legislation provides, inter alia, for “[a]utomatic” disclosure by the People to the defendant of “all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case” that are in the People’s possession or control (CPL 245.20[1]). Specifically, this appeal concerns CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv), which requires that the People disclose “[a]ll evidence and information” that “tends to . . . impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness.” We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the People were required to disclose, pursuant to CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv), underlying records from a prior case where one of the prosecution witnesses was found to be incredible, and that the Supreme Court properly determined, based upon the record before it, that the People’s certificates of compliance were improper, properly struck a statement of readiness as illusory, and properly granted the defendants’ motions, inter alia, pursuant to CPL 30.30 to dismiss the indictment on the ground that they were deprived of their statutory right to a speedy trial. * * *

This Court holds that the underlying records in the case in which Lt. Ruiz’s testimony was found to be incredible did relate to the subject matter of this case for impeachment purposes … . Here, the underlying records pertaining to Lt. Ruiz’s incredible testimony, including the transcript of his testimony, did relate to the subject matter of the case because the material went toward the weight of the credibility of the witness and could be used for impeachment purposes. Therefore, the People were required to provide the records. People v Coley, 2025 NY Slip Op 01945, Second Dept 4-2-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a comprehensive discussion of the People’s obligation to provide “automatic” disclosure of evidence which can be used to impeach the credibility of an arresting officer.

 

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THE POLICE TESTIMONY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING WAS NOT WORTHY OF BELIEF; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGALITY OF THE POLICE CONDUCT; INDICTMENT DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction by guilty plea and dismissing the indictment, determined the police did not demonstrate the legality of the street stop which culminated in the pursuit of the defendant and the seizure of the firearm in defendant’s possession. The testimony of the arresting officer, Tofalli, at the suppression hearing was deemed unworthy of belief. Therefore the People did not meet their initial burden at the hearing, i.e., proving the legality of the police conduct:

“‘In order to justify police pursuit, the officers must have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed'” … . Reasonable suspicion exists where there is a “quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man [or woman] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand” … . “A suspect’s flight alone or in conjunction with equivocal circumstances that might suggest a police request for information is insufficient to justify pursuit,” and “[p]ursuit is only authorized when flight is combined with circumstances indicating that the suspect might be engaged in criminal activity” … .

Here, the People failed to establish the legality of the police conduct in the first instance, as Tofalli’s testimony was incredible as a matter of law and patently tailored to meet constitutional objections … . Tofalli’s testimony that when the defendant pulled up his pants he was able to see an “L-shape” outline in the defendant’s waistband while the initial target was standing two feet in front of the defendant directly between Tofalli and the defendant defies common sense and strains credulity. Moreover, Tofalli’s testimony was inconsistent with the notes he made in his memo book, arrest reports generated after the incident, and his testimony before the grand jury, none of which made any mention of the initial target … , and was further inconsistent with the recording obtained from Tofalli’s body-worn camera, which revealed that prior to his interaction with the initial target, the defendant was not touching his pants, and does not depict the defendant’s T-shirt tightening around an “L-shape” object. Accordingly, under the circumstances presented, we find Tofalli’s testimony unworthy of belief … . People v Black, 2025 NY Slip Op 01943, Second Dept 4-2-25

Practice Point: The flight of the subject of a street stop, without some other indication of criminal activity, does not justify pursuit.

Practice Point: If the police testimony at the suppression hearing is not worthy of belief, the People have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate the legality of the police conduct. Suppression must be granted.

 

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THE RESTITUTION ORDERED AS PART OF DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE AFTER THE SECOND TRIAL RAISED A PRESUMPTION OF VINDICTIVENESS; DEFENDANT ARGUED THE RESTITUTION WAS PUNISHMENT FOR WINNING THE APPEAL OF THE FIRST TRIAL; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT VACATED THE RESTITUTION; ALSO, THE MURDER SECOND DEGREE COUNTS WERE DISMISSED AS INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS OF MURDER FIRST DEGREE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating the restitution portion of the sentence, determined the presumption of vindictiveness had not been overcome. The defendant had won an appeal requiring a second trial. Defendant argued that the restitution in the amount of $139,231.87 ordered after the second trial was punishment for the successful appeal. The Third Department also dismissed the murder second degree counts a inclusory concurrent courts of murder first degree:

“[T]o insure that trial courts do not impose longer sentences to punish defendants for taking an appeal, a presumption of vindictiveness generally arises when defendants who have won appellate reversals are given greater sentences after their retrials than were imposed after their initial convictions” … . * * *

… [T]he imposition of restitution after retrial did result in an enhanced sentence following defendant’s successful appeal, and, as a result, the presumption of vindictiveness arose … . However, the court failed to engage in any on-the-record examination of the objective reasons why an enhanced sentence must be imposed, other than finding that it was not vindictive to order defendant “to make financially whole the representatives of his victims,” facts that indisputably existed at the time of the initial sentencing … . * * *

While we observe that County Court may have not actually been seeking to punish defendant for exercising his right to appeal when it imposed restitution, it was nevertheless the court’s obligation to overcome the presumption of vindictiveness by placing the reasons for the enhanced sentence on the record, and, based upon its failure to do so, we are constrained to vacate this portion of defendant’s sentence … . People v Powell, 2025 NY Slip Op 01839, Second Dept 3-27-25

Practice Point: Here ordering restitution as part of the sentence after the second trial raised a presumption that the restitution constituted “punishment” for defendant’s winning the appeal of the first trial. The sentencing court put nothing on the record to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness, so the restitution was vacated.

Practice Point: Here the murder second degree counts were dismissed as concurrent inclusory counts of murder first.

 

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PROOF THAT THE WEAPON WAS LOADED WHEN IT WAS FOUND THE DAY AFTER DEFENDANT POSSESSED IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CRIMINAL-POSSESSION-OF-A-WEAPON-SECOND-DEGREE COUNT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction on a count charging criminal possession of a weapon second degree, determined the People did not prove the firearm was loaded at the time defendant possessed it:

… [W]e find that [the evidence] was legally insufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant’s guilt of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree as charged under count 9 of the indictment, which pertained to the Intratec firearm. A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when, inter alia, with intent to use the same unlawfully against another, such person possesses a loaded firearm (see Penal Law § 265.03[1][b]). Here, the evidence presented by the People …. was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant possessed the Intratec firearm in Queens on July 8, 2007. However, the People did not present any evidence that the Intratec firearm was loaded at the time that it was in the defendant’s possession in Queens on July 8, 2007, as charged under count 9 of the indictment … . Rather, the People merely presented evidence that the Intratec firearm was loaded at the time that it was found by the police in a garage in Brooklyn approximately one day later on July 9, 2007. Under these circumstances, the evidence was legally insufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant’s guilt of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree as charged under count 9 of the indictment … . People v Bostic, 2025 NY Slip Op 01816, Second Dept 3-26-25

Practice Point: Proof that a firearm was loaded on July 9 does not prove the firearm was loaded when defendant possessed it on July 8.​

 

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THE JUDGE, IN RENDERING THE VERDICT, STATED THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT PROVEN HE WAS FRAMED AND THEREFORE WAS GUILTY; THAT SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT, REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the court, in rendering its verdict, shifted the burden of proof to the defendant:

… Supreme Court, in rendering its verdict, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The defendant asserted at trial that he had been framed by the police. In delivering its verdict, the court ruled that “the credible testimony before me does not persuade this Court beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] defendant was in fact framed. And that being so . . . I find [the] defendant guilty.” The court’s finding “reverses the constitutionally required principles that the defense bears no burden and that it is the prosecution that must introduce evidence sufficient to persuade the fact finder, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt” … . People v Steward, 2025 NY Slip Op 01825, Second Dept 3-26-25

Practice Point: Here the judge, in rendering the verdict, stated the defendant was found guilty because the defendant had not proven he was framed. Shifting the burden of proof to the defendant required reversal and a new trial.

 

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THE JUDGE DID NOT HOLD A COMPETENCY HEARING IN VIOLATION OF THE MANDATED PROCEDURES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW ARTICLE 730; MATTER REMITTED FOR A RECONSTRUCTION HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, ordering a reconstruction hearing on the defendant’s competence to stand trial, determined that the judge had not followed the procedures mandated by Criminal Procedure Law article 730:

“Article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law sets out the procedures courts of this State must follow in order to prevent the criminal trial of [an incompetent] defendant” … . The CPL expressly provides that “[w]hen the examination reports submitted to the court show that the psychiatric examiners are not unanimous in their opinion as to whether the defendant is or is not an incapacitated person . . . the court must conduct a hearing to determine the issue of capacity” (CPL 730.30[4] …).. “That section is mandatory and not discretionary” … .

Here, once the Supreme Court made a threshold determination that the defendant’s conduct warranted an examination, it should have followed the procedures mandated by CPL article 730. The failure to comply with the statute deprived the defendant of the right to a full and fair determination of his mental capacity to stand trial … . We find, however, that the requirements of CPL article 730 can be satisfied by a reconstruction hearing … .  People v Petty, 2025 NY Slip Op 01824, Second Dept 3-26-25

Practice Point: If the court orders a psychiatric examination to determine whether defendant is an incapacitated person and the psychiatric examiners are not unanimous, the court must conduct a hearing on the issue of capacity.​

 

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THE NEW YORK CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD (CCRB) IS NOT ENTITLED TO UNSEAL THE RECORD OF THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND TRIAL OF AN OFF-DUTY POLICE OFFICER WHO SHOT A MAN IN A ROAD RAGE INCIDENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice McCormick, determined the NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) was not entitled to unseal the record of a criminal action which had resulted in the acquittal of an off-duty police officer (the defendant) who shot and killed a man during a road rage incident:

At his criminal trial, the defendant presented a justification defense … [and] the jury acquitted him of all charges. As a result, the records pertaining to the defendant’s arrest and criminal prosecution were sealed (see CPL 160.50). * * *

The CCRB charged the defendant with three counts of intentionally using force without police necessity, rising to the level of assault in the second degree, in violation of the NYPD’s Patrol Guide. * * *

… [T]he CCRB moved herein to unseal the record of this criminal action … in order to conduct its disciplinary trial … . * * *

Although the New York City Charter authorizes the CCRB to compel the attendance of witnesses and to require the production of such records and other materials as are necessary for its investigations of police misconduct, and further requires the NYPD, inter alia, to provide records and other materials that are necessary for the CCRB’s investigations, the Charter specifically exempts from such disclosure “such records or materials that cannot be disclosed by law” (NY City Charter § 440[d][1]). As such, it cannot be said that the CCRB has been given a specific grant of power that would allow it to access the sealed records … . People v Isaacs, 2025 NY Slip Op 01818, Second Dept 3-26-25

Practice Point: The NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board cannon unseal the record of the criminal prosecution of a police officer which resulted in an acquittal.

 

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HERE THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT HAD ORDERED A RECONSTRUCTION HEARING BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL RECORD WAS WOEFULLY INCOMPLETE; THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE RECONSTRUCTION HEARING WAS PROPERLY DONE AND AFFIRMED DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION; THE DISSENT TOOK ISSUE WITH NATURE OF THE RECONSTRUCTION HEARING (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming defendant’s conviction over a dissent, determined the reconstruction hearing compelled by the incomplete original record was properly done. The dissent disagreed:

We … reserved decision … and remitted the matter to County Court “to conduct a reconstruction hearing with respect to the missing and irregular transcripts” … .

Upon remittal, the court conducted a reconstruction hearing during which it heard the testimony of the trial judge and his confidential law clerk, the trial prosecutor, defendant’s former attorneys, a court clerk, and a county clerk. The court also admitted in evidence the trial judge’s notes; the court’s voir dire challenge sheet; the trial prosecutor’s notes on the jury charge and his copy of the verdict sheet; the court clerk’s minutes, exhibit list, and witness list; the county clerk’s case summary; and various court exhibits from the trial. Based on the record of the reconstruction hearing and the original record, we now affirm.

From the dissent:

Upon remittal, the court convened a reconstruction hearing without expressly delineating the missing and irregular transcripts to be reconstructed. Instead, the court heard the testimony of witnesses offered by the People and closed the hearing without determining whether the evidence submitted was sufficient to reconstruct a record that would permit defendant to review “whether genuine appealable and reviewable [trial] issues do or do not exist” … . That was error. Although the reconstruction required by the substantial irregularities in this trial transcript was considerably broader than the discrete issues for which reconstruction is more frequently directed … , the intent of our prior decision was for the court to make a determination whether the missing and irregular transcripts were sufficiently reconstructed, not merely to assist in the marshaling of evidence from which this Court could reconstruct the trial record behind closed doors … . People v Meyers, 2025 NY Slip Op 01762, Fourth Dept 3-21-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for the issues raised, and the procedures to be followed, when the original record is too incomplete to allow an appellate review.

 

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IN THIS STRANGULATION CASE, A POLICE OFFICER’S TESTIMONY ABOUT UNRELATED ALLEGED STRANGULATIONS INVOLVING OTHER COMPLAINANT’S DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s strangulation conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the admission of the testimony of a police officer describing unrelated allegations of strangulation by other complainants deprived defendant of a fair trial:

… County Court erred in admitting in evidence testimony from a police officer who responded to the scene regarding his observations of other, unnamed complainants in prior, unspecified cases. The officer was permitted to testify that he had taken photographs “once or twice” of complainants who had “alleged strangulations,” and that he could not recall having observed bruises on those other complainants. The officer’s testimony was used by the People in order to explain that the lack of marks on the neck of the victim in the present case did not mean that defendant did not strangle her. Indeed, during closing argument the People invited the jury to “recall the testimony of [the officer], that he did not observe any signs of bruising on [the victim’s] neck. You’ll also recall that he has been to other strangulations and investigated those, and he didn’t find any injuries there either.” We conclude that the officer’s testimony regarding prior, unrelated cases is entirely irrelevant to the instant case, and that it was error to admit that “irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony” … . People v Iqbal, 2025 NY Slip Op 01746, Fourth Dept 3-21-25

Practice Point: Here a police officer’s vague testimony about unrelated allegations of strangulation involving complainants other than the victim in this strangulation case deprived defendant of a fair trial.

 

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PRIVATE MESSAGES SENT BY THE JUVENILE DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR A “TERRORISTIC THREAT” (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined the messages sent by the juvenile did not meet the criteria for a terroristic threat:

… [A] person is guilty of making a terroristic threat when “with intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population . . . [they] threaten[ ] to commit or cause to be committed a specified offense and thereby cause[ ] a reasonable expectation or fear of the imminent commission of such offense” (Penal Law § 490.20 [1]). Here, petitioner presented testimony that respondent sent private messages to another student in a different school district that respondent was planning to commit a mass shooting to end bullying in his school. There was no evidence that those threats were made to anyone other than the student or that respondent requested that the student relay the threats to others. “A private conversation between immature teenage friends, without more, does not establish the element of intent to intimidate a civilian population” … . Matter of Jose M.F. (Seneca County Presentment Agency), 2025 NY Slip Op 01734, Fourth Dept 3-21-25

Practice Point: Threatening to commit a mass shooting to end school bullying in a private message to another student does not satisfy the criteria for a “terroristic threat.”

 

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