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MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motion for a new trial (CPLR 4404) in this car-bus-accident wrongful death case if plaintiff did not agree to a reduction of damages for pre-impact terror and conscious pain and suffering:

Here, the evidence at trial established that the decedent made eye contact with the defendant bus operator, William R. Dortch, for approximately one second before the bus collided with the decedent’s vehicle. Under these circumstances, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determinations that the $250,000 award for pre-impact terror deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation and to grant the branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was for a new trial on the issue of pre-impact terror unless the plaintiff agreed to an award in the principal sum of $50,000 … . …

Here, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the jury award in the principal sum of $1,250,000 deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation for the decedent’s post-impact conscious pain and suffering. The evidence established that the decedent was able to feel pain following the collision, but that she was able to do so for, at most, 11 to 20 minutes and that, during that time, she was minimally conscious (see id. at 460). Under these circumstances, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for a new trial on the issue of conscious pain and suffering unless the plaintiff agreed to an award in the principal sum of $400,000 was properly granted … . Vatalaro v County of Suffolk, 2018 NY Slip Op 05352, Second Dept 7-18-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 4404 (MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/BUSES (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BUSES, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/WRONGFUL DEATH (DAMAGES, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/DAMAGES (WRONGFUL DEATH, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/PRE-IMPACT TERROR  (WRONGFUL DEATH, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING (WRONGFUL DEATH, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WAS A NECESSARY PARTY TO THIS JAIL TIME CALCULATION PROCEEDING, ISSUE CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, MATTER REVERSED AND REMITTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the New York City Department of Corrections (NYCDOC) was a necessary party in this proceeding contesting a jail time credit calculation. Although the issue was not raised below, a necessary-party issue can be raised for the first time on appeal but may not be corrected by an appellate court:

NYCDOC is a necessary party to this proceeding “because petitioner is seeking additional credit for jail time spent in correctional facilities in New York City [under NYCDOC] and, if petitioner is successful, [NYCDOC’s] commissioner will be required, pursuant to . . . Correction Law [§ 600-a], to recompute petitioner’s jail time and deliver a certified transcript of the record of petitioner’s jail time”…

While respondent did not raise this issue in Supreme Court, it is well-established that “‘a court may always consider whether there has been a failure to join a necessary party’, including on its own motion, and for the first time on appeal” … . As this Court “may not, on its own initiative, add or direct the addition of a party[,] . . . the matter must be remitted to Supreme Court to order [NYCDOC] to be joined if [it] is subject to the jurisdiction of the court and, if not, to permit [its] joinder by stipulation, motion or otherwise and, if joinder cannot be effectuated, the court must then determine whether the proceeding should be permitted to proceed in the absence of [a] necessary part[y]” … . Matter of Velez v New York State, Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2018 NY Slip Op 05243, Third Dept 7-11-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (NECESSARY PARTY, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WAS A NECESSARY PARTY TO THIS JAIL TIME CALCULATION PROCEEDING, ISSUE CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, MATTER REVERSED AND REMITTED (THIRD DEPT))/CPLR 1001 (NECESSARY PARTY, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WAS A NECESSARY PARTY TO THIS JAIL TIME CALCULATION PROCEEDING, ISSUE CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, MATTER REVERSED AND REMITTED (THIRD DEPT))/NECESSARY PARTY (CIVIL PROCEDURE, APPEALS, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WAS A NECESSARY PARTY TO THIS JAIL TIME CALCULATION PROCEEDING, ISSUE CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, MATTER REVERSED AND REMITTED (THIRD DEPT))/CRIMINAL LAW (JAIL TIME CREDIT CALCULATION, (NECESSARY PARTY, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WAS A NECESSARY PARTY TO THIS JAIL TIME CALCULATION PROCEEDING, ISSUE CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, MATTER REVERSED AND REMITTED (THIRD DEPT))/NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NYCDOC) (JAIL TIME CREDIT CALCULATION, (NECESSARY PARTY, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WAS A NECESSARY PARTY TO THIS JAIL TIME CALCULATION PROCEEDING, ISSUE CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, MATTER REVERSED AND REMITTED (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (NECESSARY PARTY,  NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WAS A NECESSARY PARTY TO THIS JAIL TIME CALCULATION PROCEEDING, ISSUE CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, MATTER REVERSED AND REMITTED (THIRD DEPT))

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CHILD’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT WHEN MOTHER FAILED TO APPEAR AT AN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL HEARING IN THIS PATERNITY AND CUSTODY PROCEEDING SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Family Court abused its discretion when it dismissed an equitable estoppel hearing in a paternity and custody proceeding when mother failed to appear and the child requested an adjournment:

Despite the fact that the mother had appeared on all prior court dates, and was in the middle of her testimony at the hearing, the Family Court denied the child’s request for an adjournment, and instead directed dismissal of the petition for failure to prosecute. The child, Malachi S., appeals. …

Here, as the child and the mother correctly contend, the request for an adjournment was reasonable and there was no indication of intentional default or willful abandonment. Under these circumstances, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in directing the dismissal of the petition for failure to prosecute rather than granting the child’s request for an adjournment … . Matter of Simmons v Ford, 2018 NY Slip Op 05176, Second Dept 7-11-18

​FAMILY LAW (CHILD’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT WHEN MOTHER FAILED TO APPEAR AT AN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL HEARING IN THIS PATERNITY AND CUSTODY PROCEEDING SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/ADJOURNMENT (FAMILY LAW, CHILD’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT WHEN MOTHER FAILED TO APPEAR AT AN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL HEARING IN THIS PATERNITY AND CUSTODY PROCEEDING SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/PATERNITY  (CHILD’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT WHEN MOTHER FAILED TO APPEAR AT AN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL HEARING IN THIS PATERNITY AND CUSTODY PROCEEDING SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW, CHILD’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT WHEN MOTHER FAILED TO APPEAR AT AN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL HEARING IN THIS PATERNITY AND CUSTODY PROCEEDING SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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PROPERTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO JOIN THE SLIP AND FALL ACTION WITH A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM THE SLIP AND FALL INJURY PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the property defendants’ motion to join the slip and fall action with a medical malpractice action stemming from the slip and fall injury was properly denied. Plaintiff had stepped in a rodent hole and subsequently sued hospitals for malpractice in the treatment of her foot injury:

“When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before a court, the court, upon motion, may order a joint trial of any or all the matters in issue” (CPLR 602[a]…). The determination of such a motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court… . Denial of the motion may be warranted where common questions of law or fact are lacking … , where the actions involve dissimilar issues or disparate legal theories … , or where a joint trial would substantially prejudice an opposing party … or pose a risk of confusing the jury or rendering the litigation unwieldy … .

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the property defendants’ motion for a joint trial given the limited commonality between the two actions, the disparate legal theories and dissimilar issues they involve, the very different procedural stages of the two actions at the time the motion was made, and the potential prejudice to the opposing parties as well as the risks of juror confusion and unwieldy litigation if a joint trial was granted … . Cromwell v CRP 482 Riverdale Ave., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 05137, Second Dept 7-11-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (PROPERTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO JOIN THE SLIP AND FALL ACTION WITH A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM THE SLIP AND FALL INJURY PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, JOINDER, PROPERTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO JOIN THE SLIP AND FALL ACTION WITH A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM THE SLIP AND FALL INJURY PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE  (CIVIL PROCEDURE, JOINDER, PROPERTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO JOIN THE SLIP AND FALL ACTION WITH A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM THE SLIP AND FALL INJURY PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 602  (PROPERTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO JOIN THE SLIP AND FALL ACTION WITH A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM THE SLIP AND FALL INJURY PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/JOINDER (CIVIL PROCEDURE, (PROPERTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO JOIN THE SLIP AND FALL ACTION WITH A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM THE SLIP AND FALL INJURY PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (CIVIL PROCEDURE, JOINDER, PROPERTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO JOIN THE SLIP AND FALL ACTION WITH A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM THE SLIP AND FALL INJURY PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

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RECORDS PERTAINING TO PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS ARE DISCOVERABLE AND MUST BE TURNED OVER TO THE DEFENDANT, EVEN IF PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING RECOVERY OF UNREIMBURSED SPECIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff was required to turn over to defendant records pertaining to no-fault benefits in this car accident case. Plaintiff had argued the records were not discoverable because plaintiff was not seeking to recover unreimbursed special damages:

CPLR 3101(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof.” “The words, material and necessary,’ are . . . to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity”… .

In an action relating to a motor vehicle accident, a plaintiff’s medical records relating to treatment following the accident are material and necessary to the defense of a plaintiff’s claim to having sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102, in addition to any claim to recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life … . Accordingly, since the plaintiff’s no-fault records are material and necessary to the defense of this action, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff’s motion for a protective order … .

The plaintiff improperly relies upon CPLR 4545(a) to support his contention that collateral source records are not discoverable where a plaintiff is not seeking to recover unreimbursed special damages. CPLR 4545(a) governs the admissibilityof evidence to establish that damages have been or will be covered in whole or part by a collateral source. By contrast, in the context of discovery, “[a]ny matter which may lead to the discovery of admissible proof is discoverable, as is any matter which bears upon a defense, even if the facts themselves are not admissible” … . Moreover, whether any of the plaintiff’s no-fault records are admissible for purposes other than for showing collateral source payment is not before us at this stage of the action. Cajamarca v Osatuk, 2018 NY Slip Op 05133, Second Dept 7-11-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (NEGLIGENCE, DISCOVERY, RECORDS PERTAINING TO PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS ARE DISCOVERABLE AND MUST BE TURNED OVER TO THE DEFENDANT, EVEN IF PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FOR UNREIMBURSED SPECIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, DISCOVERY, RECORDS PERTAINING TO PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS ARE DISCOVERABLE AND MUST BE TURNED OVER TO THE DEFENDANT, EVEN IF PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FOR UNREIMBURSED SPECIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT))/INSURANCE LAW (NO-FAULT, NEGLIGENCE, DISCOVERY, RECORDS PERTAINING TO PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS ARE DISCOVERABLE AND MUST BE TURNED OVER TO THE DEFENDANT, EVEN IF PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FOR UNREIMBURSED SPECIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT))/NO-FAULT BENEFITS (NEGLIGENCE, DISCOVERY, RECORDS PERTAINING TO PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS ARE DISCOVERABLE AND MUST BE TURNED OVER TO THE DEFENDANT, EVEN IF PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FOR UNREIMBURSED SPECIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT))/DISCOVERY (NO-FAULT BENEFITS,  RECORDS PERTAINING TO PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS ARE DISCOVERABLE AND MUST BE TURNED OVER TO THE DEFENDANT, EVEN IF PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FOR UNREIMBURSED SPECIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (DISCOVERY, RECORDS PERTAINING TO PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS ARE DISCOVERABLE AND MUST BE TURNED OVER TO THE DEFENDANT, EVEN IF PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FOR UNREIMBURSED SPECIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT))

THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT’S REPRESENTATIVE’S SIGNATURE AND THE JURAT APPEARED ON AN OTHERWISE BLANK PAGE SEPARATE FROM THE AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT A GROUND FOR DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s unopposed motion for summary judgment should not have been denied on the ground that defendant’s representative’s signature and the jurat appeared on a page separate from the rest of defendant’s affidavit:

The Supreme Court denied the motion on the ground that, in an affidavit of Charles Dunne, an authorized representative of the defendant, on which the defendant primarily relied in support of its motion, Dunne’s signature and the jurat appeared on a separate, otherwise blank page. The defendant appeals.

The Supreme Court erred in denying the defendant’s unopposed motion on the ground that Dunne’s affidavit was not properly signed. The fact that Dunne’s signature and the jurat appeared on a page separate from the rest of the affidavit did not render it inadmissible. If anything, the separate signature page amounted to an irregularity that the court should have disregarded, as doing so did not prejudice the plaintiff (see CPLR 2001…), which was deemed to have waived the issue by failing to timely raise it after service of the defendant’s motion papers … . Status Gen. Dev., Inc. v 501 Broadway Partners, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 05217, Second Dept 7-11-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT’S REPRESENTATIVE’S SIGNATURE AND THE JURAT APPEARED ON AN OTHERWISE BLANK PAGE SEPARATE FROM THE AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT A GROUND FOR DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/AFFIDAVITS (CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT’S REPRESENTATIVE’S SIGNATURE AND THE JURAT APPEARED ON AN OTHERWISE BLANK PAGE SEPARATE FROM THE AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT A GROUND FOR DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 2001 (THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT’S REPRESENTATIVE’S SIGNATURE AND THE JURAT APPEARED ON AN OTHERWISE BLANK PAGE SEPARATE FROM THE AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT A GROUND FOR DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT’S REPRESENTATIVE’S SIGNATURE AND THE JURAT APPEARED ON AN OTHERWISE BLANK PAGE SEPARATE FROM THE AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT A GROUND FOR DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/JURAT (CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT’S REPRESENTATIVE’S SIGNATURE AND THE JURAT APPEARED ON AN OTHERWISE BLANK PAGE SEPARATE FROM THE AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT A GROUND FOR DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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CPLR 311-A REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff did not comply with the CPLR requirements for service of a summons and complaint upon a limited liability company and the court did not obtain jurisdiction over the defendant:

Here, the plaintiff commenced the action by the filing of a summons and verified complaint on September 20, 2016. The affirmation of personal service executed by the plaintiff’s counsel stated that on September 24, 2016, at the defendant’s store located in Hicksville, he personally served the defendant with a copy of the summons and complaint by delivering it to “JANE DOE, A PERSON WHO REFUSED TO PROVIDE NAME.” Although this attempt at service occurred within 120 days after the commencement of the action, the defendant correctly contends that the manner of service failed to comply with the requirements of CPLR 311-a, which provides, as relevant here, that personal service upon a limited liability company shall be made by delivering a copy personally to any member or manager of the company, any agent authorized to receive process, or any other person designated by the company to receive process. The defendant, by its evidentiary submissions, demonstrated that the individual purportedly served was not authorized to receive process on behalf of the defendant, and thus, jurisdiction over the defendant was not obtained … . Pinzon v IKEA N.Y., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 05213, Second Dept 7-11-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CPLR 311-A REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 311-A (CPLR 311-A REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT))/LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (CPLR 311-A REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT))/JURISDICTION  (CPLR 311-A REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF STAFFING AGENCY WAS NOT ENTITLED, BASED UPON A BALANCING OF THE EQUITIES, TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENFORCING A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT WHICH OSTENSIBLY PROHIBITED DEFENDANT FROM CONTINUING TO WORK AT THE HOSPITAL WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD PLACED HIM AFTER DEFENDANT TERMINATED HIS CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff staffing agency was not entitled to a preliminary injunction in this action to enforce a restrictive covenant which ostensibly prohibited defendant, for a period of time, from working at the hospital where plaintiff had placed him. Defendant had terminated his contract with plaintiff, contracted with a competitor staffing agency, and continued to work at the same hospital. Defendant demonstrated the alternatives to working at the same hospital would either require a 3 to 4 hour commute, or result in his not working at all while he renewed his credentials in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff alleged allowing defendant to continue to work at the hospital would damage its business model and lead to competitors taking away contracts. The Fourth Department noted that the harm to plaintiff would only occur if the court rules in its favor, not during the pendency of the action:

It is well settled that ” [p]reliminary injunctive relief is a drastic remedy [that] is not routinely granted’ ” … . Moreover, “[i]n reviewing an order denying a motion for [a] preliminary injunction, we should not determine finally the merits of the action and should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by [the court] but should review only the determination of whether that discretion has been abused” …

“In order to establish its entitlement to a preliminary injunction, the party seeking the injunction must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, . . . three separate elements: (1) a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits; (2) the prospect of irreparable injury if the provisional relief is withheld; and (3) a balance of equities tipping in the moving party’s favor’ ” … . Delphi Hospitalist Servs. LLC v Patrick, 2018 NY Slip Op 05100, Fourth Dept 7-6-18

​EMPLOYMENT LAW (RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, PLAINTIFF STAFFING AGENCY WAS NOT ENTITLED, BASED UPON A BALANCING OF THE EQUITIES, TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENFORCING A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT WHICH OSTENSIBLY PROHIBITED DEFENDANT FROM CONTINUING TO  WORK AT THE HOSPITAL WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD PLACED HIM AFTER DEFENDANT TERMINATED HIS CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF (FOURTH DEPT))/RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS (EMPLOYMENT LAW, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS, PLAINTIFF STAFFING AGENCY WAS NOT ENTITLED, BASED UPON A BALANCING OF THE EQUITIES, TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENFORCING A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT WHICH OSTENSIBLY PROHIBITED DEFENDANT FROM CONTINUING TO  WORK AT THE HOSPITAL WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD PLACED HIM AFTER DEFENDANT TERMINATED HIS CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, EMPLOYMENT LAW, RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, PLAINTIFF STAFFING AGENCY WAS NOT ENTITLED, BASED UPON A BALANCING OF THE EQUITIES, TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENFORCING A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT WHICH OSTENSIBLY PROHIBITED DEFENDANT FROM CONTINUING TO  WORK AT THE HOSPITAL WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD PLACED HIM AFTER DEFENDANT TERMINATED HIS CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF (FOURTH DEPT))/PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS (EMPLOYMENT LAW, RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, PLAINTIFF STAFFING AGENCY WAS NOT ENTITLED, BASED UPON A BALANCING OF THE EQUITIES, TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENFORCING A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT WHICH OSTENSIBLY PROHIBITED DEFENDANT FROM CONTINUING TO  WORK AT THE HOSPITAL WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD PLACED HIM AFTER DEFENDANT TERMINATED HIS CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF (FOURTH DEPT))

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PETITION BY A FORMER ROMANTIC PARTNER SEEKING JOINT CUSTODY OF CHILDREN BORN TO RESPONDENT BASED UPON AN ALLEGED AGREEMENT TO RAISE THE CHILDREN AS A FAMILY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BY THE REFEREE FOR FAILURE TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE, THE REFEREE SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS IN A MOTION PURSUANT TO CPLR 4401 (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department reversed the dismissal, by a Referee, of the petition brought seeking joint custody of children born to respondent, with whom petitioner had had a romantic relationship, on the basis of an agreement that petitioner and respondent would raise the children as a family. The court noted that a dismissal pursuant to CPLR 4401 for failure to make out a prima facie case can not take into account credibility determinations:

Petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking joint custody of, and visitation with, the five subject children, all of whom were born to respondent and conceived by the implantation of fertilized eggs. With respect to her standing to commence this proceeding, petitioner alleged that she and respondent had previously been involved in a romantic relationship, and that they entered into an agreement to raise and co-parent the child that was alive when the parties met. Petitioner further alleged that, prior to the conception of the younger four children, the parties also agreed that respondent would conceive additional children and the parties would jointly raise them as a family. The Referee granted a hearing on the issue of petitioner’s standing to seek custody of the children, at which petitioner’s testimony was consistent with the petition. … At the conclusion of petitioner’s case, the Referee granted respondent’s motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 to dismiss the petition. …

… “[I]n determining a motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case, the evidence must be accepted as true and given the benefit of every reasonable inference which may be drawn therefrom . . . The question of credibility is irrelevant, and should not be considered” … .

Here, the Referee made credibility determinations and weighed the probative value of the evidence in making a determination on the motion to dismiss. Consequently, we reverse the order, reinstate the petition and remit the matter to Family Court to determine, after a full hearing, whether petitioner, by clear and convincing evidence, has established with respect to the four younger children that she “has agreed with the biological parent of the child[ren] to conceive and raise [them] as co-parents” … , and whether, despite being a “partner without such an agreement [she] can establish standing” with respect to the older child … . Matter of deMarc v Goodyear, 2018 NY Slip Op 05095, Fourth Dept 7-6-18

FAMILY LAW (PETITION BY A FORMER ROMANTIC PARTNER SEEKING JOINT CUSTODY OF CHILDREN BORN TO RESPONDENT BASED UPON AN ALLEGED AGREEMENT TO RAISE THE CHILDREN AS A FAMILY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BY THE REFEREE FOR FAILURE TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE, THE REFEREE SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS IN A MOTION PURSUANT TO CPLR 4401 (FOURTH DEPT))/CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW, PETITION BY A FORMER ROMANTIC PARTNER SEEKING JOINT CUSTODY OF CHILDREN BORN TO RESPONDENT BASED UPON AN ALLEGED AGREEMENT TO RAISE THE CHILDREN AS A FAMILY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BY THE REFEREE FOR FAILURE TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE, THE REFEREE SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS IN A MOTION PURSUANT TO CPLR 4401 (FOURTH DEPT)))CIVIL PROCEDURE (PETITION BY A FORMER ROMANTIC PARTNER SEEKING JOINT CUSTODY OF CHILDREN BORN TO RESPONDENT BASED UPON AN ALLEGED AGREEMENT TO RAISE THE CHILDREN AS A FAMILY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BY THE REFEREE FOR FAILURE TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE, THE REFEREE SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS IN A MOTION PURSUANT TO CPLR 4401 (FOURTH DEPT))/CPLR 4401  (PETITION BY A FORMER ROMANTIC PARTNER SEEKING JOINT CUSTODY OF CHILDREN BORN TO RESPONDENT BASED UPON AN ALLEGED AGREEMENT TO RAISE THE CHILDREN AS A FAMILY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BY THE REFEREE FOR FAILURE TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE, THE REFEREE SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS IN A MOTION PURSUANT TO CPLR 4401 (FOURTH DEPT))/STANDING (FAMILY LAW, CUSTODY, PETITION BY A FORMER ROMANTIC PARTNER SEEKING JOINT CUSTODY OF CHILDREN BORN TO RESPONDENT BASED UPON AN ALLEGED AGREEMENT TO RAISE THE CHILDREN AS A FAMILY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BY THE REFEREE FOR FAILURE TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE, THE REFEREE SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS IN A MOTION PURSUANT TO CPLR 4401 (FOURTH DEPT))

, , ,

COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined Supreme Court exceeded its authority when it vacated an arbitration award and the court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the police officer (Lee) seeking Municipal Law 207-c benefits in another arbitration proceeding handled by a union lawyer:

Lee established that the court failed to acquire personal jurisdiction over her in the proceeding to confirm the arbitration award … because the City never properly served her … . Nor did the court acquire personal jurisdiction over Lee by the unauthorized appearance of the Union’s attorney “on behalf of Katherine Lee.” Contrary to the City’s contention, there is no evidence that Lee expressly or implicitly authorized the Union’s attorney to represent her at any stage of the proceedings. …

We further conclude that the court erred in sua sponte vacating its prior order and judgment, which confirmed the arbitration award … , and directing further arbitration. … A court has authority to “vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice” … . That authority, however, is not unlimited… . “A court’s inherent power to exercise control over its judgments is not plenary, and should be resorted to only to relieve a party from judgments taken through [fraud,] mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” … .

In vacating the order and judgment, … the court “exceeded the narrow bounds within which courts are authorized to alter [arbitration] awards” … . None of the bases in CPLR 7511 (b) or (c) for vacating or modifying an arbitration award applies to the arbitrator’s failure to award the City a specific dollar amount for the value of benefits received by Lee, and the court had no power to disturb the award apart from the grounds set forth in those subdivisions  … . Matter of City of Syracuse (Lee), 2018 NY Slip Op 05077, Third Dept 7-6-18

​ARBITRATION (MUNICIPAL LAW, COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (MUNICIPAL LAW, COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ARBITRATION,  COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))

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