You are here: / Civil Procedure
,

30-Day Time-Limit for Bringing Article 78 Proceeding Pursuant to Public Health Law Runs from Date of Determination, Not Date of Written Notice of Determination

The Third Department upheld the Appalachian Regional Emergency Medical Services Council’s determination that petitioner’s Article 78 action was untimely. Although the proceeding was brought within 30 days of the written notice of the Council’s determination, and the Council had a policy of issuing written notice, the Third Department determined the 30 day time-limit started when the determination was made, not when written notice was received:

Public Health Law  §  3008  (5) requires that an appeal be taken within 30 days of when a regional council makes its determination, and there is no statutory requirement that the determination be  in writing (see Public Health Law § 3008 [4]… .  Matter of Richmondville Volunteer Emergency Squad, Inc v NYS Department of Health…, 515688, 3rd Dept, 6-6-13

 

Nature of Motion to Resettle Explained

In dismissing the appeal from the denial of a motion to resettle or clarify, the Third Department explained the nature of a motion to resettle and some aspects of motions to reargue and renew:

Petitioner’s motion was one to resettle and/or clarify Supreme Court’s prior judgment regarding back pay. Such a motion is designed “not for substantive changes [in, or to amplify a prior decision of, the court], but to correct errors or omissions in form, for clarification or to make the [judgment] conform more accurately to the decision” … .  Such  motions  rest on  the inherent power  of courts to  “‘cure mistakes,  defects  and  irregularities that  do  not  affect substantial rights of [the] parties'” Here, petitioners’ motion  sought, unsuccessfully, to amplify and substantively amend, not merely to clarify, Supreme Court’s prior judgment  … Under established precedent, no appeal lies from the “‘denial of a motion to resettle [or clarify] a substantive portion of an order'” … .Moreover, even were we to view petitioners’ motion as one to reargue, which Supreme Court indicated would have been untimely (see CPLR 2221 [d] [3]), the motion was not “identified specifically as such” (CPLR  2221  [d] [1]), as required, and, in any event, no appeal lies from the denial of a motion to reargue ….  The motion likewise was not denominated as one seeking renewal (see CPLR 2221 [e] [1]) and was not based upon “new facts” or “a change in the law” (CPLR 2221 [e] [2]).  Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.  Matter of Torpey v Town of Colonie, 515902, 3rd Dept, 6-6-13

 

Certification Order Requiring Filing of Note of Issue in 70, Rather than 90, Days Could Not Be Basis of Dismissal

The Second Department determined that a certification order which required a note of issue be filed within 70 days, rather than 90 days, could not be the basis for dismissal of the action:

The certification order dated March 2, 2010, did not constitute a valid 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216 because it directed the plaintiff to file a note of issue within 70 days, rather than 90 days, of the date of the order. Since the order failed to conform with a statutorily mandated condition precedent to dismissal of the action, the Supreme Court was not authorized to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3216… . Although the plaintiff raises this issue for the first time on appeal, it involves a question of law that appears on the face of the record, and could not have been avoided if brought to the attention of the Supreme Court… . Gu v Hatsis, 2013 NY Slip Op 03970, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

Note of Issue Which States Discovery Not Complete Is a Nullity

The Second Department determined a note of issue which indicates discovery is not complete is a nullity:

Pursuant to Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (22 NYCRR) § 202.21, a note of issue must be accompanied by a certificate of readiness, which must state that there are no outstanding requests for discovery and the case is ready for trial (see 22 NYCRR 202.21[a], [b]). While the filing of a note of issue within 90 days after service upon the plaintiff of a written demand to serve and file the note of issue precludes a court from dismissing the action …, here, the plaintiffs’ certificate of readiness stated, inter alia, that discovery proceedings now known to be necessary were not completed, that there were outstanding requests for discovery, and that the case was not ready for trial. Since the certificate of readiness failed to materially comply with the requirements of 22 NYCRR 202.21, the filing of the note of issue was a nullity, and that branch of the appellant’s motion which was to vacate the note of issue was properly granted… .  Furrukh v Forest Hills Hosp, 2013 NY Slip Op 03968, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

,

Failure to Allege Specific Facts to Rebut Process Server Affidavit Required Denial of Motion to Vacate Judgment w/o Hearing

The Second Department upheld Supreme Court’s denial of a motion to vacate a judgment on the ground defendant was not served.  No hearing was necessary because defendant did not swear to specific facts to rebut the facts in the process server’s affidavit:

“Although a defendant’s sworn denial of receipt of service generally rebuts the presumption of proper service established by the process server’s affidavit and necessitates an evidentiary hearing, no hearing is required where the defendant fails to swear to specific facts to rebut the statements in the process server’s affidavits'”…. Since the appellant never denied the specific facts contained in the process server’s affidavit, no hearing was required… .  Bank of NY v Samuels, 2013 NY Slip Op 03958, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine Applied

In affirming the dismissal of the action on forum non conveniens grounds, the First Department described the criteria and relevant facts as follows:

The doctrine of forum non conveniens, as codified under CPLR 327, permits a court to stay or dismiss an action “where it is determined that the action, although jurisdictionally sound, would be better adjudicated elsewhere” …. The doctrine rests on considerations of justice, fairness and convenience … . * * *

The subject matter of this action – insurance coverage for liability relating to the manufacture of products in Massachusetts – has no substantial connection to New York. When the policies were issued, Warren was a Massachusetts corporation and had its principal place of business in that state. Liberty Mutual, the insurer under the policies at issue, is a Massachusetts corporation that has its principal place of business in that state. Both plaintiffs are foreign corporations that maintain their principal places of business in other states… . Century Indem Co v Liberty Mut Ins Co, 2013 NY Slip Op 03953, 1st Dept, 6-4-13

 

,

Appellate Court Can Grant Summary Judgment to Nonappealing Party

In the course of a decision awarding partial summary judgment to the defendant, the Third Department noted that “this Court has the authority to grant summary judgment to a nonappealing party” and did so with regard to a nonappealing defendant as well.  Shree Shiv Shakti Corp… v Khalid Properties, LLC, 515810, 3rd Dept 5-30-13

 

,

Statute of Limitations for Fraud Applies to Forgery​

The Second Department noted that the statute of limitations provisions for fraud are applied to forgery:

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the statute of limitations for a fraud cause of action applies to a cause of action alleging forgery … .The statute of limitations for a fraud-based cause of action requires that the action be commenced within six years after the allegedly fraudulent act or within two years after discovery, whichever is later….   Faison v Lewis, 2013 NY Slip OP 03813, 2nd Dept, 5-29-13

 

,

Family Court Has Power to Issue Judgment for Child Support Arrearages

After Family Court ruled it did not have jurisdiction to issue a judgment for child support arrearages, the Third Department determined that the court did in fact have jurisdiction.   In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Peters, the Third Department wrote:

While “Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, constrained to exercise only those powers granted to it by the State Constitution or by statute” …, it is empowered “to determine applications to modify or enforce judgments and orders of support” … .In that regard, petitioner [child support collection unit] is authorized to commence violation proceedings “on behalf of persons” who receive child support pursuant to a court order … .  *  *  *

Petitioner thus acted well within its statutory authority in commencing this proceeding to enforce a child support order that respondent had “fail[ed] to obey,”  and  Family  Court  likewise had  subject  matter  jurisdiction to consider it… .  In the Matter of Chemung County Support Collection Unit…v Greenfield, 515864, 3rd Dept, 5-30-13

 

 

 

A Default Judgment Not Supported by “Proof of the Facts Constituting the Claim” as Required by CPLR 3215 (f) Is Not a Nullity​

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, the Court of Appeals determined that the failure to file “proof of the facts constituting the claim” (as required by CPLR 3215(f)) in an application for a default judgment is not a jurisdictional defect that renders a default judgment a nullity.  The Court wrote:

…[T]he word “jurisdiction” is often loosely used. But in applying the principle “that a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is void, and that the defect may be raised at any time and may not be waived” …, it is necessary to understand the word in its strict, narrow sense. So understood, it refers to objections that are “fundamental to the power of adjudication of a court” …. “Lack of jurisdiction” should not be used to mean merely “that elements of a cause of action are absent” …, but that the matter before the court was not the kind of matter on which the court had power to rule.

The defect in the default judgment before us is not jurisdictional in this sense. A failure to submit the proof required by CPLR 3215(f) should lead a court to deny an application for a default judgment, but a court that does not comply with this rule has merely committed an error — it has not usurped a power it does not have. The error can be corrected by the means provided by law — i.e., by an application for relief from the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015. It does not justify treating the judgment as a nullity.  Manhattan Telecommunications Corporation v H & A Locksmith, Inc…, No 118,CtApp, 5-30-13

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy