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VILLAGE BOARD WAS NOT REQUIRED TO CONSIDER AN APPLICATION FOR THE AMENDMENT OF A ZONING ORDINANCE WHICH IS A LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION NOT SUBJECT TO AN ARTICLE 78 REVIEW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the village board properly declined to consider an application to rezone the subject property, which was an exercise of a legislative function:

“[T]he amendment of a zoning ordinance is a purely legislative function” … . The Village Board is vested with discretion to amend its zoning ordinance, and it is not required to consider and vote upon every application for a zoning change (see Village Law § 7-708 …). Thus, in the present case, the Village Board’s determinations not to consider the plaintiffs/petitioners’ applications were a legislative function not subject to review under CPLR article 78 … . Matter of Hampshire Recreation, LLC v Village of Mamaroneck, 2020 NY Slip Op 02062, Second Dept 3-25-20

 

NEW YORK PLAINTIFF, NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDANT, TORTS ALLEGEDLY OCCURRED IN GEORGIA; UNDER A CONFLICT OF LAWS ANALYSIS GEORGIA LAW CONTROLS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court properly ruled that Georgia law controlled the action which alleged Bank of America’s employees or agents notarized documents with false signatures. The torts were alleged to have occurred in Georgia. Plaintiff was a domiciliary of New York and Bank of America was a domiciliary of North Carolina:

If the conflicting laws regulate conduct, the law of the place of the tort applies because of the “locus jurisdiction’s interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties” and “the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on similar conduct in the future” … . Where [, as here], however, the conflicting laws relate to the allocation of losses, then “considerations of the State’s admonitory interest and party reliance are less important” … . Nevertheless, pursuant to the third rule set forth in Neumeier v Kuehner (31 NY2d 121, 128 [1972]), i.e., where the parties are domiciled in different states with conflicting laws, the law of the place of the tort normally applies, unless displacing it “will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants” … . We conclude that plaintiff “failed to establish that the exception applies to warrant a departure from the locus jurisdiction rule” … , and thus the third Neumeier rule warrants the application of the law of Georgia in this action … . Durham Commercial Capital Corp. v Arunachalam, 2020 NY Slip Op 02024, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

 

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SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT FROM DEFENDANT DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SERVICE OF PROCESS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant did not rebut the presumption of valid service of process:

… [P]laintiff submitted, in addition to evidence establishing the default of defendant and “proof of the facts constituting the claim” (CPLR 3215 [f] … ), the affidavit of a process server, who averred that he served defendant by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the office of the Secretary of State pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 306 (b) (1), and an affidavit of additional mailing establishing that a copy of the summons and complaint was also sent to defendant’s mailing address pursuant to CPLR 3215 (g) (4). In opposition, defendant asserted that it was entitled under CPLR 317 to be relieved from its default in pleading, and defendant submitted an affidavit in which its president averred, insofar as relevant to the issue of service, that defendant had not received the summons and complaint prior to receipt of plaintiff’s initial notice of motion for a default judgment.

… [I]n order to be relieved of a default in pleading under CPLR 317, defendant was required to show, among other things, that it did not receive actual notice of the process in time to defend the action … . It is well settled that a “process server’s affidavit constitute[s] prima facie evidence of proper service on the Secretary of State” … , and thus defendant was required to rebut the presumption of proper service … . Here, the “self-serving affidavit [of defendant’s president], which merely denied receipt, is insufficient to rebut [that] presumption” … . Lechase Constr. Servs., LLC v JM Bus. Assoc. Corp., 2020 NY Slip Op 01977, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

 

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BECAUSE FATHER’S ATTORNEY APPEARED IN THE CUSTODY PROCEEDING FATHER WAS NOT IN DEFAULT AND THE ORDER WAS THEREFORE APPEALABLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined father was not in default because his attorney appeared. Therefore the custody order was appealable:

Petitioner father commenced this proceeding seeking to modify a prior order of custody that, inter alia, awarded sole legal and physical custody of the subject child to respondent mother. The father now appeals from an order that, inter alia, continued sole legal and physical custody of the subject child with the mother.

We agree with the father that Family Court erred in entering the order upon his default based on his failure to appear in court. The record establishes that the father “was represented by counsel, and we have previously determined that, [w]here a party fails to appear [in court on a scheduled date] but is represented by counsel, the order is not one entered upon the default of the aggrieved party and appeal is not precluded” … . Matter of Williams v Richardson, 2020 NY Slip Op 01975, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

 

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CITY DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR FAILURE TO PRESERVE PRE-ACCIDENT POLICE COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS POLICE-VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE BECAUSE THE CITY DEFENDANTS WERE AWARE THEY WOULD PROBABLY ASSERT AN EMERGENCY DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the City defendants should have been sanctioned for spoliation of evidence. The action stemmed from a traffic accident involving a police vehicle and the city defendants were put on notice they would assert an emergency defense by the notice of claim. But the pre-accident police communications were not preserved:

Defendants had an obligation to preserve the pre-accident audio recordings at the time they were destroyed because the Police Department (NYPD) internal report and plaintiff’s notice of claim, which attached the public police accident report, put defendants on notice that they would likely assert an emergency operation defense. Therefore, pre-accident audio communication between the dispatcher and the NYPD vehicle or officers involved in the accident should have been preserved in case it was needed for future litigation … . Under the circumstances presented, the imposition of an adverse inference charge would be an appropriate sanction … . Sanchez v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 01970, First Dept 3-19-20

 

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A HEARING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER SERVICE OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT ON THE DOORMAN OF DEFENDANT’S APARTMENT BUILDING WAS VALID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a hearing should have been held about the validity of the service of the summons and complaint; i.e., whether service on the doorman of the defendant’s (Freeman’s) apartment building was valid service:

The plaintiff asserted that service of process was properly made pursuant to CPLR 308(2), relying on an affidavit of service indicating that service upon Freeman was effected by delivering the summons and complaint to a “doorman” in the apartment building where Freeman resided and by subsequently mailing the summons and complaint to Freeman … . While the affidavit of service constituted prima facie evidence of service of the summons and complaint pursuant to CPLR 308(2) … , the evidence submitted by Freeman in support of her motion, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint sufficiently rebutted the presumption of proper service to warrant a hearing. Freeman’s submissions included specific and detailed averments, as well as the affidavit of a security guard who worked in Freeman’s apartment building. The security guard averred that the summons and complaint were delivered to him at his desk on … , but that he was not authorized to receive packages or deliveries, that he did not deny the process server access to Freeman’s apartment, and that he did not inform Freeman of the delivery. Under these circumstances, the court should have conducted a hearing to determine whether the security guard was a person of suitable age and discretion within the meaning of CPLR 308(2), and whether the outer bounds of Freeman’s dwelling place extended to the security guard’s desk in her apartment building … . Edwards-Blackburn v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 01907, Second Dept 3-18-20

 

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IN THE CONTEXT OF AN APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED THE ULTIMATE RELIEF SOUGHT; THE CRITERIA FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WERE NOT MET (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should not have ordered the return of the down payment to the buyer (Berman) pursuant to the purchase contract in the context of granting a preliminary injunction. First, by granting the ultimate relief requested Supreme Court had effectively granted summary judgment before issue was joined. Second the criteria for a preliminary injunction were not met. The purchase contract allowed the termination of the agreement and the return of the down payment if three conditions were met. Berman alleged two of the conditions were met and the third was impossible:

Berman failed to demonstrate his entitlement to temporary injunctive relief pursuant to CPLR 6301, as he failed to establish any of the three required elements for such relief: (1) likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent granting of a preliminary injunction, (3) and a balancing of equities in his favor … . …

Berman failed to demonstrate irreparable injury, as the loss of a down payment is not an irreparable harm since the injured party could be made whole by a money judgment … . …

While Berman contends that it was impossible to obtain a Phase II Assessment within the required time, he failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success in establishing that it was impossible to obtain the report. …

Finally, Berman failed to show that the balancing of equities was in his favor.  Berman v TRG Waterfront Lender, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 01902, Second Dept 3-18-20

 

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THE REFEREE’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE NOTICE AND A HEARING TO THE DEFENDANT DID NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the referee’s failure to provide notice and a hearing to the defendant in this foreclosure action did not require reversal of the judgment of foreclosure:

It is undisputed that the referee failed to provide notice to the defendant pursuant to CPLR 4313, or to hold a hearing on the issues addressed in the referee’s report. However, as long as a defendant is not prejudiced by the inability to submit evidence directly to the referee, a referee’s failure to notify a defendant and hold a hearing is not, by itself, a basis to reverse a judgment of foreclosure and sale and remit the matter for a hearing and a new determination of amounts owed … . Where, as here, a defendant had an opportunity to raise questions and submit evidence directly to the Supreme Court, which evidence could be considered by the court in determining whether to confirm the referee’s report, the defendant is not prejudiced by any error in failing to hold a hearing … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Viola, 2020 NY Slip Op 01895, Second Dept 3-18-20

 

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PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST PERMITS GRANTING THE CONVERSION OF DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY FROM MANUFACTURING TO RETAIL; PROXIMITY TO DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY WAS NOT ENOUGH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not have standing to contest the defendant City’s issuing permits allowing defendant CAB to convert property from manufacturing to retail. Plaintiff operated a grocery store 450 feet from CAB’s property. The Second Department held proximity was not enough to confer standing on plaintiff:

“In land use matters, . . . [the plaintiff] must show that it would suffer direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large'” … . “An allegation of close proximity may give rise to an inference of damage or injury that enables a nearby property owner to challenge a land use decision without proof of actual injury” … . “However, this does not entitle the property owner to judicial review in every instance” … . “Rather, in addition to establishing that the effect of the proposed change is different from that suffered by the public generally, the [property owner] must establish that the interest asserted is arguably within the zone of interests the statute protects” … . Thus, “even where [the property owner’s] premises are physically close to the subject property, an ad hoc determination may be required as to whether a particular [property owner] itself has a legally protectable interest so as to confer standing” … .

Here, the plaintiff alleged standing on the basis of proximity, issues and interests within the zone of interests, and adverse impacts. We disagree with the Supreme Court’s finding that the plaintiff had standing to commence this action. The plaintiff failed to allege any harm distinct from that of the community at large … . 159-MP Corp. v CAB Bedford, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 01892, Second Dept 3-18-20

 

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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION ON A GROUND (STANDING) NOT RAISED BY A PARTY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed causes of action for lack of standing when that issue was not raised by the parties:

We thus conclude that the court erred in sua sponte reaching the issue of standing with respect to the second and third causes of action … . Standing “is an aspect of justiciability which, when challenged, must be considered at the outset of any litigation” … . Inasmuch as the … respondents’ cross motion with respect to the second and third causes of action was not based on petitioners’ alleged lack of standing, there was no basis for the court to reach that issue.  Matter of Barbeau v Village of LeRoy, 2020 NY Slip Op 01732, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

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