You are here: / Attorneys
,

MEDICAL JOURNAL KEPT BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AFTER SHE WAS INJURED AT THE DIRECTION OF HER ATTORNEY PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, MEDICATION LOG IS NOT PROTECTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that a medical journal kept by plaintiff’s decedent after an injury at the direction of her attorney was protected by attorney-client privilege, where as a record of her medications were not:

Upon examination of the notes turned over to Supreme Court for an in camera review, we conclude that they are a mixed collection, some of which are shielded by the attorney-client privilege and some of which are not. The three-page portion labeled “injury journal” is, as described by decedent’s attorney, a seamless report of the incident at the health club and the medical care that decedent received shortly thereafter. The medication log is on a separate page and includes other notes of a personal nature. We agree with Supreme Court that the medication log was made for the purpose of keeping a medical record rather than as a confidential communication made for the purpose of legal services. Accordingly, in the absence of evidence that the medication log constituted a communication of legal character between decedent and [her attorney], plaintiff may not invoke the attorney-client privilege to shield its disclosure … . Wrubleski v Mary Imogene Bassett Hosp., 2018 NY Slip Op 05256, Third Dept 7-12-18

ATTORNEYS (PRIVILEGE, MEDICAL JOURNAL KEPT BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AFTER SHE WAS INJURED AT THE DIRECTION OF HER ATTORNEY PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, MEDICATION LOG IS NOT PROTECTED (THIRD DEPT))/PRIVILEGE (ATTORNEY-CLIENT, MEDICAL JOURNAL KEPT BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AFTER SHE WAS INJURED AT THE DIRECTION OF HER ATTORNEY PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, MEDICATION LOG IS NOT PROTECTED (THIRD DEPT))/INJURY LOG (ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE,  MEDICAL JOURNAL KEPT BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AFTER SHE WAS INJURED AT THE DIRECTION OF HER ATTORNEY PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, MEDICATION LOG IS NOT PROTECTED (THIRD DEPT))

, ,

PROSECUTOR’S IMPROPER REMARKS DESIGNED TO ELICIT THE JURY’S SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIM DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, HOWEVER A NEW TRIAL ON THE MURDER CHARGE IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s murder conviction, determined the trial judge should have instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Although the defendant told the police he went to the victim’s house intending to kill him, there was evidence the gun went off when the victim grabbed the gun. The Second Department also noted the prosecutor improperly tried to elicit the jury’s sympathy for the victim:

… [T]he prosecutor’s comments in his opening statement about the grand jury’s indictment were improper. The prosecutor’s comments in his opening statement about the victim and his family, which could only have been intended to evoke the jury’s sympathy, were also improper… . Further, the prosecutor elicited certain testimony from the medical examiner and the victim’s father about the victim’s personal background and the victim’s family that was irrelevant to the issues at trial, and was likewise intended to evoke the jury’s sympathy … . Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor’s improprieties did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and any other error in this regard was harmless, as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and no significant probability that any error contributed to his convictions … . …

Here, the court should have granted the defendant’s request to charge manslaughter in the second degree (reckless manslaughter) as a lesser included offense of murder in the second degree (intentional murder). Reckless manslaughter is a lesser included offense of intentional murder in the second degree … . Moreover, there is a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant did not intentionally pull the trigger at the time the gun was fired … .  People v Cherry, 2018 NY Slip Op 05190, Second Dept 7-11-18

CRIMINAL LAW (PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, LESSER INCLCUDED OFFENSE, PROSECUTOR’S IMPROPER REMARKS DESIGNED TO ELICIT THE JURY’S SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIM DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, HOWEVER A NEW TRIAL ON THE MURDER CHARGE IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, PROSECUTOR’S IMPROPER REMARKS DESIGNED TO ELICIT THE JURY’S SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIM DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, HOWEVER A NEW TRIAL ON THE MURDER CHARGE IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, PROSECUTOR’S IMPROPER REMARKS DESIGNED TO ELICIT THE JURY’S SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIM DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, HOWEVER A NEW TRIAL ON THE MURDER CHARGE IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER (SECOND DEPT))/LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE A NEW TRIAL ON THE MURDER CHARGE IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER (SECOND DEPT))/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE,  A NEW TRIAL ON THE MURDER CHARGE IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER (SECOND DEPT))

, ,

MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING, THREE CRITERIA FOR VACATING A CONVICTION EXPLAINED, HERE DEFENDANT ALLEGED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE BEEN CORRECTLY INFORMED BY COUNSEL OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction should not have been summarily granted and remanded the matter for a hearing. The defendant alleged defense counsel was ineffective for failure to correctly inform him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. The First Department offered a detailed explanation of the three criteria for granting a motion to vacate in this context on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.

CPL 440.30 authorizes the summary granting of a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction where the moving papers allege a ground constituting a legal basis for the motion (CPL 440.30[3][a]); where that ground, if factually based, is supported by sworn allegations of fact essential to support the motion (CPL 440.30[3][b]); and where the sworn allegations of essential fact are either conceded by the People to be true or are conclusively substantiated by unquestionable documentary proof (CPL 440.30[3][c]). If all three of these statutory criteria are not met, the court may not grant a CPL 440.10 motion without first conducting a hearing (CPL 440.30[5]). …

… [T]he People did not concede the essential factual allegations on the issue of prejudice. Indeed, they expressly noted that defendant’s allegations of longstanding ties to the United States and lack of any connection to Haiti were entirely unsubstantiated. Neither did defendant proffer documentary proof conclusively substantiating his sworn factual allegations in support of his claim that “but for [his plea] counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial” … . …Thus, defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion failed to satisfy the third criterion of CPL 440.30(3), and for that reason, the motion court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion without first conducting a hearing and making findings of fact … . People v Gaston, 2018 NY Slip Op 05122, First Dept 7-10-18

CRIMINAL LAW (MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING, THREE CRITERIA FOR VACATING A CONVICTION EXPLAINED, HERE DEFENDANT ALLEGED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE BEEN CORRECTLY INFORMED OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))/IMMIGRATION LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING, THREE CRITERIA FOR VACATING A CONVICTION EXPLAINED, HERE DEFENDANT ALLEGED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE BEEN CORRECTLY INFORMED OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, (MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING, THREE CRITERIA FOR VACATING A CONVICTION EXPLAINED, HERE DEFENDANT ALLEGED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE BEEN CORRECTLY INFORMED OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))/VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO (MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING, THREE CRITERIA FOR VACATING A CONVICTION EXPLAINED, HERE DEFENDANT ALLEGED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE BEEN CORRECTLY INFORMED OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))/DEPORTATION (CRIMINAL LAW, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING, THREE CRITERIA FOR VACATING A CONVICTION EXPLAINED, HERE DEFENDANT ALLEGED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE BEEN CORRECTLY INFORMED OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))

FEE-SHARING AGREEMENT VIOLATED JUDICIARY LAW 491 AND COULD NOT BE ENFORCED BY A COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the fee sharing agreement violated Judiciary Law 491 and could not be enforced by a court:

With respect to the merits of the appeal, Judiciary Law § 491 prohibits any person, partnership, or corporation from sharing any fee or compensation charged or received by an attorney-at-law, in consideration of having placed in the hands of such attorney-at-law a claim or demand of any kind … .

Under the purported fee-sharing agreement, the plaintiffs would provide the defendant attorneys with proprietary information regarding potential clients, investigate claims, interview potential plaintiffs, and otherwise assist with litigation. In exchange, the defendant attorneys would pay the plaintiffs 20% of their fee for each case. This purported fee-sharing agreement whereby the plaintiffs attempt to recover from the defendant attorneys is illegal, and the plaintiffs are proscribed from seeking the assistance of the courts in enforcing it … . Ballan v Sirota, 2018 NY Slip Op 05014, Second Dept 7-5-18

​ATTORNEYS (FEE-SHARING, FEE-SHARING AGREEMENT VIOLATED JUDICIARY LAW 491 AND COULD NOT BE ENFORCED BY A COURT (SECOND DEPT))/FEE-SHARING AGREEMENT (ATTORNEYS, FEE-SHARING AGREEMENT VIOLATED JUDICIARY LAW 491 AND COULD NOT BE ENFORCED BY A COURT (SECOND DEPT))/JUDICIARY LAW 491 (ATTORNEYS, FEE-SHARING AGREEMENT VIOLATED JUDICIARY LAW 491 AND COULD NOT BE ENFORCED BY A COURT (SECOND DEPT))

, ,

DESPITE RULING THAT NO EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S REQUESTS TO TALK TO COUNSEL COULD BE PRESENTED, TWO TESTIFYING WITNESSES VIOLATED THAT RULING, BECAUSE THAT EVIDENCE CONFLICTED WITH THE DEFENSE STRATEGY A MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECLARED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department reversed defendant’s conviction of felony leaving the scene of an accident and ordered a new trial. Defendant struck a pedestrian whose body came into defendant’s car through the windshield. Defendant did not contact the police for over an hour. Prior to trial defense counsel obtained a ruling from the judge that the People could not introduce any evidence defendant sought to communicate with counsel. That ruling was violated twice by testifying witnesses:

Defendant’s strategy at trial relied in large part upon the fact that she was not at fault in the accident but did witness the victim’s body being propelled through her windshield and coming to rest inches away from her. She relied upon this state of affairs to contend that her failure to contact authorities was not because she was “coldly calculating,” but because she was in shock and incapable of doing so. Defendant further questioned the proof supporting the People’s hypothesis that she left the scene with her sister before the 911 call.

Any indication that defendant sought to consult with counsel would undermine the foundation of this defense by prejudically suggesting that she was conscious of guilt, rational enough to consider the question of counsel and, perhaps, capable of reporting the accident or taking steps to avoid doing so … . …

In our view, [the] repeated violations of the pretrial ruling, in a case where defendant’s capacity to act and her actions after the accident were in serious dispute, caused harm that could not be reliably dissipated. County Court therefore abused its discretion in declining to declare a mistrial … and, inasmuch as we do not agree with defendant that the People deliberately acted to provoke a mistrial …  we remit for a new trial. People v Lentini, 2018 NY Slip Op 04983, Third Dept 7-5-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, DESPITE RULING THAT NO EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S REQUESTS TO TALK TO COUNSEL SHOULD BE PRESENTED, TWO TESTIFYING WITNESSES VIOLATED THAT RULING, BECAUSE THAT EVIDENCE CONFLICTED WITH THE DEFENSE STRATEGY A MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECLARED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DESPITE RULING THAT NO EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S REQUESTS TO TALK TO COUNSEL SHOULD BE PRESENTED, TWO TESTIFYING WITNESSES VIOLATED THAT RULING, BECAUSE THAT EVIDENCE CONFLICTED WITH THE DEFENSE STRATEGY A MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECLARED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, DESPITE RULING THAT NO EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S REQUESTS TO TALK TO COUNSEL SHOULD BE PRESENTED, TWO TESTIFYING WITNESSES VIOLATED THAT RULING, BECAUSE THAT EVIDENCE CONFLICTED WITH THE DEFENSE STRATEGY A MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECLARED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))/MISTRIAL (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, DESPITE RULING THAT NO EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S REQUESTS TO TALK TO COUNSEL SHOULD BE PRESENTED, TWO TESTIFYING WITNESSES VIOLATED THAT RULING, BECAUSE THAT EVIDENCE CONFLICTED WITH THE DEFENSE STRATEGY A MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECLARED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))

,

DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO DISMISS THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department reversed defendant’s convictions and dismissed the accusatory instruments because defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Counsel failed to moved to dismiss the prosecution on the ground that defendant’s right to a speedy trial had been violated. Had the motion been made, it would have succeeded:

Where, as here, a class A misdemeanor is the most serious offense of which a defendant is accused, the People have 90 days from the commencement of the criminal action to declare their readiness (see CPL 30.30 [1] [b]…). Compliance with this deadline is determined by “computing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People’s declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the result any postreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion” … . Here, although the People declared their readiness 19 days after the accusatory instruments were filed and defendant was arraigned on the charges, they expressly stated at the subsequent appearance on February 9, 2015 that they were not ready for trial and sought an adjournment for the very purpose of trial preparation. The People did not thereafter declare their readiness until June 15, 2015, beyond the 90-day period. Thus, as the People acknowledge, defendant possessed a meritorious statutory speedy trial claim, and defense counsel’s failure to raise it in a pretrial motion to dismiss deprived defendant of meaningful representation … . People v Smart, 2018 NY Slip Op 04979, Third Dept 7-5-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (ATTORNEYS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO DISMISS THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO DISMISS THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CRIMINAL LAW,  DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO DISMISS THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/SPEEDY TRIAL (CRIMINAL LAW, ATTORNEYS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO DISMISS THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))

,

FAMILY COURT’S FAILURE TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY BEFORE ALLOWING FATHER TO PROCEED PRO SE REQUIRED REVERSAL, DESPITE FATHER’S BEING REPRESENTED WHEN THE HEARING CONTINUED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court in this contempt and modification of custody proceeding, determined Family Court should not have allowed father to represent himself without first making an inquiry to ensure father understood the consequences of going forward without an attorney. Although Family Court informed father that he should obtain counsel because he was misconstruing the law, and father was represented when the hearing resumed, one of the witnesses examined by father pro se was not recalled for examination by father’s attorney:

“A waiver of the right to counsel must be explicit and intentional, and the court must assure that it is made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily”… . Thus, the hearing court must “perform a searching inquiry to determine whether a party is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, which might include inquiry into the party’s age, education, occupation, previous exposure to legal procedures and other relevant factors bearing on a competent, intelligent, voluntary waiver” … . …

Supreme Court erred by commencing the hearing without first ascertaining that the father was unequivocally waiving his right to counsel and, if so, conducting an inquiry into whether that waiver was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made … . Although one of the two witnesses who testified while the father was pro se ultimately was recalled after the father obtained counsel, and was subjected to direct and cross-examination for a second time, the other witness — the caseworker — was not recalled and her testimony supported both of the mother’s petitions. Furthermore, the violation of a party’s statutory right to counsel “requires reversal, without regard to the merits of the unrepresented party’s position” and, therefore, we need not consider whether the mother would have succeeded on her modification petition absent the caseworker’s testimony … . Matter of Hensley v DeMun, 2018 NY Slip Op 04995, Third Dept 7-5-18

​FAMILY LAW (ATTORNEYS, FAMILY COURT’S FAILURE TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY BEFORE ALLOWING FATHER TO PROCEED PRO SE REQUIRED REVERSAL, DESPITE FATHER’S BEING REPRESENTED WHEN THE HEARING CONTINUED (THIRD DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (FAMILY LAW,  FAMILY COURT’S FAILURE TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY BEFORE ALLOWING FATHER TO PROCEED PRO SE REQUIRED REVERSAL, DESPITE FATHER’S BEING REPRESENTED WHEN THE HEARING CONTINUED (THIRD DEPT))/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT’S FAILURE TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY BEFORE ALLOWING FATHER TO PROCEED PRO SE REQUIRED REVERSAL, DESPITE FATHER’S BEING REPRESENTED WHEN THE HEARING CONTINUED (THIRD DEPT))/PRO SE (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT’S FAILURE TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY BEFORE ALLOWING FATHER TO PROCEED PRO SE REQUIRED REVERSAL, DESPITE FATHER’S BEING REPRESENTED WHEN THE HEARING CONTINUED (THIRD DEPT))/WAIVER (RIGHT TO COUNSEL, FAMILY LAW,  FAMILY COURT’S FAILURE TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY BEFORE ALLOWING FATHER TO PROCEED PRO SE REQUIRED REVERSAL, DESPITE FATHER’S BEING REPRESENTED WHEN THE HEARING CONTINUED (THIRD DEPT))

,

DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT OBJECT TO THE COURT’S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY DEFENDANT’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE OF GUILT OF THE OFFENSE ON TRIAL, DEFENSE COUNSEL TOLD THE JURY THEIR JOB WAS TO SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH THEREBY DIMINISHING THE PEOPLE’S BURDEN OF PROOF, AND DEFENSE COUNSEL INDICATED TO THE JURY DEFENDANT HAD TEN PRIOR CONVICTIONS, DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel:

Defense counsel repeatedly stated to the jury during voir dire that the trial was to be “a search for the truth.” It is settled that a “prosecutor’s characterization of [a] trial as a search for the truth’ [is] indeed improper” … , inasmuch as it is a way of “proposing that the jury might convict even in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt so long as the jury concluded that its verdict represented the truth” … . Here, by making that statement to the jury during voir dire then repeating it at least three times during summation, defense counsel improperly diminished the People’s burden of proof.

Furthermore, it is also well settled that, when a defendant testifies and is cross-examined regarding his prior convictions, he or she is entitled to have the court “charge the jury that such prior convictions could only be used in evaluating defendant’s credibility, and that they could not be used as evidence of defendant’s guilt”… . Here, counsel requested such a charge, the prosecutor conceded that the charge should be given, and the court agreed to give it. Nevertheless, the court’s instructions indicated that the jury may rely upon evidence of a previous conviction in evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, including defendant, but the court did not instruct the jury that they may not consider the prior conviction as evidence of defendant’s guilt. Defense counsel did not object or otherwise bring the omission to the court’s attention. …

Furthermore, defense counsel exacerbated the harmful impact of defendant’s prior convictions during the cross-examination of the People’s fingerprint expert by eliciting evidence that gave the impression that defendant had 10 or more prior arrests and/or convictions. People v Mccallum, 2018 NY Slip Op 04898, Fourth Dept 6-29-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (ATTORNEYS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT OBJECT TO THE COURT’S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY DEFENDANT’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE OF GUILT OF THE OFFENSE ON TRIAL, DEFENSE COUNSEL TOLD THE JURY THEIR JOB WAS TO SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH THEREBY DIMINISHING THE PEOPLE’S BURDEN OF PROOF, AND DEFENSE COUNSEL INDICATED TO THE JURY DEFENDANT HAD TEN PRIOR CONVICTIONS, DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT OBJECT TO THE COURT’S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY DEFENDANT’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE OF GUILT OF THE OFFENSE ON TRIAL, DEFENSE COUNSEL TOLD THE JURY THEIR JOB WAS TO SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH THEREBY DIMINISHING THE PEOPLE’S BURDEN OF PROOF, AND DEFENSE COUNSEL INDICATED TO THE JURY DEFENDANT HAD TEN PRIOR CONVICTIONS, DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (FOURTH DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT OBJECT TO THE COURT’S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY DEFENDANT’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE OF GUILT OF THE OFFENSE ON TRIAL, DEFENSE COUNSEL TOLD THE JURY THEIR JOB WAS TO SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH THEREBY DIMINISHING THE PEOPLE’S BURDEN OF PROOF, AND DEFENSE COUNSEL INDICATED TO THE JURY DEFENDANT HAD TEN PRIOR CONVICTIONS, DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (FOURTH DEPT))

,

DEFENSE COUNSEL PROVIDED DEFENDANT WITH ERRONEOUS INFORMATION ABOUT THE LENGTH OF HIS SENTENCE SHOULD HE BE CONVICTED AFTER TRIAL AND ERRONEOUSLY TOLD THE DEFENDANT HIS PLEA TO SEX TRAFFICKING WOULD NOT MAKE HIM SUBJECT TO THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction by guilty plea, determined defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel told the defendant he could receive a 75-year sentence if convicted on the charged offenses, when the most the defendant could receive was 15 to 30 years. Defense counsel also erroneously told the defendant the sex trafficking offense to which he pled guilty would not make him subject to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA):

The evidence, including a letter from defense counsel to the prosecutor during plea negotiations and the testimony of defendant and defense counsel at the hearing on defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment, established that defendant and defense counsel perceived a viable defense to the sex trafficking charges and were leaning toward going to trial, but defendant—under the misapprehension that he risked the possibility of an aggregate maximum term of imprisonment that would be the equivalent of a life sentence for him—relied upon defense counsel’s erroneous advice in accepting a plea that addressed his primary concerns by providing the ostensible benefit of greatly reducing his sentencing exposure while also avoiding any SORA implications. We thus conclude on this record that defendant was denied meaningful representation inasmuch as defense counsel’s erroneous advice compromised the fairness of the process as a whole by depriving defendant of the ability to make an intelligent choice between pleading guilty or proceeding to trial … . People v Oliver, 2018 NY Slip Op 04885, Fourth Dept 6-29-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENSE COUNSEL PROVIDED DEFENDANT WITH ERRONEOUS INFORMATION ABOUT THE LENGTH OF HIS SENTENCE SHOULD HE BE CONVICTED AFTER TRIAL AND ERRONEOUSLY TOLD THE DEFENDANT HIS PLEA TO SEX TRAFFICKING WOULD NOT MAKE HIM SUBJECT TO THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL PROVIDED DEFENDANT WITH ERRONEOUS INFORMATION ABOUT THE LENGTH OF HIS SENTENCE SHOULD HE BE CONVICTED AFTER TRIAL AND ERRONEOUSLY TOLD THE DEFENDANT HIS PLEA TO SEX TRAFFICKING WOULD NOT MAKE HIM SUBJECT TO THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL PROVIDED DEFENDANT WITH ERRONEOUS INFORMATION ABOUT THE LENGTH OF HIS SENTENCE SHOULD HE BE CONVICTED AFTER TRIAL AND ERRONEOUSLY TOLD THE DEFENDANT HIS PLEA TO SEX TRAFFICKING WOULD NOT MAKE HIM SUBJECT TO THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))

, , ,

VALIDITY OF STREET STOPS PRESENTS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN REVIEW ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF WHETHER THE LOWER COURT RULING HAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, HERE THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE VALIDITY OF THE STOPS UNDER DE BOUR, TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORD CONCERNING TWO JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL HOWEVER (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over two dissents, reversing the Appellate Division, determined that the street stops and searches of the defendants (Nonni and Parker) were valid under the DeBour criteria. The police had received a report of a robbery at the location, the defendants were the only persons seen when the police arrived, and both ran or walked away when asked to stop. The court noted that justification for street stops presents a mixed question of law and fact which can be reviewed by the Court of Appeals only to the extent of determining whether the lower court rulings have support in the record. The Court of Appeals reversed, however, because the record did not allow review of two jury notes received by the judge but not specifically addressed by the trial judge or counsel:

Here, for both defendants, the police had a founded suspicion of criminal activity to support a common-law right of inquiry. The police received a radio transmission of a burglary in progress, and their encounter with defendants at the reported address occurred a mere five minutes later. The officers first saw defendants exiting private property, the scene of a suspected crime. The officers observed no other persons or cars in the secluded, residential area, and it was early in the morning on a federal holiday. In accordance with De Bour, those circumstances were sufficient to justify the officers asking defendants what they were doing and where they were going, and to continue inquiring when defendants did not respond after the officers identified themselves. Further, the officers’ testimony, credited by the court, that defendant Nonni then “actively fled from the police,” combined with the specific circumstances observed by the officers during their initial encounter with defendants, provides sufficient record support for the court’s determination that there was reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify defendant Nonni’s pursuit, forcible stop, and detainment … .  …

According to the arresting officers’ testimony, after defendant Parker saw defendant Nonni run and some police officers give chase, defendant Parker increased his pace, acted in an evasive manner, and crossed the street onto the front lawn of another property. The officer twice characterized Parker’s movements as “running,” albeit at a slow pace. While active avoidance of a confrontation between the police and an acquaintance does not itself give rise to reasonable suspicion, its combination with the specific, highly-suspicious circumstances observed by the police may give rise to heightened suspicion. Thus, record support exists for the court’s conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion, and that the pursuit, stop, and detainment of defendant Parker, as well as the subsequent search of his bag, were permissible. * * *

… .[T]he court did not read into the record the contents of the notes at issue here …. Further, there is no hint in the record that the court provided counsel the contents of the notes; rather, an inference may be drawn to the contrary. Tellingly, while the court had read other notes, and had confirmed that counsel had read their contents on the record in the past, there is no such record regarding these two substantive notes. Indeed, the court’s reference with respect to the first note—that it believed counsel had agreed to the readback it would provide in response—made no reference to the other two notes, suggesting that there was no discussion about those notes. Whether the record demonstrates a court has shown counsel prior jury notes as a matter of practice is irrelevant, since there must be specific, record proof that the court did so for each note. People v Parker, 2018 NY Slip Op 04776, CtApp 6-28-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (VALIDITY OF STREET STOPS PRESENTS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN REVIEW ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF WHETHER THE LOWER COURT RULING HAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, HERE THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE VALIDITY OF THE STOPS UNDER DE BOUR, TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORD CONCERNING TWO JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL HOWEVER (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, VALIDITY OF STREET STOPS PRESENTS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN REVIEW ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF WHETHER THE LOWER COURT RULING HAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, HERE THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE VALIDITY OF THE STOPS UNDER DE BOUR, TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORD CONCERNING TWO JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL HOWEVER (CT APP))/STREET STOPS  (VALIDITY OF STREET STOPS PRESENTS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN REVIEW ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF WHETHER THE LOWER COURT RULING HAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, HERE THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE VALIDITY OF THE STOPS UNDER DE BOUR, TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORD CONCERNING TWO JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL HOWEVER (CT APP))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, VALIDITY OF STREET STOPS PRESENTS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN REVIEW ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF WHETHER THE LOWER COURT RULING HAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, HERE THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE VALIDITY OF THE STOPS UNDER DE BOUR, TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORD CONCERNING TWO JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL HOWEVER (CT APP))/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, STREET STOPS, VALIDITY OF STREET STOPS PRESENTS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN REVIEW ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF WHETHER THE LOWER COURT RULING HAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, HERE THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE VALIDITY OF THE STOPS UNDER DE BOUR, TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORD CONCERNING TWO JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL HOWEVER (CT APP))/DE BOUR (STREET STOPS, VALIDITY OF STREET STOPS PRESENTS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN REVIEW ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF WHETHER THE LOWER COURT RULING HAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, HERE THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE VALIDITY OF THE STOPS UNDER DE BOUR, TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORD CONCERNING TWO JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL HOWEVER (CT APP))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, STREET STOPS, VALIDITY OF STREET STOPS PRESENTS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN REVIEW ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF WHETHER THE LOWER COURT RULING HAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, HERE THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE VALIDITY OF THE STOPS UNDER DE BOUR, TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORD CONCERNING TWO JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL HOWEVER (CT APP))/JURY NOTES (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT’S FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORD CONCERNING TWO JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL HOWEVER (CT APP))/O’RAMA (JURY NOTES, CRIMINAL LAW, COURT’S FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORD CONCERNING TWO JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL HOWEVER (CT APP))

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy