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MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PROPERLY GRANTED, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘GOOD CAUSE’ AND ‘INTEREST OF JUSTICE’ CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s cross motion to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint was properly granted. Defendant doctor had retired and was no longer working at the place of business where the medical malpractice summons and complaint was served:

… [A]n attempt at service that later proves defective cannot be the basis for a “good cause” extension of time to serve process pursuant to CPLR 306-b… . However, the more flexible “interest of justice” standard accommodates late service that might be due to mistake, confusion, or oversight, so long as there is no prejudice to the defendant … . Indeed, the court may consider diligence or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor, in making its determination, including expiration of the statute of limitations, the potentially meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff’s request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant … .

Here, several factors weighed in favor of granting the plaintiff’s cross motion. The action was timely commenced, and the statute of limitations with respect to one of the two causes of action had expired when the plaintiff cross-moved for relief  … . The appellant also had actual notice of this action within 120 days after its commencement … . Furthermore, an extension of time to serve the summons and complaint under CPLR 306-b in the interest of justice is available where, as here, “service is timely made within the 120-day period but is subsequently found to have been defective” … .Finally, we note that whether a plaintiff has demonstrated that he or she has a potentially meritorious cause of action is but one factor to be considered by a court in determining a CPLR 306-b motion … . Estate of Fernandez v Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., 2018 NY Slip Op 04306, Second Dept 6-13-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PROPERLY GRANTED, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘GOOD CAUSE’ AND ‘INTEREST OF JUSTICE’ CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 306-b  (MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PROPERLY GRANTED, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘GOOD CAUSE’ AND ‘INTEREST OF JUSTICE’ CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/SERVICE OF PROCESS  (MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PROPERLY GRANTED, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘GOOD CAUSE’ AND ‘INTEREST OF JUSTICE’ CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/EXTEND TIME, MOTION TO (SERVICE OF PROCESS, MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PROPERLY GRANTED, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘GOOD CAUSE’ AND ‘INTEREST OF JUSTICE’ CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))

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