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Relation-Back Doctrine Allowed Amendment of Complaint After S/L Had Run

The Fourth Department determined the relation-back doctrine allowed plaintiff to amend the complaint.  The court noted that the addition of “piercing the corporate veil” allegations in the amended complaint was “of no moment” because no new cause of action was stated thereby:

In order for the relation back doctrine to apply, a plaintiff must establish that “(1) both claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, (2) the additional party is united in interest with the original party, and by reason of that relationship can be charged with notice of the institution of the action such that he or she will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (3) the additional party knew or should have known that, but for a mistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against the additional party as well” … .

Here, we conclude that the first prong of the relation back doctrine test is satisfied because the claims against DelMonte P.C. arise out of the same occurrence as that alleged against DelMonte, doing business as Niagara Chiropractic Office, i.e., Venne’s treatment of plaintiff … .  We further conclude that plaintiffs satisfied the second prong of that test inasmuch as DelMonte P.C. employed Venne and therefore may be held vicariously liable for his conduct … .  We conclude that plaintiffs also satisfied the third prong of that test inasmuch as they established that their failure to include DelMonte P.C. as a defendant in the original or first amended complaint “ ‘was a mistake and not . . . the result of a strategy to obtain a tactical advantage’ ” … .  Nasca… v Delmonte…, 1191, 4th Dept 11-15-13

 

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German Museum Proved It Had Superior Title to Ancient Assyrian Gold Tablet in Decedent’s Estate/Doctrine of Laches Did Not Apply

In an estate proceeding, the Court of Appeals determined the doctrine of laches did not apply and the German Museum was entitled to the return of the Assyrian gold tablet, which was in decedent’s estate but had been missing from the museum since World War II:

We agree with the Appellate Division that the Estate failed to establish the affirmative defense of laches, which requires a showing “that the museum failed to exercise reasonable diligence to locate the tablet and that such failure prejudiced the [E]state” …. .  While the Museum could have taken steps to locate the tablet, such as reporting it to the authorities or listing it on a stolen art registry, the Museum explained that it did not do so for many other missing items, as it would have been difficult to report each individual object that was missing after the war. Furthermore, the Estate provided no proof to support its claim that, had the Museum taken such steps, the Museum would have discovered, prior to the decedent’s death, that he was in possession of the tablet … .  As we observed …in a related discussion of the defense of statute of limitations, “[t]o place a burden of locating stolen artwork on the true owner and to foreclose the rights of that owner to recover its property if the burden is not met would . . . encourage illicit trafficking in stolen art” … .

Additionally, the Estate failed to demonstrate “the essential element of laches, namely prejudice” … .  While the Estate argued that it had suffered prejudice due to the Museum’s inaction, there is evidence that at least one family member (decedent’s son) was aware that the tablet belonged to the Museum.  And, although the decedent’s testimony may have shed light on how he came into possession of the tablet, we can perceive of no scenario whereby the decedent could have shown that he held title to this antiquity. Matter of Flamenbaum, 178, CtApp 11-14-13

 

Evidence Not Sufficient to Demonstrate Spanish Document Was an Enforceable Judgment; In Motion for Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint (CPLR 3213) There Is No Impediment to Plaintiff’s Supplementing Its Papers After Defendant’s Response

The First Department determined Supreme Court should not have decided, as a matter of law, a Spanish document was a judgment enforceable in New York. Only differing expert affidavits were provided and the operative statutes were not translated and submitted to the court. In addition, the court noted that the plaintiff’s submission of papers after defendant responded to the motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint was properly allowed. Defendant was able to respond to the additional documents:

CPLR 5302 provides that New York will recognize foreign decrees that are “final, conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending.” * * * The motion court was provided with the affidavits of the experts whose opinions differed, but was not provided with translated copies of the [statutes] cited by both experts. Thus, the court was not provided adequate information to determine as a matter of law that the document is a final judgment under Spanish law and ripe for enforcement in New York. * * *

There is no absolute rule that in a CPLR 3213 motion, a plaintiff cannot supplement its papers in response to a defendant’s arguments, so as to establish its entitlement to summary judgment in lieu of complaint. “Nothing that is curable by the mere addition of papers should result in a denial of the motion, unless it is a denial with leave to renew on proper papers” (David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3213:8). “Mere omissions from the affidavits” that can be rectified by filing and serving additional affidavits should be cured by a continuance or adjournment in order for the additional affidavits to be served and filed (id.). * * * Here, defendant had an opportunity to address the merits of the later-submitted documents, in the form of a reply in the cross motion, and therefore plaintiff’s failure initially to include all the documents did not result in prejudice to defendant and require denial of the motion… .  Sea Trade Mar Corp v Coutsodontis, 2013 NY Slip Op 07560, 1st Dept 11-14-13

 

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Improper Notice of Benefit Termination; Four-Month S/L Never Triggered; Termination Annulled

The Second Department determined the four-month statute of limitations for Article 78 review was never triggered because the NYC Housing Authority’s (NYCHA’s) failed to provide proper notice of termination of Section 8 housing benefits.  Therefore the termination was properly annulled and the subsidy was properly reinstated:

Pursuant to paragraph 22(f) of the Williams first partial consent judgment, the four-month statute of limitations of CPLR 217 begins to run on the date of receipt of the NYCHA’s notice of default letter … . Paragraph 22(f) cannot be read in a vacuum. Relying on contract principles, as urged by the NYCHA, and reading the Williams first partial consent judgment as a whole, we conclude that the NYCHA has the burden of satisfying the condition precedent of serving all three notices upon the Section 8 participant before its determination to terminate a participant’s subsidy can be considered final and binding upon the participant … . * * *

Here, the NYCHA failed to show that it mailed two of the three required notices. It did not present any proof that it mailed the initial warning letter and it submitted insufficient proof with respect to the mailing of the T-1 letter. As a result of this failure to abide by the notice provisions set forth in the Williams first partial consent judgment, the statute of limitations was not properly triggered and did not begin to run … . Matter of Dial v Rhea, 2013 NY Slip Op 07475, 2nd Dept 11-13-13

 

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Statutory Requirements for Recovery and Limits Imposed by Subrogation Explained; ”Law of the Case” Doctrine in Appellate Context Explained

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, the Second Department determined plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of the law of the case (a decision in a prior appeal) to prove the amount owed on its mechanic’s liens. The court used the opportunity to explain the “law of the case” doctrine (re: prior appellate decisions) and “review the statutory requirements for recovery under the Lien Law, and the limits on recovery imposed by the principle of subrogation:”

In addition to a lienor’s right to recover being limited by the contract price or reasonable value of the materials provided, it is further limited by the principle of subrogation (see 8-92 Warren’s Weed New York Real Property § 92.11[1], [4]; 34 New York Practice: Mechanics Liens in New York § 2:3. Lien Law § 4(1) provides, “If labor is performed for, or materials furnished to, a contractor or subcontractor for an improvement, the lien shall not be for a sum greater than the sum earned and unpaid on the contract at the time of filing the notice of lien, and any sum subsequently earned thereon. In no case shall the owner be liable to pay by reason of all liens created pursuant to this article a sum greater than the value or agreed price of the labor and materials remaining unpaid, at the time of filing notices of such liens, except as hereinafter provided.” In other words, no individual mechanic’s lien can exceed the amount owed by the owner to the general contractor at the time of filing the lien … . Money still due and owing from the owner to the contractor at the time of the filing of the lien, plus any sums subsequently earned thereon, is known as the “lien fund”… .  The subcontractor’s right to recover is derivative or subrogated to the right of the general contractor to recover. Thus, if the general contractor is not owed any amount under its contract with the owner, then the subcontractor may not recover… .  Peri Formwork Sys Inc v Lumbermens Mut Cas Co, 2013 NY Slip Op 07461, 2nd Dept 11-13-13

 

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Statutory 9% Interest Rate, Not Contractual 18% Rate, Should Have Been Applied to Breach of Contract Damages (Even Though the Monthly Payments Were Deposited in an Escrow Account During Litigation)

The Second Department determined plaintiff should have been awarded prejudgment interest on the principal amount of the damages awarded for breach of contract at the statutory 9% rate, not the contractual 18% rate which was included in the agreed monthly installment payments:

…CPLR 5001(a) mandates an award of prejudgment interest on the principal amount of the damages awarded for its breach of contract even though the monthly payments due were deposited in an escrow account during the pendency of this action, and [defendant] received no benefit from the disputed payments while they were held in escrow … . However, the Surrogate’s Court improperly applied interest on the monthly payments due at the rate of 18% per annum. “When a claim is predicated on a breach of contract, the applicable rate of prejudgment interest varies depending on the nature and terms of the contract” … . The contract rate of interest will be “used to calculate interest on principal prior to loan maturity or a default in performance,” and in the absence of “a provision in the contract addressing the interest rate that governs after principal is due or in the event of a breach, New York’s statutory rate will be applied as the default rate” … . Under the terms of the agreement at issue here, each monthly payment includes interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Since the contract rate has already been applied to each monthly payment prior to its maturity, and the agreement does not include a provision addressing the interest rate that governs after each monthly payment is due or in the event of a breach, the Surrogate’s Court should have applied interest upon each monthly payment from the date it became due at the statutory rate of 9% per annum (see CPLR 5004…). Ross v Ross Metals Corp, 2013 NY Slip Op 07466, 2nd Dept 11-13-13

 

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Sheriff Entitled to Poundage Even If No Money Collected—Execution by Sheriff Triggered Settlement

The Fourth Department determined the sheriff was entitled to poundage even though no money was actually collected by the sheriff (the execution by the sheriff triggered a settlement):

The Sheriff …. moved for an order awarding the payment of poundage pursuant to CPLR 8012.  We conclude that the court erred in denying that motion.  “ ‘Poundage is a fee awarded to the Sheriff in the nature of a percentage commission upon moneys recovered pursuant to a levy or [an] execution of attachment’ . . . The Sheriff’s right to receive poundage fees is wholly statutory . . . , and the statute must be strictly construed . . . Under the statute, the Sheriff is entitled to poundage fees ‘for collecting money by virtue of an execution’ (CPLR 8012 [b] [1])” … .  Although it is undisputed that the Sheriff did not actually collect any money, an award of poundage may still be made where, inter alia, “a settlement is made after a levy by virtue of an execution” (…see CPLR 8012 [b] [2]; …). …[W]here, as here, “payment by the debtor is made directly to the creditor after a sheriff levies, the payment constitutes a settlement, and the sheriff will be entitled to poundage” … .  Pursuant to the unambiguous language of the statute, the Sheriff is entitled to $24,500 in poundage based on the settlement amount of $650,000 (see CPLR 8012 [b] [1], [2]). Foley v West-Herr Ford Inc…, 1040, 4th Dept 11-8-13

 

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Review of Action Brought Under General Municipal Law Section 4 (Re: Unlawful Use of Tax, Water and Sewer Funds) Must Be by Article 78, Not Appeal

In an action brought pursuant to General Municipal Law section 4 for an order directing a summary investigation into the financial affairs of the respondents (village, fire department and water board), the Third Department determined the respondents could not appeal Supreme Court’s ordering of the investigation. The petitioners alleged the tax, water and sewer moneys collected may have been corruptly and/or unlawfully expended. The petitioners’ only avenue for court review is an Article 78 prohibition proceeding:

This appeal must be dismissed as there is no appeal as of right from Supreme Court’s order in this statutory special proceeding directing a summary investigation (see CPLR 5701 [a]; see also CPLR art 4…).   Although certain respondents contend, seemingly persuasively, that Supreme Court is not authorized by General Municipal Law § 4 to direct an investigation against them as they are not a “village” or “town,” this Court cannot grant their requested relief in the absence of an appealable order.  We note that respondents could have moved in Supreme Court to dismiss on this ground within the time allowed for an answer; having properly raised this defense as an objection in point of law in their answer, respondents are entitled to pursue summary dismissal of this special proceeding in that court, in the first instance (see CPLR 404 [a]; see also CPLR 7804 [f]; Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 7804:7 at 673-675).  At this juncture, those claims could only be addressed by this Court in a special proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the nature of prohibition, instituted in this Court (see CPLR 506 [b] [1]; 7803 [2]…).  Matter of Village of Victory…, 515205, 3rd Dept 11-7-13

 

Amendment of Summons and Complaint to Fix Misnamed Party Allowed

In affirming the Supreme Court’s allowing a summons and complaint to be amended to include a misnamed party [Enigma Management] which shared the same address and counsel and provided the same services as the named defendant, the Third Department wrote:

The showing required by plaintiffs in support of their motion pursuant to CPLR 305 (c) included “that the intended but misnamed defendant was fairly apprised that it was the party the action was intended to affect [and that it] would not be prejudiced” … .  Here, plaintiffs’ proof established, among other things, that service occurred at the shared address of defendant and Enigma Management, defendant and Enigma Management essentially acted as one in asserting identical causes of action against plaintiffs, both claimed to have done laboratory work for plaintiffs, they had the same counsel and they used a variety of names in their billing and correspondence.  There is no prejudice to Enigma Management in permitting the amendment.  MVP Health Insurance Company v Enigma Diagnostic Corporation, 515660, 3rd Dept 11-7-13

 

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Affirmative Defense of Arbitration Waived by Participation in Judicial Process

The Third Department determined that defendant waived a contractual provision requiring arbitration by participating in the judicial process:

…[W]hile defendant asserted the contractual arbitration provision as an affirmative defense in its answer, it did not move to stay the action and compel arbitration (see CPLR 7503 [a]).  Instead, it aggressively participated in the discovery process and received the benefit of extensive discovery from plaintiff, which would not otherwise have been available in arbitration … . In doing so, defendant’s acceptance of the judicial forum “manifested a preference ‘clearly inconsistent with . . . [a] claim that the parties were obligated to settle their differences by arbitration'” … .  Thus, we agree with Supreme Court’s determination that defendant’s actions resulted in a waiver of its right to compel arbitration … . Masson v Wiggins & Masson LLP…, 515340, 515427, 3rd Dept 10-31-13

 

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