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COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION.

The Second Department, reversing (modifying), Supreme Court determined the complaint stated a cause of against for negligent misrepresentation against an insurance broker (Weiss) individually and for breach of fiduciary duty against the broker’s corporation (JDW). It was alleged that the defendants failed to add plaintiff’s landlord as an additional insured and the broker signed a certificate which falsely indicated the landlord had been added to the policy:

Here, the Supreme Court erred in determining, upon reargument, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action sounding in negligent misrepresentation against Weiss individually. … [W]e note that the complaint, as amplified by the evidentiary materials submitted by the plaintiffs, alleged that Weiss personally signed a certificate of insurance falsely stating that the plaintiffs’ landlord had been added as an additional insured on a certain commercial general liability insurance policy, and forwarded this certificate to the plaintiffs, knowing that it was required by the plaintiffs’ landlord. This is sufficient, for purposes of CPLR 3211(a)(7), to state a cause of action against Weiss, based on his personal participation in the commission of a tort … . * * *

The common-law rule is that “an insurance broker acting as an agent of its customer has a duty of reasonable care to the customer to obtain [specifically] requested coverage within a reasonable time after the request, or to inform the customer of the agent’s inability to do so, [but] the agent owes no continuing duty to advise, guide or direct the customer insured to obtain additional coverage” … . However “[w]here a special relationship develops between the broker and client, . . . [the] broker may be liable, even in the absence of a specific request, for failing to advise or direct the client to obtain additional coverage” … . The Court of Appeals has identified three “exceptional situations” which may give rise to such a special relationship: ” (1) the agent receives compensation for consultation apart from payment of the premiums; (2) there was some interaction regarding a question of coverage, with the insured relying on the expertise of the agent; or (3) there is a course of dealing over an extended period of time which would have put objectively reasonable insurance agents on notice that their advice was being sought and specially relied on'” … .

Here, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the complaint sufficiently alleged that there was a course of dealing between JDW and the plaintiffs over an extended period of time, which may have given rise to a special relationship between them … . JT Queens Carwash, Inc. v JDW & Assoc., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 07295, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)/CORPORATION LAW (INSURANCE LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)/NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (INSURANCE LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)/FIDUCIARY DUTY (INSURANCE LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)

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COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL.

The Second Department determined plaintiff had stated a cause of action under the “pierce the corporate veil” theory. Weaver was the developer of a construction project and Andrea was the general contractor. Defendant Weinberg was a member of Weaver and a shareholder of Andrea. Plaintiff had obtained a unpaid judgment against Andrea. Plaintiff alleged Weinberg abused the privilege of doing business in corporate form and sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold Weinberg liable for Andrea’s debts. The court noted that, although the contention that New York does not recognize a cause of action for piercing the corporate veil was not raised below, the question could be considered on appeal because it involves a question of law which appears on the record and which could not have been avoided if raised at the proper time:

To survive a motion to dismiss the complaint, a party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must allege facts that, if proved, establish that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted (1) exercised complete domination over the corporation with respect to the transaction at issue, and (2) through such domination, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form to perpetrate a wrong or injustice against the plaintiff such that a court in equity will intervene … . “Factors to be considered in determining whether an individual has abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate or LLC form include the failure to adhere to [corporate or] LLC formalities, inadequate capitalization, commingling of assets, and the personal use of [corporate or] LLC funds” … .

“Additionally, the corporate veil will be pierced to achieve equity, even absent fraud, when a corporation has been so dominated by an individual or another corporation and its separate entity so ignored that it primarily transacts the dominator’s business instead of its own and can be called the other’s alter ego” … . A cause of action under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is “not required to meet any heightened level of particularity in its allegations … .

Here, the plaintiff adequately pleaded allegations that Weinberg dominated Andrea, and that he engaged in acts amounting to an abuse of the corporate form to perpetrate a wrong or injustice against the plaintiff. In this regard, the plaintiff alleged that Andrea was inadequately capitalized, that Weinberg commingled the assets of Andrea with the assets of Weaver, that Weinberg failed to adhere to corporate formalities with respect to Andrea, that Weinberg kept assets out of Andrea to avoid paying its debts and the judgment to the plaintiff, and that Weinberg used the account of Weaver to partially pay the debts of Andrea to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also sufficiently pleaded allegations that Weaver was the alter ego of Andrea. Olivieri Constr. Corp. v WN Weaver St., LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 07302, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

 

CORPORATION LAW(COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL)/PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL)/APPEALS (COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL)

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DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO (COURT WILL NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO WRONGDOERS).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion too complex for summary here (by Justice Tom), affirmed the dismissal of complaints stemming from the Madoff Ponzi scheme pursuant to the doctrine of in pari delicto (courts will not resolve a dispute between two wrongdoers).

In this case, plaintiff’s claims are precluded under the doctrine of in pari delicto. As the funds’ bankruptcy trustee, plaintiff stands in the funds’ shoes, and is subject to a defense based on the in pari delicto doctrine to the same extent as the funds … . Thus, the doctrine “prevents the trustee from recovering in tort if the corporation, acting through authorized employees in their official capacities, participated in the tort” … .

While a claim of in pari delicto sometimes requires factual development and is therefore not amenable to dismissal at the pleading stage … , the doctrine can apply on a motion to dismiss in an appropriate case … , such as where its application is “plain on the face of the pleadings” … . New Greenwich Litig. Trustee, LLC v Citco Fund Servs. (Europe) B.V., 2016 NY Slip Op 06796, 1st Dept 10-18-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO, COURT WILL NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO WRONGDOERS)/CORPORATION LAW (DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO, COURT WILL NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO WRONGDOERS)/IN PAR DELICTO (DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO, COURT WILL NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO WRONGDOERS)/MADOFF PONZI SCHEME (DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO, COURT WILL NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO WRONGDOERS)

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NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, determined a broad choice of law provision in a contract required the application of New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202). Plaintiff is a corporation incorporated under the law of the Province of Ontario Canada. The statute of limitations for breach of contract under Ontario law is two years. New York’s statute of limitations is six years. Because, under the facts, New York’s borrowing statute applies and therefore the Ontario statute of limitations controls, the action is untimely:

The borrowing statute is itself a part of New York’s procedural law and is a statute of limitations in its own right, existing as a separate procedural rule within the rules of our domestic civil practice, addressing limitations of time … . Thus, applying the borrowing statute is perfectly consistent with a broad choice-of-law contract clause that requires New York procedural rules to apply to the parties’ disputes. 2138747 Ontario, Inc. v Samsung C&T Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 06671, 1st Dept 10-11-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)/CONTRACT LAW (CHOICE OF LAW, NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)/CORPORATION LAW (CHOICE OF LAW CONTRACTUAL PROVISION, NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)/BORROWING STATUTE (NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)/CHOICE OF LAW (CONTRACT, NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION; UNDER THE BORROWING STATUTE, THE CANADIAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES AND RENDERS THE ACTION BROUGHT BY A CANADIAN PLAINTIFF UNTIMELY)

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JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, determined defendants’ motion to dismiss breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action as untimely was properly denied. The facts, which concern the sale of interests in a Russian oil company, are too complex to summarize here. The court held that the complaint alleged a breach of a 2001 joint venture investment agreement based upon an alleged failure to pay plaintiff a portion of sale proceeds in 2013, making the 2014 lawsuit timely:

 

… [T]he motion court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s causes of action for breach of their joint venture agreement and the 2001 Agreement, and for breach of defendants’ fiduciary duty. It held that although there was no written investment agreement signed by both defendants … plaintiff sufficiently pleaded the existence of a valid oral agreement by alleging that the parties agreed to the central terms of the unsigned investment agreement. It further held that the oral agreement was not void under the statute of frauds because it was capable of being performed within one year, and because the statute of frauds is generally inapplicable to joint ventures. It also rejected defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of joint venture claims were time barred, reasoning that the claimed breach of the 2001 Agreement was defendants’ failure to pay plaintiff his percentage share of the 2013 … sale proceeds. * * *

This action was commenced within both limitations periods, because defendants “had a recurring obligation to pay plaintiff his . . . share of the profits generated by” the joint venture. … . A new claim accrued when the obligation to do so was allegedly breached in 2013. Lebedev v Blavatnik, 2016 NY Slip Op 06463, 1st Dept 10-4-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE)/CONTRACT LAW (JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE)/CORPORATION LAW (JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE)/JOINT VENTURES (JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE)/STATUTE OF FRAUDS (JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE)

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SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, recalling and vacating a prior decision and order dated May 31, 2016, determined plaintiff did not state a cause of action for fraud. Plaintiff, a sophisticated investor, procured a majority interest in DuCool, a manufacturer of heating and cooling equipment. The plaintiff, in a share purchase agreement, acknowledged the speculative nature of the investment. And plaintiff was given full access to DuCool’s records prior to the purchase:

Where a cause of action is based in fraud, “the complaint must allege misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, falsity, scienter on the part of the wrongdoer, justifiable reliance and resulting injury” … . Furthermore, where the plaintiff is a sophisticated party, “if the facts represented are not matters peculiarly within the [defendant’s] knowledge, and the [plaintiff] has the means available to [it] of knowing, by the exercise of ordinary intelligence, the truth or the real quality of the subject of the representation, [the plaintiff] must make use of those means, or [it] will not be heard to complain that [it] was induced to enter into the transaction by misrepresentations” … . Circumstances constituting fraud must be set forth in a complaint in detail (CPLR 3016[b]). MP Cool Invs. Ltd. v Forkosh, 2016 NY Slip Op 05944, 1st Dept 9-1-16

FRAUD (SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD)/SECURITIES (SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD)/CORPORATION LAW (SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD)

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PLAINTIFF, A SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR, DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY IN WHICH PLAINTIFF INVESTED AND PURCHASED A CONTROLLING INTEREST, PLAINTIFF HAD THE MEANS TO DISCOVER THE TRUTH BEHIND ANY ALLEGED FALSE CLAIMS.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, determined plaintiff, a sophisticated investor, did not state a cause of action for fraud on the part of the company (DuCool) in which plaintiff invested:

Where a cause of action is based in fraud, “the complaint must allege misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, falsity, scienter on the part of the wrongdoer, justifiable reliance and resulting injury” … . Furthermore, where the plaintiff is a sophisticated party, “if the facts represented are not matters peculiarly within the [defendant's] knowledge, and the [plaintiff] has the means available to [it] of knowing, by the exercise of ordinary intelligence, the truth or the real quality of the subject of the representation, [the plaintiff] must make use of those means, or [it] will not be heard to complain that [it] was induced to enter into the transaction by misrepresentations” … . Circumstances constituting fraud must be set forth in a complaint in detail (CPLR 3016[b]). * * *

Plaintiff is an experienced and sophisticated investor. It did not plead facts to support the justifiable reliance element of fraud … . Plaintiff had total, unfettered access to every aspect of DuCool's company information both before and after its initial investment, even before it held a controlling interest in DuCool. Although learning through the due diligence conducted by its own technology and business consultants that there were frequent technological problems with DuCool products, some of them “severe,” plaintiff proceeded to invest in the company. Thereafter, as the 49% shareholder, plaintiff had the largest percentage ownership of any individual shareholder and it had access to information concerning the operations of the business. There is no factual basis on which to conclude that the alleged fraud involved matters peculiarly within defendants' knowledge, because plaintiff had the means to discover the truth behind any false claims about the condition of the company and whether this was a feasible investment… . MP Cool Invs. Ltd. v Forkosh, 2016 NY Slip Op 04159, 1st Dept 5-31-16

FRAUD (PLAINTIFF, A SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR, DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY IN WHICH PLAINTIFF INVESTED, PLAINTIFF HAD THE MEANS TO DISCOVER THE TRUTH BEHIND ANY ALLEGED FALSE CLAIMS)/CORPORATION LAW (PLAINTIFF, A SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR, DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY IN WHICH PLAINTIFF INVESTED, PLAINTIFF HAD THE MEANS TO DISCOVER THE TRUTH BEHIND ANY ALLEGED FALSE CLAIMS)/CORPORATION LAW (PLAINTIFF, A SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR, DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY IN WHICH PLAINTIFF INVESTED AND PURCHASED A CONTROLLING INTEREST, PLAINTIFF HAD THE MEANS TO DISCOVER THE TRUTH BEHIND ANY ALLEGED FALSE CLAIMS)

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SHAREHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE ACTION IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE, MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's demand for a jury trial in this shareholders' derivative action should have been granted. The court noted that a motion to strike a demand for a jury trial can be made anytime up to the opening of trial:

Supreme Court erred in finding that plaintiff in this shareholders' derivative action was entitled to a jury trial, since the claims brought in his capacity as a shareholder were “derivative and therefore equitable in nature” … . Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the motion was not untimely, since a motion to strike a demand for a jury trial may be made at anytime up to the opening of trial … , and we find no prejudice in defendants' delay of a few months, following the restoration of the case to the calendar, in making their motion. Moyal v Sleppin, 2016 NY Slip Op 04107, 1st Dept 5-26-16

CORPORATION LAW (SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTION IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE, MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTION IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE, MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTION (SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTION IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE, MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/JURY TRIAL, MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR (SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTION IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE, MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

LIABILITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN FOUND ON THE PART OF THE CORPORATE PRINCIPALS WHO COMMITTED OPPRESSIVE ACTS AGAINST PLAINTIFF SHAREHOLDER.

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that liability should not have been found on the part of the corporate principals who committed oppressive acts against the complaining (plaintiff) shareholder:

The Supreme Court also should not have found liability on the part of [the] corporate principals of the corporate defendants, because one of the primary legitimate purposes of incorporating is to limit or eliminate the personal liability of corporate principals … , and the court did not find that they “abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form”… . Qadan v Tehseldar, 2016 NY Slip Op 04036, 2nd Dept 5-25-16

CORPORATION LAW (LIABILITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN FOUND ON THE PART OF THE CORPORATE PRINCIPALS WHO COMMITTED OPPRESSIVE ACTS AGAINST PLAINTIFF SHAREHOLDER)

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PURCHASER OF UNSOLD SHARES IN A COOPERATIVE BOUND BY A STIPULATION TO WHICH PURCHASER WAS NOT A PARTY; STIPULATION RESTRICTED THE NUMBER OF BOARD MEMBERS WHO COULD BE ELECTED BY HOLDERS OF UNSOLD SHARES.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, determined a purchaser of a cooperative apartment, Johnson, was bound by a pre-existing stipulation to which Johnson was not a party. The stipulation required that the holders of unsold shares in the cooperative (HUS) could elect no more than two of the five directors. Unsold shares are held by investors who do not live in the apartments:

The [relevant] documents, including Johnson’s express agreement to take subject to the provisions of the proprietary lease, which incorporated the stipulation, make clear that he was an HUS and was bound by the stipulation’s provisions, including the election restriction … .

[The holder of the unsold shares] should not be permitted to frustrate its obligations under the offering plan or stipulation by transferring its shares to puppet entities to syphon votes away from resident shareholder candidates in order to control the board well beyond the period contemplated by the Attorney General … . Indeed, there is no question that the sole purpose of [the] assign[ment of] 600 shares to Johnson just four days before the … board election was to avoid the provision that prohibited holders of unsold shares from electing more than two directors. Matter of Tiemann Place Realty, LLC v 55 Tiemann Owners Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 04007, 1st Dept 5-24-16

CONTRACT LAW (COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS, PURCHASER OF UNSOLD SHARES IN A COOPERATIVE BOUND BY A STIPULATION TO WHICH PURCHASER WAS NOT A PARTY; STIPULATION RESTRICTED THE NUMBER OF BOARD MEMBERS WHO COULD BE ELECTED BY HOLDERS OF UNSOLD SHARES)/CORPORATION LAW (COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS, PURCHASER OF UNSOLD SHARES IN A COOPERATIVE BOUND BY A STIPULATION TO WHICH PURCHASER WAS NOT A PARTY; STIPULATION RESTRICTED THE NUMBER OF BOARD MEMBERS WHO COULD BE ELECTED BY HOLDERS OF UNSOLD SHARES)/COOPERATIVES (COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS, PURCHASER OF UNSOLD SHARES IN A COOPERATIVE BOUND BY A STIPULATION TO WHICH PURCHASER WAS NOT A PARTY; STIPULATION RESTRICTED THE NUMBER OF BOARD MEMBERS WHO COULD BE ELECTED BY HOLDERS OF UNSOLD SHARES)

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