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Defendant Cannot Meet Its Burden In a Summary Judgment Motion Solely by Pointing to Proof Problems in the Plaintiff’s Case/Court, Pursuant to Its Power to Search the Record in Determining a Summary Judgment Motion, Cannot Address Claims that Were Not the Subject of the Motion

In a private nuisance action, the Third Department noted that a defendant cannot prevail on a summary judgment motion solely by arguing gaps or proof problems in the plaintiff’s case and the court cannot “search the record” to dismiss claims that were not the subject of the summary judgment motion:

In support of their motions for summary judgment, defendants did nothing more than argue that plaintiffs failed to plead — and ultimately will be unable to prove — compensable damages and, therefore, dismissal of plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action sounding in private nuisance and trespass was warranted. Even assuming, without deciding, that defendants’ assessment of plaintiffs’ pleadings and examination before trial testimony is accurate, the case law makes clear that the moving party must affirmatively demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment “and does not meet its burden [in this regard merely] by noting gaps in its opponent’s proof” … . * * *

…Although CPLR 3212 (b) — cited by Supreme Court here — indeed permits a court to search the record and grant summary judgment to a nonmoving party, Supreme Court’s authority in this regard extends “only . . . to a cause of action or issue that is the subject of the motions before the court” … . Stated another way, “[a] motion for summary judgment addressed to one claim or defense does not provide a basis for the court to search the record to grant summary judgment on an unrelated claim or defense” … . Schillaci v Sarris, 2014 NY Slip Op 08072, 3rd Dept 11-20-14

 

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Heightened Pleading Requirements for Fraud Not Met

The First Department determined that plaintiff’s fraud cause of action was properly dismissed for failure to meet the heightened pleading requirements:

Plaintiff has not satisfied the heightened pleading standard for a fraud claim under CPLR § 3016(b) because it failed to identify any of the allegedly, false representations that [defendant] made with the then present intent to induce plaintiff’s investment in the project. Moreover, the fraudulent inducement claim duplicates the breach of contract claim because plaintiff has not alleged any representation that is collateral to the contract … . “A fraud-based claim is duplicative of breach of a contract claim when the only fraud alleged is that the defendant was not sincere when it promised to perform under the contract.” MMCT LLC v JTR Coll Point LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 08103, 1st Dept 11-20-14

 

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In a Lead-Paint-Injury Case, Non-party Medical Records Not Discoverable (Re: Plaintiff’s Mother and Siblings)–Non-party Academic Records Should Be Submitted for In Camera Review–Mother Cannot Be Compelled to Submit to an IQ Test

The Third Department determined the extent of allowable discovery re: non-parties in a lead-paint-injury case.  The defense sought medical and academic records of plaintiff’s mother and siblings, all non-parties, and sought to compel the mother to undergo an IQ test.  The Third Department held that the non-party medical records were not discoverable (except for the mother’s records during pregnancy), the non-party academic records should be submitted to the court for in camera review, and the mother should not be compelled to undergo an IQ test:

A subdivision of the main disclosure statute provides that “[u]pon objection by a person entitled to assert the privilege, privileged matter shall not be obtainable” (CPLR 3101 [b]). Medical records are protected by a doctor-patient privilege and cannot be disclosed without consent or a waiver of the privilege (see CPLR 4504 [a]…). A plaintiff waives the privilege by commencing an action that places his or her mental or physical condition at issue, but nonparties are not subject to having their medical histories made public merely because a relative commences an action … . As plaintiff’s mother and siblings did not consent and have not waived that privilege, Supreme Court should not have ordered disclosure of their medical records … . An exception exists for the mother’s medical records during the time of her pregnancy with and birth of plaintiff, but plaintiff has already provided an authorization for those records … .

Regarding the mother’s and siblings’ academic records, defendants have submitted an expert affidavit, as noted above, indicating that those records are relevant and necessary to determine whether other factors caused plaintiff’s injuries … . Considering that these records are private but not privileged, Supreme Court reasonably balanced defendants’ need for them and their possible relevance against the burden to these nonparties from disclosure, requiring that the siblings’ records be produced to the court for an in camera review … . The mother’s academic records should similarly be submitted to the court for review and redaction of any privileged material. …

Defendants’ need for her IQ test results, however, are not outweighed by the burden on her to undergo such a test, as well as the potential for extending this litigation by focusing on information extraneous to plaintiff’s condition, such as all of the factors contributing to the mother’s IQ … . Considering the private and personal nature of the information sought and the potential delay due to myriad collateral issues, defendants should not be able to compel plaintiff’s mother, a nonparty, to undergo an IQ test … . Perez v Fleischer, 2014 NY Slip Op 008101, 3rd Dept 11-20-14

 

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Failure to File Proof of Service Is a Procedural Irregularity Which Can Be Cured

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court, finding that plaintiff’s failure to file proof of service of a complaint was a procedural irregularity which had been promptly cured.  The defendant (Hernandez), who was in default, was given 30 days to appear and answer:

The failure to file proof of service is a procedural irregularity, not a jurisdictional defect, that may be cured by motion or sua sponte by the court in its discretion pursuant to CPLR 2004 … . Here, in light of the plaintiff’s prompt action in moving to correct the irregularity following the denial of his motion for leave to enter a default judgment and the lack of prejudice to Hernandez, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to deem the filing of proof of service on Hernandez timely nunc pro tunc … . However, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, a court may not grant such relief retroactive to Hernandez’s prejudice by placing him in default as of a date prior to the order … . In other words, service will not be deemed complete …, as the plaintiff argues (see CPLR 308[4]). Rather, Hernandez must be afforded an additional 30 days after service upon him of a copy of this decision and order to appear and answer … . Khan v Hernandez, 2014 NY Slip Op 07985, 2nd Dept 11-19-14

 

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Filing of Article 78 Petition Itself Constituted a Demand that Respondent Perform Its Duty, the Triggering Event for the Four-Month Statute of Limitations in a Mandamus to Compel Proceeding/Supreme Court and Surrogate’s Court Have Concurrent Jurisdiction Over the Administration of an Estate

The Second Department noted that Supreme Court and Surrogate’s Court have concurrent jurisdiction over the administration of a decedent’s estate. The petitioner commenced the Article 78 proceeding to compel the NYC Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS) to accept a designation of a beneficiary form.  Surrogate’s Court had declined to exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding. The Second Department explained that the filing of the petition itself triggered the four-month statute of limitations for mandamus, so the proceeding was timely:

In a proceeding in the nature of mandamus to compel, the four-month statute of limitations begins to run “after the respondent’s refusal, upon the demand of the petitioner . . . to perform its duty” (CPLR 217[1]…). The filing of a CPLR article 78 petition can itself be construed as a demand … . Here, the petitioner made her demand that NYCERS perform its duty to accept her late husband’s fully completed and notarized designation of beneficiary form by filing the petition in this proceeding … . Accordingly, the petition is not time-barred … . Matter of Gopaul v NYC Employees’ Retirement Sys, 2014 NY Slip Op 0802-0, 2nd Dept 11-19-14

 

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Absence of a Certificate of Conformity Not a Fatal Defect Re: a Motion for a Default Judgment/Court Should Not Have Raised, Sua Sponte, a Defense to the Motion on Behalf of Defendant Who Did Not Answer or Appear

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court, finding that the absence of a certificate of conformity was not fatal to the motion for a default judgment:

In 2012, the plaintiff, a resident of the State of Georgia, commenced this action against the defendant, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. On June 22, 2012, the defendant was served with a copy of the summons and complaint pursuant to CPLR 308(1). He neither appeared in the action, interposed an answer, nor otherwise moved with respect thereto. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff’s affidavit of merit, notarized in Georgia, lacked a proper certificate of conformity as required by CPLR 2309(a), and denied the motion, with leave to renew upon the submission of a proper affidavit. The plaintiff appeals.

” A party’s right to recover upon a defendant’s failure to appear or answer is governed by CPLR 3215′” … . Thus, a plaintiff moving for a default judgment against a defendant must submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting the claim, and proof of the defaulting defendant’s failure to appear or answer (see CPLR 3215[f]…). Here, in support of his motion to enter a default judgment, the plaintiff met all of these requirements … . Although the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff’s affidavit lacked a proper certificate of conformity, it should have considered the affidavit since the absence of a certificate of conformity is not a fatal defect … . Further, even if the subject certificate of conformity was inadequate, the defendant failed to answer or appear in opposition to the motion, and it was inappropriate for the Supreme Court to, sua sponte, raise the issue on the defendant’s behalf … . Todd v Green, 2014 NY Slip OP 08004, 2nd Dept 11-19-14

 

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Declaratory Judgment Finding that the Insurer Was Not Obligated to Defend or Indemnify the Insured Precluded, Under the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel, Suit by Plaintiff Against the Insurer—Plaintiff Was In Privity with the Insured Pursuant to Insurance Law 3420 and Had No Greater Rights than the Insured

The defendant insurer had obtained a declaratory judgment finding that the insurer was not obligated to defend or indemnify the insured, VTEQE group, because the insured had not complied with the policy’s notice requirements.  Plaintiff obtained a judgment against VTEQE.  The instant action was brought seeking payment of the judgment from VTEQE’s insurer.  The Second Department determined that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from suing the insurer because of the declaratory judgment.  By suing the insurer plaintiff stood in the shoes of the insured and has no greater rights than the insured.  The court explained the relevant analysis:

“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party . . . whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same'” … . “The doctrine applies if the issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the first action, and the [party against whom the issue was decided] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action” … . The party seeking the protection of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action … . ” The party against whom preclusion is sought bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination'” … . “Generally, a nonparty to a prior litigation may be collaterally estopped by a determination in that litigation by having a relationship with a party to the prior litigation such that his own rights or obligations in the subsequent proceeding are conditioned in one way or another on, or derivative of, the rights of the party to the prior litigation” … .

Here, Hudson established, prima facie, that the plaintiff is in privity with the VTEQE group for the purpose of the application of collateral estoppel … . When a plaintiff maintains a direct action against an insurer pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420, it “stands in the shoes” of the insured and can have no greater rights than the insured … . River View at Patchogue LLC v Hudson Ins Co, 2014 NY Slip Op 08000, 2nd Dept 11-19-14

 

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Plaintiff Had Made Out a Prima Facie Case of Undue Influence—Trial Judge Erred by Making Credibility Determinations and Granting a Judgment In Favor of the Defendant As a Matter of Law (CPLR 4401)

In reversing Supreme Court, the Second Department determined the motion for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401 should not have been granted.  The plaintiff sought to set aside a conveyance by deed on the ground of undue influence. The Second Department held that plaintiff had made out a prima facie case and sent the matter back for trial in front of a different judge:

” A trial court’s grant of a CPLR 4401 motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where the trial court finds that, upon the evidence presented, there is no rational process by which the fact trier could base a finding in favor of the nonmoving party'” … . ” In considering the motion, the trial court must afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may be properly drawn from the facts presented, and the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmovant'” … .

The burden of proving undue influence generally rests with the party asserting its existence … . “However, where there is a confidential relationship between the beneficiary and the grantor, [a]n inference of undue influence’ arises which requires the beneficiary to come forward with an explanation of the circumstances of the transaction” … . “In the absence of an explanation, the beneficiary has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was fair and free from undue influence” … .

Here, in granting the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, the Supreme Court improperly resolved issues of the credibility of the witnesses against the plaintiff … . Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolving all issues of credibility in the plaintiff’s favor, we find that the plaintiff established, prima facie, that a confidential relationship existed between the decedent and the defendant, requiring the defendant to come forth with an explanation of the circumstances of the transaction. Palladino v McCormick, 2014, NY Slip Op 07992, 2nd Dept 11-19-14

 

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The Toll of the Statute of Limitations Under the Continuing Representation Doctrine Ceased When the Attorney Was Discharged, Not When the Consent to Change Attorney Was Subsequently Filed—Various Ways In Which the Attorney-Client Relationship Can Be Terminated In this Context Explained In Some Depth

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, held that the continuing representation toll of the statute of limitations ceases when the attorney is actually discharged and not when the consent to change attorney is subsequently filed:

An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years from the accrual of the claim (see CPLR 214[6]…). Accrual is measured from the commission of the alleged malpractice, when all facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred and the aggrieved party can obtain relief in court … , regardless of when the operative facts are discovered by the plaintiff … . However, “causes of action alleging legal malpractice which would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations are timely if the doctrine of continuous representation applies” … . The three-year statute of limitations is tolled for the period following the alleged malpractice until the attorney’s continuing representation of the client on a particular matter is completed … . For the doctrine to apply, there must be clear indicia of “an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney” … . * * *

There are different ways that attorney-client relationships can be ended. One way is for the client to discharge the attorney, which can be done at any time with or without cause … . A second way is for the attorney and client to execute a Consent to Change Attorney or for counsel to execute a stipulation of substitution, which is then filed with the court in accordance with CPLR 321(b) (see Vincent Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C321:2). Alternatively, if the attorney deems it necessary to end the relationship without the consent of the client, such as where there is an irretrievable breakdown in the relationship or a failure of cooperation by the client, the attorney may move, on such notice as may be directed by the court, to be relieved as counsel by court order (see e.g. CPLR 321[2]; Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.16[c]…).

An affirmative discharge of an attorney by the client is immediate. By contrast, from the standpoint of adverse parties, counsel’s authority as an attorney of record in a civil action continues unabated until the withdrawal, substitution, or discharge is formalized in a manner provided by CPLR 321 … . This rule protects adverse parties from the uncertainty of when or whether the authority of an opposing attorney has been terminated …, even when the adverse party is informally aware that a discharge or substitution of an opposing counsel is pending or imminent … . * * *

The essence of a continuous representation toll is the client’s confidence in the attorney’s ability and good faith, such that the client cannot be expected to question and assess the techniques employed or the manner in which the services are rendered … . “One of the predicates for the application of the doctrine is continuing trust and confidence in the relationship between the parties”‘ … . What constitutes a loss of client confidence is fact specific, varying from case to case, but may be demonstrated by relevant documentary evidence involving the parties, or by the client’s actions. Farage v Ehrenberg, 2014 NY Slip OP 07977, 2nd Dept 11-19-14

 

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Pursuant to the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, Seller of Home Was Not Obligated to Disclose Information About the Possibility of the Incursion of Golf Balls from the Neighboring Golf Course

The Second Department determined a complaint alleging fraudulent concealment against the seller of plaintiffs’ home (Glickenhous) was properly dismissed.  Plaintiffs bought property bordering a golf course.  After a tree bordering the course fell, golf balls landed on plaintiffs’ property.  The doctrine of caveat emptor required the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) [documentary evidence utterly refutes allegations in the complaint] and CPLR 3211(a)(7) [pleading does not state a cause of action] :

“New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes no duty on the seller or the seller’s agent to disclose any information concerning the premises when the parties deal at arm’s length, unless there is some conduct on the part of the seller or the seller’s agent which constitutes active concealment” … . “Mere silence on the part of the seller, without some affirmative act of deception, is not actionable as fraud” … . ” To maintain a cause of action to recover damages for active concealment, the plaintiff must show, in effect, that the seller or the seller’s agents thwarted the plaintiff’s efforts to fulfill his responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor'” … . “Where the facts represented are not matters peculiarly within the party’s knowledge, and the other party has the means available to him of knowing, by the exercise of ordinary intelligence, the truth or the real quality of the subject of the representation, he must make use of those means, or he will not be heard to complain that he was induced to enter into the transaction by misrepresentations” … .

Here, Glickenhaus had no duty to disclose any information regarding the premises under the doctrine of caveat emptor … . Moreover, any risk to the property posed by the incursion of golf balls was a matter readily ascertainable by the plaintiffs through the exercise of ordinary intelligence, and the documentary evidence submitted on the motion demonstrates that any such concerns were a matter of public record not peculiarly within the knowledge of Glickenhaus … . Behar v Glickenhaus Westchester Dev Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 07969, 2nd Dept 11-19-14