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PLAINTIFF MINORITY SHAREHOLDER ALLOWED TO REPLEAD DIRECT CLAIMS UNDER CAYMAN ISLANDS LAW AGAINST THE CORPORATION STEMMING FROM DISPROPORTIONATE PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BETWEEN DIRECTORS AND PLAINTIFF.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Andrias, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined two causes of action which improperly alleged both direct and derivative claims by a shareholder against the corporation were properly dismissed but could be repled to make direct claims under Cayman Islands law. The dissent argued leave to replead was not warranted by the facts alleged:

Plaintiff should be given an opportunity to replead to remedy the pleading deficiencies … . Although a challenge to a decision to pay dividends would generally be derivative, plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that his claim is direct because the disproportionate payment of dividends is discriminatory and directly harmed him as a minority shareholder. Thus, rather than corporate mismanagement, plaintiff asserts unequal treatment in the form of an intentional, premeditated plan to pay the Investors huge windfall dividends while freezing out minority shareholders in order to induce them to sell their shares to the Investors at a steep discount. * * *

… [P]laintiff should [also] be given leave to replead to separate his direct claim of being induced by the Directors to part with his common shares … for less than their true value from his derivative claim alleging harm to the company … , and to set forth facts to establish the special circumstances necessary under Cayman Islands law to create a fiduciary duty between the Directors and plaintiff as a minority shareholder. Davis v Scottish Re Group Ltd., 2016 NY Slip Op 01756, 1st Dept 3-10-16

CORPORATION LAW (SHAREHOLDER’S DIRECT CLAIMS STEMMING FROM DISPROPORTIONATE PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BETWEEN SHAREHOLDER AND DIRECTORS)/DIVIDENDS (DIRECT CLAIM AGAINST CORPORATION STEMMING FROM DISPROPORTIONATE PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS)/FIDUCIARY DUTY (CORPORATION LAW, DUTY OWED SHAREHOLDER BY DIRECTORS AS BASIS FOR DIRECT CLAIM)

NEW YORK COURTS DO NOT HAVE THE POWER TO DISSOLVE A FOREIGN CORPORATION.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, overruling its own precedent, determined New York courts do not have jurisdiction over the dissolution of a foreign corporation:

 

We agree with the near-universal view that the courts of one state do not have the power to dissolve a business entity formed under another state’s laws. Because a business entity is a creature of state law, the state under whose law the entity was created should be the place that determines whether its existence should be terminated … . Matter of Raharney Capital, LLC v Capital Stack LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 01425, 2nd Dept 2-25-16

CORPORATION LAW (NEW YORK COURTS CANNOT DISSOLVE A FOREIGN CORPORATIOIN)/JURISDICTION (NEW YORK COURT’S CANNOT DISSOLVE A FOREIGN CORPORATION)/ FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (NEW YORK COURTS CANNOT DISSOLVE)

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COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE MAY APPLY TO SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS.

The First Department determined Supreme Court should have conducted an in camera review of documents sought from Morgan Stanley by the petitioner to see whether the documents are privileged under a “common interest privilege.”  Even though a third party, NaturEner, was privy to the documents, and despite a debtor-creditor relationship between Morgan Stanley and NaturEner, because Morgan Stanley and NaturEner shared a common interest in the underlying contract dispute, the common interest privilege may apply:

The common interest privilege is an exception to the rule that the presence of a third party will waive a claim that a communication is confidential. It requires that the communication otherwise qualify for protection under the attorney-client privilege and that it be made for the purpose of furthering a legal interest or strategy common to the parties asserting it … .

We find that Morgan Stanley and NaturEner shared a common interest in their desire to have plaintiff comply with its contractual obligations under the Rim Rock agreements. The fact that respondent and defendant were in a debtor-creditor relationship did not make their interests adverse in all matters and at all times … . Under the circumstances, the court should have ordered an in camera inspection, the limited relief requested in the petition … . Matter of San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v Morgan Stanley Senior Funding, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 01238, 1st Dept 2-18-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE MAY APPLY TO SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS, PARTIES COOPERATING IN LAWSUIT)/COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE (PARTIES COOPERATING IN LAWSUIT)/PRIVILEGE (COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE, PARTIES COOPEERATING IN LAWSUIT)

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DE FACTO MERGER OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS FASHIONED BY THE COURT.

The First Department determined questions of fact were raised about whether there was a de facto merger of two nonprofit corporations. If a de facto merger is found in the sale of a corporation, the liabilities of the seller become the liabilities of the buyer. Because the established “de facto merger” law does not address nonprofits (which have no “owners”), the First Department fashioned a “nonprofit de facto merger” analytical framework:

Since, unlike for-profit corporations, nonprofits do not have owners, we hold that continuity of ownership is not a sine qua non of de facto merger of nonprofits, as it is for a finding of a de facto merger of for-profits … . Thus, it is necessary to examine the other elements of de facto merger.

Plaintiffs satisfied the second and third elements, “cessation of ordinary business operations and the dissolution of the selling corporation as soon as possible after the transaction,” and “the buyer’s assumption of the liabilities ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of the seller’s business”… . …

Triable issues of fact exist as to the fourth element of de facto merger, “continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets and general business operation”… . Ring v Elizabeth Found. for the Arts, 2016 NY Slip Op 01127, 1st Dept 2-16-16

CORPORATION LAW (DE FACTO MERGER OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK)/DE FACTO MERGER (DE FACTO MERGER OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK)/NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS (DE FACTO MERGER OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK)

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BOARD OF RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE CORPORATION UNREASONABLY WITHHELD CONSENT TO TRANSFER SHARES AND PROPRIETARY LEASE TO TWO SONS OF THE DECEASED APARTMENT RESIDENTS.

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the board of defendant residential cooperative corporation unreasonably withheld consent for the shares and proprietary lease to be transferred to the two sons of the deceased holders of the shares and proprietary lease. The case turned on the language of the proprietary lease. The application was made by the two sons, only one of whom was to live in the apartment. The dissent emphasized the term “a family member,” arguing the proprietary lease did not allow a transfer to more than one family member. Estate of Del Terzo v 33 Fifth Ave. Owners Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 01039. 1st Dept 2-11-16

CORPORATION LAW (RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE, BOARD UNREASONABLY WITHHELD CONSENT TO TRANSFER OF SHARES AND PROPRIETARY LEASE)/RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE (BOARD UNREASONABLY WITHHELD CONSENT TO TRANSFER OF SHARES AND PROPRIETARY LEASE)/PROPRIETARY LEASE (RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE, BOARD UNREASONABLY WITHHELD CONSENT TO TRANSFER OF SHARES AND PROPRIETARY LEASE)

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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion for change of venue should have been granted. The court noted that the sole residence of a domestic corporation for venue purposes is the county designated in its certificate of incorporation:

 

“[T]o prevail on a motion pursuant to CPLR 510(1) to change venue, a defendant must show that the plaintiff’s choice of venue is improper, and also that the defendant’s choice of venue is proper” … . The venue of an action is proper in the county in which any of the parties resided at the time of commencement (see CPLR 503[a]…). “[T]he sole residence of a domestic corporation for venue purposes is the county designated in its certificate of incorporation, despite its maintenance of an office or facility in another county” … . Matoszko v Kielmanowicz, 2016 NY Slip Op 00942, 2nd Dept 2-10-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CORPORATION LAW (RESIDENCE OF DOMESTIC CORPORATION FOR VENUE PURPOSES IS COUNTY DESIGNATED ON CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION)/VENUE (MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/VENUE (RESIDENCE OF DOMESTIC CORPORATION FOR VENUE PURPOSES IS COUNTY DESIGNATED ON CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION)

SHAREHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE ACTION AGAINST MORGAN STANLEY ARISING FROM THE LOSS OF $6.2 BILLION FROM HIGH RISK TRADING DISMISSED; PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE PRE-SUIT DEMAND WOULD BE FUTILE.

The First Department, in this shareholders’ derivative action against Morgan Stanley, determined the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that a pre-suit demand upon the board of directors would have been futile.  Therefore, the action was properly dismissed (without prejudice). The lawsuit involved the so-called “London Whale” debacle where $6.2 billion was lost in high-risk trading despite public representations the group engaged in only low risk hedging. The court explained the relevant criteria for a futility demonstration:

 

Plaintiffs’ claim, based on the Board’s alleged failure to properly exercise its oversight duties, is premised on the theory of liability articulated in In re Caremark Intl. Inc. Derivative Litig. (698 A2d 959…). * * *

In Caremark cases, allegations of demand futility are analyzed under the principles set forth in Rales v Blasband (634 A2d 927, 933-934 [Del 1993]) …). Under Rales, the plaintiff must plead particularized facts raising “a reasonable doubt that, [at] the time the complaint [was] filed, the board of directors could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand” … . To rebut the presumption of disinterestedness, the plaintiff must plead particularized facts that, if proved, would establish that a majority of the directors face a “substantial likelihood” of personal liability for the wrongdoing alleged in the complaint … . A “mere threat” of liability is insufficient … .

Here, plaintiffs failed to make the requisite showing that the board could not exercise independent business judgment because a majority of directors faced a substantial likelihood of liability for the challenged conduct. At the time plaintiffs filed their complaint, the board consisted of 11 directors. At most, plaintiffs showed that four of them — inside director Dimon and the three members of the Risk Policy Committee — faced a substantial likelihood of liability … . “Because a majority of the directors are independent, demand is not excused”… . Wandel v Dimon, 2016 NY Slip Op 00252, 1st Dept 1-14-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE)/SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT [SARA] (1000-FOOT SCHOOL-GROUNDS NO-GO ZONE IS NOT PUNITIVE IN EFFECT AND DOES NOT VIOLATE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE)/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1000-FOOT SCHOOL-GROUNDS NO-GO ZONE IN THE SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT IS NOT PUNITIVE IN EFFECT AND THEREFORE DOES NOT VIOLATE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE)/EX POST FACTO CLAUSE (1000-FOOT SCHOOL-GROUNDS NO-GO ZONE IN THE SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT IS NOT PUNITIVE IN EFFECT AND THEREFORE DOES NOT VIOLATE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE)

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Libel Action Based Upon Allegedly False Impressions Created by an Article in an Online News Publication, Including the Allegedly False Context of a Quotation of Plaintiff’s Own Words, Allowed to Go Forward; Pleading Requirements for Piercing the Corporate Veil Not Met.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, determined: (1) the complaint did not state a cause of action for libel per se (because extrinsic facts were necessary for a defamatory interpretation of the statement); (2) the libel cause action failed to sufficiently plead special damages (leave to replead granted); (3) the fact that one of the allegedly defamatory statements was in plaintiff’s “own words” did not warrant dismissal; and (4) the complaint did not adequately allege that the publisher of the statements (Daily Holdings) was the alter ego of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation. The opinion includes substantive discussions (which cannot be fairly summarized here) of defamation, falsity, libel per se, libel, special damages, the so-called “own words” defense, and the requirements for piercing the corporate veil. With respect to the plaintiff’s twitter post which allegedly was used in a false context, the court discussed the so-called “own words defense:”

It is true that courts across the country have extended the “truth defense” to include an “own words” defense (see e.g., Thomas v Pearl, 998 F2d 447, 452 [7th Cir 1993] [holding that “(a) party’s accurate quoting of another’s statement cannot defame the speaker’s reputation since the speaker is himself responsible for whatever harm the words might cause. . . . The fact that a statement is true, or in this case accurately quoted, is an absolute defense to a defamation action.”]; Van Buskirk v Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F3d 977, 981-982 [9th Cir 2002] [applying the “own words” defense despite “contextual discrepancies” between the plaintiff’s own words and the defendants’ quotation of those words]; Johnson v Overnite Transp. Co., 19 F3d 392, 392 n1 [8th Cir 1994] [recognizing the “general rule that a defamation claim arises only from a communication by someone other than the person defamed”]; Smith v School Dist. of Philadelphia, 112 F Supp 2d 417, 429 [ED Pa 2000] [noting that “(g)enerally, a plaintiff can not (sic) be defamed by the use of his own words”]). Although defendants cite to Thomas v Pearl (998 F2d 447) in their brief, the parties failed to specifically address whether the “own words” defense should be adopted by this Court; and we are aware of no authority, in either New York State jurisprudence or in the Second Circuit, which either expressly accepts or rejects the “own words” defense. We are aware of only one case in the State, albeit a federal district court case, that even mentions the defense: Fine v ESPN (11 F Supp 3d 209, 224 [ND NY 2014]), in a section titled ” Own Words’ Defense,” states that it cannot reach the issue because the records needed to compare the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s words were not properly before the court on a motion to dismiss. This highlights, however, the importance of a court’s need to compare the two statements as they appear in the actual writings before applying the “own words” defense to dismiss a defamation claim. This is also evident from the fact that the “own words” defense derives from the “truth defense.” Even if we were to adopt the “own words” defense, we find that it would not apply here where a comparison of the two statements reveals the potential for them to have different effects on the mind of the reader. Franklin v Daily Holdings, Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 08139, 1st Dept 11-12-15

 

Complaint Did Not Sufficiently Allege Demand for Board’s Action Would Be Futile, Criteria Described

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The complaint did not sufficiently allege efforts to have the board initiate the action or the reasons for not making that demand:

Such “[d]emand is futile, and excused, when the directors are incapable of making an impartial decision as to whether to bring suit” … . Demand is excused because of futility when a complaint alleges with particularity (1) “that a majority of the board of directors is interested in the challenged transaction,” which may be based on self-interest in the transaction or a loss of independence because a director with no direct interest in the transaction is “controlled” by a self-interested director, (2) “that the board of directors did not fully inform themselves about the challenged transaction to the extent reasonably appropriate under the circumstances,” or (3) “that the challenged transaction was so egregious on its face that it could not have been the product of sound business judgment of the directors” … . However, “[t]o justify failure to make a demand, it is not sufficient to name a majority of the directors as defendants with conclusory allegations of wrongdoing or control by wrongdoers” … .

Here, the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead that they made a sufficient demand, or that any demand would have been futile … . Taylor v Wynkoop, 2015 NY Slip Op 07643, 2nd Dept 10-21-15

 

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Guilty Plea to Possession of a Weapon Charge in One County Precluded Prosecution for the Same Offense in Another County (Double Jeopardy)

The Fourth Department determined charges stemming from the possession of a weapon in two counties triggered the protection against double jeopardy:

Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of reckless endangerment in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.25) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [3]). The charges arose from an incident in which defendant discharged a firearm into the bedroom window of an occupied, residential home in Oswego County during the early morning hours of March 5, 2012. Defendant was apprehended by the police later that day at a motel in Onondaga County, where a handgun was found in his vehicle. Prior to his trial in Oswego County Court, defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to, in Onondaga County Court, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree for the handgun recovered from his vehicle. * * *

It is well settled that a defendant has “the right not to be punished more than once for the same crime” … . “When successive prosecutions are involved, the guarantee serves a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit . . . and protects the accused from attempts to secure additional punishment after a prior conviction and sentence” … . This case presents a prototypical instance of a constitutional double jeopardy violation inasmuch as defendant was prosecuted and convicted of a crime in Oswego County to which he had pleaded guilty in Onondaga County. In both instances, the charge was the same: criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree pursuant to Penal Law § 265.03 (3).

We reject the People’s contention that double jeopardy did not attach because defendant was convicted in Oswego County before he was sentenced on his guilty plea in Onondaga County. “[T]ermination of a criminal action by entry of a guilty plea constitutes a previous prosecution for double jeopardy purposes” … . People v Gardner, 2015 NY Slip Op 07363, 4th Dept 10-9-15

 

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