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DEFENDANT DRIVER RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DRIVER OF THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER WAS NEGLIGENT; THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT’S OUT-OF-STATE AFFIDAVIT DID NOT HAVE A CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY DID NOT AFFECT ITS VALIDITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion for summary judgment by Ellis, the driver of the car in which plaintiff was a passenger, should have been denied. And the cross motion for summary judgment by plaintiff should have been denied. The defendant driver’s description of the accident raised a question of fact whether Ellis was negligent. The fact that the defendant driver submitted an out-of-state affidavit without a certificate of conformity was not a fatal defect:

… [T]he … defendants raised a triable issue of fact through the affidavit of John Koranteng, the alleged operator of the … defendants’ vehicle. Koranteng averred that he checked to make sure that the left side of his vehicle was clear before he began to initiate a right turn onto Brooklyn Avenue. Koranteng claimed that, while he was turning right, the collision occurred when Ellis’s vehicle attempted to aggressively pass him on his driver’s side … . Ellis’s contention that Koranteng’s affidavit was not in admissible form and, therefore, should not have been considered, is without merit, since the absence of a certificate of conformity for an out-of-state affidavit is not a fatal defect … .

… [T]he Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability insofar as asserted against the … defendants. … [T]he … defendants raised a triable issue of fact through the submission of … Koranteng’s affidavit … . ” … [I]f triable issues of fact are raised by the defendants . . . summary judgment on the issue of liability must be denied, even if the moving plaintiff was an innocent passenger” … . Wise v Boyd Bros. Transp., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 03345, Second Dept 5-26-21

 

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FAILURE TO TAKE TIMELY STEPS TO SETTLE THE ORDER IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION RENDERED THE ACTION ABANDONED PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.48 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure action was abandoned because no steps were taken to settle the order:

“Proposed orders . . . with proof of service on all parties where the order is directed to be settled or submitted on notice, must be submitted for signature, unless otherwise directed by the court, within 60 days after the signing and filing of the decision directing that the order be settled or submitted” (22 NYCRR 202.48[a]). “Failure to submit the order . . . timely shall be deemed an abandonment of the motion or action, unless for good cause shown” (22 NYCRR 202.48[b]). These provisions are not applicable where the decision does not explicitly direct that the proposed judgment or order be settled or submitted for signature (see Funk v Barry, 89 NY2d 364). However, the direction to “settle” order “ordinarily entails more complicated relief,” and therefore “contemplates notice to the opponent so that both parties may either agree on a draft or prepare counter proposals to be settled before the court” (id. at 367 …). Here, Nationstar failed to timely settle the order pursuant to the requirements of 22 NYCRR 202.48(a), and did not show good cause for its failure to do so … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48 to deem, as abandoned, Nationstar’s motion. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Yogev, 2021 NY Slip Op 03297, Second Dept 5-26-21

 

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THE GUARANTEES QUALIFED AS INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY AND SUPPORTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT; ONLY PURELY LEGAL ARGUMENTS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL CAN BE CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment in lieu of complaint based upon guarantees which met the definition of instruments for the payment of money only. The court noted that two arguments raised for the first time on appeal (documents not qualified as business records and failure to include a payment schedule) could not be considered because they were not purely legal arguments. A third argument, which was purely legal, was considered:

Defendants’ contention that the guaranties do not qualify as instruments for the payment of money only, as required by CPLR 3213, because they guarantee performance as well as payment and reference must be made to documents outside the guaranties to determine if the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) conditions have been met, is unavailing. Although this argument was raised for the first time on appeal, since these are “legal issues appearing on the face of the record which could not have been avoided” if they had been raised earlier, we will address the argument … .

The guaranty at issue in 27 West 72nd St. qualifies as an instrument for the payment of money only because it guarantees only payment and not performance. … [T]he … operative provision of the guaranty says, “Guarantor guarantees the payment of the Guaranteed Obligations.”

The guaranty at issue in 31 East 28th St. also qualifies as an instrument for the payment of money only. Although it says, “Guarantor guarantees the payment and performance of the Guaranteed Obligations as and when due and payable,” the mere addition of the words “and performance” does not necessarily remove the guaranty from the category of instruments for the payment of money only, particularly when the sentence ends with “as and when due and payable.”  27 W. 72nd St. Note Buyer LLC v Terzi, 2021 NY Slip Op 03364, First Dept 5-27-21

 

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THE FIDUCIARY TOLLING RULE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST ACTION AGAINST AN EXECUTOR (WHO WAS REMOVED BY THE COURT) UNTIL THE SUCESSOR FIDUCIARY WAS APPOINTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the constructive trust action based upon alleged self-dealing by an executor who was removed by the court was not time-barred. The fiduciary tolling rule applied:

Under the fiduciary tolling rule, a claim alleging wrongful conduct by an individual in his or her fiduciary capacity does not accrue until there is an open repudiation of the fiduciary obligation or a judicial settlement of the fiduciary’s account … . This rule tolls the statute of limitations “for all misconduct committed by the fiduciary prior to repudiation of its obligation or termination of the [fiduciary] relationship” … since, absent either repudiation or removal, the aggrieved parties “were entitled to assume that the [fiduciary] would perform his [or her fiduciary] responsibilities” … , and it is highly unlikely that a sitting fiduciary would assert a constructive trust claim against himself or herself. …  Under this rule, the toll continues until a successor fiduciary is appointed … . Matter of George, 2021 NY Slip Op 03231, Third Dept 5-20-21

 

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THE ARBITRATION AWARD IS VALID EVEN IF BASED ON AN ERROR OF LAW OR FACT; THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE A LETTER OF ENGAGEMENT DID NOT PRECLUDE THE ATTORNEY’S ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT; CPLR 5225 DOES NOT REQUIRE A SPECIAL PROCEEDING TO ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined (1) the arbitrator’s award was valid even if an error of law or fact was made; (2) the failure to provide a letter of engagement did not preclude the petitioner-attorney’s action for breach of contract; (3) petitioner was not required to commence a special proceeding to enforce the judgment; (4) the motions to enforce the judgement do not violate the Commercial Division rules:

… [E]ven if the arbitrator had made an error of law or fact in concluding that respondents had breached the retainer agreements, this alone would not justify vacating the award … . …

… [T]he court improperly denied the motions [to enforce the judgment] based upon its finding that petitioner had failed to commence a separate special proceeding to enforce the judgment. The language of CPLR 5225 clarifies that the court had jurisdiction to resolve the turnover motion. While CPLR 5225(a) provides that a judgment creditor seeking turnover of money or personal property “in possession or custody” of the judgment debtor does so “[u]pon motion of the judgment creditor,” CPLR 5225(b) provides that a judgment creditor seeking turnover of money or personal property in a third party’s possession or custody does so “[u]pon a special proceeding commenced by the judgment creditor” … Given that petitioner brought the motions against the judgment debtor as opposed to a third party, it was not required to commence a separate proceeding. Matter of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP v World Class Capital Group, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 03252, First Dept 5-20-21

 

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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF MISSED A STATUS CONFERENCE; THE SUA SPONTE ORDER IS NOT APPEALABLE; PLAINTIFF CORRECTLY MOVED TO VACATE THE ORDER AND APPEALED THE DENIAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint because plaintiff missed a status conference. The First Department noted that the sua sponte dismissal order was not appealable as of right. Therefore plaintiff correcting moved to vacate the order and then appealed the denial of that order:

Contrary to defendant Hudson’s argument, the status conference order sua sponte dismissing the complaint was not appealable as of right (CPLR 5701[a][2] …). Plaintiff followed proper procedure by “apply[ing] to vacate the order and then appeal[ing] from the denial of that motion so that a suitable record [could] be made and counsel afforded the opportunity to be heard on the issues” … .

The court improvidently exercised its discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal without giving plaintiff notice that such a sanction might be imminent … . Further, the sanction of dismissal was not warranted, and would not have been warranted even upon a motion on notice, based on plaintiff’s noncompliance with one order … . MJC Elec., Inc v Hudson Meridian Constr. Group, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 03258, First Dept 5-20-21

 

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A GENERAL RELEASE AND WAIVER WHICH IS CONTRADICTED BY ACTIONS WHICH POST-DATE THE DOCUMENT CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS A RELEASE; THE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE POWER, SUA SPONTE, PURSUANT TO CPLR 5019, TO VACATE THE COURT’S OWN ORDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined (1) actions which post-date a release and waiver which conflict with the terms of the release and waiver indicate the document can not be construed as a release, and (2) the judge did not have the authority, sua sponte, to vacate the court’s own order:

“‘Where a waiver form purports to acknowledge that no further payments are owed, but the parties’ conduct indicates otherwise, the instrument will not be construed as a release'” … . …

The Supreme Court erred in, sua sponte, vacating the December 2016 order. “‘Pursuant to CPLR 5019(a), a trial court has the discretion to correct an order or judgment which contains a mistake, defect, or irregularity not affecting a substantial right of a party, or is inconsistent with the decision upon which it is based. However, a trial court has no revisory or appellate jurisdiction, sua sponte, to vacate its own order or judgment'” … . Additionally, “[p]ursuant to CPLR 5015(a), a court may relieve a party from an order or judgment, but only ‘on motion of [an] interested person’ and ‘with such notice as the court may direct” … .

Here, to the extent that the Supreme Court was acting pursuant to CPLR 5019(a), the court erred, since that statute cannot be used by courts to vacate prior orders or judgments or “reconsider[ ] the merits of summary judgment” … . United Airconditioning Corp. v Axis Piping, Inc.2021 NY Slip Op 03210, Second Dept 5-19-21

 

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MANDAMUS PETITION TO COMPEL JUDGES TO ISSUE A WRITTEN ORDER DECIDING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO REARGUE HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, granted the petition to compel judges to issue a written order denying petitioner’s motion to reargue a motion to vacate his conviction:

Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioner demonstrated a clear legal right to a written order determining his motion for leave to reargue his prior motion pursuant to CPL 440.10, in the action entitled People v Cruz … and mandamus properly lies to compel the respondents to issue that written order, as well as an order determining the petitioner’s motion to reargue the “bench decision” … . Matter of Cruz v D’Emic, 2021 NY Slip Op 03175, Second Dept 5-19-21

 

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APPELLANT PURCHASED THE PROPERTY WHILE THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS PENDING; APPELLANT’S MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined appellant’s motion to intervene in this foreclosure action should have been granted:

The plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose a mortgage given by the defendant Kathleen O. Nocella. Nocella defaulted in appearing in the action. During the pendency of the action, nonparty Henry Irving, LLC (hereinafter the appellant), acquired title to the subject property. In September 2017, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment and for an order of reference. The appellant cross-moved, inter alia, for leave to intervene in the action. …

The appellant was entitled to intervene as of right pursuant to CPLR 1012(a) since it established that the representation of its interest by the parties would be inadequate, that the action involved the disposition of title to real property, and that it would be bound and adversely affected by a judgment of foreclosure and sale (see CPLR 1012[a][2], [3]; 6501 …). Contrary to the court’s determination, neither the fact that the appellant obtained its interest in the subject property after this action was commenced and the notice of pendency was filed, nor the fact that the defendants defaulted in answering or appearing, definitively bars intervention … . Moreover, since the appellant’s cross motion, inter alia, for leave to intervene was made before an order of reference or judgment of foreclosure and sale was issued, the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the timing of the cross motion … . Bank of Am., NA v Nocella, 2021 NY Slip Op 03159, Second Dept 5-19-21

 

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THE PEOPLE FAILED TO TIMELY REDUCE THE BOND OBLIGATION TO A JUDGMENT, THEREFORE THE SURETY’S MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT FORFEITING THE $100,000 BAIL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, determined the surety’s motion to vacate a judgment forfeiting $100,000 bail should have been granted. Although the surety’s (Empire’s) motion was untimely, the People had failed to timely reduce the bond obligation to a judgment. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here:

In this special proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR 5015 by a surety of a defendant in a criminal case, the dispositive question is whether a surety is procedurally precluded from moving to vacate a judgment of bail forfeiture as untimely made. The People argue that the application is precluded because the surety did not move within the one-year time limit applicable to a motion for remission of the forfeiture, which, as set forth in CPL 540.30(2), “must be made within one year after the forfeiture of bail is declared.” We answer the question in the negative because the People must first comply with the statutory mandate of CPL 540.10(2) before they can raise the one-year statute of limitations of CPL 540.30(2). The People did not comply with CPLR 540.10(2), which requires the People to reduce a bond obligation to a judgment within 120 days after the forfeiture is declared by the court. People v Empire Bonding & Ins. Co., 2021 NY Slip Op 03120, First Dept 5-13-21

 

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